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An abundance of natural resources in a country is conducive to its develop-
ment. It is precisely this assumption that constitutes the basis for traditional
development thinking.1 The basic premise of this study is that natural
resources undoubtedly can and do play an important role in kick-starting the
economy of a country. Nevertheless, the last few decades have shown a harsher
reality, where natural resources have triggered, financed or fuelled a number
of internal armed conflicts. Examples include the armed conflicts in Cambodia,
Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, which have been financed with the exploitation of a variety of
valuable natural resources, including diamonds, gold, timber, oil and cocoa.2
Some of these internal armed conflicts were internationalised with the
involvement of foreign States looking for a share in the natural resource wealth
of the country where the conflict was taking place. For example, access to the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo proved to be an
important motivation for Uganda and Rwanda to continue their military
presence in the DR Congo.3 Similarly, the involvement of the Liberian president
Charles Taylor in the internal armed conflict in neighbouring Sierra Leone
was in part motivated by his desire to gain access to high quality diamonds
from that country.4
These resource-related armed conflicts have had devastating effects on the
civilian populations of the afflicted countries. Serious human rights violations
have been committed in resource-related armed conflicts, many of which have
1 See, e.g., the UNCTAD Integrated Programme for Commodities, UNCTAD Resolution 93(IV)
(1976); as well as documents that are related to the New International Economic Order
(NIEO), in particular the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, UN General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974.
2 Another example is Colombia, where opium plays a major role in sustaining the armed
conflict between the government and the FARC. However, the current study deals only
with those natural resources that can be traded on legitimate markets, because of their
significance for promoting sustainable development.
3 See the reports of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular the Final
Report of 16 October 2002, UN Doc. S/2002/1146 which describes in great detail the involve-
ment of Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda in the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural
resources
4 See Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 18 May 2012 in the case
against Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, in particular, paras. 5843-6149 on diamonds.
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been extensively documented in reports of UN Panels of Experts and NGOs.5
Some of these are directly related to the exploitation of natural resources, while
other violations have taken place as part of the general conflict situation.
Examples include the burning and plundering of villages, the use of forced
labour by armed groups for the extraction of natural resources, sexual violence,
and the maiming of civilians as part of a campaign of terror. All these viola-
tions are in some way linked to natural resources, either because they are
committed to gain access to or to retain control over the natural resources or
because the natural resources serve as the means to finance the armed conflicts
in which atrocities are committed.6
In addition, unsustainable patterns of resource exploitation by belligerents
have had a severe impact on the natural environment in most of these armed
conflicts. In many cases natural resources have been extracted by armed groups
with little regard for the protection of the environment. For example, extensive
logging by all the parties to the armed conflict in Cambodia significantly
diminished the country’s forest cover.7 Similarly, highly organized and system-
atic exploitation activities within and around UNESCO World Heritage sites
in the DR Congo, including ivory poaching, logging and mining, have posed
5 See, e.g., the following reports. On Angola, see, e.g., Global Witness, ‘A Rough Trade: The
Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict’ (1998). On Sierra Leone,
see, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra
Leone (1998). On the DR Congo, see, e.g., the Final report of the Group of Experts on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo prepared in accordance with paragraph 8 of Security
Council Resolution 1857 (2008), UN Doc. S/2009/603; and the Report of the Mapping Exercise
Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
Committed Within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Between March 1993 and June 2003, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(2010).
6 In this respect, see the Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations
of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed Within the Territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Between March 1993 and June 2003,
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2010), p. 350. This report, which was
drawn up by a team of human rights officers documenting human rights abuses during
the conflict in the DR Congo, identifies three different types of links between natural
resources exploitation and human rights abuses. These relate to: (1) violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law committed within the context of the struggle
by parties to an armed conflict to gain access to and control over the areas of the country
rich in natural resources; (2) human rights abuses committed by parties to an armed conflict
as part of a regime of terror and coercion established in areas under their control; and (3)
the role of natural resources in funding armed conflicts, which are themselves a source
and cause of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Although
the findings of the mapping team are based on the situation in the DR Congo alone, the
links identified in the report relate to other resource-related conflicts as well.
7 For more details on the links between logging and the armed conflict in Cambodia, see
P. Le Billon & S. Springer, ‘Between War and Peace: Violence and Accommodation in the
Cambodian Logging Sector’, in W. de Jong, D. Donovan, and K. Abe (eds.), Extreme Conflict
and Tropical Forests, New York: Springer 2007, pp. 17-36.
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a significant threat to the integrity of these biodiversity reserves.8 Another
example is the land degradation that occurred in Sierra Leone as a result of
substantial diamond mining during the conflict. Exhausted mining sites were
not restored, resulting in severe environmental degradation.9 The environ-
mental damage caused by the unsustainable extraction of resources during
armed conflict seriously hinders the prospects for the economic reconstruction
of conflict-afflicted States.
Some of the conflicts dealt with in this book have come to an end. The
Cambodian Khmer Rouge movement has been put to a halt in the late 1990s.
The armed conflict in Sierra Leone ended in 2002 and members of the RUF,
as well as the former Liberian president Charles Taylor, recently went on trial
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone for crimes committed during this
civil war. Furthermore, Liberia has implemented significant institutional
reforms under the leadership of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.
However, peace is fragile. The leading economist Paul Collier showed that
even a decade after an armed conflict has ended, there is an almost 15 per
cent chance that a country will relapse.10 Armed conflicts that involve natural
resources are actually twice as likely to re-ignite as those that do not involve
natural resources.11
Some of the armed conflicts discussed in this book have not yet been
resolved. The armed conflict in the DR Congo is a salient example. The growing
demand for raw materials on the world market, in particular for rare metals
and oil, underscores the need to find lasting solutions to the problems asso-
ciated with resource-related armed conflict. Disregarding the role played by
natural resources in these conflicts will only prolong them and increase the
risk of a relapse after the conflict has ended. Conversely, integrating the
adequate management of natural resources and the environment into strategies
for conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding is imperative for creating
the conditions for a sustainable peace.12
8 Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2002/565, paras. 50 and 52.
9 See UNEP, Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding Assessment, February 2010,
p. 45.
10 P. Collier, A. Hoeffler and D. Rohner, ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil
War’, Working Paper, November 2007, p. 16.
11 M.D. Beevers, ‘Forest Resources and Peacebuilding: Preliminary Lessons from Liberia and
Sierra Leone’, in P. Lujala & S.A. Rustad (eds.), High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding, Oxon/New York: Earthscan (2012), p. 368;
12 Ibid., p. 368; UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and
the Environment (2009), p. 19. This was also recognised in a Presidential Statement of the
UN Security Council, which stressed that “in countries emerging from conflict lawful,
transparent and sustainable management […] and exploitation of natural resources is a
critical factor in maintaining stability and in preventing a relapse into armed conflict”. See
the Statement by the President of the Security Council made in connection with the Council’s
consideration of the item entitled Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UN
Doc. S/PRST/2007/22, 25 June 2007.
4 Chapter 1
1.1 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCE WEALTH AND ARMED
CONFLICT
In order to devise strategies for the prevention and resolution of resource-
related armed conflicts, it is first of all necessary to have a proper understand-
ing of the relationships between natural resource wealth and armed conflict.
There is a large body of academic literature, in particular in the fields of the
economic and political sciences, that has studied the so-called “political eco-
nomy of armed conflict” or the economic dimensions of civil war.13 The
sudden increase in “self-financing”14 internal armed conflicts during the 1990s
highlighted the relationships between natural resource wealth and armed
conflict.
Early academic research into the self-financing nature of armed conflicts
drew attention to the role of natural resources in providing the means to finance
an armed conflict as an alternative to other sources of funding. The armed
conflicts in Cambodia and Angola, for example, were originally funded with
external sponsorship. When this funding dried up as a result of the end of
the Cold War, the parties to the conflict turned to natural resources to fund
their armed struggle. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge movement exploited
timber and gemstones to finance its rebellion. In Angola, the rebel movement
UNITA turned to diamonds, while the government used oil revenue to suppress
the rebellion.
In addition, access by belligerents to natural resource wealth also proved
to be an important factor in prolonging internal armed conflicts. Natural
resources give parties to an armed conflict access to weapons and to political
13 See, e.g., K. Ballentine, K. & H. Nitzschke (ed.), Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource
Dimensions of Civil War, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers (2005); K. Ballentine & J. Sherman
(ed.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, International Peace
Academy, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers (2003); I. Bannon and P. Collier (eds.),
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions, Washington D.C.: World Bank
(2003); P. Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be
Done About It, New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press (2007); P. Collier, A. Hoeffler and
D. Rohner, ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War’, Working Paper,
November 2007; P. Collier, & A. Hoeffler, ‘Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict’, The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2005), p. 625-633; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler,
‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004), p. 563-595; P. Collier
and A. Hoeffler, ‘On Economic Causes of Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 50 (1998), p.
563-573; P. Le Billon, Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources, New York:
Columbia University Press (2012); P. Le Billon, Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed
Conflict, Adelphi Papers, 2nd edition, Abingdon: Routledge (2005); M. Renner, ‘The Anatomy
of Resource Wars’, Worldwatch Paper 162, Washington D.C.: Worldwatch Institute (2002);
and M. Ross, ‘What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?’, Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 41 (2004), pp. 337-356.
14 K. Ballentine & J. Sherman (ed.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and
Grievance, International Peace Academy, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers (2003),
pp. 1-3.
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support. In addition, the profits obtained from resource exploitation can prove
to be a disincentive for armed groups to sit down at the negotiating table.155
Exact data are not available, but it is estimated that the RUF made at least 25
million dollars a year from the trade in diamonds. This is relatively little
compared to the revenue generated by the Khmer Rouge from logging, es-
timated at 120 million dollars a year at least.16
Furthermore, more fundamental relationships between natural resource
wealth and armed conflict can also be identified. In particular, natural
resources have been linked to the outbreak of armed conflict.17 These theories
focus on the institutional effects of resource wealth, on the role of natural
resources as the motivation for the outbreak of armed conflict and on the role
of natural resources in providing the opportunities to start an armed conflict.
According to the “resource curse thesis” described by the economist
Richard Auty, resource wealth can lead to economic stagnation and under-
performance. Large rents for resources may make governments less account-
able, because these rents replace tax revenues for which governments must
account to the population. This in turn may lead to the weakening of govern-
ment institutions, making a country vulnerable to the outbreak of an armed
conflict.18
Grievances and greed theories focus on the role of natural resources in
provoking the outbreak of armed conflicts. According to the “grievances
theory”, perceived injustices relating to the use of natural resources may be
a cause for the outbreak of armed conflict. These perceived injustices may relate
to the effects of the exploitation of natural resources on the living environment
of particular ethnic or social groups or they may relate to the (unequal) dis-
tribution of the benefits obtained from the exploitation of natural resources.19
According to the “greed theory”, the likelihood of armed conflict breaking
out is increased if rebel groups try to obtain rent from natural resources. The
prospect of gaining access to large deposits of natural resources which these
15 5 See, e.g., I. Bannon and P. Collier (eds.), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options
and Actions, Washington D.C.: World Bank (2003), pp. 217-218.
16 For these and other estimates, see M. Renner, ‘The Anatomy of Resource Wars’, Worldwatch
Paper 162, Washington D.C.: Worldwatch Institute (2002), p. 7.
17 On this subject, see P. Le Billon, Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources,
New York: Columbia University Press (2012), p. 17.
18 See R. Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis, Rout-
ledge: London (1993). In this sense, the concept is related to notions such as the “Paradox
of Plenty” and the “Dutch disease”. Since then, several studies, both in economics and in
political science, have confirmed the hypothesis of the resource curse. See, e.g., M.L. Ross,
‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse’, World Politics 51(2) (1999), pp. 297-322; and
J.D. Sachs and A.M. Warner, ‘The Curse of Natural Resources’, European Economic Review
45 (2001), pp. 827-838.
19 See, e.g., M.T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, New York: Metro-
politan Books (2001), p. 208; and M. Ross, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War?
Evidence from Thirteen Cases’, International Organization, Vol. 58 (1) (2004), p. 41.
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groups can exploit for their personal gain may be an incentive for them to
start an armed conflict.20
Unlike grievances and greed theories, which focus on the role of natural
resources in provoking armed conflict, the “feasibility thesis” focuses on the
opportunities for starting an armed conflict created by natural resource wealth.
This theory assumes that a rebellion will occur if it is militarily and financially
feasible. According to this theory, an armed conflict is therefore more likely
to occur in a country where large quantities of easily accessible natural
resources are available to rebels.21
A fourth theory about the relationship between natural resource wealth
and armed conflict focuses on the opportunities created by the outbreak of
an armed conflict for third parties to engage in the looting of the natural
resources. Recent incidents of elephant poaching in the Central African Repub-
lic where conflict broke out after a coup d’état on 24 March 2013 are an
example of this. Poachers were reported to have killed a large number of
elephants in the Dzanga-Ndoki national park, a UNESCO World Heritage Site.22
Although part of the poaching in the Central African region is directly linked
to the financing of rebel groups, in particular of the Lord’s Resistance Army,23
the poaching in itself constitutes a broader problem related to weaknesses in
law enforcement.24 The outbreak of an armed conflict is merely a factor that
exacerbates these types of situations, in the sense that the chaos and instability
created by the outbreak of an armed conflict increases the opportunities for
individuals or groups to engage in the looting of natural resources. As the
relationship between natural resources and armed conflict is less direct in these
situations, it is not of immediate interest to the current study.
In conclusion, natural resources can therefore provide the means to finance
an armed conflict; they can prolong existing armed conflicts; and they can play
a role in the outbreak of an armed conflict. In addition, the outbreak of an
armed conflict may create opportunities for third parties to loot natural
resources for their personal gain. Of course, natural resources can also play
many different roles in armed conflicts. In Sierra Leone, for example, the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission established after the end of the armed conflict
concluded that diamonds had provided the RUF with the means to finance
20 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 56
(2004), pp. 563-595.
21 M.L. Ross, ‘What do we know about natural resources and civil war?’, Journal of Peace
Research 41: 3, 2004, pp. 337-356.
22 See ‘Elephant poaching on rise in chaos-hit Central African Republic’, 26 April 2013,
www.reuters.com (last consulted on 4 June 2013).
23 See the Statement by the President of the Security Council on the Central African Region,
UN Doc. S/PRST/2013/6, 29 May 2013, para. 10.
24 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the United Nations Regional Office
for Central Africa and on the Lord’s Resistance Army-affected Areas, UN Doc. S/2013/297,
20 May 2013, paras. 7-9.
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– and maybe even prolong – their rebellion.25 At the same time, the Commis-
sion considered that the economic mismanagement of the natural resource
wealth in that country – which not only involved diamonds, but also bauxite,
coffee and cocoa – and the resulting failure of successive governments to use
the proceeds from these exports to enhance the standard of living of the
population, were important factors in the outbreak of the armed conflict in
1991.26
1.2 THE ACTORS INVOLVED IN RESOURCE-RELATED ARMED CONFLICTS
Strategies for the prevention and resolution of resource-related armed conflicts
require a proper understanding of the role and the legal position of the differ-
ent actors involved in the exploitation of natural resources in situations of
armed conflict. Resource-related armed conflicts involve a range of different
actors. Most of the armed conflicts discussed in this book are internal armed
conflicts involving a State and/or one or more armed groups engaged in the
exploitation of the State’s natural resources.27 These armed groups either
exploit the natural resources themselves or levy taxes from companies by
granting them concessions.
However, in some of the armed conflicts discussed in this book, foreign
States are also involved in the exploitation of a State’s natural resources. In
some cases it is carried out directly by these States, either by their national
armies or by companies that are offered access to exploitation sites in territory
under the control of these States. In other cases, the involvement of foreign
States is limited to assisting the armed groups engaged in the exploitation.
For example, this assistance can consist of offering smuggling routes to these
armed groups or of trading natural resources with them.
From a legal perspective, the range of actors involved in resource-related
armed conflicts entails many challenges, not least with regard to determining
the applicable rules. There are relevant rules in several fields of international
law, in particular, in international economic, environmental, human rights
and humanitarian law.28 However, as discussed in more detail in Part II of
this book, the applicable legal framework varies depending on the actors
involved and in addition, depends on the typology of the armed conflict.
The following sub-sections briefly touch upon some of the issues that are
of particular relevance for understanding the legal position of the different
25 See ‘Witness to Truth’, the Final Report of the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, Volume Three B, Chapter One.
26 Ibid., Volume Three A, Chapter Two.
27 On the typology of armed conflicts, see Chapter 6 of this study.
28 Chapter 5 discusses the general presumption that the outbreak of hostilities does not ipso
facto affect the operation of treaties.
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actors involved, as well as their role in resource-related armed conflicts. In
order to illustrate these issues, reference is made as much as possible to
existing conflict situations.
1.2.1 Domestic governments
International law accords a right to States and peoples to exercise sovereignty
over their natural resources. This right, including the right to exploit the State’s
natural resources, is exercised by the government, subject to a number of
conditions derived principally from international human rights and environ-
mental law. The role of the government is therefore crucial for the legal frame-
work to function properly. Moreover, several of the armed conflicts that are
at the heart of this book show that a strong political will to address the links
between natural resources and armed conflict at the national level is essential
for achieving a sustainable peace. However, at the same time, it is possible
to identify several challenges relating to the role of the government.
The first challenge that is relevant to the current study concerns the legit-
imacy of the government. International law accords the State and its people
the right to exploit domestic resources; it does not accord this right to the
government. The government can exercise this right only on behalf of the State
and its people. The question therefore arises whether a government that does
not or can no longer be considered to represent the State and its people is
entitled to exercise sovereignty over the State’s natural resources. For example,
in the armed conflict that raged in Angola for decades between 1975 and 2002,
both the ruling MPLA and opposing UNITA claimed to be the legitimate govern-
ment of Angola. Another example concerns the civil conflict in Libya in 2011,
when the Qadhafi government lost its legitimacy during the course of the
armed conflict. This issue is discussed in more detail in Part I of this book.
Furthermore, the way in which governments exercise authority over the
State’s natural resources can also present a challenge. The failure of govern-
ments to exercise authority over the State’s natural resources in the proper
manner underlie many of the armed conflicts examined in this book. The
armed conflict in Sierra Leone referred to above is a relevant example. Eco-
nomic mismanagement and the resulting failure of successive governments
to use the proceeds from the exports of the country’s natural resources to raise
the standard of living of the population have been identified as root causes
for the outbreak of the armed conflict in 1991.29
Similar patterns can be recognised in the DR Congo, where political elites
have used the natural resource wealth of the country for their personal enrich-
ment, leaving the population with very little to survive on. The DRC Mapping
29 Ibid., Volume Three A, Chapter Two.
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Report, drafted by independent experts under the auspices of the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded, for example, that
“(…) During Mobutu’s rule, natural resource exploitation in Zaire was characterised
by widespread corruption, fraud, pillaging, bad management and a lack of
accountability. The regime’s political/military elites put systems in place that
enabled them to control and exploit the country’s mineral resources, thereby
amassing great personal wealth but contributing nothing to the country’s sustainable
development. […] The two Congolese wars of 1996 and 1998 represented a further
major setback to development, causing the destruction of a great deal of infra-
structure and propagating the practice of resource pillaging inherited from Mobutu’s
kleptocratic regime, under the pretext of funding the war effort”.30
In addition, economic mismanagement can also be a factor in sustaining armed
conflicts. Opaque systems of public administration have allowed the govern-
ments of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, for example, to procure weapons in contra-
vention of UN Security Council sanctions. In Liberia, the Taylor government
largely excluded revenues from the timber and rubber sectors from the public
administration. The evidence suggests that these revenues were used both for
President Taylor’s personal expenditure and for the procurement of weapons
in contravention of UN Security Council sanctions.31 In addition, in Côte
d’Ivoire, the procurement of weapons was financed with the proceeds from
the cocoa and oil industries.32 In both countries, the natural resources indus-
tries were to a large extent controlled by the government.
These examples clearly show the significance of properly functioning
institutions for the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts. This issue
is examined in more detail in section 1.3 of this introductory chapter.
1.2.2 Foreign States
Foreign States have played a role in several of the armed conflicts examined
in this book. In the ongoing conflict in the DR Congo, for example, Uganda
and Rwanda have been both directly and indirectly involved in the armed
conflict. Between 1998 and 2003 both countries engaged in the exploitation
30 Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law Committed Within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo Between March 1993 and June 2003, Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (2010), p. 351.
31 Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), para-
graph 19, concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/2001/1015, paras. 309-350.
32 See, e.g., Midterm report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire submitted in accordance
with paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008), UN Doc. S/2009/188, paras.
59-72; Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, prepared in accordance with
paragraph 14 of Security Council Resolution 1980 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/196, para. 113.
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of the DR Congo’s natural resources, while controlling parts of the territory
of the DR Congo.33 The Panel of Experts, set up by the UN Security Council
to investigate the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of
wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, concluded that the exploita-
tion of natural resources constituted one of the principal reasons for the
continued presence of these countries in the DR Congo.34
In 2002, the DR Congo initiated proceedings against both countries before
the International Court of Justice, but the Court could only exercise jurisdiction
in relation to the DRC’s case against Uganda.35 With respect to Uganda, the
Court found evidence of the involvement of senior officers of the Ugandan
army, as well as of individual soldiers, in the exploitation of the DRC’s natural
resources.36 It also found that high-ranking officers of the Ugandan army
facilitated the illegal trafficking of natural resources by commercial entities
from territories occupied by the Ugandan army. The Court attributed respons-
ibility for the conduct of members of the Ugandan army to the Ugandan State
and found that the failure of the Ugandan authorities to take adequate
measures to prevent such acts from being committed constituted a breach of
Uganda’s international obligations.37
Although both Uganda and Rwanda have officially left the territory of the
DR Congo, there is evidence to suggest that they still play a major role behind
the scenes. The 2012 final report of the Group of Experts on the DR Congo,
which replaced the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, points to the role of Uganda and Rwanda in providing direct military
support to the rebel movement M23. There are even strong indications to
suggest that these countries sent in troops in July 2012 to help M23 gain control
over Congolese territory.38
Another example of a State providing support to armed groups in a foreign
country was the support provided by Liberia under President Charles Taylor
to rebel groups operating in Sierra Leone, in particular to the Revolutionary
33 See the Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2002/1146,
paras. 65-131.
34 Ibid.
35 See International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005.
For the judgment of the Court with respect to the determination of jurisdiction in relation
to Rwanda, see International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment
of 3 February 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6.
36 Ibid., para. 242.
37 Ibid., para. 243.
38 See the Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DR Congo, prepared in pursuance
of paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/843, 15 November
2012.
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United Front (RUF) between 1997 and 2002. A report of the Panel of Experts
on Sierra Leone, published in 2000, already pointed to the active involvement
of President Taylor in fuelling the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The report
indicated that Taylor and his inner circle were “in control of a covert sanctions-
busting apparatus that include[d] international criminal activity and the arming
of the RUF in Sierra Leone”.39 The report also noted that this sanctions busting
was “fed by the smuggling of diamonds and the extraction of natural resources
in both Liberia and areas under rebel control in Sierra Leone”.40 A subsequent
report published by the Panel of Experts on Liberia confirmed these con-
clusions.41 The issue of Taylor’s involvement in the exploitation of diamonds
by the RUF in Sierra Leone was also examined in the trial against Charles
Taylor before the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Court held, inter alia,
that it had been proved beyond reasonable doubt that diamonds were
delivered to Taylor in exchange for weapons and ammunition.42
These examples show that the involvement of foreign States in the exploita-
tion of natural resources in situations of armed conflict can take many forms.
A State can be involved because it is trading with armed groups (Taylor-RUF),
but it can also be directly involved in the exploitation of the natural resources
(Uganda in the DR Congo). From a legal perspective, a further distinction must
be made between a State that exploits natural resources in another State
without exercising control over part of that State’s territory and a State that
exploits natural resources in territory where it is exercising de facto authority
as an occupying power. Different rules apply to these two different situations.
Therefore it is very important to determine the precise role played by a State
in an armed conflict. This issue is discussed in more detail in Part II of this
book.
1.2.3 Armed groups
Armed groups have been involved in most of the armed conflicts examined
in this book. Examples include the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia; the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in Sierra
Leone; the Forces Nouvelles in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the Patriotic Forces
for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC) and the Mai Mai groups in the DR Congo.
39 Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306
(2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/1195, December 2000, para.
212.
40 Ibid.
41 Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), para-
graph 19, concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/2001/1015, 26 October 2001, paras. 112-124.
42 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T,
Trial Chamber II, Judgment of 18 May 2012, paras. 5948 and 6057.
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These armed groups have all financed their armed struggle by means of the
trade in natural resources.
As regards the legal rules that apply to these armed groups, a distinction
must first of all be made between armed groups such as UNITA and the Forces
Nouvelles, that were able to control large areas of State territory over a long
period of time, and other groups, such as the Mai Mai, that are loosely organ-
ized militia groups with no control over territory. While the activities of all
armed groups are subject to the basic obligations formulated in Article 3 of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the activities of highly organized armed groups
like UNITA and the Forces Nouvelles that exercise control over a part of State
territory may fall under the scope of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. However, two additional criteria must be met before Additional
Protocol II actually applies to an internal armed conflict. The first relates to
its material scope of application. Additional Protocol II applies only to armed
conflicts to which the government is a party. The second relates to the Proto-
col’s formal applicability. While the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been
ratified by all States, the Additional Protocol II has been ratified by far fewer
states. Angola, for example, is not a party to Additional Protocol II, while the
DR Congo only ratified the protocol in 2002.43
The issue of ratification of Additional Protocol II by the State draws atten-
tion to another issue that has raised quite a lot of debate in the academic
literature, i.e., the legal basis for imposing direct obligations on armed groups
without allowing these groups to formally accede to the relevant treaties.44
The Geneva Conventions are concluded between the “plenipotentiaries of the
Governments represented at the Diplomatic Conference”, also referred to as
the “High Contracting Parties”, while Additional Protocol II is only open for
signature by the Parties to the Geneva Conventions.45 At the same time,
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the provisions of Additional
Protocol II address armed groups directly. Common Article 3 determines that
“each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply” certain minimum human-
itarian standards, while Article 1 (1) of Additional Protocol II states that it
“develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions”.
It is not sufficient to assume that, by ratifying a legal instrument, a govern-
ment not only binds itself, but also the population it represents, including
armed groups.46 As Liesbeth Zegveld argues, this sort of “hierarchical’ view
43 See http://www.icrc.org/ for information regarding ratification of the protocol.
44 See L. Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press (2002), p. 14.
45 See L. Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press (2002), p. 14.
46 See the following note, prepared by Claude Pilloud, staff lawyer of the ICRC, for the 1947
preparatory meeting for the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, reported in F. Kalshoven, ‘The
Undertaking to Respect and to Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tiny Seed to
Ripening Fruit’, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 2 (1999), p. 12, note 28: “La
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of the relationship between the government and non-state armed groups is
undermined by the mere fact that non-state armed groups often “seek to
exercise public authority, and in doing so they question the authority of the
established government, including the government’s laws”.47 Therefore if
the obligations of armed groups cannot be based on the consent of the State
to be bound by relevant instruments, what would then constitute the legal
basis for imposing obligations upon these groups? As Lindsay Moir argues,
an alternative, more plausible argument would be to consider the obligations
of non-state armed groups to be based directly on international rather than
domestic law. In his view, non-state armed groups are not bound by inter-
national humanitarian law as members of the population of a State but as
“individuals under international law”, upon whom international law directly
confers rights and obligations.48
In international practice the inability of armed groups to participate in the
process of international law making is not considered to constitute an im-
pediment to imposing direct obligations upon these groups. In several of its
cases, the International Court of Justice has confirmed that armed groups are
bound by international humanitarian law. In its judgment of 27 June 1986 in
the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
the International Court of Justice expressly noted that the acts of the contras
towards the Nicaraguan Government were governed by the law applicable
to non-international armed conflicts.49 Furthermore, in its judgment of 19
December 2005 in the Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo,
the Court noted that Uganda should have prevented “violations of […] inter-
national humanitarian law by other actors present in the occupied territory,
formule adoptée par les experts au sujet de la guerre civile ne semble pas donner satis-
faction, car elle implique le principe de réciprocité que la Division juridique voudrait, dans
toute la mesure du possible, éliminer. C’est pourquoi la Division juridique désirerait mettre
sur pied une disposition qui prévoit que les Gouvernements, en signant la Convention,
s’engagent non seulement en tant que Gouvernements, mais engagent aussi l’ensemble
de la population dont ils sont les représentants. On pourrait alors en déduire que toutes
les parties de la population d’un Etat qui entreprend une action en guerre civile est liée
ipso facto par la Convention”. Also see D. Momtaz, ‘Le droit international humanitaire
applicable aux conflits armés non internationaux’, Recueil des cours, Vol. 292 (2001), p. 72.
Also see the Report of the Secretary-General on Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts, UN Doc. A/7720 of 20 November 1969, para. 171.
47 L. Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press (2002), p. 16. Unfortunately, Zegveld does not provide an
alternative theory. Rather, she emphasises that there is actually a problem and examines
how this problem is dealt with in practice by international bodies.
48 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2002),
p. 56.
49 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para.
219; L. Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press (2002), p. 10.
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including rebel groups acting on their own account”.50 Despite the fact that
the particular circumstances of the case induced the Court to attribute respons-
ibility for the acts of the armed groups to Uganda, the case suggests that armed
groups “acting on their own account” can commit violations under inter-
national humanitarian law.
Where there are sufficient indications for the direct applicability of inter-
national humanitarian law to armed groups, another question that arises is
whether armed groups are bound by other fields of international law as well,
in particular by international human rights and environmental law. Unlike
international humanitarian law, which directly confers obligations on non-State
armed groups, international human rights and environmental law almost
exclusively formulate obligations for States. Only a few international human
rights and environmental conventions directly confer obligations on private
parties. For non-state armed groups, reference can be made to the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of
children in armed conflict. This Protocol formulates a prohibition for armed
groups to “recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years”.51
International environmental law, on the other hand, does not formulate any
direct obligations for armed groups.
As both international human rights and environmental law primarily
formulate obligations for States, most of the obligations for armed groups
contained in these fields of international law must be implemented by means
of domestic law. Both fields of international law formulate “due diligence”
obligations for States, which means that the State must ensure that private
actors respect the relevant obligations. Problems arise in situations where States
cannot exercise control over the activities of private actors, in particular the
activities of armed groups. It can be difficult or even impossible for States to
ensure compliance with international human rights and environmental
standards in territories that are under the control of armed groups.
The question is therefore whether armed groups that are in control of parts
of the State territory can be considered to be directly bound by international
human rights and environmental law, especially when they exercise functions
50 International Court of Justice, Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005, para.
179. Author’s italics added.
51 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of
children in armed conflict, adopted on 25 May 2000, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000), Article 4.
It should be noted that the Convention formulates a soft obligation: armed groups “should
not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years”.
Author’s emphasis added. In addition, see C. Ryngaert, ‘Human Rights Obligations of
Armed Groups’, Revue Belge de Droit International, Vol. 41, Issue 1-2 (2008), p. 364.
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of governmental authority.52 This is an extremely difficult question to answer
in abstracto. There are relatively few examples of armed groups that behave
like de facto authorities, even though they may be highly organized. Mention
can be made, for example, to the Forces Nouvelles in Côte d’Ivoire. Although
this opposition force was in full control of the north of Côte d’Ivoire, it did
not function as a local authority. The Group of Experts established by the UN
Security Council to investigate violations of the arms and diamond embargoes
concluded in its 2009 final report that, notwithstanding the formal reintro-
duction of local government in the north of Côte d’Ivoire, “[t]he political
situation in northern Côte d’Ivoire currently bears more resemblance to a war-
lord economy than to a functioning government administration”.53
A closer look at international practice does not provide direct support for
the thesis that armed groups are bound by international human rights or
environmental law. However, it does provide some support for the thesis that
there is, in the words of Cédric Ryngaert, a “legitimate expectation of the
international community” for armed groups to comply with international
human rights law, not as a legal but as a moral obligation.54 In several of
its resolutions, the UN Security Council has called upon parties to an internal
armed conflict to respect international human rights law. Examples include
Resolution 1231 of 11 March 1999 on the situation in Sierra Leone, in which
the Council “calls upon all parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone fully to respect
human rights and international humanitarian law”; and Resolution 1291 of
24 February 2000 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
in which the Security Council calls on all parties to the conflict in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo “to protect human rights and respect international
humanitarian law and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide of 1948”.55
All in all, current practice does not indicate that the proposition that armed
groups are bound by human rights law is accepted, while there is no evidence
at all for the proposition that armed groups are bound by international en-
vironmental law. Of course, armed groups can always choose to assent to
human rights or environmental obligations, either through agreements with
the government or through unilateral declarations. In fact, there are several
examples of peace agreements between governments and armed groups, where
52 With respect to human rights, see, e.g., A. Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State
Actors in Conflict Situations’, International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 88, Issue 863 (2006),
p. 491-523; and C. Ryngaert, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Armed Groups’, Revue Belge
de Droit International, Vol. 41, Issue 1-2 (2008), p. 355-381.
53 Final report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security
Council Resolution 1842 (2008) of 9 October 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/521, para. 36.
54 For the notion of “legitimate expectations” of the international community as a more realistic
alternative to legally binding obligations, see C. Ryngaert, ‘Human Rights Obligations of
Armed Groups’, Revue Belge de Droit International, Vol. 41, Issue 1-2 (2008), pp. 355-381.
55 See UN Security Council Resolution 1231 (1999), para. 4; and S/RES/1291 (2000), para. 15.
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armed groups agree to respect human rights as well as other international
legal obligations.56
A final issue that deserves consideration is the question whether non-state
armed groups are bound by customary international law. In this respect Yoram
Dinstein argues that “[t]he inability of individuals, either singly or as insurgent
groups, to participate in custom-formation does not affect the fundamental
principle that – once formed […] – customary international law is binding on
all human beings without exception”.57 This is a rather bold statement which
needs to be put into perspective.
The better view would be that non-state actors can be directly bound by
customary international law in the same way as they are directly bound by
treaties. In other words, non-state armed groups can be directly bound by
customary norms that address these groups, either directly or as parties to
an armed conflict. By way of example, reference can be made to the rules
embodied in common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which are
considered to apply to all internal armed conflicts, both as a matter of treaty
law and as customary international law. According to the International Court
of Justice in the Nicaragua case, common Article 3 reflects “elementary con-
siderations of humanity”.58 Other customary international norms that apply
to internal armed conflicts, and which therefore can be assumed to bind armed
groups directly, include the core principles of international humanitarian law,
in particular the principles of humanity, distinction, necessity and proportion-
ality.
In contrast, armed groups cannot be directly bound by those customary
norms that are exclusively addressed to States. This means, for example, that
armed groups are not directly bound by the international environmental
principles of sustainable use and prevention. As explained in Chapter 4 of
this book, these principles are addressed to States and must be made effective
for other actors through implementation in national law.
As a general rule, it can thus be argued that armed groups can only be
directly bound by rules of customary international law that address these
groups, while they are not directly bound by those rules that exclusively
address States. There appears to be one exception to this general rule. Reference
56 See, e.g., Article 3(3) of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo concluded between the Congolese government and five
armed opposition groups, in which the parties “reaffirm their support for the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,
the International Pact on Economic and Socio-Cultural Rights of 1966, the African Charter
on Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples of 1981, and duly ratified international conven-
tions”.
57 Y. Dinstein, ‘The Interaction Between Customary International Law and Treaties’, Recueil
des Cours, Vol. 322 (2006), p. 2344. On the notion of customary international law and its
formation, see section 1.7.2 of this chapter.
58 International Court of Justice, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, Judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 218.
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can be made to the Martens clause, as inserted, inter alia, in the preamble to
Additional Protocol II applicable to internal armed conflicts. This clause, which
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this book, aims to ensure that
human beings remain protected in situations of armed conflict, even in the
absence of specific treaty rules. It is argued that this clause enables the applica-
tion to armed groups of some customary international law rules that normally
address States only, in particular customary international law rules relating
to the protection of human rights. However, it is relevant to note that these
customary norms do not then apply to armed groups as a matter of customary
international law but rather as a matter of treaty law, viz., through the Martens
clause.
1.2.4 Companies
Because of their involvement at every stage of the production and distribution
process related to natural resources, companies play a key role in resource-
related armed conflicts. They are able to make an important contribution to
solving these armed conflicts, but they can also exacerbate the situation with
their practices. To illustrate the negative impact of companies on resource-
related armed conflicts, reference can be made to the reports of various Panels
of Experts established by the UN Security Council in relation to the conflicts
in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DR Congo. These reports show the
involvement of companies in such diverse practices as the extraction of natural
resources controlled by rebel groups, the smuggling of natural resources, and
breaking weapons embargoes introduced by the UN Security Council.59
The Dutchman Guus Kouwenhoven is a well-known example of a business-
man who was directly involved in illegal practices related to an armed conflict.
He was the director of the Oriental Timber Company, the largest timber
company operating in Liberia during the presidency of Charles Taylor. Kou-
wenhoven is suspected of being involved in the delivery of arms to Taylor
in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone in contravention of the embargo imposed
by the UN Security Council,60 a crime for which he is currently standing trial
before the Dutch Appeals Court.61 In addition, the Panel of Experts on Liberia
59 See, e.g., the Final Report of the Monitoring Group on Angola, UN Doc. S/2000/1225, in
particular, paras. 154-161; and the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN Doc.
S/2000/1195, December 2000.
60 See the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/1195, December 2000,
para. 215.
61 The trial has been on the roll for several years now. In 2006, Guus Kouwenhoven was
convicted by the Dutch district court for the delivery of weapons to Taylor. In appeal,
Kouwenhoven was acquitted. The Dutch Supreme Court has finally referred the case back
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found evidence to suggest that Kouwenhoven’s Oriental Timber Company,
as well as other timber companies, helped Taylor to divert revenues from the
timber industry for extra-budgetary activities.62
Furthermore, several Panels of Experts have reported on companies that
had direct business dealings with armed groups. The report of the Panel of
Experts on Angola, also known as the Fowler Commission after its chairman,
indicated that before the imposition of the diamond sanctions on Angola, UNITA
had auctioned off mining permits to foreign companies for the exploitation
of mines within UNITA-controlled territory. In addition, the Panel found that
UNITA had granted various diamond buyers a licence to operate within the
areas under its control in exchange for a commission.63
In addition to these examples of direct company involvement in resource-
related armed conflicts, there are also many examples of companies that are
or have been indirectly involved in resource-related armed conflicts. This is
partly due to the character of these conflicts. Natural resources that are used
to finance armed conflict clearly have an economic value, which makes them
valuable to companies further up the supply chain as well. Companies that
produce consumer goods such as jewellery and electronic devices buy their
raw materials – such as diamonds, gold and coltan – from other companies.
Because of these purchases, these companies can also be indirectly involved
in the financing of armed conflicts. Several reports of Panels of Experts have
demonstrated the relative ease with which diamonds from countries like
Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire were able to enter the legit-
imate diamond market. The Fowler report specifically pointed to the diamond
market’s lax controls and regulations to explain the relative ease with which
illegal diamonds could find their way onto the market.64
While these examples show the negative impact that companies can have
on resource-related armed conflicts, they also show the possibilities that exist
for companies to make a positive contribution to ending them. In fact, several
initiatives have been launched in recent years to end corporate complicity in
the trade in resources from countries engaged in conflicts. Important initiatives
include the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds and
the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals
to the Court of Appeal, which is bound to take a decision very soon. For a discussion of
this case and the difficulties of exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction, see L.J. van den Herik,
‘The Difficulties of Exercising Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: The Acquittal of a Dutch
Businessman for Crimes Committed in Liberia’, International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009),
pp. 211–226.
62 Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), para-
graph 19, concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/2001/1015, 26 October 2001, paras. 321-350.
63 See the Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against
UNITA, UN Doc. S/2000/203, 10 March 2000, paras. 78 and 79.
64 Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA,
10 March 2000, UN Doc. S/2000/203, paras. 87-93.
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from Conflict-affected and High-risk Areas. In addition, initiatives have been
launched to address the role of companies in fostering corruption, in particular
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. These initiatives are discussed
in more detail in Part III of this book.
It is also important to note that all of these initiatives have a voluntary
character. Their effectiveness depends on the willingness of companies to
implement these instruments. In addition, as discussed in more detail in Part
III of this book, these instruments all respond to the particular needs of the
State where the natural resources are located. The question therefore arises
whether international law could also impose binding obligations on companies.
In this respect, reference can be made to the 1969 International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, which directly confers responsibil-
ity for damage caused by oil pollution to private shipowners.65 Furthermore,
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea prohibits natural or legal
persons from appropriating parts of the deep seabed and its resources.66
However, these are among the few examples of international legal instruments
that directly impose binding obligations on companies. For the most part, the
legal position of companies is regulated by national law, both of the home
and the host State. Companies must respect these national laws in their
business practices.
1.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS RESOURCE-RELATED ARMED
CONFLICTS
The preceding sections showed that there are several links between natural
resources and armed conflict. Natural resources can provide the means to
finance an armed conflict, they can be associated with the outbreak of an
armed conflict and they can prolong armed conflicts. Moreover, there is a wide
range of actors involved in these armed conflicts, whose activities are subject
to different legal regimes. These factors require a multifaceted and comprehens-
ive approach to the prevention, containment and resolution of resource-related
armed conflicts.
Two main challenges can be identified in this respect. The first concerns
stopping natural resources from financing or fuelling armed conflicts. This
implies, first of all, the adoption of strategies that address the trade in natural
resources as well as other forms of financing related to natural resources, such
as the issuing of mining and timber concessions by armed groups and foreign
States as well as forms of illegal taxes on natural resources. It also implies
65 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, adopted on 29
November 1969, 973 UNTS 3.
66 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted on 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3, Article 137.
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adopting strategies aimed at returning the control over the State’s natural
resources to the government.
The second challenge is to improve the governance over natural resources
within States in order to resolve existing armed conflicts and to prevent a
relapse into armed conflict. Strategies focusing on the financial aspects of
natural resources exploitation address only some of the problems associated
with resource-related armed conflicts. They do not provide solutions for
grievances related to environmental degradation or the misuse or improper
distribution of profits obtained from natural resources. Nor do they provide
solutions for institutional failures related to the resource curse. These problems
require a more structural approach aimed at resolving resource-related armed
conflicts and preventing the outbreak of new conflicts.
A key aspect of this sort of structural approach is to address failures in
the governance of States with regard to natural resources. For the purposes
of the present book, the term ‘governance’ seeks to denote the broader frame-
work for the exercise of political authority with respect to the management
of natural resources within States.67 Although it is the government of a State
that is entrusted with the task of managing the State’s natural resources, it
does so within a broader social and political framework. First of all, the
government exercises authority over the State’s natural resources on behalf
of the State and its people. Therefore it has to take into account the interests
of groups and individuals within society. In addition, international actors can
also be involved in the governance of natural resources. For example, the
Security Council can use its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to
assist a government to implement reforms in its natural resources policies.
Therefore the term ‘governance’ should primarily be understood to refer to
this broader participatory framework, or in other words, to the process of
governing.
Furthermore, the term ‘governance’ is often associated with the quality
of governance, and reference is made to ‘good governance’. Although there
is no common definition of the concept of good governance, it is possible to
identify certain common elements. These include abiding by the rule of law,
public participation, transparency, accountability, control of corruption and
67 On the concept of governance and related concepts, see T. Weiss, ‘Governance, Good
Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges’, Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 2 (2000), pp. 795–814; W.A. Knight, ‘Democracy and Good Governance’,
in T.G. Weiss & S. Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press (2008), pp. 620-633; E. Brown-Weiss & A. Sornarajah, ‘Good Governance’,
in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for Com-
parative Public Law and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), Vol.
IV, pp. 516-528; and K.H. Ladeur, ‘Governance, Theory of’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Encyclopedia
of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and Inter-
national Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), Vol. IV, pp. 541-553.
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government effectiveness.68 All these elements can be found in the definition
of good governance as incorporated in Article 9(3) of the 2000 Cotonou Con-
vention concluded between the European Union and its member States on
the one hand, and the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group
of States on the other. The Cotonou Convention defines good governance as:
“the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and
financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It
entails clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, trans-
parent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and
distribution of resources and capacity building for elaborating and implementing
measures aimed in particular at preventing and combating corruption.”69
As a comprehensive definition, the Cotonou definition can serve as a bench-
mark for understanding the concept of good governance and its implications.
Furthermore, it provides a very useful point of reference for the present study,
which focuses on good governance in relation to natural resources manage-
ment. For the purposes of the present study, good governance refers to:
the sustainable, transparent and accountable management of natural resources
for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear and
participatory decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, trans-
parent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and
distribution of natural resources and their revenues, as well as capacity building
for elaborating and implementing measures aimed in particular at preventing and
combating corruption in the public administration of revenues from natural
resources.
Taking the Cotonou definition as a point of reference, this definition focuses
on some of the particular challenges associated with the governance of natural
resources, while adding the elements of participation and sustainability to the
definition. This book argues that for the management of natural resources good
governance requires the active involvement of citizens in decision-making
processes as well as due regard for environmental protection, which is reflected
in the concept of sustainability. Furthermore, good governance is considered
an essential prerequisite for achieving sustainable development. This was
68 See E. Brown-Weiss & A. Sornarajah, ‘Good Governance’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Encyclopedia
of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and Inter-
national Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), Vol. IV, pp. 516-528.
69 Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group
of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States, of the Other
Part, 23 June 2000 (last revised: 2010).
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recently confirmed in the Rio+20 Declaration, “The Future We Want”.70
Arguably, good governance constitutes the basis of natural resources govern-
ance to prevent and resolve armed conflicts. One of the objectives of this book
is to assess whether and to what extent these requirements for good govern-
ance are reflected in current approaches to addressing the links between
natural resources and armed conflict.
1.4 DEFINITION OF TERMS USED IN THIS BOOK
Some terms are used throughout this book without further clarification. One
of these terms is ‘natural resources’. Natural resources can be defined as “those
materials or substances of a place which can be used to sustain life or for
economic exploitation”71 or as “any material from nature having potential
economic value or providing for the sustenance of life”.72 These definitions
first of all emphasise the economic function of natural resources. In this sense,
natural resources constitute primary commodities, i.e., “raw or unprocessed
material[s] that [are] extracted or harvested and also require very little process-
ing before consumption”.73 Indeed, for the purposes of this book, their eco-
nomic value as raw materials is a defining characteristic of natural resources.
It is for this reason that natural resources constitute an important source of
funding for armed conflicts. Natural resources can often be relatively easily
obtained by parties to an armed conflict and can be sold without further
processing. The primary focus of this book is therefore on those natural
resources that are relatively easy to obtain but are highly profitable, such as
timber, minerals and rare metals.
Nevertheless, natural resources are not only economic goods. They also
form an integral part of the environment, and may perform an important
ecological function as well. For example, trees not only provide timber, but
also help to reduce climate change. In addition, forests are the habitat for
70 The relevant section of the Rio+20 Outcome Document reads: “We acknowledge that
democracy, good governance and the rule of law, at the national and international levels,
as well as an enabling environment, are essential for sustainable development, including
sustained and inclusive economic growth, social development, environmental protection
and the eradication of poverty and hunger. We reaffirm that to achieve our sustainable
development goals we need institutions at all levels that are effective, transparent, account-
able and democratic”. See UN General Assembly Resolution 66/288 of 11 September 2012,
para. 13.
71 Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007).
72 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p. 1056.
73 Ibid. UNCTAD distinguishes the following groups of primary commodities: foods and
tropical beverages (includes basic foods, coffee, cocoa and tea); vegetable oil seeds and oil;
agricultural raw materials (includes timber and rubber); and minerals, ores and metals
(includes copper, tin, tungsten, gold and crude petroleum). See UNCTAD, Handbook of
Statistics (2012).
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numerous different species. This is also expressed in the definitions given
above. As elements of the environment, natural resources can be necessary
to “sustain life”. In this respect, reference can be made to Principle 2 of the
1972 Stockholm Declaration, which refers to “the natural resources of the earth,
including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative
samples of natural ecosystems”.74
The environment, which is another term used throughout this book, can
then be defined in relation to natural resources. The environment comprises
the air, water, land, flora and fauna, which interact as part of different eco-
systems. It can be argued that the environment needs protection for two
distinct but interrelated reasons. First, the environment needs protection for
the inherent values it represents. Furthermore, human beings are dependent
upon the environment. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice stated: “(…) the
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality
of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn”.75
In relation to natural resources, reference is often made to the term ‘exploit-
ation’. The Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo opted
for a very broad definition of this term, to include the extraction, production,
commercialization and exports of natural resources and other services such
as transport and financial transactions.76 The present book largely follows
this definition, although “other services” are not covered by the term ‘exploit-
ation’. Where this book refers to the exploitation of natural resources, it gen-
erally refers to the extraction, production and trade in natural resources, unless
a further distinction is required.
In some cases this book refers to the ‘illicit’ or ‘illegal’ exploitation of
natural resources to designate exploitation activities that are conducted in
violation of rules of international law. It is important to note that the term
‘illegal’, as used in legal documents, often fails to distinguish between resource
exploitation that is contrary to international law and resource exploitation that
is contrary to national law. Mining without an official permit under domestic
law constitutes ‘illegal exploitation’ from the domestic perspective, even if
it does not necessarily violate any rule of international law. This is reflected
in the definition of the Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, adopted by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region,
which defines illegal exploitation as “any exploration, development, acquisition,
74 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
16 June 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
75 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996, I.C.J.
Reports 1996, p. 226.
76 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2001/357, para. 16.
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and disposition of natural resources that is contrary to law, custom, practice,
or principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as well as the
provisions of this Protocol’.77 References to ‘illegal exploitation’ in this book
however primarily designate activities that are contrary to international law.
Another term that is sometimes used in this book is ‘conflict resources’.
There is as yet no legal definition of the term. The only official document that
uses a related term is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, a voluntary
agreement between State, civil society and the diamond sector to combat the
trade in ‘conflict diamonds’. The definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ adopted in
the Scheme focuses exclusively on the role of rebel movements. According
to the Scheme, conflict diamonds are “rough diamonds used by rebel move-
ments or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate
governments…”.78
The NGO Global Witness proposed adopting the following alternative
definition of conflict resources: “conflict resources are natural resources whose
systematic exploitation and trade in a context of conflict contribute to, benefit
from, or result in the commission of serious violations of human rights, viola-
tions of international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes
under international law”.79 The advantage of this definition is that it does
not distinguish between natural resources exploited by rebel groups and those
exploited by the government, which makes it more neutral. However, in
another sense the definition is too narrow. In order to designate natural
resources as conflict resources under this definition, it is necessary to establish
that the natural resources have contributed to violations of international law.
This is problematic in the sense that not all natural resources that contribute
to armed conflicts, necessarily contribute to, benefit from, or result in violations
of international law. This book therefore prefers to define conflict resources
as natural resources whose systematic exploitation and trade finance or fuel-
armed conflicts.
1.5 AIM OF THE BOOK
This book addresses the problem of resource-related armed conflicts from an
international law perspective. More specifically, it aims to identify and assess
the role of international law in ensuring that natural resources are used to
promote development as well as sustainable peace in countries that are ex-
77 Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, adopted by the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region on 30 November 2006, Article 1.
78 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section I.
79 Global Witness, ‘The Sinews of War: Eliminating the Trade in Conflict Resources’, Briefing
Document of November 2006, p. 10.
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periencing or that have experienced armed conflicts which are either caused,
financed or fuelled by natural resources.
For this purpose, the book first of all assesses the general legal framework
for the governance of natural resources within States. In this respect, the first
role of international law is that it establishes legal rights and obligations with
regard to the exploitation of natural resources in States, including legal entitle-
ments to the benefits derived from their exploitation. This book aims to identify
these legal rights and obligations deriving from international economic, en-
vironmental and human rights law, as the legal framework relevant for the
exploitation of natural resources in situations of armed conflict, as well as for
the governance of natural resources as part of a strategy for conflict resolution
and post-conflict peacebuilding.
Furthermore, this book aims to establish whether and to what extent the
general legal framework for the governance of natural resources continues
to apply in times of armed conflict. In addition, it aims to assess the extent
to which rules from the law of armed conflict address the illicit exploitation,
looting and plundering of natural resources by parties to an armed conflict,
including the resulting environmental damage. Does international law provide
adequate rules to prohibit these practices and to address the related environ-
mental damage?
Finally, the book aims to identify standards for the governance of natural
resources in States recovering from armed conflict. Most of these standards
have been developed with ad hoc approaches, in particular UN Security Council
resolutions and informal multi-stakeholder processes. This book assesses the
contribution of both types of mechanisms for the legal framework for the
governance of natural resources.
These objectives can be translated into the following three research ques-
tions that are the subject of the three consecutive parts of this book:
1. Does current international law provide rules to ensure that natural resources are
exploited for the purpose of achieving sustainable development?
2. Do these rules continue to apply in situations of armed conflict and does inter-
national humanitarian law provide relevant rules?
3. Do norms and standards developed with ad hoc mechanisms contribute to improv-
ing governance over natural resources in States that are recovering from armed
conflict?
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
This book consists of three parts. Part I deals with the international legal
framework for the governance of natural resources within States. This part
comprises three chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources as the basis for the governance of natural
26 Chapter 1
resources within States. The principle of permanent sovereignty formulates
a right for States and peoples to freely exploit their natural resources for the
purposes of development. This chapter examines two questions in particular:
- What rights and obligations does the principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources entail?
- To whom does the right to exercise permanent sovereignty over natural resources
accrue: to States, to peoples or both?
The main conclusion of this chapter is that the principle of permanent sover-
eignty over natural resources entails a right for governments to exploit the
State’s natural resources on behalf of the State and its people on condition
that it does so for national development and the well-being of the people of
the State.
Chapter 3 discusses these conditions in greater detail. The principal ques-
tions of this chapter are:
- Who are the “people”?
- What is meant by peoples having a right to freely exploit natural resources?
- What is meant by natural resources having to be exploited for the well-being of
the people?
Chapter 3 examines these questions from the perspective of collective or
“peoples’” rights. It identifies groups that are eligible to exercise peoples’ rights
and examines the implications of peoples’ rights for the governance of natural
resources within States.
Chapter 4 discusses the protection of natural resources under international
environmental law. It assesses the obligations imposed by international en-
vironmental law on States with regard to the protection of the environment,
as well as the implications of these obligations for the governance of natural
resources within States. The main question underpinning this chapter is:
- To what extent does international environmental law qualify the right of States
to exploit their natural resources?
It is argued that the rights and obligations identified in Part I are not only
relevant for the governance of natural resources by governments in situations
of peace, but that they are also relevant in situations of armed conflict.
Part II of this book discusses the international legal framework regulating the
protection and management of natural resources during armed conflict. Chap-
ter 5 examines the question whether and to what extent norms of international
human rights and environmental law continue to apply in situations of armed
conflict. For this purpose, the chapter looks at how armed conflict affects
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treaties, a topic which has been the object of a recent study by the International
Law Commission (ILC), resulting in the adoption of a set of articles. The chapter
discusses the work of the ILC in this respect. It also looks at the broader issue
of how treaties operate during armed conflict. In addition to treaty law, this
chapter also analyses the role of customary international law in situations of
armed conflict. Even if a particular treaty is considered not to apply in times
of armed conflict, specific obligations contained in its provisions may continue
to be valid because of their customary international law status. This leads to
the following question:
- To what extent do norms of international human rights and environmental law
continue to apply during armed conflict and what are the implications for the
legal framework regarding the exploitation of natural resources in situations of
armed conflict?
Chapter 6 assesses the protection afforded to natural resources and the
environment by international humanitarian law. This field of law is of parti-
cular relevance, as it is the only field of law that contains obligations directly
binding non-state armed groups. In addition, it is the principal source of rights
and obligations for States with a military presence on the territory of a foreign
State. The principal question dealt with in this chapter is:
- To what extent does international humanitarian law contain rules that prohibit
the illicit exploitation, looting and plundering of natural resources by parties to
an armed conflict and that address the related environmental damage?
This chapter argues that international humanitarian law contains only a few
rules that were specifically developed to regulate the use of natural resources
by parties to an armed conflict. Therefore, for the most part, recourse must
be made to more general rules of this body of law relating to the protection
of property and civilian objects. In order to address the specific challenges
posed by resource-related armed conflicts, these more general rules of inter-
national humanitarian law are interpreted in the light of the more specific rules
of international environmental and human rights law relating to natural
resources.
Part III of this book discusses the international legal and political framework
regulating the governance of natural resources as part of conflict resolution
and post-conflict peacebuilding strategies. In this respect, Chapter 7 discusses
the approach of the Security Council to the role of natural resources in financ-
ing armed conflict. In many cases the UN Security Council has resorted to
imposing sanctions to address the links between natural resources and armed
conflict. The objective of Chapter 7 is to assess whether and to what extent
the Security Council resolutions have, in addition, developed standards for
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the governance of natural resources. For this purpose, Chapter 7 discusses
a range of sanction regimes imposed by the Security Council in order to
address resource-related armed conflicts. The principal question underpinning
this chapter is:
- How and to what extent have the Security Council resolutions gone beyond the
sanctioning of illegal trafficking of natural resources, in the sense that they have
addressed issues related to the governance of natural resources?
Chapter 8 discusses informal political instruments that have been developed
in response to resource-related armed conflicts. In addition to States, the
business community and civil society have been involved in the design of these
instruments and have been given a stake in their implementation. These
instruments are part of a growing trend in international politics for drafting
‘guidelines’, ‘codes of conduct’ or other non-binding instruments rather than
negotiating formal treaties. Nevertheless, these informal instruments do formu-
late standards for the management of natural resources in States emerging
from armed conflict. The obvious questions are therefore:
- What standards do these instruments formulate for the management of natural
resources in countries emerging from armed conflict?
- Do these informal instruments provide a credible alternative to legally binding
instruments?
Finally, Chapter 9 summarises the general conclusions of this book. It
assesses the adequacy of the overall international legal framework for the
governance of natural resources within States and discusses the way forward.
1.7 THE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW ADOPTED IN THIS BOOK
The issue of resource-related armed conflicts is relatively new and has not
yet been addressed in a systematic way in formal law-making processes. To
determine the applicable rules, it is therefore first of all necessary to rely on
the existing rules of international law that pertain to the governance of natural
resources within States in general, as well as on the rights and obligations of
parties to an armed conflict. Furthermore, relevant standards can be derived
from ad hoc processes, in particular from Security Council resolutions and from
political agreements and codes of conduct adopted to address the issue of
resource-related armed conflicts.
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1.7.1 Treaties and treaty interpretation
Many of the general rules and standards examined in this book are incorpor-
ated in treaties, one of the primary sources of international law as listed in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The 1907 Hague
Regulations, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols
formulate rules for parties to an armed conflict, which include rules that are
relevant for the exploitation of natural resources by parties to an armed con-
flict. In addition, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
as well as international environmental conventions, formulate obligations for
States which determine their right to exploit their natural resources.
One of the primary aims of this book is to determine the extent to which
these existing rules of international law can effectively address problems
connected to resource-related armed conflicts. However, the existing rules are
part of different subsystems, which to a large extent operate independently
from each other. In order to address the problems connected with resource-
related armed conflicts in a comprehensive manner, it is necessary to bring
these fields of international law closer together. One of the principal methods
used in this book to achieve this is treaty interpretation.
In this respect, reference must be made to the traditional rules on treaty
interpretation as codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.80 According to the basic rule for treaty interpretation
formulated in Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention, “[a] treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose”. This basic rule is developed using the rules formulated in the
other subsections of Article 31.81 Article 31 (3) of the Vienna Convention is
particularly relevant in this respect. It lists the other elements to be taken into
account together with the context of the treaty. These include subsequent
80 These rules are generally considered to represent customary international law. See, e.g.,
the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran
v. United States of America), Judgment of 6 November 2003, I.C.J Reports 2003, p. 161, para.
41, in which the Court refers to “the general rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”. Also see the earlier judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute between Libya and
Chad (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994, I.C.J. Reports 1994,
p. 6, para. 41.
81 See the Commentary to the ILC draft Articles on the Law of treaties, which indicates that
“the process of interpretation is a unity and that the provisions of the article form a single,
closely integrated rule”. Reports of the International Law Commission on the second part
of its seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session, UN Doc A/6309/Rev.l, in Yearbook
of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 220.
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agreements and practice as well as “any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties” to the treaty.82
Both Article 31(1) and (3) of the Vienna Convention contain elements that
permit an interpretation of the provisions of a treaty in the light of the broader
system of international law. First, rules of international law that are not part
of the framework of the treaty can be taken into account when determining
the “ordinary meaning” of the terms of treaty provisions in accordance with
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, including rules from different subsets
of international law. The WTO Appellate Body’s reference in the Shrimp/Turtle
case of 12 October 1998 to environmental treaties for the interpretation of the
term “exhaustible natural resources” as used in the 1947 GATT is a well-known
example.83
Secondly, rules from different subsets of international law as well as general
international law can be considered to be “any relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties” for the interpretation of
the substantive obligations. This is often referred to as the systemic method
of interpretation. In the Oil Platforms case, for example, the International Court
of Justice referred to this method in order to interpret the obligations of the
parties to a bilateral treaty in the light of their obligations under general
international law.84
In this respect there are two further issues that merit closer attention. The
first concerns the question of inter-temporal law and its application to the
interpretation of treaties. Here it must be noted that the obligations contained
in the various conventions examined in this book were drafted at different
times. Most of the relevant rules of international humanitarian law, for
example, were drafted in the first half of the twentieth century, while most
relevant rules of international environmental and human rights law evolved
in the second half of the twentieth century. Therefore the question arises
whether modern environmental and human rights norms, for example, can
82 Article 31 (3) of the Vienna Convention states that “[t]here shall be taken into account,
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules applicable in the relations between the
parties”.
83 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998.
84 International Court of Justice, Oil Platforms case (Iran v. United States of America), Judg-
ment of 6 November 2003, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 161, para. 41. The Court stated in relevant
part: “under the general rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, interpretation must take into account "any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties" (Art. 31, para.
3 (c)). The Court cannot accept that Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty was
intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant rules of international law on the
use of force…”.
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be used to interpret old norms in the field of international humanitarian law.
The inter-temporal interpretation of treaty obligations – also referred to as
the dynamic-evolutionary method of treaty interpretation – has certainly
received broad recognition in the case law of international tribunals since the
adoption of the Vienna Convention, both as regards the interpretation of treaty
terms and as regards the interpretation of the substantive obligations.85
In its Namibia Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice ruled
that “an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within
the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpreta-
tion”.86 Similarly, in its judgment in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case, the Court
added that “new norms have to be taken into consideration, and […] new
standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activ-
ities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past”.87
Other courts and tribunals have made similar statements. For example,
in its landmark Shrimp/Turtle case of 12 October 1998 the WTO Appellate Body
referred to modern ideas regarding environmental protection in order to
interpret the terms of the GATT 1947. In that case the Appellate Body considered
that “[t] he words of Article XX(g), ‘exhaustible natural resources’, were actually
crafted more than 50 years ago” and that “[t]hey must be read by a treaty
interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations
about the protection and conservation of the environment.”88 With reference
to the Namibia Opinion of the International Court of Justice, the Appellate Body
also stated that “the generic term ‘natural resources’ in Article XX(g) is not
‘static’ in its content or reference but is rather by definition, evolutionary”.89
85 G. Ress, ‘The Interpretation of the Charter’, in Simma, The Charter of the United Nations.
A Commentary, Oxford 2002, p.23. For different approaches to evolutionary interpretation,
see P-M. Dupuy, ‘Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties: Between Memory and Prophecy’,
in E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention, Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2011), pp. 123-137. For an early critical perspective on the evolutionary
approach, see M.K. Yasseen, ‘L’Interprétation des Traités d’Après la Convention de Vienne
sur le Droit des Traités’, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 151 (1976), p. 27.
86 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, para. 53. Author’s
emphasis added.
87 For another example of new norms to be taken into account for the interpretation of existing
obligations, see International Court of Justice, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment of
19 December 1978, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3, para. 80.
88 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, para. 129.
89 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, para. 130. The relevant passage of the
Namibia Opinion to which the Appellate Body refers deals with an evolutionary interpreta-
tion of generic treaty provisions. In this respect, the International Court of Justice held:
“[m]indful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in accordance
with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion, the Court is bound to take
into account the fact that the concepts embodied in [the relevant provision of the treaty]
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Similarly, in the OSPAR Arbitration case of 2 July 2003, the arbitral tribunal
operating under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration considered
more in general that “[l]est it produce anachronistic results that are inconsistent
with current international law, a tribunal must certainly engage in actualisation
or contemporization when construing an international instrument that was
concluded in an earlier period”.90
These are just a few examples of evolutionary interpretation of treaty
obligations by international courts. The examples show the importance that
courts attach to interpreting legal instruments in the legal and social context
in which these instruments are applied. This brings to the fore the second issue
that merits closer attention, concerning the nature of the rules that can be used
to interpret treaty provisions. In this respect, a distinction must be made
between the application of rules for the purpose of determining the ordinary
meaning of treaty terms and the application of “any relevant rules of inter-
national law applicable in the relations between the parties” to the treaty in
order to interpret the substantive obligations. In order to determine the
ordinary meaning of treaty terms, courts can take into account all the relevant
rules from other fields of international law, whether or not the parties to the
dispute are also parties to these treaties. These rules are not used as legal
sources, but rather as a source of information.91
However, the reference to “any relevant rules of international law applic-
able in the relations between the parties” in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Conven-
tion calls for a stricter approach. Only those relevant rules that are applicable
to the parties to the treaty can be taken into account. This requirement has
led to a lively debate in the academic literature, focusing on the meaning of
“the parties”. The advocates of a strict interpretation argue that “the parties”
can only refer to all the parties to the treaty under consideration, while the
advocates of the broader view argue that Article 31 (3) (c) refers to the parties
to a particular dispute about the interpretation of a treaty.92 In view of this
were not static, but were by definition evolutionary […]. The parties to the Covenant must
consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such”. See Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, para. 53.
90 Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention
(Ireland v. United Kingdom), Final Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of 2 July
2003, para. 103.
91 In order to determine the ordinary meaning of treaty provisions, courts do not necessarily
have to use legal sources. Courts can, for example, also look at standards that do not amount
to legal rules or to common practices.
92 See U. Linderfalk, ‘Who Are ‘the Parties’? Article 31, Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna
Convention and the ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ Revisited’, in Netherlands International
Law Review, Vol. 55, Issue 3 (2008), pp. 343-364; G. Marceau, ‘Conflicts of Norms and
Conflicts of Jurisdictions: The Relationship between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and
other Treaties’, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 35, Issue 6 (2001), p. 1087; Report of the Study
Group of the International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmenta-
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controversy, this book adopts a cautious approach. The interpretation rule
of Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention is used primarily as a means to
reconcile treaty law with customary international law, the other major primary
source of international law as recognised in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
1.7.2 Customary international law
Customary international law constitutes an important source for this study,
first, because it is capable of binding all States, irrespective of their adherence
to a particular treaty regime.93 In this sense, customary international law
obligations are therefore basic obligations that are binding on the large majority
of States – and possibly on other actors such as non-state armed groups –
provided that the obligations address these groups as well. Furthermore,
customary international law obligations play an important role in the inter-
pretation of treaty provisions, because by their very nature they constitute
“relevant rules that are applicable in the relations between the parties” accord-
ing to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Moreover, a major advantage of
customary rules over treaty obligations is related to their operation in situations
of legal uncertainty, in particular in situations of armed conflict and in the
immediate aftermath of such conflicts. It has been argued that customary
international law obligations from all fields of international law continue to
apply in situations of armed conflict.94 In contrast, the continued applicability
tion of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006; C. McLachlan, ‘The Principle of
Systemic Integration and Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention’, International Comparat-
ive Law Quarterly, Vol. 54 (2005), pp. 279-320; M. Samson, ‘High Hopes, Scant Resources:
A Word of Scepticism about the Anti-Fragmentation Function of Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 24 (2011),
pp. 701-714; C. McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31 (3) (c) of
the Vienna Convention’, International Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 54 (2005), pp. 310-319;
and M.K. Yasseen, ‘L’Interprétation des Traités d’Après la Convention de Vienne sur le
Droit des Traités’, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 151 (1976).
93 There are only two exceptions to this rule. The first relates to the existence of local or
regional customary law, which is only binding on States that are part of a specified group
of States. The other exception relates to the possibility for States to object to being bound
by a rule that is still in the process of crystallising into customary international law. If a
State is persistent in its objections to an evolving rule, this State is not bound by the rule
of customary international law once it has matured. See H. Thirlway, ‘The Sources of
International Law’, in M.D. Evans, International Law, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press (2010), pp. 106-108. Also see Y. Dinstein, ‘The Interaction Between Customary
International Law and Treaties’, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 322 (2006), pp. 285-287.
94 This is also the implicit view of the International Law Commission, which has included
a provision in its draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties asserting that
“[t]he termination of or the withdrawal from a treaty, or the suspension of its operation,
as a consequence of an armed conflict, shall not impair in any way the duty of any State
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of treaty obligations is largely dependent upon the operation of the treaty of
which they are part. Treaties can be suspended or their operation can be
affected in other ways, which also affects the applicability of the individual
obligations contained in the treaty, unless these treaty obligations represent
customary international law as well.95
Of course, it cannot be argued that obligations under customary inter-
national law operate in the same manner irrespective of the circumstances
in which they apply. For example, the customary international law obligation
to conduct an environmental impact assessment for economic projects that
are likely to cause damage to the environment does not necessarily give rise
to the same procedural obligations in situations of armed conflict as it does
in situations of peace.96 The obligation must then be viewed in the context
of the restrictions that apply in situations of armed conflict. However, as a
matter of principle, it can be asserted that the core obligation to conduct such
an assessment applies in situations of armed conflict as well.
Consequently rules of customary international law can be considered to
provide a general legal framework applicable to the exploitation of natural
resources in situations of armed conflict, as well as in immediate post-conflict
situations. This legal framework applies to the large majority of States – as
well as to armed groups if the rules address these groups – and it operates
even when specific treaty obligations do not, or when States have not become
parties to these treaties. It is for these reasons that this book devotes a great
deal of attention to establishing the legal status of rules and principles, even
when these rules and principles have been recognised in treaty law as well.
In order to determine the existence of a rule of customary international
law, Article 38 (1) (b) of the ICJ Statute requires “evidence of a general practice
accepted as law”. Therefore it must be demonstrated that there is an estab-
lished State practice (objective requirement) and that States are convinced that
this behaviour is required under international law (subjective requirement).
In an often-quoted paragraph of the judgment of the International Court of
Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the Court explains the subjective
requirement as follows:
“[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must
also be such, or to be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule requiring it. The need
to fulfil any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under inter-
national law independently of that treaty”.
95 On the relationship between treaty law and customary international law, see International
Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14,
paras. 173-179. Also see Y. Dinstein, ‘The Interaction Between Customary International
Law and Treaties’, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 322 (2006), pp. 243-427.
96 This obligation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this study.
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for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very
notion of opinio juris sive necessitates”.97
This requirement has special significance for the voluntary agreements entered
into by States, as discussed in Part III of this book. In these instances, States
do not act upon these agreements from a sense of legal obligation, but rather
to honour their political commitments.
As to the objective requirement, the International Court of Justice deter-
mined in the Nicaragua case that the practice required for the formation of a
rule of customary international law does not need to be “in absolutely rigorous
conformity with the rules”.98 Rather, “the conduct of States should, in general,
be consistent with such rules”.99 Furthermore, the Nicaragua case indicates
that a State that seeks to defend or justify inconsistent practice with a
recognised rule “by appealing to exceptions or justifications within the rule
itself” in fact confirms the existence of that rule itself.100
One of the factors in determining whether a particular rule of customary
international law has developed is therefore to assess the extent of consistent
State practice. Do States generally follow a rule? And if States act inconsistently
with a given rule, do they explain their conduct by raising doubts about the
very existence of the rule, or do they only challenge the application of the rule
in particular instances? In the latter case, the attitude of the State in question
can be interpreted as an indication of opinio juris as to the existence of a rule
of customary international law.
Furthermore, the existence of rules of customary international law can often
be deduced from treaty law. As the International Court of Justice acknow-
ledged in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, rules of customary international
law can evolve from treaty obligations. In these cases it is essential to deter-
mine whether States act in a certain way because they believe that such be-
haviour is required under international law in general, or because they are
acting in accordance with their treaty obligations. It is only in the former case
that a rule of customary international law can be considered to have been
97 International Court of Justice, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic
of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment of 20
February 1969, I.C.J Reports 1969, p. 4, para. 77.
98 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.
14, para. 186.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid. The Court stated in the relevant part: “If a State acts in a way prima facie inconsistent
with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications
contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable
on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule”.
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established.101 Furthermore, treaty provisions can also codify existing rules
of customary international law. By way of example, reference can be made
to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. This principle
notably evolved from UN General Assembly resolutions, but was subsequently
recognised in several treaties.
It is important to note that the creation of customary international law is
an essentially State-centred process. The practice of other actors – such as non-
state armed groups – is not taken into account in the process of the creation
of customary international law. This classic view of the creation of customary
international law as a State-centred process was also the starting point for the
landmark study of the ICRC on customary international humanitarian law.
According to the ICRC study, the approach of the study “to determine whether
a rule of general customary international law exists is a classic one, set out
by the International Court of Justice in a number of cases, in particular in the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases”.102 The practice of non-state armed groups
is examined under the heading of “other practice”, but is not expressly taken
into account for the determination of rules of customary international human-
itarian law.
For the purposes of this book, the customary international law status of
rules of international law is in most cases derived from the widespread recog-
nition of relevant norms and principles in treaty law, as well as in binding
resolutions adopted by organs of international organizations. In addition,
secondary sources of international law, in particular judicial decisions are
examined in order to confirm the customary international law status of norms
and principles.
1.7.3 Soft law
‘Soft law’, in particular principles and standards formulated in non-binding
documents, constitutes an important reference point for this book.103
101 International Court of Justice, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic
of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment of 20
February 1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 4, paras. 71-74. The Court considered in general that
the process of conventional norms generating norms of customary international law
constituted “one of the recognized methods by which new rules of customary international
law may be formed”.
102 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law,
Volume I: Rules, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. xxxviii.
103 The phenomenon of ‘soft law’ is broader and is also referred to in relation to soft norms
in otherwise binding treaties. However, this book focuses on soft law in the sense of non-
binding documents. For discussions on the notion of soft law, see, e.g., A. Boyle & C.
Chinkin, The Making of International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007); D. Shelton,
‘International Law and ‘Relative Normality”, in M. Evans (ed.), International Law, Third
Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010); H. Hillgenberg, ‘A Fresh Look at Soft Law’,
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Although soft law comes in many different forms, most instruments used in
this book can be classified in one of the two following categories. The first
consists of non-binding instruments adopted by States, either directly or
through their representation in an intergovernmental organization, while the
second consists of non-binding instruments adopted by other actors with the
purpose of influencing State behaviour.
Examples of the first category include non-binding resolutions and declara-
tions adopted by States at international forums, in particular, UN General
Assembly resolutions and documents resulting from world conferences, such
as the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and the 1992
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. It also includes informal
agreements entered into by States, containing political or moral commitments.
Two arrangements which are very important for this book are the Kimberley
Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds and the Principles of the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Finally, reference can be made
to codes of conduct adopted by States but directed at non-state actors. The
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-affected and High-risk Areas is an important example of this.
Examples of the second category include standard-setting instruments
adopted by organs of international organizations or non-governmental organ-
izations made up of independent experts. The work of the International Law
Commission is relevant in this respect. This commission was established by
the UN General Assembly with the specific mandate to promote “the progress-
ive development of international law and its codification”.104 Furthermore,
reference can be made to the work of the International Law Association and
especially of the New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law
Relating to Sustainable Development. The second category of soft law also
contains instruments adopted by independent treaty bodies, such as the general
comments, recommendations and case law adopted by human rights treaty
bodies.
The principal question that arises in relation to the concept of soft law is
what value – if any – these instruments have for international law. The concept
of soft law is subject to an intense debate in the academic literature between
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10 (1999), pp. 499-515; J.J. Kirton & M.J. Trebilcock,
‘Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social
Governance’, Aldershot, etc., Ashgate (2004); J. Ellis, ‘Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the
Validity of Public International Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 25 (2012), pp.
313-334; and M. Goldmann, ‘We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King: Past, Present, and
Future Approaches to International Soft Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 25
(2012), pp. 335-368. For a critical analysis of the notion of soft law, see J. Klabbers, ‘The
Redundancy of Soft Law’, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 65 (1996), pp. 167-182;
J. d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment
of Legal Rules, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011).
104 Statute of the International Law Commission, UN General Assembly Resolution 174 (II)
of 21 November 1947, last amended by resolution 36/39 of 18 November 1981, Article 1.
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authors who attribute legal value to soft law documents and those who adhere
to a strictly binary – or positivist – approach to international law.105 This
book does not regard soft law as a source of international legal rights or
obligations. An important distinction between soft law and law proper is that
soft law does not have legal effect. It cannot be directly relied on in court or
in inter-state relations in general, nor does the violation of soft law trigger
the application of the secondary rules of international law, such as those
relating to State responsibility. In other words, soft law does not create rights
or obligations for States and it can be “set aside” without any legal conse-
quences.
Nevertheless, soft law is important for international law in a number of
ways. Specifically, for the purposes of this book, it performs two important
functions. First, soft law is used in this book as a means to interpret and clarify
obligations under international law. For example, it is used as a source of
information to determine the ordinary meaning of vague or open-ended treaty
terms, in accordance with Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. Furthermore, soft law documents are also used in a more
general way to give substance and meaning to obligations under international
law. The General Comments and case law made by human rights treaty bodies,
for example, are used to interpret the provisions of the relevant treaties and
clarify the substantive obligations of parties to these treaties.
In addition, soft law documents are used in this book as a source of infor-
mation to indicate the direction in which international law is developing. This
is especially true for soft law that falls into the first category, i.e., non-binding
documents adopted by States. Although soft law documents do not as such
reflect opinio juris – the very fact that soft law documents are non-binding is
in conflict with the whole idea of recognising them as reflections of opinio
juris – soft law documents can be regarded as a form of recognition by States
of the importance of certain principles and standards. These documents
represent an initial agreement between States to take certain principles or
standards as guidelines for their future behaviour. In many cases, the initial
proclamation of principles or standards in non-binding documents has
subsequently resulted in a formal endorsement of these principles or standards,
either through their incorporation in a formal treaty or through their gradual
acceptance as norms of customary international law. It is for these purposes
that soft law is used in this book.
105 See supra for literature on the notion of soft law.
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1.7.4 Binding acts of international organizations: UN Security Council Resolu-
tions
Binding acts of international organizations are not included in the list of formal
sources of international law set out in Article 38 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice. This is not surprising, as the text of Article 38 of the
Statute dates back to the 1922 Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, at which time the possibility of international organizations taking
binding decisions was not yet foreseen. Apart from this historical reason, there
is another reason why binding acts of international organizations are not
included in the list of formal sources. Binding acts of international organiza-
tions are not original sources of international law, in the sense that these acts
derive their legal authority from another source, i.e., the treaty on which they
are based. As Philippe Sands notes, they can therefore “be considered as part
of treaty law”.106 For the purposes of this book, the most relevant acts of
international organizations are the decisions adopted by the UN Security
Council, usually as part of resolutions passed pursuant to Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. Decisions of the UN Security Council derive their legal authority
from the UN Charter, which determines in Article 25 that “the Members of
the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter”.
As only “decisions” of the UN Security Council are legally binding, this
raises an important question, i.e., how to determine whether or not the
measures imposed by the UN Security Council are legally binding. The question
whether particular paragraphs of a resolution entail binding obligations can
be derived first of all from the language used. Where the UN Security Council
“decides” on particular measures or “demands” that States or other entities
take particular measures, it is clear that these measures constitute binding
obligations. In contrast, when the Security Council “urges” or “requests” States
or other entities to take particular measures, it cannot be concluded that the
measures were intended to be binding.
However, the language used is not decisive for determining whether or
not particular paragraphs of Security Council resolutions are legally binding.
This is particularly the case when the language used is indeterminate. For
example, the status of paragraphs in Security Council resolutions starting with
“calls upon” is not entirely clear. In these cases, the binding nature of such
paragraphs can only be determined by looking at the specific context of the
resolution, including the text, the verbatim records and UN Security Council
106 P. Sands & J. Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, Third Edition (2012), p. 109.
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discussions on related resolutions.107 Whether a particular UN Security Coun-
cil resolution contains decisions must therefore be determined by means of
a careful analysis of the text of the Resolution, its objectives and the context
in which it was adopted.
UN Security Council resolutions are important to this book for three main
reasons. First, decisions taken by the UN Security Council are binding upon
States and have priority over conflicting obligations of States under inter-
national law. This priority position of UN Security Council resolutions follows
from Article 103 of the UN Charter, which determines that “in the event of
a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under
the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agree-
ment, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’.
Furthermore, decisions taken by UN Security Council resolutions can also
bind entities other than States, including non-state armed groups, international
organizations and companies. Most of the obligations for these entities are
formulated indirectly, but sometimes the Council has also formulated direct
obligations for such actors. An example is Resolution 811 (1993), adopted in
relation to the armed conflict in Angola. In this Resolution, the Council
demanded that UNITA “accept unreservedly the results of the democratic
elections of 1992 and abide fully by the Acordos de Paz”.108
In addition to formulating obligations for States and other entities, UN
Security Council resolutions are also relevant for this book because they
formulate standards for the governance of natural resources. In some of its
107 In this respect, see the approach set out by the International Court of Justice in its Namibia
and Kosovo Opinions. In the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the Court determined that a con-
clusion regarding the binding nature of a Security Council Resolution can be made only
after careful analysis of its language. According to the Court, the question whether the
powers under Article 25 of the UN Charter have been exercised “is to be determined in
each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might
assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council”.
International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 53, para 114. In the
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the Court explained the differences between the interpretation
of treaties and the interpretation of Security Council resolutions, determining that other
factors must be taken into account when interpreting Security Council resolutions, especially
in relation to their drafting process and legal effects. International Court of Justice, Accord-
ance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports (2010), p. 403, para. 94. Also see
M.C. Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’, in Max Planck Yearbook
of United Nations Law (1998), p. 73-95. Security Council Report, Special Research Report 2008,
No. 1 on Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities, 23 June 2008,
pp. 9-12, available at <www.securitycouncilreport.org>, consulted on 24 June 2008. For
a discussion of the Namibia Opinion, see D.W. Greig, Invalidity and the Law of Treaties,
London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2006), pp. 166-180.
108 UN Security Council Resolution 811 (1993), especially para. 2.
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resolutions, the UN Security Council has imposed conditions on lifting sanctions
with regard to the implementation of certification measures or reform programs
by States satisfying a number of requirements related to good governance.
The standards set by the UN Security Council are not only relevant in them-
selves, but have also influenced other approaches to curb the trade in illicit
natural resources and to improve the governance of natural resources.
1.7.5 Principles of international law
This book examines several principles of international law, including the
principles of self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural
resources as well as a number of principles that are of particular importance
to specific fields of international law, such as the precautionary principle in
international environmental law and the principles of necessity and
proportionality in international humanitarian law. The question arises how
to define ‘principles’, both in terms of their legal implications and in relation
to the sources of international law.
It is first necessary to distinguish ‘principles’ as used in this book from
‘general principles of international law’ as a source of international law pur-
suant to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The latter
was originally inserted in the Statute of the Permanent Court of Justice to
prevent situations of non liquet, when the Court would find no express rule
either in treaty law or in customary international law as a basis for its de-
cision.109 In these cases, the Court could fall back on “the opinio juris communis
of civilised mankind”.110 Many of these general principles are derived from
national legal systems. For example, Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which states the law to be applied by the Court,
refers to “general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws
of legal systems of the world”.111 In addition, there are general principles
that are directly part of international law, but these are often difficult to
distinguish from customary international law.112 For example, in the DR
Congo-Uganda case, the International Court of Justice referred to the principle
109 See H. Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’, in M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law,
third edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010), p. 108.
110 B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (2006).
111 Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90.
112 See B.D. Lepard, Customary International Law: A New Theory with Practical Applications, ASIL
Studies in International Legal Theory, Cambridge, New York, etc.: Cambridge University
Press (2010), pp. 166-167; B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts
and Tribunals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2006), p. 23.
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of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources as “a principle of customary
international law”.113
When this book refers to principles of international law, it does not rely
on a particular source of international law. The principles examined in this
book derive their authority from all sources of international law, but notably
from treaty law and customary international law. For example, Article 1(2)
of the UN Charter refers to “the principle of self-determination” as a basis for
developing friendly relations among States, while it is also widely considered
to be part of customary international law. The defining feature of a ‘principle’
for the purposes of this book is that it has been recognised as such by the
international community, in one form or the other. Such recognition can be
based on an express reference in a treaty, but it can also be based on other
factors, such as extensive reliance in the practice of States on a particular
principle or its application by international courts in specific cases.
Secondly, it is important to inquire into the nature of principles of inter-
national law. What does it imply to recognise something as a ‘principle of
international law’? Principles are often regarded as operating on a higher level
of generality than rules.114 Reference can be made in this respect to the
classical work of Georg Schwarzenberger, who defined principles as “mere
abstractions from actual rules”.115 This book prefers to turn the definition
around, regarding rules as concretisations of principles. Where Schwarzen-
berger’s aim was to deduce certain fundamental principles from applicable
rules, the purpose of this book is to examine the impact of principles on the
development of more concrete rules. Principles are therefore regarded in this
book as overarching concepts which form the basis for more detailed rights
and obligations.
113 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 244.
114 See International Law Association, Final Report of the Committee on Formation of Custom-
ary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of
General Customary International Law, London Conference (2000), p. 11.
115 G. Schwarzenberger, ‘The Fundamental Principles of International Law’, Recueil des Cours
Vol. 87 (1956), p. 210.
Part I
The legal framework for the governance of
natural resources in States
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS TO PART I
The objective of this part of the book is to examine the international legal
framework for the governance of natural resources within States. In an inde-
pendent State it is obviously the government that first and foremost has the
right to exercise political authority in relation to the exploitation of natural
resources. This is explored in more detail in Chapter 2. That chapter discusses
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as the organizing
principle for the governance of natural resources within States and their
economic jurisdiction. However, the right of the government to exploit the
State’s natural resources is qualified by obligations arising from international
human rights and environmental law. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the
legal position of the government itself. Chapter 3 discusses the obligations
for governments under human rights law, while Chapter 4 examines obliga-
tions for governments resulting from international environmental law.

2 Defining the right of peoples and States to
freely exploit their natural resources:
permanent sovereignty over natural
resources
2.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
International law establishes a right for States and peoples to freely exploit
their natural resources. This right originates in UN General Assembly Resolu-
tion 523 (IV) of 12 January 1952, which formulates a right for “under-developed
countries” to freely determine the use of their natural resources. Soon after
the adoption of this resolution, the right developed along two different but
interrelated tracks. First, the right was asserted in terms of the principle of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources.1 In addition, as Chile proposed,
the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources was inserted
into the two human rights covenants of 1966 as inherent in their right to self-
determination.2
Today the right of States and peoples to freely dispose of their natural
resources is firmly established in the principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources which incorporates this right. The principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources constitutes the very foundation on which
the protection and management of natural resources in modern international
law is based. Its relevance for the protection and management of natural
resources has been confirmed in many international legal instruments, as well
as in resolutions of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly.
In addition, the International Court of Justice has recognised the importance
of the principle and considers it to constitute a principle of customary inter-
national law.3
1 It should be noted that the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources itself
was for a long time asserted as a right before it received recognition as a legal principle.
For example, compare the landmark 1962 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, which designates permanent sovereignty over natural resources as a
right accruing to both peoples and nations. See UN General Assembly Resolution 1803
(XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 14 December 1962.
2 The original proposal for Article 1(2) introduced by Chile in 1952 provided in relevant part
that “the right of the peoples to self-determination shall also include permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources”. For a discussion of the Chilean proposal, see N.J.
Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge: Cambrid-
ge University Press (1997), pp. 49-56.
3 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 244.
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This chapter first aims to determine the content of the right of States and
peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources. For this purpose, this
chapter examines the evolution, the nature and the legal status of the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Furthermore, the principle
of permanent sovereignty identifies States and peoples as holders of the right
to freely dispose of “their” natural resources. This chapter examines the impli-
cations of this dual ownership in relation to the right to freely dispose of
natural resources. It argues that the dual ownership construction has two
implications. First, it emphasises that the right to exercise permanent sover-
eignty over natural resources is an essential component of State sovereignty,
which other States must respect in their international relations. Secondly, the
recognition of peoples as also being subjects of the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources in addition to States must be interpreted
as qualifying the right of the government of a State to dispose of the State’s
natural resources. The government exercises this right on behalf of the people
of the State.
2.2 EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL
RESOURCES
This section outlines the evolution of the principle of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources. It demonstrates that this is a dynamic principle, which
has adapted to changing circumstances. For this reason the principle has not
only remained relevant over time, but has in fact become the governing prin-
ciple for the management and protection of natural resources.
2.2.1 Early recognition: permanent sovereignty and the right to self-deter-
mination
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources originates in
resolutions of the UN General Assembly. It emerged in the 1950s following
the decolonisation movement, and was advanced by newly independent and
developing countries as a means of protecting their ownership rights over the
natural wealth and resources situated within their territory.4 At the time, the
main idea behind – what was then still called – the right to permanent sover-
4 For a detailed examination of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources,
see N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (1997); D. Rosenberg, Le Principe de Souveraineté des Etats sur
Leurs Ressources Naturelles, Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (1983);
G. Elian, The Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff
& Noordhoff (1979).
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eignty over natural resources was to provide these countries with the legal
tools to regain control over their natural resources and to exploit them for their
own benefit. Therefore, initially the principle was primarily associated with
such controversial issues as the right of States to regulate foreign investment,
and in particular with the right to nationalise natural resources. In this respect,
Resolution 626 (VII) was the first resolution to make an express link between
the right of peoples to freely exploit their natural resources on the one hand,
and the exercise of sovereignty on the other.5
A few years later, Resolution 837 (IX) determined that the right to per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources was an inherent part of the right
of self-determination and requested the Commission on Human Rights to make
recommendations concerning the right of peoples and nations to self-deter-
mination, “including recommendations concerning their permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources”.6 This resolution marked the be-
ginning of a process aimed at the clarification of the concept of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources leading up to the 1962 Declaration on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.7
2.2.2 The 1962 Declaration and the following years: regulating foreign invest-
ment
The Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, adopted
by the General Assembly on 14 December 1962 by 87 votes to 2, with 12
abstentions, lays down eight basic principles concerning the exercise of per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources.8 The focus of the Declaration is
on the regulation of foreign investment in the natural resources sector. In this
respect, the Declaration aims to strike a balance between the interests of States
5 UN General Assembly Resolution 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952 on the right to exploit
freely natural wealth and resources determines that “the right of people fully and freely
to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty”. This
resolution is quite controversial, because of its political context. Although references to
a right to nationalise natural resources ultimately have not been inserted in the text, the
resolution became known as the “nationalisation resolution”. See N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty
over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
(1997), pp. 41-49.
6 UN General Assembly Resolution 837 (IX) on recommendations concerning international
respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination of 14 December 1954.
7 Instrumental in this development has been the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources, set up by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 1314 (XIII) of
12 December 1958 “to conduct a full survey of [permanent sovereignty over natural wealth
and resources as a] basic constituent of the right to self-determination”.
8 See N.J. Schrijver, ‘Natural Resources, Permanent Sovereignty over’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.),
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 3rd ed., available through <http://
www.mpepil.com> (2008), para. 10. For the voting records, see Yearbook of the United Nations
(1962), pp. 502-503. The negative votes were cast by France and South Africa.
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exporting capital in protecting their investments and the interests of States
importing capital in retaining control over their natural resources.9
Furthermore, the Declaration attempts to clarify the nature and scope of
the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. In this respect,
paragraph 1 of the Declaration asserts a right to permanent sovereignty over
“natural wealth and resources”, i.e., over every part of the environment.10
It attributes this right to “peoples and nations” and specifies that it must be
exercised “in the interest of their national development and of the well-being
of the people of the State concerned”.
Arguably this obligation is also incumbent upon States when they
nationalise, expropriate or requisition natural wealth and resources. According
to paragraph 4 of the declaration, the nationalisation, expropriation or requisi-
tioning of natural wealth and resources is permitted only on “grounds or
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized
as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and
foreign”. Although the primary objective of this paragraph is the protection
of foreign investment, it can also be read as emphasising the obligation to
exercise permanent sovereignty in the interest of national development and
the well-being of the population of the State.
The final provision that is of interest is paragraph 7 of the declaration,
which determines that “violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sover-
eignty over their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. Although the objective of
this provision was originally to protect developing States against foreign
investors exploiting their natural resources on unequal terms, it is arguably
also relevant for situations in which foreign States plunder a State’s natural
resources, which happened (and is still happening to some extent) in the DR
Congo. In these cases, States are therefore committing an internationally
wrongful act, activating the law on State responsibility.11
9 The principal question that was before the Committee discussing the draft resolution was
the “achievement of a formula which would safeguard and reconcile two essential principles,
namely, respect for the national sovereignty of developing countries in need of foreign
capital for the development of their natural resources, and provision of adequate guarantees
for potential investors”. Yearbook of the United Nations (1962), p. 500.
10 See N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (1997), p. 16, who notes that the “concept of natural wealth
may come close to what is commonly called ‘the environment’ as a description of a physical
matter, being the air, the sea, the land, flora and fauna and the rest of the natural heritage”.
11 Nevertheless, in the Congo-Uganda case, the Court of Justice dismissed the relevance of
this principle to the particular situation of looting and plundering of the DRC’s natural
resources by soldiers of the Ugandan army. See International Court of Justice, Case Con-
cerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005. These aspects of the case
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of this study.
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Subsequent General Assembly resolutions focus mainly on the implementa-
tion of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and place
it in a more prominent developmental context. In addition, these resolutions
increasingly point to States rather than peoples as the subjects of the principle
of permanent sovereignty. Resolution 2158 (XXI) of 6 December 1966, for
example, “reaffirms the inalienable right of all countries”, while Resolution
2692 (XXV) of 11 December 1970 is entitled “Permanent sovereignty over natural
resources of developing countries” and Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) of 17 December
1973 “[s]trongly reaffirms the inalienable rights of States to permanent sover-
eignty over all their natural resources”.12
At the same time, these resolutions emphasise that States must exercise
the right to permanent sovereignty in order to promote development. For
example, Resolution 2158 (XXI) determines that countries exercise permanent
sovereignty “in the interest of their national development”. Similarly, Resolu-
tion 2692 (XXV) reaffirms that permanent sovereignty “must be exercised in
the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people
of the State concerned”.
The political situation changed dramatically as a result of the economic
crisis that broke out in the early 1970s. Discontented with the existing inter-
national economic order, developing countries advocated the establishment
of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which was aimed at addressing
inequities in the economic system. Among the founding principles of this new
economic order permanent sovereignty over natural resources figured
prominently, and this was to extend to “all economic activities”.13 Therefore
the NIEO Declaration significantly extended the scope of the principle of per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources. This is one of the principal reasons
why the NIEO Declaration has continued to be controversial.14
Another interesting feature of the NIEO Declaration is that the principle
of permanent sovereignty is considered to accrue exclusively to States and
that it is no longer explicitly subject to the obligation to use this right in the
interest of national development. At the same time, the Declaration expresses
“the need for developing countries to concentrate all their resources for the
12 UN General Assembly Resolution 2158 (XXI) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, adopted on 6 December 1966, UN General Assembly Resolution 2692 (XXV)
on Permanent sovereignty over natural resources of developing countries and expansion
of domestic sources of accumulation for economic development, adopted on 11 December
1970, UN General Assembly Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) on Permanent sovereignty over natural
resources, adopted on 17 December 1973. Author’s emphasis added. It should be noted
that contrary to what its title suggests, Resolution 2692 (XXV) reaffirms the right to per-
manent sovereignty of both nations and peoples, especially in paragraph 2.
13 See the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UN
General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, para. 4(e).
14 See N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (1997), pp. 96-100.
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cause of development”.15 This is considered one of the founding principles
of the NIEO.
The NIEO Declaration is accompanied by a programme of action which
stipulates the measures that need to be taken for it to become fully effective.
One of the measures referred to in the programme of action is the adoption
of a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States as “an effective instru-
ment towards the establishment of a new system of international economic
relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and interdependence of the
interests of developed and developing countries”.16
The purpose of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which
was adopted later that year by a majority of the UN General Assembly,17 was
to promote “the new international economic order, based on equity, sovereign
equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all
States”.18 With regard to natural resources, the Charter proclaims the right
for “every State” to “freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including
possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and eco-
nomic activities”.19
From these resolutions it may be inferred that, in the context of the debate
in the UN General Assembly during the 1960s and early 1970s, the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources gradually shifted from a right
accruing to peoples and nations, as in the 1962 Declaration, to a right accruing
to States, as in the 1974 NIEO Declaration and Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States. In addition, during this same period, the scope covered by
the principle was extended from “natural wealth and resources” in the 1962
Declaration to “natural resources and all economic activities” in the NIEO
Declaration, and finally to “all its wealth, natural resources and economic
activities” in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. However,
the latter continued to be controversial.
15 Ibid., para. 4(r).
16 Programme of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UN
General Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, under VI.
17 The Charter was adopted with 120 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions. It met with considerable
opposition from developed States. See N.J. Schrijver, Development without Destruction: The
UN and Global Resource Management, United Nations Intellectual History Project Series,
Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press (2010), pp. 50-54.
18 UNGA Resolution 3281(XXIX) of 12 December 1974 on a Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States.
19 The text was adopted in spite of criticism by the developed states. See N.J. Schrijver,
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (1997), pp. 102-103.
Defining the right of peoples and States to freely exploit their natural resources 51
2.2.3 From resource rights to duties: permanent sovereignty and sustainable
development
Whereas the main focus of the debates in the UN General Assembly during
the first two stages of the evolution of the principle was on establishing rights,
the principle was increasingly incorporated in declarations and treaties as a
duty-based concept in the following decades. As a result of the evolution of
international environmental law during the 1970s and 1980s, the exercise of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources by States gradually became
qualified by obligations pertaining to the protection and management of
natural wealth and resources.20 These obligations relate both to the extraterri-
torial effects resulting from the use of natural resources by States, as well as
to the protection of parts of the environment within State boundaries that
represent a value to the international community as a whole.
The first obligation relates to the responsibility of States “to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national juris-
diction”. According to the International Court of Justice, this obligation has
become part of “the corpus of international law relating to the environment”.21
The obligation not to cause extraterritorial damage to the environment, which
was first expressed in the 1941 Trail Smelter case,22 was formulated in Prin-
ciple 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and
in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
as a corollary of the sovereign right of states “to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental and – in the Rio Declaration – develop-
mental policies”.23
In addition, the sovereign right of States to exploit their natural resources
and the corresponding responsibility not to cause transboundary environmental
20 For a detailed analysis of the impact of international environmental law on the notion of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, see N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural
Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1997),
Chapters 8 and 10.
21 According to the Court, “the existence of a general obligation of States to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or
of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating
to the environment”. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Reports 66, para 29.
22 In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the arbitral tribunal held that “under the principles of
international law […] no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such
a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties
or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established
by clear and convincing evidence”, Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada) 16
April 1938, 3 RIAA 1907 (1941).
23 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
16 June 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972); Declaration of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13 June 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
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harm has been incorporated in several international environmental conventions,
including the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 1992 UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the 1994 Convention to Combat
Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, Particularly in Africa.24
Moreover, some of these conventions formulate more precise obligations
aimed at the prevention of extraterritorial damage to the “global commons”.25
For example, the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, obliges parties to “take appropriate measures . . . to protect human
health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result
from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone
layer”.26 Similarly, the 1992 UNFCCC formulates as a general principle that
the parties should “protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations” and to that end must, inter alia, “promote sustainable
management” of sinks and reservoirs.27
While the prohibition against causing extraterritorial damage to the environ-
ment relates to the protection of the environment of third States and of areas
beyond national jurisdiction, international environmental law also contains
obligations for States with regard to the protection of their own natural wealth
and resources. These obligations flow from the general obligation to conserve
and use natural wealth and resources in a sustainable way for the benefit of
current and future generations, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4
of this book.28
24 See the second paragraph of the preamble of the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, Vienna, 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 323; Article 3 of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 May 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79; paragraph 8 of the preamble of
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, 9 May 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107; and paragraph 15 of the preamble of the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification,
Particularly in Africa, New York, 17 June 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3.
25 The term ‘global commons’ refers to what the Stockholm and Rio Declarations call the areas
beyond national jurisdiction. For an examination of the concept of ‘global commons’, see
N.J. Schrijver & V. Prislan, ‘From Mare Liberum to the Global Commons: Building on the
Grotian Heritage’, in Grotiana, Vol. 30 (2009), pp. 168–206.
26 Article 1 of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March
1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 323, while paragraph 2 of the preamble recalls that states have “the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies”.
27 Articles 3(1) and 4(1)(d) of the UNFCCC, while paragraph 8 of the preamble recalls that
states have “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies”.
28 For an examination of the notions of sustainable use, intergenerational equity and other
notions related to the concept of sustainable development, see N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Evolution
of Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception, Meaning and Status’, Recueil
des Cours, Vol. 329 (2007), Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2008), Chapter 5.
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While affirming the sovereignty of states over their natural resources, the
1972 Stockholm Declaration already placed great emphasis on the responsibility
of man to protect the environment and the earth’s natural resources.29 The
obligation to conserve and use natural wealth and resources in a sustainable
way is also inherent in the notion of sustainable development, which is com-
monly described as “development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.30
Several international environmental treaties take the sovereignty of states
over their natural resources as their starting point, but simultaneously contain
obligations which qualify the exercise of this sovereignty for the benefit of
the international community as a whole. Examples include the 1972 UNESCO
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
which obliges parties to identify, protect, conserve, present, and transmit to
future generations sites that have been designated as “natural heritage”, i.e.,
natural features, geological and physiographical formations and natural sites
“for whose protection it is the duty of the international community as a whole
to co-operate”,31 and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, which
obliges parties to cooperate with other states “for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity”, i.e., “the variability among living
organisms from all sources […] and the ecosystems and ecological complexes
of which they are a part”, the conservation of which is designated by the
convention as a “common concern of humankind”.32 In addition, the 1982
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) contains a mixed obligation,
referring to parts of the sea both within and outside the jurisdiction of States.
UNCLOS’s Article 193, one of the convention’s environmental provisions, asserts
the sovereign right of States to exploit their own natural resources and links
this right to the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.33
It can therefore be stated that international environmental law has both
expressed and qualified the sovereign right of States to exploit their own
29 In this respect, Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration states that “[m]an ... bears a solemn
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations”.
In addition, Principle 2 determines that “the natural resources of the earth ... must be safe-
guarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or
management”.
30 Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future, Report of the World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development (1987).
31 Articles 4 and 6 of the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, Paris, 23 November 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151. Article 6 also states that
the parties to the Convention fully respect “the sovereignty of the States on whose territory
the . . . natural heritage . . . is situated”.
32 Article 5, Article 2 and the third paragraph of the preamble of the Convention on Biological
Diversity. Article 3 formulates the principle that states have “the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies”.
33 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, New York, 10 December 1982, 1833
UNTS 3, Article 193.
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natural resources. International environmental law prescribes that States must
take due account of the environment when they exercise the rights flowing
from the principle of permanent sovereignty, both outside and inside their
national jurisdiction.34
2.2.4 Other duties: towards a people-oriented concept of permanent sover-
eignty
During the 1990s and the first decade of this century, international legal and
political instruments increasingly emphasised that sovereignty over natural
resources should be exercised in the interests of the country and its people.
In a way, this development can be regarded as a return to the foundations
of the principle of permanent sovereignty. As mentioned before, early resolu-
tions related to permanent sovereignty over natural resources were based on
the premise that States and people had the right to freely dispose of their
natural resources on condition that the natural resources were exploited for
national development and the well-being of the people. The very first principle
of the 1962 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
proclaims that “[t]he right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of
their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State
concerned”.35
As noted by Nico Schrijver, this condition gradually disappeared from
the permanent sovereignty-related resolutions.36 The condition re-emerged
in the context of resource-related armed conflicts. It was first referred to in
legal and political instruments adopted to address resource-related armed
conflicts. In a resolution entitled “Strengthening Transparency in Industries”,
adopted in 2008, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed that “every State has
and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty over all its wealth, natural
resources and economic activities” and in this respect recalled “its resolution
1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, in which it declared that the right of peoples
and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources
must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-
being of the people of the State concerned”.37 In addition, Article VII of the
Lomé Peace Agreement for Sierra Leone provides that “the Government shall
34 These obligations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 of this study.
35 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN General Assembly
Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962.
36 See N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (1997), pp. 308-309.
37 UN General Assembly Resolution 62/274 on Strengthening Transparency in Industries,
adopted on 26 September 2008, paras. 4 and 5.
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exercise full control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other
resources, for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone.”38
These legal and political instruments illustrate a new tendency to qualify
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources for the purpose
of promoting development. Article 3 of the Protocol of the International
Conference of the Great Lakes Region Against the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources, a regional treaty adopted by the members of the Inter-
national Conference on the Great Lakes Region to address the illegal exploita-
tion of natural resources in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, provides first
of all that “Member States shall freely dispose of their natural resources” and
adds that this right “shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people”.
It then specifies that “in no case, the populations of a State shall be deprived
of it”.39 In addition, the Protocol determines that “[m]ember States shall devel-
op and implement a participatory and transparent mechanism for the exploita-
tion of natural resources, according to their respective economic and social
systems”.40
It is interesting to note that Article 3 of the Protocol to a certain extent
reproduces Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
which provides: “All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural
resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people.
In no case shall a people be deprived of it”. However, there are some important
textual differences between the Protocol and the African Charter. The Protocol
vests the right to freely dispose of natural resources in States and not in
peoples. In addition, it determines that “populations” rather than “peoples”
may not be deprived of their right. By distinguishing so clearly between States
on the one hand, and peoples and populations on the other, the Protocol
emphasises the obligation of States to exploit their natural resources for
national development and the well-being of the population.
A similar trend to qualify the principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources can be recognised in resolutions of the Security Council. For
example, in Resolution 1457 (2003) on the DR Congo the Security Council
reaffirms the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo over its
natural resources and emphasises that these should be exploited “transparently,
legally and on a fair commercial basis, to benefit the country and its people”.41
In the same resolution, the Security Council encourages the Congolese govern-
ment to reform the natural resources sector “so that the riches of the Demo-
38 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, 7 July 1999.
39 Article 3(1) of the Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, adopted
by the members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region of 30 November
2006.
40 Ibid., Article 3(4).
41 UN Security Council Resolution 1457 (2003), in particular, paragraph 4.
56 Chapter 2
cratic Republic of the Congo can benefit the Congolese people”.42 Another
example is provided by Resolution 1521 (2003) on the situation in Liberia, in
which the Security Council emphasises that government revenues from the
Liberian timber industry must be used “for legitimate purposes for the benefit
of the Liberian people, including development”.43 It also encourages the
Liberian government to “establish transparent accounting and auditing
mechanisms” for this purpose.44
These instruments reveal a trend towards the adoption of a people-oriented
interpretation of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources.45 This people-oriented interpretation strengthens an interpretation
of the principle of permanent sovereignty which concentrates on the obligations
of governments vis-à-vis the people of the State. Thus, arguably, while the
principle of permanent sovereignty has always given rise to horizontal rights
and – at a later stage – obligations, a contemporary interpretation of the
principle increasingly adds a vertical dimension to the right to exercise per-
manent sovereignty.46
2.3 THE NATURE AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENT SOVER-
EIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has acquired
a strong status in international law. While it originated in resolutions of the
UN General Assembly, the principle has received recognition in various binding
legal instruments as well. First, several international environmental conventions
take the sovereign right of States to exploit their natural resources as their
starting point. Examples include the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), and the 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Coun-
tries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in
Africa, which all refer to the principle in their preambles. In addition, the 1972
UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity contain references
to the principle.
The principle of permanent sovereignty is also reflected in human rights
law as a component of the right to self-determination. The 1966 Human Rights
42 Ibid., para. 7.
43 UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), in particular, paragraph 11.
44 Ibid., para. 13.
45 Compare E. Duruigbo, ‘Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Re-
sources in International Law’, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 33, p. 33-100
(2006), for a thorough analysis of a people-centred construction of permanent sovereignty
and its implications for the management of natural resources in a state.
46 Also see chapter 3 of this study.
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Covenants formulate a right for peoples to freely dispose over their natural
resources,47 while a similar provision has been inserted in the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.48 In addition, the principle has been included
in the preamble and the provisions of the Protocol Against the Illegal Exploita-
tion of Natural Resources, referred to in the preceding section.49
Furthermore, the principle has found recognition in the practice of the UN
Security Council in relation to the maintenance of international peace and
security. In its Presidential Statement of 25 June 2007 on natural resources and
conflict, the Security Council “reaffirms that every state has the full and
inherent sovereign right to control and exploit its own natural resources in
accordance with the Charter and the principles of international law”.50 The
Security Council has also occasionally referred to the principle, e.g., in Resolu-
tion 330 (1973) on “Strengthening of International Peace and Security in Latin
America” and in Resolution 1457 (2003) on “The situation concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo”, referred to in the preceding section.51
It can be concluded that the principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources has found widespread recognition in legal and political
documents. While not all of the treaties that refer to the principle of permanent
sovereignty do so in their provisions, the principle of permanent sovereignty
is consistently included as a basic principle for international regulations
relating to natural resources found within national jurisdiction. Therefore it
can be argued that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources is one of the organizing principles of international law relating to
natural resources.
It can also be argued that the principle of permanent sovereignty is part
of customary international law. The status of the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources as a principle of customary international
law was also expressly recognised by the International Court of Justice in the
47 See the identical Articles 1(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), New York, Annex to UNGA Resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966,
993 UNTS 3; and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), New
York, Annex 2 to UNGA Resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
48 See Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Banjul, 27 June 1981,
21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
49 Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, adopted by the members
of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region of 30 November 2006, Article 3.
50 Presidential Statement on ‘Maintenance of international peace and security: natural resources
and conflict’, UN Doc. S/PRST/2007/22 of 25 June 2007, para. 2.
51 In Resolution 330 on ‘Strengthening of International Peace and Security in Latin America’,
adopted on 21 March 1973, the Security Council recalls several General Assembly resolutions
and notes “with deep concern the existence and use of coercive measures which affect the
free exercise of permanent sovereignty over the natural resources of Latin American
countries”. In Resolution 1457 on ‘The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of
the Congo’, adopted on 24 January 2003, para. 2 of the preamble, the Security Council
reaffirmed “the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo over its natural
resources”.
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DR Congo-Uganda case.52 However, the Court did not elaborate on its findings.
Instead, it simply recalled that the principle of permanent sovereignty is
expressed in the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
and is elaborated in greater detail in the NIEO Declaration and the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States.
The references of the Court to these three UN General Assembly resolutions
raise some important questions. The first concerns the legal basis for the
customary international law status of the principle of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources. Did the Court imply that the principle of permanent
sovereignty derives its status as a principle of customary international law
from these UN General Assembly resolutions? This does not seem likely, given
their legal status, as well as the controversies regarding the resolutions. Rather
it could be argued that the Court referred to these declarations because they
comprehensively set out the principle of permanent sovereignty.
The second question concerns what is covered by the customary inter-
national law principle of permanent sovereignty. As discussed above, the NIEO
Declaration, as well as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
significantly widened the scope of the principle of permanent sovereignty from
“natural wealth and resources” in the 1962 Declaration to “all its wealth,
natural resources and economic activities” in the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties. In line with international practice, it is argued here that as a legal
principle, the principle of permanent sovereignty applies only to natural wealth
and resources.
The final question concerns the rights and obligations related to the prin-
ciple of permanent sovereignty. Does the customary international law status
of the principle extend to all rights and obligations ensuing from the principle?
In particular, does it include an obligation to exploit natural resources for
national development and the well-being of the people, as formulated in the
1962 Declaration? In his Declaration on the judgment, Judge Koroma argues
in favour of such an interpretation. Moreover, he argues that the obligation
to exploit natural resources for national development and the well-being of
the people, as well as the basic right to exploit natural resources, “remain in
effect at all times, including during armed conflict and during occupation”.53
52 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 244.
53 Declaration of Judge Koroma to the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 19
December 2005 in the Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 11. Emphasis in
original.
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2.4 LEGAL SUBJECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER
NATURAL RESOURCES
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources accrues to States
as well as peoples. For States, the principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources must be regarded as an attribute of State sovereignty. This
is how the principle appears in international environmental instruments.
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio
Declaration and Article 3 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity all
proclaim that “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources…” Similarly, Article 6 of the 1972 World Heritage Conven-
tion expresses its full respect for “the sovereignty of the States on whose
territory the cultural and natural heritage […] is situated”.
Furthermore, the principle of permanent sovereignty has developed as part
of the right to self-determination of peoples and has been inserted in the
identical Articles 1(2) of the ICESCR and the ICCPR as a right for peoples to freely
dispose over their natural resources. In this respect, it should be noted that
peoples are referred to both as legal subjects and as beneficiaries of the prin-
ciple of permanent sovereignty. This is particularly clear from the authoritative
1962 Declaration on the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, which declares that “the right of peoples and nations to permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources must be exercised in the interest of
their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State
concerned”.54
The dual character of peoples as subjects and beneficiaries of the principle
of permanent sovereignty has two important implications. First, it implies that
natural resources must be exploited for the benefit of the people of a State.
Secondly, as legal subjects of the principle of permanent sovereignty, peoples
can also assert rights over the State’s natural resources. These issues are
discussed in more detail in the following chapter, dealing with peoples’ rights.
This chapter will also deal with the preliminary question of defining the groups
that qualify as “peoples” under international law.
2.5 THE POSITION OF GOVERNMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law designates States and peoples as subjects of the principle
of permanent sovereignty, and there is an implicit assumption that States and
peoples have institutions that exercise the relevant rights and obligations on
their behalf. The existence of such institutions even constitutes one of the
54 See UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, 14 December 1962, especially paragraph 1. Author’s emphasis added.
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defining features of a State, as demonstrated by the definition of a State in
the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. This
definition, which is generally considered to be part of customary international
law, determines that a State should possess the following qualifications: a
permanent population; a defined territory; a government; and the capacity
to enter into relations with other States.55
In most cases, States do have a government that represents the State and
its people. In these cases, the government is also the appropriate body to
exercise control over the State’s natural resources. Nevertheless, there are also
situations where the government of a State does not represent or no longer
represents the people of the State. Examples include the illegal white minority
regime that ruled Southern Rhodesia between 1964 and 1978, and the Gaddafi
regime that lost its legitimacy as a result of its actions against the Libyan
population during the armed conflict in 2011.
Furthermore, in most internal armed conflicts the legitimacy of the govern-
ment is contested by opposition forces. In some cases, there are even parallel
government authorities that enjoy a certain measure of recognition by foreign
States. One of the most prominent examples of this was the Angolan opposition
group UNITA that – until it lost the democratic elections in 1992 – enjoyed some
support from western States, notably from the United States and South Africa.
During this period, UNITA was in control of part of the territory of Angola,
where it exploited diamonds and even issued concessions to companies to
mine diamonds.
The question that arises is whether international law contains rules to
determine whether particular entities in a State are entitled to exercise per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources. For the most part, international
law remains silent on these matters.56 Formally, international law deals with
the recognition of States, and not of governments. It generally presumes that
a government represents the State, even when the government has been
installed as a result of an internal revolution.57 Furthermore, international
55 Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December
1933, 165 LNTS 19.
56 For a thorough analysis of issues regarding the recognition of governments in international
law, see, in particular, S. Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With
Particular Reference to Governments in Exile, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1998); and B.R. Roth,
Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1999). An older
example is H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press (1947).
57 See H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
(1947; paperback edition 2012), pp. 91-93.
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law presumes that the de jure government continues to represent the State as
a whole, as long as an internal power struggle continues.58
The question that arises is whether these long-standing rules of customary
international law have retained their relevance over time. An examination of
modern State practice in relation to recent changes in government demonstrates
the continuing relevance of these rules, but it also demonstrates the importance
attached by the international community to the existence of a representative
government in States. This can be illustrated with reference to the response
of the international community to the coups d’état in Haiti and Sierra Leone
on the one hand, and to the revolutions in Libya and Syria on the other.
First, the response of the international community to the coups in Haiti
in 1991 and Sierra Leone in 1997 underlines the importance it attaches to
upholding democratic governance.59 In both cases the international community
condemned the coup d’état and proceeded to take further action, including
military intervention, to restore the democratically elected government.
In response to the coup d’état in Haiti in 1991, which brought down the
democratically elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide, the UN General Assem-
bly immediately adopted a resolution in which it strongly condemned “the
attempted illegal replacement of the constitutional President”, considering “as
unacceptable any entity resulting from that illegal situation”. It also demanded
“the immediate restoration of the legitimate Government”.60 Two years later,
in its Resolution 841 (1993), the UN Security Council deplored the fact that
“despite the efforts of the international community, the legitimate government
of Jean Bertrand Aristide has not been reinstated”. It went on to emphasise
the “unique and exceptional circumstances” of the situation, notably the
requests by the Permanent Representative of Haiti and the Organization of
American States to adopt sanctions, as well as the general humanitarian
situation in Haiti, as the basis for further Security Council action.61
Reference can also be made to the coup d’état which took place in Sierra
Leone in 1997. As a result of this coup, a military junta was established by
58 See H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
(1947; paperback edition 2012), p. 93. For the distinction between de jure and de facto
governments, see S. Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular
Reference to Governments in Exile, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1998), in particular, pp. 226-231.
Talmon defines a de facto government as: “an authority which has gained effective control
of the State by overthrowing the constitutional government in a coup d’état or a revolution
but [which] has not (yet) been recognized as legally qualified to represent the State on the
international plane”. De facto governments should be distinguished from occupation
governments, although the latter are also regarded as exercising de facto authority. However,
in contrast to de facto governments, the legal position of occupants is regulated through
international law. For more details, see Chapter 6 of this study.
59 See also K.M. Manusama, The United Nations Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era:
Applying the Principle of Legality, Leiden: Nijhoff (2006), pp. 153-154.
60 UN General Assembly Resolution 46/7 of 11 October 1991, paras. 1 and 2.
61 UN Security Council Resolution 841 (1993), paragraphs of the preamble.
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the opposition group AFRC (and later joined by the RUF) which lasted over a
year. The Security Council immediately condemned the coup. In particular,
it demanded that the military junta “take immediate steps to relinquish power
in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically elected
Government and a return to constitutional order”.62
While the cases of Haiti and Sierra Leone serve as examples of the attitude
of the international community with regard to coups d’état against demo-
cratically elected governments, the recent revolutions in the Arab region,
including the revolution in Libya in 2011 and the current revolution in Syria
are examples of the attitude of the international community to popular revolu-
tions against authoritarian regimes.
The response of the international community to the situation in Libya is
most telling in this respect.63 It is relevant to note that during the armed
conflict in Libya, neither the UN Security Council nor individual States made
any explicit pronouncements about the illegality of the existing de jure govern-
ment. For example, in the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council in
response to the events during the civil war in Libya in 2011, the UN Security
Council refrained from making any pronouncements about the legal status
of the Gaddafi regime. Even though it imposed economic and diplomatic
sanctions against the regime, the Security Council continued to address the
Gaddafi government in the role of the official authorities representing the
Libyan State in its resolutions. The UN Security Council did not pronounce
on the status of the National Transitional Council (NTC), the main opposition
group in Libya.
However, individual States started to express their recognition for the NTC
during the course of the armed conflict, although these States did not recognise
the NTC as the official government of Libya, but rather as the representative
of the Libyan people.64 In other words, the recognition by States of the NTC
as the representative of the Libyan people did not affect the legal position of
the Gaddafi regime as the official de jure government of Libya. The official
position of States changed only after the defeat of the Gaddafi regime. In
Resolution 2009 (2011), the Security Council implicitly recognised the National
Transitional Council, formed by the opposition forces, as the new Libyan
authorities.
Similar responses can be observed in relation to the ongoing conflict in
Syria. In 2011, protests broke out in Syria, demanding democratic reforms.
After these protests were violently repressed by the Syrian President Assad,
62 See the Security Council’s Presidential Statements of 27 May 1997 (S/PRST/1997/29), 11
July 1997 (S/PRST/1997/36) and 6 August 1997 (S/PRST/1997/42) as well as Resolution
1132 (1997), especially paragraph 1.
63 For more details on the Libyan conflict, see Chapter 7.
64 See S. Talmon, ‘Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council’, ASIL Insights,
Vol. 15 (16), 16 June 2011.
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an armed conflict broke out in the country. The opposition forces, organized
in the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCS),
have gained control over parts of the country. However, the international
community has so far been divided on the issue, and consequently the UN
Security Council has not been able to adopt any measures. The UN General
Assembly, on the other hand, has adopted several resolutions regarding Syria,
calling on the Syrian authorities to put an end to the human rights violations
committed by the authorities and to embrace a peace plan prepared under
the auspices of the League of Arab States.65 However, while the General
Assembly stressed its support “for the aspirations of the Syrian people for
a peaceful, democratic and pluralistic society”66 in several of its resolutions,
it has not pronounced on the illegality of the Assad government.
Furthermore, while individual States have expressed their support for the
opposition, recognising the NCS as the sole representative of the Syrian people,
none of these States – except Libya – has recognised the NCS as the new
government of Syria.67 Nevertheless, as was the case in the Libyan conflict,
third States have started to provide the NCS with active support. For example,
in a recent decision the European Union decided to ease its embargo on oil
from Syria and to allow exports of oil from rebel-held territory in Syria in order
to “support and help the opposition”.68 In addition, both the European Union
and the United States have expressed their intention to permit the supply of
weapons to the Syrian opposition, if scheduled peace talks between the Syrian
government and the opposition fail.69
These case studies lead to the conclusion that the international community
makes a distinction between coups d’état against democratically elected govern-
ments and internal revolutions against authoritarian regimes. Whereas coups
against democratically elected governments are unanimously condemned by
the international community, regime changes that have been brought about
through internal revolutions against authoritarian regimes are considered
legitimate. This conclusion is supported by regional instruments that deal with
the recognition of governments. It is relevant to note that the two regions that
have suffered most from coup d’états in recent history, i.e., Africa and Latin
America, have both adopted instruments that attach legal consequences to
unconstitutional changes in government.
65 See UN General Assembly Resolution 66/176 of 19 December 2011; Resolution 66/253 of
16 February 2012; and Resolution 67/183 of 20 December 2012.
66 See, e.g., UN General Assembly Resolution 67/183 of 20 December 2012, para. 4.
67 For the position of Libya, see ‘Libya NTC says (it) recognises Syrian National Council’,
Khaleey Times of 11 October 2011.
68 Council of the European Union, Press release: Council eases sanctions against Syria to
support opposition and civilians, EU Doc. 8611/13, 22 April 2013.
69 See, e.g., the Decision of the Council of the European Union of 27 May 2013 on Syria,
available through http://www.consilium.europa.eu/.
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Article 7(g) of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace
and Security Council of the African Union provides that the African Peace
and Security Council shall “institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional
change of Government takes place in a Member State, as provided for in the
Lomé Declaration”.70 The Lomé Declaration distinguishes between four
situations of unconstitutional changes of government, including a military coup
d’état against a democratically elected government, as happened in Sierra
Leone in 1997, and the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish
power to the winning party after elections, as happened in Côte d’Ivoire in
2011.71 Similarly Article 9 of the Charter of the Organization of American
States provides that the right to participate in the sessions of the principal
organs of the organization may be suspended for a member of the Organization
whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force.72
An important conclusion that can be drawn from these regional instruments
is that there is an indirect premise that the legitimacy of governments is based
on a popular mandate. Although both instruments clearly show that neither
of the regional systems recognises a government that has taken power by force,
this applies only to the extent that this force is directed towards the overthrow
of a democratically elected government. The instruments therefore leave open
the possibility of recognising a government that has been established as a result
of a coup d’état directed against an authoritarian regime.
Some cautious conclusions can be drawn from modern State practice in
relation to regime change. The first conclusion is that regime change resulting
from coups d’état against democratically elected governments is generally not
accepted by the international community. In contrast, the international com-
munity does recognise governments that are established after a successful
internal revolution against an authoritarian regime. This demonstrates the great
importance attached by the international community to the representative
character of governments. Another conclusion that can be drawn from modern
state practice is that, even when States express their support to opposition
forces, the status quo of a ruling de jure government is maintained until the
conflict is over.
70 See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union, Adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, on
9 July 2002.
71 The Lomé Declaration distinguishes the following situations as unconstitutional changes
in government: i) military coup d’état against a democratically elected Government; ii)
intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government; iii) replacement
of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident groups and rebel movements;
iv) the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after
free, fair and regular elections. See the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the framework
for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes of government (AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI).
72 Charter of the Organization of American States, adopted on 30 April 1948 (last amended
on 10 June 1993), 119 UNTS 3.
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There is still the question of the implications of modern State practice for
the right of opposition groups to exploit natural resources and to issue mining
concessions in situations where the legitimacy of the government is contested.
The cases of Libya and Syria provide a partial answer to this question.
Although official recognition of the opposition forces as the new government
of the State has not occurred in either of these situations during the armed
conflict, the opposition movements are considered to be entitled to exploit
the State’s natural resources. This is clearly shown by the decision of the
European Union referred to above, which lifted the EU embargo on oil from
Syria for exports of oil from rebel-held territory.
How can this decision be explained? Arguably, the most logical explanation
is to interpret the support provided to the opposition groups in Libya and
Syria in the light of the nineteenth- century theory of recognition of belliger-
ency, discussed in Chapter 6 of this book. According to this theory, third States
can recognise an armed group as an official belligerent, thus rendering the
armed conflict international. This recognition has the effect of making armed
groups that are in effective control of portions of the State territory subject
to international occupation law, which grants occupants a qualified right to
exploit the natural resources in occupied territory.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the right to exploit a State’s natural
resources pursuant to the principle of permanent sovereignty is normally
vested in the government of a State. However, in those cases where the legality
of the government is contested, the right to exploit the State’s natural resources
can accrue to opposition groups as well, provided that these groups enjoy
recognition by a sufficient number of third States as the sole representative
of the people. It can be inferred from the case studies and legal instruments
referred to above that recognition is granted when the de jure government can
no longer be considered to represent its people. It can further be inferred from
the case studies of Libya and Syria that this occurs when a government deliber-
ately harms its people. This is what happened in Libya and Syria, where the
de jure governments were accused of gross human rights violations against
their own population.
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The principle of permanent sovereignty is a typical product of the era of
decolonisation. It was established to help newly independent and developing
States to regain control over their natural resources. It was intended to provide
a shield for these countries to defend their interests against other countries
and foreign companies, in particular against inequitable arrangements for the
exploitation of their natural resources. Initially permanent sovereignty was
therefore primarily a rights-based concept, applicable in inter-state relations.
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Over the years, the principle of permanent sovereignty has proved to be
a dynamic concept. It has become the organizing principle for the governance
of natural resources within States, entailing both rights and obligations for
States. States have qualified their right to exercise permanent sovereignty over
natural resources, amongst other things, to protect the environment. Moreover,
the rights and obligations attached to the principle have increasingly been
given a vertical as well as a horizontal dimension. Recent legal and political
instruments emphasise the promotion of national development as the central
objective of the exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. In
addition, these instruments assign a central position to peoples in this regard,
and stipulate that natural resources must be exploited for the benefit of the
people.
The following chapters examine these issues in more detail. Chapter 3
discusses permanent sovereignty as an inherent part of the right to self-deter-
mination. In addition, it examines the closely related right to development.
Subsequently, Chapter 4 discusses obligations arising from international
environmental law and their impact on the principle of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources.
3 A closer look at peoples as subjects and
beneficiaries of the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources
3.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The principle of permanent sovereignty accrues to both States and to peoples.
For States, the right to freely dispose of their natural resources is an attribute
of their sovereignty, while for peoples, the right to freely dispose of their
natural resources is an inherent part of their right to self-determination. In
both cases, it is the government of a State which has the primary responsibility
for exercising the associated rights and for fulfilling the associated obligations
on behalf of the State and its people. The responsibility of the government
to exercise permanent sovereignty on behalf of the State and its people takes
shape in an obligation to exercise the right to permanent sovereignty over
natural resources for the purpose of promoting national development and
ensuring the well-being of the people. This chapter aims to determine the
implications of this obligation for the governance of natural resources within
a sovereign State. What is meant by saying that natural resources must be
exploited for national development and the well-being of the people? This
chapter also examines the implications of considering peoples as subjects of
the right to self-determination. What is meant by saying that peoples have
the right to freely dispose over their natural resources?
These questions are examined from the perspective of the right to self-
determination and the closely related right to development. Both rights have
an external and an internal dimension. This chapter argues that the internal
dimension of these rights must be interpreted first and foremost as entailing
a corresponding obligation for governments to provide the possibility for
peoples to participate in a State’s decision-making processes. In addition, it
is argued that the right to development entails a right for peoples as well as
for individuals to enjoy the benefits deriving from development.
In order to fully understand the rights to self-determination and to develop-
ment, as well as their implications for the governance of natural resources,
it is essential to determine first which groups are eligible to exercise these
rights. Therefore section 2 examines the notion of “peoples”. Sections 3 and
4 of this chapter discuss the evolution, contents, nature and legal status of the
right to self-determination and the right to development, as well as the implica-
tions of these rights for peoples living in sovereign States. Finally, section 5
draws some final conclusions.
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3.2 A MORE DETAILED DEFINITION OF “PEOPLES”
International law does not contain a formal definition of the term “peoples”.
This section examines some of the definitions that have been elaborated to
define peoples in order to identify the groups eligible to exercise peoples’
rights.
3.2.1 A definition of “peoples”
International human rights law has granted peoples several rights, including
the right to exist, the right to self-determination and the right to development.
Over the years, several attempts have been made to identify the groups eligible
to exercise the associated rights. Some of these definitions have focused on
distinguishing peoples from minorities in order to determine which groups
are entitled to exercise the right to external self-determination.1 However,
attempts have also been made to draft more general definitions which would
apply to all “third generation” rights.
Most definitions focus on a combination of common characteristics of group
members on the one hand, and self-identification as a people on the other.
For example, Yoram Dinstein argues that “peoplehood must be seen as con-
tingent on two separate elements, one objective and the other subjective”. In
his opinion, “the objective element is that there has to exist an ethnic group
linked by common history”, while the subjective basis for peoplehood consists
of “an ethos or state of mind”.2
While Yoram Dinstein opts for a narrow interpretation of the term people
by confining its scope to ethnic groups, a broader definition emerged from
an international meeting of experts convened by UNESCO in 1989 under the
chairmanship of Justice Michael Kirby. The final report of the group of experts
describes a “people” as a group of individuals who enjoy certain common
features, such as a common historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity,
cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious or ideological affinity, terri-
torial connection and a common economic life. In addition, the group must
have a size that exceeds a mere association of individuals within a State, it
1 On the issue of minority rights, see S. Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005); L.A. Thio, Managing Babel: The International
Legal Protection of Minorities in the Twentieth Century, Leiden: Nijhoff (2005); Y. Dinstein &
M. Tabory (ed.), The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers (1992); P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, reprint (2001); B. Vukas, ‘States, Peoples and Minorities’, Receuil des Cours,
Vol. 231 (1991), pp. 263-524.
2 Y. Dinstein, ‘Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities’, International & Comparative
Law Quarterly Vol. 25 (1976), p. 104. It should be noted that Dinstein primarily looked at
the notion from the perspective of self-determination.
Peoples as subjects and beneficiaries of the principle of PSNR 69
must either have the will to be identified as a people or the consciousness of
being a people and the group must be able to express its common character-
istics and will for identity in the form of institutions or by other means.3
The first drawback of this definition is that it does not properly recognise
that the term people refers to more than a “group of individuals”. A people
is an entity in itself, which – as a community – can have interests that do not
coincide with the interests of each individual member of the group. There may
even be a conflict between the interests of the group as a whole and the
interests of some individuals in that group.
This is illustrated by a case brought before the Human Rights Committee
relating to the traditional right of an indigenous people to engage in reindeer
husbandry. This case has not been chosen to discuss the status of indigenous
peoples as “peoples” under international law,4 but rather to illustrate the
general point that communities have an identity that is distinct from their
individual members.
In the case of Kitok v. Sweden, Swedish law restricted the right to engage
in reindeer husbandry to members of Sami villages in order to protect the
culture of the Sami community. There were important reasons for restricting
the number of reindeer herders, above all to ensure the survival of the Sami
community as a whole. Swedish legislation left it to the Sami community to
determine who was a member of the community and who was not. The
complainant was of Sami origin, but because his community did not accept
him as a member of a particular Sami village, he could not engage in reindeer
herding for a living. Therefore there was a clear conflict between the right
of Mr. Kitok as a member of the Sami community to engage in an economic
activity and the right of the Sami community as a whole to preserve its culture
by refusing individual members the right to engage in this economic activity.
In this case, the Human Rights Committee considered that the Swedish govern-
ment had not violated Mr. Kitok’s right to enjoy his culture. Specifically, the
Committee considered that the method selected by the Swedish government
to protect the interests of the Sami community as a whole was reasonable and
consistent with Article 27 of the ICCPR.5
Despite the wording of Article 27 of the ICCPR, which proclaims a right
for individuals belonging to particular minorities to enjoy their culture, it can
therefore be concluded from the application of Article 27 in this case that a
community is more than a group of individuals. It has a separate identity.
3 Final Report and Recommendations of the International Meeting of Experts on further study
of the concept of the rights of peoples, UNESCO, Doc. SHS-89/CONF.602/7, 22 February
1990, p. 8.
4 It is relevant to note here that indigenous peoples do not constitute ‘peoples’ for the purpose
of exercising a right to external self-determination. However, as this chapter will illustrate,
indigenous peoples are eligible to assert particular peoples’ rights.
5 Human Rights Committee, Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/
D/197/1985 (1988).
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This is not adequately recognised in the UNESCO definition of peoples. Further-
more, as acknowledged by the UNESCO report itself, the practical relevance
of the definition – or any definition for that matter – is limited. Not only are
the elements that the definition identifies not sufficiently specific to distinguish
peoples from other groups, but in addition the notion of peoples by its very
nature is a dynamic concept which may have different meanings in different
contexts.6 As Budislav Vukas noted: “International practice does not even tend
to provide and use one single definition and meaning of the expression
‘people’. We witness an always more diversified use of this term simultaneous-
ly with the increased interest for the individual and different groups in inter-
national relations and in international law”.7
In fact, depending on the particular context in which it is used, the term
“people” can refer to a variety of groups or entities, even within a single
document. For example, as regards the UN Charter, there are slight variations
in the use of the term throughout. The reference to “We the peoples of the
United Nations” in the opening words of the Charter – read together with
the reference to “our respective governments” in the closing paragraph of the
preamble – may be said to refer to the peoples living in UN member States.8
Articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter – which indicate that friendly relations
among nations should be based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples – refer to peoples in a generic sense, in-
cluding peoples living in UN member States as well as other peoples.9 Finally,
Article 73 of the UN Charter uses the term “peoples” exclusively to designate
the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories.
6 In this respect, the UNESCO report indicates that “[I]t is possible that, for different purposes
of international law, different groups may be a ‘people’. A key to understanding the
meaning of ‘people’ in the context of the rights of peoples may be the clarification of the
function protected by particular rights. A further key may lie in distinguishing between
claims to desirable objectives and rights which are capable of clear expression and accept-
ance as legal norms”. Final Report and Recommendations of the International Meeting of
Experts on further study of the concept of the rights of peoples, UNESCO, Doc. SHS-89/
CONF.602/7, 22 February 1990, p. 8.
7 B. Vukas, ‘States, Peoples and Minorities’, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 231 (1991), p. 318.
8 It is relevant to note that the reference to “We the peoples” was inserted at the instigation
of the United States delegation, which considered the reference as an expression of the
democratic basis on which the new organization was to be founded. However, as pointed
out by the Netherlands, not all governments represented in San Francisco could be regarded
as deriving their mandate directly from the people. This issue was resolved by establishing
a connection between “We the peoples” and “our respective governments”. See O. Spijkers,
The United Nations, the Evolution of Global Values and International Law, School of Human
Rights Research Series, Vol. 47, Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia (2011), pp. 66-67.
9 Indeed, the travaux préparatoires specify that “peoples” should be understood to designate
“groups of human beings who may, or may not, comprise states or nations”. See Memo-
randum of the Secretary on a List of Certain Repetitive Words and Phrases in the Charter,
Document WD381, CO/156, 18 June 1945, in Documents of the United Nations Conference
on International Organization (UNCIO), Vol. 18, New York: United Nations (1954), p. 658.
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Another example is provided by the African Charter of Human and
Peoples’ Rights, which recognises, inter alia, the rights of peoples to exist
(Article 20), to self-determination (Article 20), to freely dispose of their wealth
and natural resources (Article 21), to development (Article 22) and to an
adequate environment (Article 24). A closer analysis of the use of the term
“peoples” in this legal instrument reveals that it refers to such groups as the
populations of non-self-governing territories, to the State itself, to the entire
population of a state and to indigenous peoples.10 Therefore it may be con-
cluded that several groups are eligible to qualify as peoples for the purpose
of exercising the rights associated with the term.
In conclusion, the term “peoples” refers to a dynamic concept that can be
applied to different groups, depending on the context and the particular right
that is invoked. The term “peoples” is used first and foremost to designate
those groups that are eligible to exercise a right to external self-determination.
In this sense, as explained in the following section, the term “peoples” refers
exclusively to colonial peoples and to peoples under external subjugation.
Nevertheless, other groups are also eligible to exercise peoples’ rights. In
particular it is possible to identify two categories of peoples in the context
of the sovereign State. These are the population of a State as a whole, as well
as specific groups within a State, in particular, indigenous peoples and peoples
that constitute a minority in independent States.11
All these groups benefit from the general protection provided by human
rights law to the population of a State as a whole and to individuals within
a society. Moreover, minorities and indigenous peoples have been assigned
a special status in international law in order to protect their culture. They are
eligible to exercise people’s rights only for this purpose. This section briefly
discusses the position of indigenous peoples in international law, because these
peoples have a special relationship with their lands and the natural resources
situated on their lands.
10 For a detailed analysis of the different meanings of the term ‘peoples’ in the African Charter
on Human and Peoples Rights, see R.N. Kiwanuka, ‘The Meaning of “People” in the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 82, No.
1 (1988), pp. 80-101.
11 As regards minorities, a distinction can be made between four types of minorities, as
recognised in the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. See Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN General Assembly
Resolution 47/135, 18 December 1992. With the exception of national minorities, these
groups enjoy the rights referred to in Article 27 of the ICCPR.
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3.2.2 “Peoples” in the sense of indigenous peoples
Indigenous peoples are communities in society that are descended from the
traditional inhabitants of a country.12 These communities have their own
culture and traditions that differ from the dominant culture in a given society.
Examples include the Maori in New Zealand, the Sami in Finland and the
San people in Southern Africa. More specifically, indigenous peoples can be
defined as:
“peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account
of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical
region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the
establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status,
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institu-
tions”.13
In many cases, indigenous peoples have a special relationship with the land
they live on, which is an essential part of their culture. In order to protect their
traditional way of life and their identity as a community, indigenous peoples
have been granted a number of rights, including rights over land and natural
resources.14
The principal binding legal instrument in which the rights of indigenous
peoples were formulated is ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.15 However, this Convention has
been ratified by only 20 States. The hesitancy of States to ratify the Convention
is indicative of the controversies surrounding the recognition of indigenous
12 For a more detailed analysis of the special position of indigenous peoples in international
law, see A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination,
Culture and Land, Cambridge studies in international and comparative law, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (2007); and N.J. Schrijver, ‘Unravelling State Sovereignty? The
Controversy on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Permanent Sovereignty over their
Natural Wealth and Resources’, in Boerefijn, I. & Goldschmidt, J. (ed.), Changing Perceptions
of Sovereignty and Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Cees Flinterman, Antwerp/Oxford/
Portland: Intersentia (2008), pp. 85-98. See also the final report of the Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights, Mrs. Erica Daes, on Indigenous peoples’ permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 of 13 July 2004 and its
addendum, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30/Add.1 of 12 July 2004.
13 Article 1(1)(b) of the ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, Geneva, 27 June 1989 (entry into force: 5 September 1991), 28 ILM
1382 (1989).
14 For a general account of the position of indigenous peoples in international law, see
A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination, Culture and
Land, Cambridge studies in international and comparative law, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2007).
15 ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
Geneva, 27 June 1989 (entry into force: 5 September 1991), 28 ILM 1382 (1989). This Conven-
tion has been ratified by only 22 States.
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rights. Key provisions of the Convention focus on the protection of the culture
of indigenous peoples (Article 5), consultation with indigenous peoples regard-
ing matters that directly affect them (Article 6) and the right of indigenous
peoples to control their own development (Article 7).
Furthermore, in order to avoid any misunderstandings regarding the legal
status of indigenous peoples under the Convention, Article 1(3) of ILO Conven-
tion 169 specifies that “[t]he use of the term ‘peoples’ in this Convention shall
not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may
attach to the term under international law”. This provision should be inter-
preted as a safeguard to prevent indigenous peoples from claiming a right
to secession.
In 2007, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.16 This declaration does not define the term “indigenous
peoples”, but it does indicate in Article 2 that “indigenous peoples and indi-
viduals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals”.17
The Declaration carefully defines and outlines the rights of indigenous
peoples. Article 3 of the Declaration grants a right to self-determination to
indigenous peoples, which, according to Article 4, concerns “matters relating
to their internal and local affairs”.18 Other substantive rights regulate specific
matters relating to the special position of indigenous peoples, such as the rights
to practice their cultural and religious traditions, as formulated in Articles
11 and 12 of the declaration.
The Declaration also contains detailed provisions regarding the protection
of indigenous peoples’ traditional lands. Article 26, for example, formulates
a right for indigenous peoples “to own, use, develop and control the lands,
territories and resources that they possess”. In addition, Article 27 formulates
an obligation for States to establish an impartial, open and transparent process
“to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to
their lands, territories and resources”. Finally, and of the utmost importance
for the current book, Article 32 determines that States must
“consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and
informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources”.
16 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Annex to UN General
Assembly Resolution 61/295, 2 October 2007.
17 Author’s emphasis added.
18 In this regard, also see Article 46(1), which determines that nothing in the declaration may
be construed as “authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States”. This provision thus confirms that for indigenous peoples the right to self-determina-
tion does not entail a right to secession.
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This provision constitutes the basis for the obligations of governments regard-
ing the exploitation of natural resources on indigenous lands. This obligation
was also recognised by the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Guidelines of both Committees
indicate that a proper implementation of the right to self-determination implies
the recognition and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to ownership
of the lands and territories that they traditionally occupy or use for their
livelihood. It also requires the establishment of procedures allowing for in-
digenous and local communities to be duly consulted, as well as the adoption
of decision-making processes which seek the prior informed consent of in-
digenous peoples and local communities regarding matters that affect their
rights and interests under the Covenant.19
Of course, neither the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples nor
the Guidelines of these two authoritative human rights committees are legally
binding. Nevertheless, the obligation to consult indigenous peoples has also
been recognised in the case law of the Human Rights Committee itself and
in the case law of other human rights bodies, notably in relation to the pro-
tection of minority rights and the right to self-determination. This case law
is discussed in section 3 of this chapter in relation to the right to self-deter-
mination.
3.2.3 Concluding remarks on the definition of peoples
The notion of “peoples” is a dynamic concept which can apply to different
groups.20 However, in the context of a sovereign State, the term “peoples”
refers in particular to all persons within a State as the sum of all the peoples
living in the State, i.e., the population as a whole, and to distinct groups within
a State possessing certain common characteristics, in particular, minorities and
indigenous peoples.
This book focuses on the rights of peoples in relation to the exploitation
of natural resources. In this respect, two rights are of particular importance.
The first is the right to self-determination, because it is inextricably linked to
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The second
is the right to development, which is both a logical extension of the right to
19 Guidelines for the treaty-specific document to be submitted by States parties under Article
40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. CCPR/C/2009/1 of
22 November 2010, under Article 1; Guidelines for the treaty-specific documents to be
submitted by States parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2008/2 of 24 March 2009.
20 For a study of the implementation of United Nations Resolutions regarding the right of
colonial peoples to self-determination, see in particular, H. Gros-Espiell, ‘The Right to Self-
Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions – A Study’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980).
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self-determination and an expression of the obligation of States to exploit their
natural resources for national development and the well-being of the people
of the State concerned. The following sections examine both rights in turn and
analyse their implications for peoples living in sovereign States.
3.3 THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
The right to self-determination refers to a right for peoples to “freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development”.21 The most relevant aspect for this book is the fact that the
right to self-determination, as enshrined in the 1966 Human Right Covenants,
includes a right for peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources. This
section examines the evolution, nature and legal status of the right to self-
determination, with an emphasis on its relation to the exploitation of natural
resources. It also explores the implications of the right to self-determination
for peoples living in independent States.
3.3.1 Evolution of the right to self-determination
Self-determination as a political postulate
The origins of the right to self-determination can be traced back to the birth
of the nation state, which was based on the idea that governmental authority
should be derived from the consent of the governed. The 1581 Dutch Act of
Abjuration was the first document to propose that the government is respons-
ible for its population and that populations whose rights and freedoms are
not respected have the right to choose another government.22
21 The identical Articles 1 of the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and on Civil and Political Rights.
22 The Dutch Act of Abjuration (Plakkaat van Verlatinghe) states as follows: “Whereas God
did not create the people slaves to their prince, to obey his commands, whether right or
wrong, but rather the prince for the sake of the subjects (without which he could be no
prince), to govern them according to equity, to love and support them as a father his
children or a shepherd his flock, and even at the hazard of life to defend and preserve them.
And when he does not behave thus, but, on the contrary, oppresses them, seeking opportun-
ities to infringe their ancient customs and privileges, exacting from them slavish compliance,
then he is no longer a prince, but a tyrant […]. And particularly when this is done deliber-
ately […], they may not only disallow his authority, but legally proceed to the choice of
another prince for their defence”. English translation, available through <http://www.let.
rug.nl/~usa/D/1501-1600/plakkaat/plakkaaten.htm>, last consulted on 7 June 2013. The
idea that governmental authority should be derived from the consent of the governed was
not entirely new. Already in 1215, English barons had forced King John of England, hated
for his oppressive government, to sign a document in which their basic freedoms were
recognised. However, this document, known as the Magna Carta, did not pronounce itself
on the relationship between the government and the governed. It is rather a precursor to
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Thus in its original form, self-determination refers to the right of a popula-
tion of a State to choose its own government. This right has an internal and
an external dimension. While the internal dimension of the right concerns the
right of a population to choose its preferred form of government, the external
dimension concerns a nation’s right to determine its international status.23
These two dimensions of self-determination also form the basis of the 1776
American Declaration of Independence, which states that:
“to secure certain unalienable rights, governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any
form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on
such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”24
In contrast, the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen
focuses primarily on internal self-determination, when it determines that any
form of governmental authority must be derived expressly from the people.25
Of course, these differences can easily be explained from a historical perspect-
ive. While the American Declaration was a proclamation of independence from
the British Empire, the French Declaration was drafted after an internal revolu-
tion.
In conclusion, it should be noted that these early expressions of the concept
of self-determination give peoples a central place. Peoples have the right to
choose the form of government that best represents their interests. Moreover,
the declarations postulate the idea that the government must be based on the
consent of the governed. These ideas were further developed in later stages
during the evolution of the concept of self-determination.
the idea that ‘rule’ should be according to ‘law’. For the Magna Carta, see J.C. Holt, Magna
Carta, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992), pp. 441-473.
23 See D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-determination, The Hague: Kluwer Law (2002), p. 205,
who explains that external self-determination “denotes the determination of the international
status of a territory and a people”, while internal self-determination “refers to the relation-
ship between the government of a State and the people of that State”.
24 The American Declaration of Independence, text available through the Avalon Project,
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/declare.asp>, consulted on 21 October 2008.
25 Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du citoyen, 26 August 1789, Article 3: “Le principe de
toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la Nation. Nul corps, nul individu ne peut
exercer d’autorité qui n’en émane expressément”, accessible through <http://www.textes.
justice.gouv.fr>. In French, the word ‘nation’ is used in the sense of the Latin word ‘natio’
and designates the population of a state. The Larousse defines ‘nation’ as a “grande
communauté humaine, souvent installée sur un même territoire, qui possède une unité
historique, linguistique et constitue une entité politique”. See the Dictionnaire Larousse,
édition 2010.
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Self-determination as a legal principle
The notion of self-determination only became firmly rooted in international
law well into the twentieth century.26 While the concept of self-determination
does not appear at all in the Covenant of the League of Nations, despite a
proposal by the American President Wilson to insert a provision on self-
determination in the Covenant,27 and is only hinted at in the 1941 Atlantic
Charter,28 the notion finally appeared and was recognised as a legal principle
in the UN Charter.29
Self-determination figures prominently as one of the main principles on
which the new world order is based. Article 1(2) of the UN Charter determines
that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to “develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples”. Furthermore, Article 55 of Chapter IX of the UN
Charter on International Economic and Social Cooperation states that the
creation of conditions of stability and well-being are necessary for peaceful
and friendly relations among nations “based on the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples”.
26 See generally on the right of self-determination, A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples:
A Legal Appraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial
Lecture Series (1995); P. Alston, ‘Peoples’ Rights: The State of the Art at the Beginning of
the 21st Century’, in P. Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights, Academy of European Law, Oxford:
Oxford University Press (2001), pp. 259-293; D. Thürer & T. Burri, ‘Self-Determination’,
in R. Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for Com-
parative Public Law and International Law, available as an online resource (2009);
J. Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law’, in P. Alston (ed.),
Peoples’ Rights, Academy of European Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001), pp.
7-67; D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-determination, The Hague: Kluwer Law (2002).
27 Wilson’s proposal stated: “The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other
political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such
territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes
in present racial conditions and aspirations of present social and political relationships,
pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as
may in the judgment of three-fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and
manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples
[…]”. See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture Series (1995), p. 23.
28 The Atlantic Charter expresses the principle that territorial changes must accord “with the
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned’ and proclaims a right of all peoples “to
choose the form of government under which they will live”. Atlantic Charter, Yearbook of
the United Nations (1946-47), New York: United Nations (1947), p. 2.
29 Or, as Cassese puts it: “The adoption of the UN Charter marks an important turning-point:
it signals the maturing of the political postulate of self-determination into a legal standard
of behaviour”. A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture Series (1995), p. 43.
On the debates at San Francisco, see O. Spijkers, The United Nations, the Evolution of Global
Values and International Law, School of Human Rights Research Series, Vol. 47, Cambridge,
Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia (2011), Chapter VII.
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However, the Charter does not contain any further indications regarding
the implications of the principle of self-determination for inter-state relations.
In particular, it does not clarify whether the principle entails a right of
secession for peoples. The discussions of the Committee drafting the relevant
provision at San Francisco suggest that – at least as regards the opinion of
some of the Committee members – the principle of self-determination was
supposed to refer only to self-government.30 In other words, the principle
of self-determination was not supposed to entail a right for peoples to establish
an independent State.
However, a closer look at the UN Charter as a whole warrants a broader
reading of the UN Charter principle of self-determination. This is illustrated
by the text of Article 76 of the UN Charter regarding the international trustee-
ship system, which is aimed at the “progressive development towards self-
government or independence” for trust territories. The reference to inde-
pendence was inserted at the instigation of the USSR, which considered self-
government alone, as proposed by the UK, to be an inadequate objective in
the context of trustee territories.31 Interestingly, the USSR stated that the
reference in Article 76 to the purposes of the United Nations, including the
principle of self-determination, implied that “this principle could hardly be
omitted from the trusteeship chapter”, thus hinting at a broader definition
of self-determination.
In any case, it can be concluded that the drafters of the UN Charter clearly
wanted to exclude the possibility that in the UN Charter, self-determination
would be interpreted as entailing a right to secession for colonial countries.
In order to prevent any confusion on this matter, the term “self-determination”
is not mentioned at all in Article 73 of the UN Charter, the provision dealing
with colonial countries. Article 73 refers only to “self-government”, without
any general reference to the purposes of the United Nations as stated in Article
1 of the UN Charter.
Despite the general confusion about the scope of the principle of self-
determination in the UN Charter, it is therefore clear that colonial peoples were
not considered to have a right to independence. This can be regarded as one
of the last manifestations of the era of colonialism. Since then the political
landscape has changed considerably as a result of the process of decolonisation.
These changes have had a significant impact on the concept of self-determina-
tion as well. One of the most profound impacts is related to the recognition
of self-determination as a human right, because the internal dimension of self-
30 The records note that “the principle [of self-determination] conform[s] to the purposes of
the Charter only insofar as it implie[s] the right of self-government of peoples and not the
right of secession”. Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization,
Sixth Meeting of Committee I, May 16, 1945, Vol. 6 (1945), p. 296.
31 See Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Fourth Meeting
of Committee II/4, May 14, 1945, Vol. 10 (1945), p. 441.
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determination was strengthened as a result. Moreover, the range of subjects
to which the principle applies was significantly extended.
Self-determination as a human right
Not long after being established as a legal principle, self-determination was
also recognised as a human right.32 At the instigation of the USSR, the right
to self-determination was included in the identically formulated Articles 1 of
the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on
Civil and Political Rights.33
This Article consists of three components. Article 1(1) of the 1966 Covenants
formulates a right for all peoples to “freely determine their political status”
and to “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. In
order to pursue development, States must be in control of their economic
means. This is recognised in Article 1(2) of the 1966 Covenants, which for-
mulates a right for peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources and
formulates a prohibition against depriving peoples of their means of sub-
sistence. Finally, Article 1(3) formulates a positive obligation for States to
promote the realisation of the right to self-determination and a negative
obligation to respect the right.
The right to self-determination has civil and political, as well as economic
and social dimensions. The inclusion of the right to self-determination in both
human rights Covenants emphasises the comprehensive nature of the right
to self-determination.34 This section first takes a closer look at the political
dimension of self-determination and subsequently discusses the economic
dimension. It should be noted that these two dimensions are mutually inter-
dependent. The right to political self-determination cannot be achieved if the
State does not control its own natural resources, while the right to economic
self-determination cannot be achieved without proper structures for the govern-
ance of natural resources.
32 Alston calls this development the second phase in the evolution of peoples’ rights in
international law. See P. Alston, ‘Peoples’ Rights: Their Rise and Fall’, in P. Alston (ed.),
Peoples’ Rights, Academy of European Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001), pp.
262-264.
33 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), New York, Annex
to UNGA Resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), New York, Annex 2 to UNGA Resolution 2200 (XXI)
of 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. For the proposal of the USSR to include a provision
on self-determination, see the 1950 Yearbook of the United Nations, pp. 526-527.
34 See J. Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law’, in P. Alston (ed.),
Peoples’ Rights, Academy of European Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001), p. 27,
who argues that “ [i]ts inclusion in both Covenants suggests that self-determination is both
a civil and political right and an economic, social and cultural right”.
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The right to political self-determination
The concept of political self-determination, as it developed over time, has two
basic tenets, giving rise to two separate yet interrelated rights. The right to
external self-determination concerns the right of peoples to determine their
international status, while the corresponding right to internal self-determination
concerns the right of peoples to choose a political system.35 While the right
to external self-determination is primarily important in inter-state relations,
the right to internal self-determination determines the relationship between
the government and the peoples living within a State. In the light of the aim
of this book, which deals primarily with questions relating to the governance
of natural resources within States, the emphasis of this section is therefore
on internal rather than on external self-determination. The right to external
self-determination is discussed mainly to provide the necessary context for
a better understanding of the right to internal self-determination.
If the right to self-determination is interpreted as a right for peoples to
determine their international status and/or a right to choose a political system,
two questions immediately spring to mind. The first concerns the modalities
for exercising the right to self-determination, while the second concerns the
legal subjects of the right. Both questions were considered in some detail in
two authoritative declarations of the UN General Assembly dealing with the
issue of self-determination, i.e., the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as
well as in the case law of the International Court of Justice.
As regards the modalities for exercising the right to self-determination,
the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples interprets the right to self-determination principally as a right
for colonial peoples to gain independence. In particular, the Declaration refers
to the need
“to transfer all powers to the peoples of [Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories
or all other territories which have not yet attained independence], without any
conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire,
without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy
complete independence and freedom”.36
35 See R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford: Clarendon
Press (1994), p. 120, who argues that the right of peoples to freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development implies their right to choose their government.
36 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960, paras. 2 and 5. In addition, see J-F.
Dobelle, ‘Article 1 Paragraphe 2’, in J-P. Cot, A. Pellet, M. Forteau (éd.), La Charte des Nations
Unies: Commentaire Article par Article, 3e édition, Paris: Economica (2005), p. 341.
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In addition, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations – which treats self-determination alternatively
as a principle and as a right – determines that the principle of equal rights
and self-determination entails a right for all peoples to “freely determine,
without external interference, their political status and to pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development”.37 Furthermore, the 1970 Declaration
distinguishes between four modes of exercising the right to self-determination.
The Declaration determines:
“The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political
status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right
of self-determination by that people”.38
It is important to note that both declarations base the exercise of the right to
self-determination on the free expression of the will of the peoples concerned.
This interpretation of the right to self-determination as requiring a free and
genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned lies at the heart of
the right to self-determination. This is also how the right to self-determination
is interpreted by the International Court of Justice, which, in its Advisory
Opinion on the Western Sahara, expressly provided that self-determination must
be understood as “the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of
peoples”.39 This interpretation of the right to self-determination also explains
the focus of United Nations practice on organizing elections to determine the
will of the people. In the context of decolonisation, the UN has provided
assistance for the organization of a number of plebiscites and elections for the
purpose of determining the will of the people with regard to their political
future.40
The right to self-determination is also invoked in relation to UN-supervised
elections in States that have suffered from internal armed conflicts. Reference
can be made in particular to UN Security Council resolutions in relation to
the elections in Cambodia in 1993. In Resolution 745 (1992), the UN Security
Council explicitly stated that it desired to assure “the right to self-determina-
tion of the Cambodian people through free and fair elections”.41 Furthermore,
37 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, principle 5.
38 Ibid., para. 4.
39 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, 1.C.J.
Reports 1975, para. 59.
40 For examples, see A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture Series (1995), pp. 76-78.
41 UN Security Council Resolution 745 (1992), paragraph 4 of the preamble.
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in a subsequent resolution, the Council recalled that “all Cambodians have
[…] the right to determine their own political future through the free and fair
election of a constituent assembly”.42
Therefore it can be argued that in UN practice, elections generally serve
as the principal means of ascertaining that a people has been able to freely
exercise its right to self-determination. However, despite the importance of
elections for ascertaining the will of peoples, it is only a way of achieving their
right to self-determination. The essence of the modern right to political self-
determination, which can be construed as a right to representative government,
forms the basis for this. Self-determination in this sense is most clearly
described in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, which indicates that the
UN Charter principle of equal rights and self-determination requires a govern-
ment “representing the whole people belonging to the territory without dis-
tinction as to race, creed or colour”.43
This paragraph is important for several reasons. First, it can be interpreted
as a confirmation that the right to self-determination accrues to peoples living
within independent States, which had been a matter of considerable contro-
versy until the adoption of this Declaration.44 Secondly, the paragraph
emphasises the importance of a representative and non-discriminatory govern-
ment. This is also why the 1970 Declaration has often been quoted by advocates
of the right to external self-determination for oppressed groups within a State.
While the right to external self-determination is generally considered to accrue
to colonial peoples and to peoples under alien subjugation,45 some authors
have argued in favour of extending the right to external self-determination
to oppressed groups within States. These authors often point to the Friendly
Relations Declaration and argue that the principle of equal rights and self-
determination does not preclude action that would break down or harm the
42 UN Security Council Resolution 792 (1992), paragraph 6 of the preamble.
43 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, principle 5.
44 See R. Rosenstock, ‘The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations: A Survey’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 65(5) (1971), pp. 713-735,
who argues on p. 732 that “a close examination of its text will reward the reader with an
affirmation of the applicability of the principle to peoples within existing states and the
necessity for governments to represent the governed”.
45 See International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, para. 52; International Court of Justice,
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, 1.C.J. Reports 1975, paras. 54-59;
International Court of Justice, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1995, p. 90.
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territorial integrity or political unity of a State which is not “possessed of a
government representing the whole population”.46
The right for oppressed people within States to secede from that State is
still an issue of considerable controversy. In the Advisory Opinion regarding
Kosovo, the International Court of Justice had an opportunity to pronounce
on the matter. In a general sense, the Court considered:
“Whether, outside the context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject
to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, the international law of self-
determination confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right to
separate from that State is, however, a subject on which radically different views
were expressed by those taking part in the proceedings and expressing a position
on the question. Similar differences existed regarding whether international law
provides for a right of “remedial secession” and, if so, in what circumstances”.47
Instead of taking a stand on the matter, the Court adhered to a strict reading
of the question formulated by the General Assembly in its request for an
Advisory Opinion. This question concerned the legality of the Declaration of
Independence issued by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of
46 It should be noted that the relevant paragraph of the 1970 Declaration reads in full: “Noth-
ing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour”. For proponents of an a contrario reading of this
paragraph, see, i.e., A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture Series (1995), pp. 109-
115; and J-F. Dobelle, ‘Article 1 Paragraphe 2’, in J-P. Cot, A. Pellet, M. Forteau (éd.), La
Charte des Nations Unies : Commentaire Article par Article, 3e édition, Paris: Economica (2005),
p. 351, who argues that “le droit à l’autodétermination externe est en principe exclu, à
condition que le droit à l’autodétermination interne soit garanti. En revanche, la méconnais-
sance grave et persistante de ce dernier pourrait légitimement déboucher sur le droit à
l’indépendance”. For a more cautious perspective, see H. Gross Espiell, The Right to Self-
Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, UN Publication, Sales No. E/
79.XIV.5, 1979, para. 60, who underlines that if “beneath the guise of ostensible national
unity, colonial and alien domination in fact exist, whatever legal formula may be used in
an attempt to conceal it, the right of the subject people concerned cannot be disregarded
without international law being violated”. He further posits that the Declaration on Friendly
Relations “uses particularly apt language in spelling out this idea: it reaffirms the need
to reserve the territorial integrity of sovereign and independent States, but ties this concept
to the requirement that the States must be “possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour”.
47 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declara-
tion of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports
(2010), para. 82.
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Kosovo.48 The Court concluded that international law does not in general
prohibit the act of promulgating a declaration of independence.49
Although it concerns a national case, a previous judgment of the Supreme
Court of Canada in the case of Quebec also illustrates this point. The Supreme
Court was faced with the question whether the population of Quebec, a
linguistic minority living in Canada, had the right to secede from Canada.
In this instance the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
“Although much of the Quebec population certainly shares many of the character-
istics of a people, it is not necessary to decide the ‘people’ issue [in relation to the
right of self-determination] because, whatever may be the correct determination
of this issue in the context of Quebec, a right to secession only arises under the
principle of self-determination of people at international law where ‘a people’ is
governed as part of a colonial empire; where ‘a people’ is subject to alien sub-
jugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where ‘a people’ is denied any
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it
forms a part. In other circumstances, peoples are expected to achieve self-determina-
tion within the framework of their existing state. A state whose government re-
presents the whole of the people or peoples resident within its territory, on a basis
of equality and without discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determina-
tion in its internal arrangements, is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity under
international law and to have that territorial integrity recognized by other states”.50
The Quebec case implies that the right to internal self-determination must first
of all be achieved within the framework of the existing State. Whether a right
to secession exists for peoples that are not represented through their govern-
ment remains a matter of considerable controversy, as confirmed by the Kosovo
Advisory Opinion. However, it can be argued that under current international
law, questions about the representativeness of a government must primarily
be resolved within the existing framework of the State. The following sections
explain in greater detail how the right to self-determination can be achieved
in an existing State.
The right to economic self-determination
The right to freely pursue economic, social and cultural development as
enshrined in Article 1(1) of the Covenants not only requires that peoples can
48 See International Court of Justice, Request for Advisory Opinion transmitted to the Court
pursuant to General Assembly resolution A/RES/63/3 (A/63/L.2) of 8 October 2008,
‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo’.
49 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declara-
tion of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports
(2010), para. 79.
50 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, Judgment
of 20 August 1998.
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choose the form of government to achieve this objective, but also that they
have access to the economic means necessary to pursue development. There-
fore, as a corollary of the political component of the right to self-determination,
Article 1(2) of the Covenants contains a right for peoples to freely dispose of
their natural wealth and resources.
This provision was inserted in 1955 on the initiative of Chile. It proclaims
a right for all peoples to “freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law”
(…) “for their own ends”.51 Therefore the provision emphasises the freedom
of peoples to control their natural resources while at the same time it points
to the need to respect their obligations under international law. In this way,
the drafters of the Covenants have sought to create a careful balance between
the interests of States endowed with natural resources on the one hand, and
the interests of foreign investors on the other.
Towards the end of the drafting process of the Covenants, when the com-
position of the UN had changed considerably as a result of the process of
decolonisation, a safeguard provision was inserted in both covenants. Article
25 of the ICESCR and Article 47 of the ICCPR, dealing with the implementation
of the covenants, determine that nothing in the Covenants “shall be interpreted
as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and
freely their natural wealth and resources”. Some authors argue that Article
25 of the ICESCR and Article 47 of the ICCPR “were aimed at ‘rectifying’ Article
1(2) in order to meet new demands in the wake of the evolution of inter-
national politics and law that had taken place in the meantime”.52
However, a more convincing interpretation of Article 25 of the ICESCR and
Article 47 of the ICCPR is that the provisions were meant to prevent the erosion
of the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources using the
argument of “obligations arising out of international economic co-operation”.
This is reflected in the wording of the provisions, which refer only to the
Covenants themselves, and not to international law in general. Obligations
51 For the original proposal made by Chile in 1952, see supra note 110.
52 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture Series (1995), p. 57. Similarly, D.J. Halperin,
‘Human Rights and Natural Resources’, William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 9 (1967-1968),
pp. 770-787, who demonstrates that Article 25 of the ICESCR and Article 47 of the ICCPR
have a strong anti-colonialist connotation and J. Summers, The Idea of the People: The Right
of Self-Determination, Nationalism and the Legitimacy of International Law, Doctoral Dissertation,
University of Helsinki (2004), p. 146 who argues that Articles 25 and 47 formulate an
absolute right and “can be seen […] as an attempt to change the interpretation of the balance
in article 1(2) without actually being an amendment to the paragraph”.
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arising from other legal instruments or from general international law cannot
be set aside by Article 25 of the ICESCR or Article 47 of the ICCPR.53
In addition to formulating a right for peoples to freely dispose over their
natural resources, Article 1(2) of the ICESCR and the ICCPR also contains a
prohibition stipulating that “[i]n no case may a people be deprived of its own
means of subsistence”. Although it was originally inserted with the aim of
protecting newly independent States and developing countries from developed
States and foreign investors, the prohibition is also a human right which can
be invoked by peoples against their government. In this sense, the prohibition
establishes the ultimate limits for governments with respect to the use of the
State’s natural resources. It provides that the exercise of permanent sovereignty
by the government may never result in peoples being deprived of their means
of subsistence.
The provision can also be read as a prohibition for governments to deny
peoples the right of access to their means of subsistence. This right of access
covers both physical and economic access.54 For example, this means that
local communities and indigenous peoples cannot be denied physical access
to hunting grounds, rivers or forests, if this is necessary for their subsistence.
In addition, the government is also precluded from denying peoples economic
access to their means of subsistence. This means, for example, that governments
cannot deny local communities access to mines if these communities are highly
dependent on mining to earn a basic living. These issues, as well as their
implications in situations of armed conflict, are examined in greater detail in
Part II of this book.
The economic dimension of the right to self-determination was notably
expressed in resolutions of the General Assembly relating to the principle of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, including the landmark 1962
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the 1974
53 This applies particularly for obligations arising out of the UN Charter. Article 103 of the
UN charter determines that obligations under the UN Charter prevail over obligations under
other international agreements. In this respect, Article 1(1) of the UN Charter determines
that the purposes of the UN include the maintenance of international peace and security
and that international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace must
be adjusted or settled “in conformity with the principles of justice and international law”.
Author’s emphasis added. It may be noted that in addition to the general rule contained
in Article 103 of the UN Charter, both the ICESCR and the ICCPR contain explicit conflict
clauses regulating the relation between the Covenants and the UN Charter. See Article
24 of the ICESCR and Article 46 of the ICCPR.
54 For the distinction between physical and economic access in relation to the right to an
adequate standard of living, and in particular to adequate food, protected under Article
11 of the ICESCR, see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Com-
ment No. 12, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 of 12 May 1999, para. 13.
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Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States.55 An early reference can
also be found in the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration, albeit in its preamble.56
It is striking that the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations contains no
reference whatsoever to economic self-determination. A proposal to insert a
reference to natural resources was discussed in relation to the principle of
sovereign equality, rather than in relation to the principle of equal rights and
self-determination. It therefore seems that the Friendly Relations Declaration
considered the economic component of self-determination to be an attribute
of state sovereignty rather than a right of peoples.57 The aim of the Friendly
Relations Declaration, to clarify and further develop the principles of inter-state
relations, as enshrined in the UN Charter, explains this perspective.
As regards treaty law, the right to economic self-determination was also
expressed in Article 21 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights,
which formulates a right comparable to Article 1(2) of the international
covenants on economic, social and cultural rights and on civil and political
rights. However, instead of formulating an obligation to “respect obligations
arising out of international economic co-operation”, the provision formulates
the much looser obligation to “promote international economic cooperation”.
Furthermore, this economic cooperation does not have to be based on
“mutual benefit and international law” as stipulated in the covenants, but must
be based on “mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles of inter-
national law”.58 It further provides that the right of peoples to freely dispose
of their natural resources must be exercised “by States parties” and “in the
exclusive interest of the people”. In addition, it provides for a right of lawful
recovery and adequate compensation for peoples in case of the spoliation of
their natural resources.
55 UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 on Permanent Sover-
eignty over Natural Resources; UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 Decem-
ber 1974 on a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. These resolutions will be
discussed in more detail in the following section. For the relation between the right to self-
determination and permanent sovereignty, see, inter alia, Gros Espiell who argues that “the
economic content of the right of peoples to self-determination finds its expression in
particular […] in their right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources”. See Commis-
sion on Human Rights, ‘The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations
Resolutions’, study prepared by H. Gros Espiell (Uruguay), special rapporteur of the UN
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (1980), UN
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1, para 136.
56 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960, preamble, para. 8.
57 For the drafting history of the Declaration on Friendly Relations, see M. Šahović, ‘Codifica-
tion des Principes du Droit International des Relations Amicales et de la Coopération entre
les Etats’, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 137 (1972), pp. 243-310.
58 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Banjul, 27 June 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
Author’s emphasis added.
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3.3.2 The nature and legal status of the right to self-determination
The concept of self-determination has attained a firm status in international
law, both as a principle and as a human right. Since its inclusion in the UN
Charter, self-determination has been incorporated in several binding legal
instruments, including the 1966 Human Rights Covenants. In addition, several
authoritative resolutions of the UN General Assembly refer to self-determination
as well, including the authoritative 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.59
Moreover, in the East Timor Case, the International Court of Justice confirmed
that self-determination “is one of the essential principles of contemporary
international law” and that it “has an erga omnes character”.60
This case also implies that the principle of self-determination applies to
the international community of States.61 States have the obligation both to
actively promote the right to self-determination – an obligation which is based
on the UN Charter provisions regarding trust territories and, in subsequent
State practice, non-self-governing territories – and the obligation not to interfere
when a people rightfully exercises its right to self-determination, based, inter
alia, on the Declaration on Friendly Relations.
When it comes to determining the nature of the concept of self-determina-
tion, a distinction must be made between its external and internal dimension.
As regards the external dimension, self-determination can first of all be inter-
59 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. Although the primary aim of the declara-
tion was to elaborate upon the principles laid down in the UN Charter, the International
Court of Justice treats the resolution as declaratory of customary international law. In the
Nicaragua case, the Court determined that the effect of consent to the resolution may be
considered as “an acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the
resolution by themselves”. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June
1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 188.
60 International Court of Justice, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment of 30 June 1995,
I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90, para 29. In the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of
Justice determined that obligations erga omnes are “by their very nature […] the concern
of al1 States”. International Court of Justice, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1970, Second phase, I.C.J. Reports 1970,
p. 3, para 33.
61 As the International Court of Justice held that self-determination has an erga omnes character,
it can be applied to the international community as a whole. East Timor (Portugal v.
Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90), para 29. For a critical appraisal of this part
of the judgment, see D. Thürer & T. Burri, ‘Self-Determination’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law
and International Law (2012), Vol. IX, pp. 113-128, paras. 24-25. Thürer and Burri argue
that the legal consequences of the erga omnes qualification are unclear.
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preted as giving rise to a right for colonial peoples and for peoples under alien
subjugation to establish an independent State, to associate with or integrate
with another State, or to develop any other political status. In addition, the
concept entails a right to exercise control over the natural resources found
within the State territory.
Recently, the existence of the right to external self-determination for colonial
peoples and peoples under alien subjugation was confirmed in the Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding Kosovo. In the relevant
part the Court stated: “During the second half of the twentieth century, the
international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create
a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and
peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”.62 Whether
such a right exists for oppressed groups within a State as well, is a matter of
considerable controversy. In international law questions about the represent-
ativeness of a government must currently be primarily solved within the
existing framework of the State.
Once a people has organized itself within an autonomous State, whether
through secession, integration or association, it may be argued that the right
to external self-determination, including economic self-determination, is mainly
assimilated in the principle of State sovereignty and the related principles of
territorial integrity and non-intervention, which must be respected by other
States. What remains is a right for peoples within the State to internal self-
determination.
In this context, the right to self-determination primarily concerns the right
of the people of a State to freely choose the State’s political and economic
system, as well as the right for minorities to govern their local affairs.63 As
Rosalyn Higgins noted: “Self-determination requires the ongoing choice of
the people as to their governance, and, in turn, their economic, social and
cultural development”.64 In addition, the right to self-determination implies
an obligation for the government to exploit the State’s natural resources for
the benefit of the people. As Antonio Cassese argued,
“Article 1(2) […] provides that the right to control and benefit from a territory’s
natural resources lies with the inhabitants of that territory. This right, and the
corresponding duty of the central government to use the resources in a manner
62 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declara-
tion of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports
(2010), para. 79.
63 Or, as Cassese argues: “ [i]nternal self-determination means the right to authentic self-
government, that is, the right for a people really and freely to choose its own political and
economic regime”, A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture Series (1995), p. 101.
64 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford: Clarendon
Press (1994), p. 120.
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which coincides with the interests of the people, is the natural consequence of the
right to political self-determination”.65
One of the main ways of achieving the right to internal self-determination is
to establish proper procedures for decision-making, which allow for the
participation of all the parties concerned. According to the Human Rights
Committee, the relevant obligations in the identical Articles 1 of the Covenants
include first of all the establishment of constitutional and political processes
“which in practice allow the exercise of th[e] right [to self-determination]”.66
The Human Rights Committee’s emphasis on “practice” plays a central role
in this. It requires States to put in place policies which effectively guarantee
the exercise of the right to self-determination. These policies can be examined
by the Human Rights Committee as part of its mandate to examine reports
submitted by States under the general reporting obligations of the ICCPR.
In addition, these policies can also arguably be judicially scrutinised before
international human rights bodies.67 More specifically, as indicated above,
the Guidelines of the Human Rights Committee as well as those of the Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights indicate that a proper imple-
mentation of the right to self-determination requires the establishment of
procedures which allow for indigenous and local communities to be duly
consulted, as well as the adoption of decision-making processes aimed at
obtaining the prior informed consent of indigenous peoples and local commun-
65 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture Series (1995), p. 55.
66 See General Comment No. 12: The right to self-determination of peoples (Art. 1), adopted
by the Human Rights Committee at its twenty-first session, 13 March 1984, Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, para. 3 and Guidelines for the treaty-specific
document to be submitted by States parties under article 40 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. CCPR/C/2009/1 of 22 November 2010, under Article 1.
67 It should be noted in this regard that the complaint mechanisms of the ICCPR and the
ICESCR are only open to individuals, while the right to self-determination is a collective
right. Therefore, the Human Rights Committee has consistently stated, both in its General
Comments and in relevant cases, that it does not recognise claims by individuals of vi-
olations of Article 1 of the ICCPR. It does however accept claims under other provisions
of the Charter that are relevant for the realisation of the right of self-determination, in
particular Articles 25, 26 and 27 of the ICCPR. See e.g. General Comment No. 23: The rights
of minorities (Art. 27), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, 8 April 1994, para. 3.1, where the
Committee explicitly states that “[s]elf-determination is not a right cognizable under the
Optional Protocol. Article 27, on the other hand, relates to rights conferred on individuals
as such […] and is cognizable under the Optional Protocol”.
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ities regarding matters which affect their rights and interests under the
Covenant.68
However, the case law of these bodies relating to natural resources policies
does not extend beyond the protection of minority rights. In general, human
rights bodies do not accept claims regarding the protection of the public
interest. For example, under the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, individuals
have to claim to be the “victim” of violations of the ICCPR.69 The Optional
Protocol of the ICESCR that recently entered into force formulates a similar
requirement.70 This requirement forms an obstacle to challenging government
decisions regarding the exploitation of natural resources, because it prevents
persons who are not directly affected by a particular project from bringing
a claim before a human rights body.
3.3.3 Implementation of the right to economic self-determination in the
sovereign State
The right to self-determination requires the establishment of constitutional
and political processes “which in practice allow the exercise of th[e] right”.71
The question arises if and to what extent international law has recognised this
obligation specifically in relation to government decisions on the exploitation
of natural resources and, if so, whether international law offers possibilities
for redress regarding such decisions that affect the population or distinct
groups in society.
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to first look at the
growing body of concluding observations and case law of human rights bodies
regarding violations of the rights of indigenous peoples resulting from natural
resources projects conducted within their lands and initiated by governments.
The Human Rights Committee has been very active in recent years in protect-
68 Guidelines for the treaty-specific document to be submitted by States parties under Article
40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. CCPR/C/2009/1 of
22 November 2010, under Article 1; Guidelines for the treaty-specific documents to be
submitted by States parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2008/2 of 24 March 2009.
69 Article 2 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, states in the relevant
part: “individuals who claim that any of their rights enumerated in the Covenant have been
violated […] may submit a written communication to the Committee for consideration”.
Author’s emphasis added.
70 Article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Annex to UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/63/117, of 10 December
2008.
71 See General Comment No. 12: The right to self-determination of peoples (Art. 1), adopted
by the Human Rights Committee at its twenty-first session, 13 March 1984, Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, para. 3 and Guidelines for the treaty-specific
document to be submitted by States parties under article 40 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. CCPR/C/2009/1 of 22 November 2010, under Article 1.
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ing the rights of indigenous peoples over their lands and resources with the
specific aim of preserving their culture and traditional lifestyle. Although the
Human Rights Committee can only assess claims regarding the violation of
individual human rights under the Optional Protocol, the Committee has
opened the door for indigenous peoples and (other) minorities to invoke the
individual rights protected under the ICCPR as communities.
It did so with a broad interpretation of Article 27 of the ICCPR regarding
the protection of the right of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language, in community with the other members of their group. In this respect,
the Human Rights Committee linked the individual right embodied in Article
27 to the collective right embodied in Article 1 of the ICCPR.72 The Human
Rights Committee has consistently interpreted Article 27 as containing a right
for indigenous peoples to participate in decisions that affect them, such as
those regarding the use of their land, including the exploitation of the natural
resources found there.73
In addition, the rights of indigenous peoples over their lands were
recognised to some extent by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, which, in its General Comment 7 on the right to adequate housing
and forced evictions, explicitly refers to the vulnerable position of indigenous
peoples.74 In its General Comment No. 20 on non-discrimination in economic,
social and cultural rights, the Committee also raises its concerns about “formal
and substantive discrimination across a wide range of Covenant rights against
indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities”.75
Furthermore, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
decided in its landmark Ogoniland case that the right of a people to freely
dispose of its natural resources, as protected under Article 21 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, entails an obligation for the govern-
ment to monitor and regulate the activities of private operators licensed to
72 See also N.J. Schrijver, ‘Unravelling State Sovereignty? The Controversy on the Right of
Indigenous Peoples to Permanent Sovereignty over their Natural Wealth and Resources’,
in I. Boerefijn & J. Goldschmidt (eds.), Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights:
Essays in Honour of Cees Flinterman, Antwerp/Oxford/Portland: Intersentia (2008), pp. 91-92.
73 See, in particular, the landmark case of Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, Com-
munication No. 547/1993, 15 November 2000. Also see the concluding observations of the
Human Rights Committee with regard to Surinam (UN Doc. CCPR/CO/80/SUR, 4 May
2004, para. 21); Sweden (UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE, 24 April 2002, para 15); and Guyana
(UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.121, 25 April 2000, para. 21). Also see S.J. Anaya, ‘The Human
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, in F.G. Isa & K. de Feyter (ed.), ‘International Protection
of Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges’, Bilbao: University of Duesto, Human-
itarianNet (2006), pp. 604-605.
74 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 7 on the right to
adequate housing (art. 11.1 of the Covenant): forced evictions, 20 May 1997, para. 10.
75 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20 on non-discrim-
ination in economic, social and cultural rights (Art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 of 2 July 2009, para. 18.
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exploit the State’s natural resources.76 The complainants also referred to
Article 21 of the African Charter and stated that “in all their dealings with
the Oil Consortiums, the government did not involve the Ogoni Communities
in the decisions that affected the development of Ogoniland”. Although the
African Commission did not specifically address this issue, it came to the
general conclusion that the practice of the Nigerian government did not meet
the minimum standard of conduct to be expected of a government, and that
it therefore constituted a violation of Article 21 of the African Charter.77
Finally, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed an
extensive case law regarding the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples over
their communal lands. It has done so primarily based on the right to property,
protected under Article 21 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.
In this respect the case of the Saramaka people v. Surinam is particularly
relevant.78 In that case, the Court determined first of all that Article 1 of the
ICESCR and the ICCPR, to which Surinam was a party, grants a right to indi-
genous and tribal peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources so as not to be deprived of their means of subsistence.79 In the light
of these provisions the Court interpreted Article 21 of the Inter-American
Convention relating to the protection of property to “call for the right of
members of indigenous and tribal communities to freely determine and enjoy
their own social, cultural and economic development […] grant[ing] to the
members of the Saramaka community the right to enjoy property in accordance
with their communal tradition”.80
Moreover, the Court determined that if the State wanted to impose re-
strictions on the property rights of the members of the Saramaka people by
issuing concessions within their territory, the State must abide by the following
three conditions: 1) the State must ensure the effective participation of the
members of the Saramaka people in the project, including a duty to actively
consult the community and to obtain their free, prior and informed consent;
2) the State must guarantee that the Saramakas will receive a reasonable benefit
from any such project within their territory; 3) the State must perform an
environmental and social impact assessment prior to issuing concessions.81
In a recent case regarding the Sarayaku people v. Ecuador, the Inter-Ameri-
can Court elaborated on the duty to consult indigenous peoples. The most
significant aspect of this is that the Court decided that the duty to consult
76 Decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights regarding Communica-
tion 155/96, Social and Economic Rights Action Center, Center for Economic and Social
Rights v. Nigeria, 30st session, Banjul, October 2001, paras. 55-58.
77 Ibid.
78 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Surinam, Judgment
of 28 November 2007.
79 Ibid., para 93.
80 Ibid., para. 95.
81 Ibid., para. 129, paras. 133-134.
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constitutes a general principle of international law.82 The Court also con-
sidered that the consultation process should entail a “genuine dialogue as part
of a participatory process in order to reach an agreement” and that the process
must be construed as “a true instrument of participation,” carried out in “good
faith,” with “mutual trust” and with the goal of reaching a consensus.83
All of the case law of these international human rights bodies to some
extent recognises the obligation for a State to engage people in decisions
regarding the use of natural resources situated on their lands. This is a strong
argument for interpreting the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural
resources as a right to participate in government decision-making relating to
the use of natural resources.
Such a right – or obligation – to public participation has been recognised
in several instruments in relation to environmental matters. Principle 10 of
the 1992 Rio Declaration, for example, proclaims that “[e]nvironmental issues
are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant
level’.84 It also determines that individuals must have “appropriate access
to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities
[…]and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes”.85 This
entails an obligation for the government to make information available and
to provide access to justice for their citizens. Recently, the Rio+20 Declaration
emphasised that “broad public participation and access to information and
judicial and administrative proceedings are essential to the promotion of
sustainable development”.86
In terms of binding legal instruments, reference can be made to the Conven-
tion on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, concluded in Aarhus in 1998.87
The Convention entered into force in 2009 and at present 46 parties, mainly
European States, are parties to this convention. The Aarhus Convention is the
most comprehensive multilateral treaty dealing with the right to public partici-
pation. Its objective is “the protection of the right of every person of present
and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health
and well-being”.88 Therefore parties to the Convention must “guarantee the
82 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The Kichwa people of Sarayaku v. Ecuador,
Judgment of 26 July 2012, para. 164.
83 Ibid., paras. 167, 186 and 200. See also L. Brunner & K. Quintana, ‘The Duty to Consult
in the Inter-American System: Legal Standards after Sarayaku’, ASIL Insight Vol. 16, Issue
35 (2012).
84 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13 June 1992, 31 ILM
874 (1992).
85 Ibid.
86 Rio+20 Declaration: ‘The Future We Want’, UN General Assembly Resolution 66/288,
11 September 2012, para. 43.
87 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters, 28 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447.
88 Ibid., Article 1.
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rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and
access to justice in environmental matters”.89 Relevant obligations for the
government include an obligation to provide information to the general public
under Article 4 of the Convention, an obligation to provide for the participation
of the public concerned in decisions on specific activities, including an obliga-
tion to provide information and to be consulted under Article 6 of the Conven-
tion, and an obligation to provide access to justice to persons who have not
received adequate information under Article 9 of the Convention.
Although the Convention is very ambitious and covers various kinds of
industrial activities, including activities relating to the exploitation of natural
resources, its geographical scope is limited. The Convention is open to all
States, but has mainly been ratified by European States. The objective of the
Convention is another limitation. It is not concerned with decisions on the
exploitation of natural resources in general, but applies only to natural resource
projects that may have an impact on the environment.
Furthermore, reference can be made to two international environmental
treaties in terms of binding legal instruments, that include provisions on public
participation. Article 14(1)(a) of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity
provides that States must allow for public participation in the environmental
impact assessment procedure. In addition, Article 3(a) of the Anti-
Desertification Convention provides that parties “should ensure that decisions
on the design and implementation of programmes to combat desertification
and/or mitigate the effects of drought are taken with the participation of
populations and local communities”.
Finally, the right to self-determination, interpreted as a right for peoples
to participate in decision making, can also be implemented by means of
individual rights protected under the Covenants. After all, the collective right
to internal self-determination could be said to entail a right for all human
beings living in a State to participate in the organization of that State’s political
and economic system.90 One of the key provisions in this respect is Article
25 of the ICCPR, which states:
“Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the dis-
tinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors;
89 Ibid.
90 See, e.g., The Study of the Historical and Current Development of the Right to Self-Determination,
prepared by A. Cristescu (Romania), Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, UN publication, Sales No.
E.80.XIV.3 (1980).
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(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.”
Article 25 of the ICCPR formulates a right for all citizens, i.e., for all the
nationals of a State, to participate in the State’s decision-making process, a
right which can be enforced against the will of the State itself. In its General
Comment No. 25 on the right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and
the right of equal access to public service, the Human Rights Committee
explicitly stated that
“the rights under article 25 are related to […] the right of peoples to self-determina-
tion. By virtue of the rights covered by article 1(1), peoples have the right to freely
determine their political status and to enjoy the right to choose the form of their
constitution or government. Article 25 deals with the right of individuals to par-
ticipate in those processes which constitute the conduct of public affairs. Those
rights, as individual rights, can give rise to claims under the first Optional Proto-
col’.91
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the right is guaranteed by the requirement
of genuine and periodic elections and by the implementation of other human
rights, such as the right to freedom of expression formulated in Article 19 of
the ICCPR and the right to freedom of association included in Article 22 of the
ICCPR and Article 8 of the ICESCR.92
In addition, reference can be made to public participation in relation to
the right of individuals to an adequate standard of living, as enshrined in
Article 11 of the ICESCR. This provision contains an obligation for States to take
measures, including specific programmes, which are needed:
“To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by
making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge
of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems
in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural
resources”.
In its General Comment on the Right to Adequate Food, the International
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasised that the right
to adequate food includes questions regarding the accessibility of natural
resources.93 Furthermore, the Committee provided that “[t]he formulation
and implementation of national strategies for the right to food requires full
91 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public
affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service (Art. 25), 12 July 1996,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, para. 2.
92 Ibid, para. 25.
93 International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.
12: The right to adequate food (Art. 11), UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 13.
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compliance with the principles of accountability, transparency, people’s parti-
cipation, decentralization, legislative capacity and the independence of the
judiciary”.94 In addition, the Committee determined that “appropriate institu-
tional mechanisms should be devised to secure a representative process
towards the formulation of a strategy, drawing on all available domestic
expertise relevant to food and nutrition”.95
Although Article 11 of the ICESCR approaches the issue of natural resources
exploitation from the perspective of the right to have access to adequate food,
the provision may also be relevant for broader issues relating to the use of
natural resources. In particular, the provision can be linked to the prohibition
on depriving a people of its means of subsistence, as enshrined in Article 1(2)
of the ICESCR. In its General Comment relating to the Right to Adequate Food,
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights unambiguously
emphasised the importance of involving citizens in the development of national
strategies to promote the right to food, including access to natural resources.
It can be concluded that the right of a people to economic self-determina-
tion in the context of a sovereign State is primarily implemented through the
modern right of communities, as well as of individual members of the popula-
tion of a State, to take part in national and local decision-making processes.
The State is obliged to establish proper procedures which allow for these rights
to be exercised in practice. Furthermore, international human rights bodies
can, to a certain extent, assess whether States have met their obligation to
provide for public participation.96
3.4 THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
The right to self-determination includes a right for peoples to “freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development”. The right to development
– as it appears in the Declaration on the Right to Development – constitutes
one of the principal means to achieve the right to self-determination, because
it formulates a right for peoples and individuals “to participate in, contribute
94 Ibid., para. 23.
95 Ibid., para. 24.
96 On the role of human rights monitoring mechanisms in achieving State compliance with
treaty obligations, see I. Boerefijn, ‘Establishing State Responsibility for Breaching Human
Rights Treaty Obligations: Avenues under UN Human Rights Treaties’, Netherlands Inter-
national Law Review, Vol. 56(2) (2009), pp. 167-205; and A. Zimmermann, ‘Human Rights
Treaty Bodies and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice’, The Law and Practice
of International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 12 (2013), pp. 5–29.
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to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which
all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized”.97
Furthermore, the right to development “implies the full realization of the
right of peoples to self-determination”, which includes sovereignty over natural
wealth and resources.98 In this sense, it can be regarded as a continuation
of the right to self-determination for peoples who have organized themselves
in independent States. This section traces the evolution, nature and legal status
of the right to development and examines its implications for the governance
of natural resources within a sovereign State.
3.4.1 Evolution of the right to development
The UN Charter provisions on economic and social cooperation
The right to development is rooted in the UN Charter provisions on inter-
national economic and social cooperation. Article 1(3) of the UN Charter
determines that the aims of the United Nations include achieving “international
co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural,
or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion”.99 This rather broad aim was developed in
Chapter IX of the UN Charter on international economic and social cooperation.
In this respect, Article 55 specifies inter alia that the United Nations shall
promote “conditions of economic and social progress and development”. To
achieve this aim, Article 56 provides that “All Members pledge themselves
to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization”. Over
97 Article 1(1) of the Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA Resolution 41/128 of
4 December 1986. On the right to development, see in general, inter alia, A. Sengupta, ‘On
the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24 (2002),
pp. 837–889; G. Abi-Saab, ‘Droits de L’Homme et Développement: Quelques Eléments de
Réflexion,’ African Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 3 (1995), pp. 3-10; I.D. Bunn, ‘The Right
to Development: Implications for International Economic Law’, American University Inter-
national Law Review, Vol. 15 (2000), pp. 1425-1467; N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Evolution of Sustain-
able Development in International Law: Inception, Meaning and Status’, Recueil des Cours,
Vol. 329 (2007), Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2008), p. 269-274; L. Amede
Obiora, ‘Beyond the Rhetoric of a Right to Development’, Law and Policy, Vol. 18, Nos. 3
& 4 (1996), pp. 355-418; A. Pellet, Le Droit International du Développement, Collection ‘Que
sais-je?’ deuxième édition, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (1987); J. Donnelly, ‘In
Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development’,
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 15 (1985), pp. 473-509.
98 Article 1(2) of the Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA Resolution 41/128 of
4 December 1986.
99 See O. de Frouville, ‘Article 1 Paragraphe 3’, in Cot, J-P., Pellet, A., Forteau, M. (ed.), La
Charte des Nations Unies : Commentaire Article par Article, 3e édition, Paris : Economica (2005),
p. 358. De Frouville calls Article 1(3) the second pillar of the positive dimension of peace,
together with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
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the years, these provisions have become the legal foundation for a wide range
of UN efforts in the field of international development cooperation.100
International Bill of Human Rights
In addition to the provisions of the UN Charter, the human rights instruments
which were drawn in the decades after the establishment of the UN also form
the legal basis for the right to development. Although neither the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) nor the International Covenants on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) contains an express reference to a human right to development, con-
stituent elements of such a right, as well as modalities for its realisation can
be found in all three instruments. Substantive elements of a right to develop-
ment comprise first of all the right of peoples to “freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development” and the right not to be deprived of their
own means of subsistence, both of which are part of the right to self-determina-
tion included in the identical Articles 1 of the ICESCR and the ICCPR.
Furthermore, Article 25 of the UDHR and Article 11 of the ICESCR formulate
a right for all human beings to an adequate standard of living, which includes
a right to “adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous im-
provement of living conditions”. In addition, there is also the right to education
incorporated in Article 26 of the UDHR and Article 13 of the ICESCR. In a general
statement on the importance and relevance of the right to development, the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasised the comple-
mentary character of the rights included in the Covenant and the right to
development.101
As regards the modalities, Article 22 of the UDHR formulates a right for
everyone to “the realization, through national effort and international co-
operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State,
of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and
the free development of his personality”. In addition, Article 28 of the UDHR
100 See the Repertory of the Practice of United Nations Organs, in particular with regard to
Article 55, available at <http://www.un.org/law/repertory/>. From the early beginnings
of the world organization, practice of UN organs relating to the promotion of development
under Article 55 has covered a broad range of issues, including technical and financial
assistance of developing countries, international trade and finance, natural resources and
the protection of the environment. As Pellet noted, from the very start, the UN adopted
an integrated approach to development issues. A. Pellet, ‘Article 55, alinéas a et b’, in
J-P. Cot, A. Pellet, M. Forteau (éd.), La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire Article par
Article, 3e édition, Paris: Economica (2005), p. 1464.
101 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on the importance and
relevance of the right to development, adopted on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anni-
versary of the Declaration on the Right to Development, 12 July 2011, UN Doc. E/C.12/2011/2,
para. 5.
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formulates a right for everyone to a conducive social and international
order.102 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR also formulates an obligation for parties
“to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-opera-
tion […] with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means”, including the
above-mentioned right to an adequate standard of living.103
Towards the formulation of a right to development
In the years following the adoption of the 1966 human rights covenants, the
right to development started to materialise, notably through resolutions of
the UN General Assembly and the work of the Commission on Human Rights.
First, the UN General Assembly adopted a substantive Declaration on Social
Progress and Development in 1969, which identified development as one of
the “common concerns of the international community”.104 This reference
to the notion of “common concern” is significant. In international environ-
mental law, the notion of “common concern” has gained currency as a prin-
ciple which forms the basis for imposing binding obligations for States in
specific cases. These obligations not only concern affected States, but the
international community as a whole (erga omnes obligations). It is one of the
guiding principles of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity.105 Therefore by referring
to the notion of “common concern”, the Declaration not only emphasises the
fundamental importance of development for the international community as
102 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (III) on an
International Bill of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 1948. In Alston’s view, Article
28 of the UDHR must be seen as “a fact of fundamental importance in establishing the
principle that respect for human rights is not a narrowly focused obligation applying only
within strict limits to relations between individuals and their States, but rather is an open-
ended obligation applying to all societal relations whether at the local, national or inter-
national level”. P. Alston, ‘The Shortcomings of a ‘‘Garfield the Cat’’ Approach to the Right
to Development’, California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 15 (1985), p. 515.
103 In this respect, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has issued a general
comment in which it emphasised that “in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter
of the United Nations, with well-established principles of international law, and with the
provisions of the Covenant itself, international cooperation for development and thus for
the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States”. General
Comment 3 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the nature of
States parties obligations (Art. 2, para. 1 of the Covenant), para. 14, Report of the Fifth
Session, UN Doc. E/1991/23, 14 December 1990.
104 Declaration on Social Progress and Development, UN General Assembly Resolution 2542
(XXIV), adopted on 11 December 1969, Article 9.
105 For an analysis of the notion of ‘common concern’, see D. Shelton, ‘Common Concern of
Humanity’, Environmental Policy and Law, Vol. 39, issue 2 (2009), pp. 83-90; and J. Brunnée,
‘Common Areas, Heritage, Concern’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey, The Oxford
Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007), pp.
564-567.
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a whole, but also, arguably, lays the foundation for imposing binding obliga-
tions upon States.
The Declaration also incorporates some basic elements for a right to devel-
opment. It formulates a right for all peoples and human beings to “live in
dignity and freedom and to enjoy the fruits of social progress”.106 In addition,
it includes a list of elements that are considered “primary conditions of social
progress and development”, including permanent sovereignty over natural
wealth and resources.107
The promotion of development is also the underlying rationale for the
resolutions related to the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).
One of the principal aims of the proposed new international economic order
was to “ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development […]
for present and future generations”.108 The Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, adopted in the same year, lists “[i]nternational cooperation
for development” among the fundamental principles of international economic
relations.109 In addition, Article 17 of the Charter formulates an obligation
for States to cooperate for development, while Article 7 assigns the primary
responsibility “to promote the economic, social and cultural development of
its people” to the national State.
Although these resolutions can be said to pave the way for the right to
development, they approach development as an objective rather than as a right.
In fact, development was not mentioned as a human right until 1977, when
the Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution in which it requested
the UN Secretary-General to carry out a study on
“the international dimensions of the right to development as a human right in
relation with other human rights based on international cooperation, including
the right to peace, taking into account the requirements of the New International
Economic Order and the fundamental human needs”.110
106 Declaration on Social Progress and Development, UN General Assembly Resolution 2542
(XXIV), adopted on 11 December 1969, Article 1.
107 Ibid., Article 3.
108 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UN General
Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI), adopted on 1 May 1974, third paragraph of the preamble.
109 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN General Assembly Resolution 3281
(XXIV), adopted on 12 December 1974, Chapter I, under (n).
110 Resolution 4 (XXX-III) of the UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1389
(1977), 21 February 1971. The report on the international dimensions of the right to develop-
ment, published in 1979, was complemented with a report on the regional and national
dimensions of the right to development as a human right in 1981. However, neither of these
reports, although both affirming the existence of a right to development, sheds any light
on the contents of such a right. See Report of the Secretary-General on the International
Dimensions of the Right to Development, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1334 (1979); Report of the
Secretary-General on the Regional and National Dimensions of the Right to Development,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1421(Part I) and E/CN.4/1488 (PART II and III) (1981).
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This Resolution has served as a catalyst for successive efforts to determine
the contents of the right to development as part of the so-called “structural
approach to human rights” which emerged in the late 1970s.111 These efforts
resulted in the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development.
The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development
The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted with 146 votes
in favour, eight abstentions and one negative vote from the United States,
defines the human right to development as an “inalienable human right” that
entitles “every human person and all peoples to participate in, contribute to,
and enjoy economic, social and political development, in which all human
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully recognized”.112 In this respect,
“development” is defined as a “comprehensive economic, social, cultural and
political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being
of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free
and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of
benefits resulting therefrom”.113 Thus, the right to development may be
defined as a collective and individual right to participate in the process of
development and to enjoy the benefits resulting from it.
Article 1 also provides that the right to development “implies the full
realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject
to the relevant provisions of both 1966 human rights Covenants, the exercise
of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and
resources”. Thus, the realisation of the right to self-determination is regarded
as an essential precondition for exercising the right to development. After all,
how can the right to development be realised if people do not control their
own economic means or have the political power to shape their own develop-
mental policies?
Conversely, it could be argued that the right to self-determination can only
be realised by exercising the right to development. It should be remembered
that the right to self-determination is defined in the identical Articles 1(1) of
the 1966 Covenants as a right for peoples to “freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.
111 On the structural approach to human rights, see e.g. M.E. Salomon, Global Responsibility
for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of International Law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2007).
112 Declaration on the right to development, UN General Assembly Resolution 41/128, adopted
on 4 December 1986, Article 1. For voting information, see the 1986 Yearbook of the United
Nations, pp. 717-721. On the declaration, see R.N. Kiwanuka, ‘Developing Rights: The UN
Declaration on the Right to Development’, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. XXXV
(1988), pp. 257-272. On the United States position towards the right to development, see
S. Marks, ‘The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality’, Harvard Human
Rights Journal, Vol. 17 (2004), pp. 141-160.
113 Declaration on the Right to Development, preamble, second paragraph.
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In order to be able to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment, peoples must have a right to shape their development process, and, both
as individuals and communities, participate in this process and enjoy its
benefits. This is precisely what the right to development seeks to achieve.114
Therefore the right to development and the right to self-determination must
be regarded as being mutually reinforcing.
The Declaration also defines the subjects of the right to development.
According to Article 1 of the Declaration, the right to development accrues
to individuals and peoples. In this respect, Article 2(1) of the Declaration
emphasises that the human person is both the “central subject of development”
and “the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development”. As
such, the human person is also responsible for the implementation of the right
to development, both individually and collectively. However, primary respons-
ibility for the implementation of the right to development is assigned to States.
According to Article 3(1) of the Declaration, “States have the primary respons-
ibility for the creation of national and international conditions favourable to
the realization of the right to development”.
At the international level, States have an obligation, inter alia, to take steps
to formulate international development policies and must cooperate to pro-
mote, encourage and strengthen universal respect for and observance of human
rights.115 At the national level, Article 8 of the Declaration provides that States
should take all necessary measures for the realisation of the right to develop-
ment and that they have an obligation to ensure, inter alia, equality of oppor-
tunity for all in their access to basic resources and the fair distribution of
income. In addition, it provides that “States should encourage public participa-
tion in all spheres as an important factor in development and in the full
realization of all human rights”.
From the 1986 Declaration to the 1993 Vienna Declaration and beyond
The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, which produced the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, was the next benchmark in the evolu-
114 Declaration on the Right to Development, Article 1: “The right to development is an
inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled
to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social and political development…”, and
Article 2(3): “States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national develop-
ment policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire popula-
tion and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in
development and the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom”. Author’s emphasis
added. Also see M. Bedjaoui, ‘The Right to Development’, in M. Bedjaoui (ed.), International
Law: Achievements and Prospects, Paris: UNESCO (1991), p. 1188: “There is little sense in
recognizing self-determination as a superior and inviolable principle if one does not
recognize at the same time a ‘right to development’ for the peoples that have achieved
self-determination. This right to development can only be an ‘inherent’ and ‘built-in’ right
forming an inseparable part of the right to self-determination”.
115 Articles 4 and 6 of the Declaration.
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tion of the right to development.116 Like the Declaration on the Right to
Development, the Vienna Declaration points to the human person as the central
subject of development and assigns responsibility for the realisation of the
right to States, both at the national and international level.117
The Declaration also designates the right to development “as a universal
and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights” and
underlines the interrelationship between human rights and development by
stipulating that “while development facilitates the enjoyment of all human
rights, the lack of development may not be invoked to justify the abridgement
of internationally recognized human rights”.118
In addition, the Declaration establishes a direct link between the right to
development on the one hand, and the protection of the environment on the
other. In this respect, paragraph 11 of the Vienna Declaration reiterates prin-
ciple 3 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development which
determines that “[t]he right to development should be fulfilled so as to meet
equitably the developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations”.
In the years following the adoption of the Vienna Declaration, the right
to development was confirmed in several important outcome documents, such
as the Millennium Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus, the 2005 World
Summit Outcome and the 2012 Outcome Document of the United Nations
Conference on Sustainable Development.119 Moreover, it served as a stimulus
to the formulation of new development strategies, such as the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), which are aimed at integrating all the aspects
of the development process.120 Nevertheless, it seems as though the idea of
116 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, adopted on 12 July
1993.
117 Paragraph 10 of the declaration determines that “States should cooperate with each other
in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development. The international
community should promote an effective international cooperation for the realization of
the right to development and the elimination of obstacles to development”. In addition,
it stipulates that “lasting progress towards the implementation of the right to development
requires effective development policies at the national level, as well as equitable economic
relations and a favourable economic environment at the international level”.
118 Ibid.
119 See paragraph 11 of the Millennium Declaration, UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2 (2000),
adopted on 18 September 2000; paragraph 11 of the Monterrey Consensus, Report of the
International Conference on Financing for Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.198/11, adopted
on 22 March 2002; paragraph 24(b) of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN General
Assembly Resolution 60/1, adopted on 24 October 2005; and paragraph 8 of the Outcome
Document of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, ‘The Future
We Want’, UN General Assembly Resolution 66/288, adopted on 11 September 2012.
120 On the relationship between the MDGs and human rights, including the right to develop-
ment, see P. Alston, ‘Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights
and Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals’,
in Human Rights Quarterly, 27 (2005), pp. 755-829.
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development as a human right has shifted to the background to some extent
in favour of development as an all-encompassing objective.
3.4.2 The nature and legal status of the right to development
The right to development has evolved in particular in the resolutions of the
UN General Assembly and other UN organs. The only legally binding instru-
ment which formulates a right to development is the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights.121 The lack of recognition of the right to
development in legally binding instruments has led to a fierce debate in the
legal literature on the status of the right to development as an autonomous
legal right. As Nico Schrijver noted, advocates of the right to development
have sometimes elevated it “to lofty heights”, while opponents regard it as
“a dangerous smokescreen”.122 Moreover, some authors, such as Arjun
Sengupta, try to avoid the issue altogether by making a distinction between
human rights and legal rights. In Arjun Sengupta’s opinion, it is perfectly
possible for a right to be a human right without being a legal right.123
However, in the present author’s opinion, the significance of a moral right
devoid of legal meaning is questionable.
Arguably it would be going too far to consider the right to development
to be a fully-fledged human right, but that is not to say that the right is with-
out legal relevance. In Kiwanuka’s words: “[e]ven if the Declaration [on the
Right to Development] cannot be endowed with legal authority, in positivist
terms, that would not necessarily mean that it is stripped of all relevance and
121 Article 22 of the African Charter determines that “All peoples shall have the right to their
economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity
and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind” and that “States shall
have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to develop-
ment”.
122 N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception,
Meaning and Status’, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 329 (2007), Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers (2008), p. 271. Proponents of a right to development include P. Alston, ‘The
Shortcomings of a ‘‘Garfield the Cat’’ Approach to the Right to Development’, California
Western International Law Journal, Vol. 15 (1985), pp. 510-518; A. Sengupta, ‘On the Theory
and Practice of the Right to Development’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24 (2002), pp.
837–889, and M. Bedjaoui, ‘The Right to Development’, in M. Bedjaoui (ed.), International
Law: Achievements and Prospects, Paris, UNESCO (1991), pp. 1177-1203. Opponents include
Y. Ghai, ‘Whose Human Right to Development?’, Human Rights Unit Occasion Paper,
Commonwealth Secretariat (1989); and J. Donnelly, ‘In search of the Unicorn: The Juris-
prudence and Politics of the Right to Development’, California Western International Law
Journal, Vol. 15 (1985), pp. 473-509.
123 A. Sengupta, ‘On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development’, Human Rights
Quarterly, Vol. 24 (2002), pp. 859-860.
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utility in international law”.124 On the contrary, in the present author’s view,
the right to development has two dimensions which add to the existing core
of human rights and which give the right some legal significance.
First of all, at the very least, the right to development can be characterized
as “the sum of existing human rights”, which include the right to life, to an
adequate standard of living and to education.125 By extension, the right to
development may be defined as an umbrella right which integrates these
individual economic, social and cultural rights, as well as some dimensions
of civil and political rights, most notably empowerment rights such as the
rights to freedom of opinion and association. The added value of the right
to development would then primarily be its emphasis on the interrelated and
indivisible qualities of these individual rights. In this sense, the right to devel-
opment can first be characterised as a “participatory right” aimed at the
realisation of human rights pertaining to development.126 At the national
level, the right to development would then give rise to a right for all indi-
viduals to participate in the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights,
as well as a corresponding obligation for the State to implement economic,
social and cultural rights in such a way as to give due weight to the interests
of all individuals in a State, and not only to a small segment of society.127
The legal basis for this obligation is found, in the first place, in Article 2
of the ICESCR concerning the obligations of States parties to the ICESCR and in
124 R.N. Kiwanuka, ‘Developing Rights: The UN Declaration on the Right to Development’,
Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. XXXV (1988), p. 271. Bunn even argues that “the
prevailing view is that the right to development is, at the very least, on the threshold of
acceptance as a principle of positive international law”, but she does not sufficiently
elaborate her argument. I.D. Bunn, ‘The Right to Development: Implications for International
Economic Law’, American University International Law Review, Vol. 15 (2000), p. 1436.
125 N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception,
Meaning and Status’, Recueil des cours, Vol. 329 (2007), Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers (2008), p. 271.
126 For the idea of the right to development as a participatory right, see A. Orford, ‘Globaliza-
tion and the Right to Development’, in P. Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights, Academy of European
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001), p. 138.
127 Compare Georges Abi-Saab, who argues that “si la réalisation du droit collectif est une
condition nécessaire pour garantir la pleine jouissance des droits individuels qui s’y
rattachent, elle n’en est pas une condition suffisante. Ainsi, la plupart des pays ayant accédé
à l’indépendance après la seconde guerre mondiale, le respect des droits civils et politiques
laisse beaucoup à désirer. Et le même danger guette le droit au développement, si les élites
coercitives et exploitantes qui ont confisqué le pouvoir politique une fois l’indépendance
acquise, réussissent à détourner à leur bénéfice exclusif les fruits du droit au développement
ainsi conçu (c’est-à-dire les bienfaits d’un environnement économique plus favorable), plutôt
que de les laisser se répandre à toutes les couches de la population”. G. Abi-Saab, ‘Droits
de L’Homme et Développement: Quelques Eléments de Réflexion’, African Yearbook of
International Law, Vol. 3 (1995), pp. 6-7.
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Article 25 of the ICCPR concerning public participation in decision-making.128
At the international level, it can be argued that the right to development is
reflected in the collective obligation of States to cooperate for the realisation
of economic, social and cultural rights as incorporated in Article 2(1) and
Article 23 of the ICESCR.
Furthermore, the right to development develops the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, as well as the right to self-determination,
in more detail. For the purposes of this book one of the essential aspects is
that the right to development not only entails a right to participate in the
development process, but also entails a right to enjoy the fruits of develop-
ment.129 In this way, it extends the obligation of a government to exercise
the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources for national develop-
ment and the well-being of the people, as well as the right to “pursue eco-
nomic, social and cultural development” as part of the right to self-determina-
tion. The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the
right to self-determination should then be interpreted as entailing a right for
peoples to enjoy the fruits of development.
Therefore it may be concluded that despite the present uncertainties regard-
ing its precise content and legal implications, the right to development can
play an important role in realising development. It can do so in four different
ways. First, by means of its integrating function. As an umbrella right, the
right to development can play an important role in connecting different human
rights with the aim of realising economic, social and cultural development.
Secondly, the collective dimension of the right to development emphasises
the inclusive approach that is necessary to realise development. It clearly shows
that the right to development can only be realised if all sectors of society are
included in the development process. Thirdly, the dual nature of the right to
development as a collective as well as an individual right can be instrumental
128 In this respect, see General Comment No. 3 of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights on the nature of States parties’ obligations (Art. 2, par.1), Report of the
Fifth Session, UN Doc. E/1991/23, para. 8: “The Committee notes that the undertaking ‘to
take steps ... by all appropriate means including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures’ neither requires nor precludes any particular form of government or economic
system being used as the vehicle for the steps in question, provided only that it is democratic
and that all human rights are thereby respected”. Author’s emphasis added. Also see General
Comment No. 20 on Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (Art. 2,
para. 2), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, which explains the different forms of and
grounds for discrimination and which contains guidelines to assess the legitimacy of
differential treatment.
129 See the Declaration on the Right to Development. Article 1 of the Declaration formulates
a right “to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political
development”, while Article 2(3) formulates a duty for States “to formulate appropriate
national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of
the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful
participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom”.
Author’s emphasis added.
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in facilitating interaction between collective and individual rights. Finally, the
right to development can be instrumental in shaping the contents of other
human rights related to development, such as the right to education. This was
also recognised by the chairs of different UN treaty bodies, when they resolved
in a joint statement “to make a concerted effort to promote a development-
informed and interdependence-based reading of all human rights treaties, so
as to highlight and emphasize the relevance and importance of the right to
development in interpreting and applying human rights treaty provisions”.130
3.4.3 The implementation of the right to development within the sovereign
State
The right to development implies that States should implement procedures
in their domestic legislation which permit individuals and communities to
participate in the development process, while ensuring a fair distribution of
the benefits of development in society. Nevertheless, there is rarely any practice
or case law at the international level that develop these basic obligations.
As stated above, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is
the only legally binding instrument that recognises a right to development.
Some practice relating to the right to development can be found within the
framework of this Convention. The most notable example is the case of the
Endorois people v. Kenya before the African Commission on Human Rights.
The Endorois people, an indigenous people living in Kenya, alleged that their
right to development had been violated as a result of the State’s creation of
a Game Reserve in Endorois lands and its failure to adequately involve the
Endorois in the development process. The African Commission stated that
“recognising the right to development requires fulfilling five main criteria:
it must be equitable, non-discriminatory, participatory, accountable, and
transparent, with equity and [freedom of] choice as important, over-arching
themes in the right to development”.131
It also noted that consultation is an important element of the right to
development. In this respect, consultation should be interpreted in terms of
participation in government policies that concern those involved, rather than
a mere right to be informed of such policies.132 If a project carried out by
a government on indigenous lands were to have a major impact on the
130 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Joint Statement of
Chairpersons of the UN Treaty Bodies, 1 July 2011.
131 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Centre for Minority Rights Develop-
ment (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare
Council v. Kenya, 276/2003, para. 277.
132 Ibid., para. 281.
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territory, consultation should even be interpreted as implying a requirement
to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous people.133
The Commission also touched on the issue of sharing benefits, which it
linked to the right of property and compensation for the loss of property,
rather than directly to the right to development.134 In relation to the right
to development, the Commission merely stated that “the right to development
will be violated when the development in question decreases the well-being
of the community”.135 Although it is unfortunate that the Commission did
not expressly state that the issue of sharing benefits is a constituent element
of the right to development, the Commission’s statement does have an interest-
ing implication for the purposes of the present book. Arguably, it implies that
a government that decreases the well-being of the population as a result of
its governance of natural resources violates the right to development.
3.4 APPRAISAL
The current chapter has examined “peoples” as subjects and beneficiaries of
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. It addressed
this issue from the perspective of peoples’ rights, in particular from the per-
spective of the right to self-determination, which incorporates the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and from the perspective
of the closely related right to development.
In relations between States the right to self-determination entails first of
all a right for peoples to choose their political organization, including – under
exceptional circumstances –secession. In view of the major implications of this
right, it accrues to very narrowly defined categories of peoples, mainly colonial
peoples and peoples under foreign domination. In this sense, the right is
addressed to “other” States, in the sense that other States have to respect a
people’s right of self-determination. As soon as a people has organized itself
in an independent State, the right to external self-determination becomes vested
in the State. As such, it falls under State sovereignty and becomes subject to
the principle of non-intervention. This sovereign dimension includes the State’s
right to freely dispose of its natural resources, excluding other States. The right
to development is a logical continuation of the right to self-determination.
Arguably, it entails an obligation for other States to assist each other with the
development process. However, this right does not yet have a firm basis in
international law.
Furthermore, this chapter has argued that the right to self-determination
and the right to development have an internal dimension as well. In the context
133 Ibid., para. 291.
134 Ibid., para. 294.
135 Ibid.
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of the sovereign State, the right to self-determination refers first of all to the
right of the population of a State, as the sum of the peoples of the State, to
freely choose the State’s political and economic system. It also includes the
right for minorities and indigenous peoples to govern their local affairs.
In addition, the right to internal self-determination includes a right to freely
pursue economic, social and cultural development. This right is expressed in
the right to economic self-determination, which includes a right to have access
to the economic means to achieve development. The right to freely pursue
economic, social and cultural development can become effective based on the
right to development, understood as a right for peoples and individuals to
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political
development.
As regards implementing the right to internal self-determination and the
right to development, it is argued that the main way to give effect to these
rights is by means of public participation in decision-making. This implies,
for example, that a government should consult local communities that may
be affected by particular resource projects. However, it is striking that the
relevant case law of human rights bodies on public participation focuses in
particular on the protection of indigenous peoples. Those communities are
given a right to participate in decision-making with the specific aim of pre-
serving the culture and traditional lifestyle.
One important drawback of most complaint mechanisms of human rights
bodies is that they are open only to individuals who claim to be directly
affected by government decisions. This requirement stands in the way of claims
that serve a more general interest. For example, if concessions are issued in
areas that are remote from human habitation, it is not possible to file a com-
plaint before a human rights body, even if the concessions have a serious
impact on the environment. Furthermore, on the same grounds, it is not
possible to challenge a government’s failure to provide for public participation
regarding decisions on the expenditure of resource revenues.
The realisation of the right to self-determination and the right to develop-
ment therefore depends largely on whether or not individual States implement
the ensuing obligations in national law. According to the Human Rights
Committee, the implementation of the right to self-determination requires States
to put in place procedures that permit this right to be exercised in practice.
The Human Rights Committee, as well as the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, has the formal mandate to oversee the implementation
of the identical Articles 1 of the 1966 Covenants. Both committees have devoted
a great deal of attention to securing the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination through a combined reading of Article 1 and Article 27 of the
ICCPR.
It would therefore be laudable if these – and other – human rights bodies
were to adopt a more active approach to ensuring the proper implementation
of the right to internal self-determination for other communities as well, most
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notably by emphasising the importance of public participation for the
realisation of the right in their reports and comments. One possible avenue
for these human rights bodies would be to interpret treaty provisions that have
a bearing on participation of citizens in decisions affecting their well-being
in the light of identical Articles 1 of the ICESCR and the ICCPR. Relevant pro-
visions include the right to an adequate standard of living enshrined in Article
11 of the ICESCR and the right to participate in a State’s decision-making
processes, enshrined in Article 25 of the ICCPR.

4 Environmental law obligations relevant for
the governance of natural resources
4.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
This chapter discusses the role of international environmental law in determin-
ing the right of States and peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources.
It examines two principal ways in which international environmental law
impacts upon this right. First of all, this chapter examines principles formulated
by international environmental law for the exploitation of natural resources
and the protection of the environment. Relevant principles include the obliga-
tion to conserve and sustainably use natural wealth and resources, to safeguard
natural resources for future generations, to prevent damage to the environment
of other States, and to adopt a precautionary approach to the protection of
the environment and natural resources.1
Secondly, international environmental law contains several “common
regimes” aimed at protecting natural resources or parts of the environment
because of the importance they have several States. The number of States with
a stake in a common regime may vary from two, in the case of shared natural
resources, to the entire community of States, in the case of world heritage.
A general feature of these common regimes is that they impose obligations
upon States to protect the interests of the larger community of States. The aim
of this chapter is to assess how and to what extent all these obligations under
international environmental law qualify the right of States to freely dispose
of their natural resources.
One of the principal reasons for examining the principles and regimes
discussed in this chapter is related to the hypothesis that they are not only
relevant for the protection of natural resources and the environment in times
of peace, but that they are also relevant in situations of armed conflict. This
1 For different categorisations of the principles of international law, see S.A. Atapattu,
Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law, Transnational Publishers, Series on
International Law and Development, New York (2006); P. Birnie, A.E. Boyle and C. Redg-
well, International Law and the Environment, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press
(2009); P. Sands and J. Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, Third Edition (2012); N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1997); and
N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception,
Meaning and Status’, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 329 (2007), Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers (2008), pp. 221-412.
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is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this book, while the current chapter
focuses on the contents of the obligations arising from these principles and
common regimes and their implications for the principle of permanent sover-
eignty.
Section 2 of this chapter discusses the origins and structure of international
environmental law in order to provide the necessary context. Section 3 then
discusses the relevant principles of international environmental law and their
legal status. Section 4 discusses several common regimes and the obligations
ensuing from them. Finally, section 5 draws some final conclusions about the
role of international environmental law and the limits it places on the right
of States and peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources.
4.2 ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
This section briefly introduces international environmental law as a field of
international law. International environmental law has some distinctive char-
acteristics, and this section discusses some of them for a proper understanding
of this field.
4.2.1 Origins of international environmental law
International environmental law has evolved relatively recently. Although early
efforts aimed at the protection of particular ecosystems, such as rivers and
forests, can be traced back to the nineteenth century, modern international
environmental law originated particularly in the United Nations.2 In this
respect, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in
Stockholm in 1972 is usually seen as the catalyst for the development of a body
of law pertaining to the protection of the environment.3
The principal objective of this modern international environmental law
is to protect and conserve the environment for the benefit of present and future
generations of mankind. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment rather poetically emphasised the
2 For a brief outline of the evolution of international environmental law, see P.H. Sand, ‘The
Evolution of International Environmental Law’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey, The
Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007),
pp. 29-43; and P. Sands & J. Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law, Third Edition,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2012), chapter 2.
3 See M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford: Clarendon Press
(1997), p. 154; and P.H. Sand, ‘The Evolution of International Environmental Law’, in D.
Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law,
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007), pp. 33-34, who emphasises that the Stockholm
Conference was the “culmination of an intense preparatory process”.
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importance of the environment for human life and development by stating
that “Man is both creature and moulder of his environment, which gives him
physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral,
social and spiritual growth” and it added that the environment is “essential
to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights – even the right
to life itself”.4
Since the late 1980s, international environmental law has become integrated
with international development law. These two fields of law have been con-
nected by the principle of sustainable development, which was coined by the
World Commission on Environment and Development, the Brundtland Com-
mission, in its report Our Common Future as “development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs”.5 The principle of sustainable development evolved to
become one of the basic aims of international environmental law.6 ConverselyE
environmental protection constitutes an integral part of sustainable develop-
ment, which also embraces economic and social development.7 This is especial-
ly clear from Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration, which proclaims that “[i]n
order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be con-
sidered in isolation from it”.8
The need to strike a balance between economic development and the
protection of the environment in order to preserve the long-term development
potential of mankind is central to the principle of sustainable development.
4 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
16 June 1972, 11 ILM 1416 (1972), para. 1 of the preamble.
5 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1987, p. 8.
6 Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey even refer to it as “the organizing principle for international
environmental law”. See D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey, International Environmental
Law: Mapping the Field’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook
of International Environmental Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007), p. 15. Sustainable
development has also been referred to as a “meta-principle”. In this respect see V. Lowe,
‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’, in A. Boyle and D. Freestone
(eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1999),
p. 31.
7 In this respect, the Johannesburg Declaration has identified three “interdependent and
mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development”, i.e. “economic development, social
development and environmental protection”. Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable
Development, Annex to the Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,
A/CONF.199/20, 26 August - 4 September 2002, para. 5. In addition, see P. Sands & J. Peel,
Principles of International Environmental Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Third
Edition (2012), p. 10, who argue that sustainable development law is broader than
international environmental law, in that it includes, apart from environmental issues, “the
social and economic dimension of development, the participatory role of major groups,
and financial and other means of implementation”.
8 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13 June 1992, 31 ILM
874 (1992), Principle 4.
116 Chapter 4
Arguably, this approach not only entails obligations for States regarding the
use of natural resources which directly contribute to development, but also
an obligation to conserve particular ecosystems or species because of the role
they play in maintaining a balance in nature, which is essential to sustain
human life in the long term.9 This can be achieved by adopting an ecosystem
approach to sustainable development. This approach is central to the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity and can be described as “a strategy for
the integrated management of land, water and living resources that promotes
conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way”.10
During the 1990s and early 2000s the principle of sustainable development
was also promoted at a number of important international summits, including
the 2000 Millennium World Summit, the 2002 Johannesburg Summit on
Sustainable Development, the 2005 World Summit and, most recently, the 2012
Rio+20 Summit on Sustainable Development.11 These summits have con-
tributed to strengthening the legal status of the principle of sustainable devel-
opment.
Reference should also be made to the New Delhi Declaration of Principles
of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, adopted by the
International Law Association (ILA) in 2002.12 Although this declaration is
not legally binding in any way, it can be considered to be an authoritative
statement regarding the state of the law in relation to sustainable development
as it is based on an extensive study of State practice, judicial decisions and
treaty law.13
This Declaration identifies seven principles that are considered “instru-
mental in pursuing the objective of sustainable development in an effective
way”. These are the duty of States to ensure the sustainable use of natural
resources, the principle of equity and the eradication of poverty, the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities, the principle of the precautionary
approach to human health, natural resources and ecosystems, the principle
of public participation and access to information and justice, the principle of
good governance and the principle of integration and interrelationship, in
9 This is expressed through the concept of inter-generational equity. See E. Brown-Weiss,
In Fairness to Future Generations: International law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational
Equity, Tokyo: United Nations University (1989).
10 See http://www.cbd.int/ecosystem/ for more information on the ecosystem approach in
relation to the Convention on Biological Diversity.
11 See N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law: In-
ception, Meaning and Status’, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 329 (2007), Leiden/Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers (2008), pp. 221-412. For the Rio+20 Summit, see the outcome document
of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development ‘The Future We Want’,
annexed to UN General Assembly Resolution 66/288 of 11 September 2012.
12 ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable
Development, adopted on 2 April 2002, UN Doc. A/57/329 of 31 August 2002.
13 See the fifth and final report of the ILA Committee on Legal Aspects of Sustainable Develop-
ment (2002), the ILA Committee which prepared the New Delhi Declaration.
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particular in relation to human rights and social, economic and environmental
objectives. Some of these principles are examined in the current chapter, in
particular the principle of sustainable use, the principle of equity and the
precautionary principle, while others, in particular the principle of public
participation and the principle of good governance, were discussed in previous
chapters.
4.2.2 The structure of international environmental law
A proper understanding of international environmental law requires a brief
introduction to its characteristics. One of the characteristics of international
environmental law concerns its creation. In addition to the traditional sources
of international law formulated in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, the concept
of “soft law” is particularly important in international environmental law. Soft
law processes play a major role in the development of rules in the field of
international environmental law.14
The world conferences convened by the UN General Assembly and held
in Stockholm in 1972 and in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, were particularly instru-
mental in this respect. These conferences produced important declarations that
have had a great impact on the development of international environmental
law. While the character of these declarations is partly declaratory in the sense
that they formulate some well-established rules of customary international
law, they have also had an important programming function.15 Many of the
principles expressed in the declarations subsequently found their way into
international treaties or have crystallised as norms of customary international
law.
Other examples of soft law instruments that have stimulated the develop-
ment of international environmental law include (non-binding) decisions taken
by the conferences of the parties (COP) in particular treaty regimes. Although
COP decisions generally concern the implementation of obligations which are
already binding under international treaties, some have also substantively and
progressively developed the treaty obligations concerned.16 In addition, refer-
ence can be made to the work of United Nations organs, such as UNEP, and
14 For the notion of soft law, see Chapter 1 of this study.
15 For a discussion of these terms and the impact of particular UN resolutions on the formation
of international environmental law, see R.J. Dupuy, Droit déclaratoire et droit programmatoire
de la coutume sauvage a la «soft law», Toulouse: Société française pour le droit international
(1974).
16 On the role of COP decisions in the development of international environmental law, see
T. Gehring, ‘Treaty-making and Treaty Evolution’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey,
The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press
(2007), pp. 469-497.
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non-governmental organizations such as the International Law Association
(ILA), which have formulated important rules and guidelines for States.17
Another characteristic of international environmental law is directly related
to the object it is protecting. Environmental problems often not only affect the
interests of individual States, but also the interests of the larger international
community of States. Examples include climate change, atmospheric pollution,
pollution of the high seas and over-fishing. This is the reason why a relatively
large number of environmental obligations either operate erga omnes partes,
i.e., between the parties to a particular treaty regime, or sometimes even erga
omnes, i.e., between all States whether or not they are party to a particular
treaty.18
In other words, such international environmental obligations are
characterised by their legal indivisibility, in the sense that they “simultaneously
[bind] each and every State concerned with respect to all the others”, at least
within the context of particular treaty regimes.19 Thus with respect to these
obligations, several or even all States are deemed to have a legal interest in
their observance.
This has important implications for the situation of armed conflict, because,
arguably, the indivisibility of particular environmental obligations restricts
the options for parties to an armed conflict to suspend their treaty obligations.
For example, reference can be made to particular obligations for States under
the Convention on Biological Diversity, which aims to protect the Earth’s
biological diversity in the interests of the international community. Article 8
(c) of this Convention, for example, prescribes that States “[r]egulate or manage
17 Compare the UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the
Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources
Shared by Two or More States, 17 ILM 1097 (1978), discussed in section 2.3.5 below, and
the ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable
Development, in ILA Report of the Seventieth Conference, New Delhi (2002).
18 For the distinction between erga omnes and reciprocal obligations, see the Case Concerning
the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment of 5 February 1970,
I.C.J. Reports, 1970, p. 3, para. 33, where the Court stated that “an essential distinction should
be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a
whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By
their very nature the former are the concern of al1 States. In view of the importance of
the rights involved, al1 States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes”.
19 See the definition of the concept of erga omnes obligation by Special Rapporteur Mr. Gaetano
Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report on State responsibility, UN Doc A/CN.4/444 and Add. 1-3, para.
92, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1992, Vol. II, Part One, p. 34. See
also the commentary of the ILC on Article 48 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
which mentions obligations under environmental treaties as an example of obligations erga
omnes partes. See the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-
third session, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), p. 126. The concept of erga omnes and the resulting
indivisibility is not to be confused with the concept of ‘integral agreements’ discussed in
Chapter 6.
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biological resources important for the conservation of biological diversity”.20
It can be assumed that States are expected to continue to respect this obligation
unless they are completely prevented from doing so.
A third characteristic of international environmental law is that environ-
mental obligations can, to a certain extent, be invoked by entities other than
States. The evolution of international law in the field of sustainable develop-
ment has facilitated the interaction between international environmental law
and international human rights law. Today international environmental law
obligations of States are increasingly invoked by individuals and minority
groups claiming a right to a decent, healthy or satisfactory environment, either
directly or as part of their rights to life, private life, property or access to
information and justice.21
Similarly, the emergence of the rights of future generations as part of the
concept of sustainable development has also encouraged a human rights
approach in international environmental law. The rights of future generations
must expressly be taken into account by States as part of their environmental
obligations. The fact that representatives of future generations cannot directly
enforce their rights at the international level does not preclude the existence
of these rights as such. Moreover, as discussed below, the rights of future
generations have been expressly addressed by some national courts.
4.3 PRINCIPLES RESULTING FROM INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
International environmental law formulates several principles, some of which
lay down obligations for States with regard to the use of natural resources
and the environment. This section reviews those principles of international
environmental law that have a special resonance for the situation of armed
conflict. These are the obligations to conserve and sustainably use natural
wealth and resources, to promote the equitable allocation of natural resources
between generations, to adopt a precautionary approach to the protection of
the environment and natural resources, a prohibition against causing extraterri-
20 However, it must be noted that Article 8 of the Biodiversity Convention formulates a
conditional obligation which provides lenience to States that find themselves in a difficult
situation. States are only to implement the obligations contained in the provision “as far
as possible and appropriate”.
21 See, e.g., P. Birnie, A.E. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, Third
Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 271-287; P. Sands & J. Peel, Principles
of International Environmental Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Third Edition
(2012), pp. 775-789. K.S.A. Ebeku, ‘Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment and
Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection in Nigeria: Gbemre v. Shell
Revisited’, RECIEL, Vol.16, issue 3 (2007), pp. 312-320; M. Fitzmaurice & J. Marshall, ‘The
Human Right to a Clean Environment–Phantom or Reality? The European Court of Human
Rights and English Courts Perspective on Balancing Rights in Environmental Cases’, Nordic
Journal of International Law, Vol. 76 (2007), pp. 103-151.
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torial damage; and an obligation to cooperate for the protection of the global
environment.
4.3.1 The obligation to conserve and sustainably use natural wealth and
resources
The obligation to conserve and sustainably use natural wealth and resources,
or the principle of sustainable use, seeks to set limits on the way in which
States use the natural wealth and resources situated within their territory and
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, with the aim of safeguarding their
capital for the benefit of present and future generations. The obligation is
reflected in several of the principles of both the 1972 Stockholm and the 1992
Rio Declaration. Principle 2 of the Stockholm Declaration, for example, pro-
vides that “[t]he natural resources of the earth […] must be safeguarded for
the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or
management, as appropriate”. In addition, Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration
imposes an obligation on States to “cooperate in a spirit of global partnership
to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s eco-
system”.
Arguably, the obligation to conserve and use natural wealth and resources
in a sustainable way constitutes the core of the concept of sustainable develop-
ment and of international environmental law in general.22 This is reflected
in the large number of international environmental and other resource-related
treaties in which the obligation is enshrined. Some of these indicate specific
measures required for the implementation of the obligation, or provide defini-
tions of the terms ‘conservation’ or ‘sustainable use’, others contain more
general references to the obligation. For example, more general references are
included in the 2006 International Tropical Timber Agreement, which aims,
inter alia, to encourage the members of the International Tropical Timber
Organization to “develop national policies aimed at sustainable utilization
and conservation of timber producing forests”.23
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity is an example of a more
explicit treaty. It defines the term ‘sustainable use’ as “the use of components
of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term
decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the
needs and aspirations of present and future generations”.24 In addition, Article
6 of the convention obliges parties to develop or adapt “national strategies,
22 See D. French, International law and policy of sustainable development, Melland Schill Studies
in International Law, Manchester: Manchester University Press (2005), p. 38.
23 Article 1(m) of the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 27 January 2006.
24 Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 May 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.
79.
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plans or programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity”, as well as to “integrate […] the conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity into […] plans, programmes and policies”. In Articles
8 and 9 it also outlines specific measures which parties need to adopt to
conserve biological diversity and contains in Article 10 a provision on the
sustainable use of components of biological diversity.
The 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals, although focused mainly on conservation and not so much on
sustainable use, also contains specific measures for the implementation of the
obligation to conserve and sustainably use natural wealth and resources. Parties
to the convention are required to take specific measures to conserve migratory
species, especially those which are endangered (listed in Appendix I to the
convention) or whose conservation status is unfavourable (listed in Appendix
II to the convention).25 In addition, the convention provides a definition of
the term “conservation status of a migratory species”, thus also providing an
indirect definition of the term “conservation”. The conservation status of a
migratory species is defined as “the sum of the influences acting on the
migratory species that may affect its long-term distribution and abundance”.26
The obligation to conserve and sustainably use natural wealth and resources
takes different forms. In the 1971 Ramsar Convention on the Protection of
Wetlands, it is expressed in the principle of the “wise use” of wetlands and
of migratory stocks of waterfowl.27 The 1973 Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) refers merely
to the need to protect endangered species against “overexploitation”.28 Inter-
national freshwater law uses the terms “equitable and reasonable” as well as
“optimal and sustainable utilization”.29 Furthermore, in international fisheries
law as well as in the law of the sea, the principle of sustainable use takes the
form of an obligation to preserve the “maximum” or “optimum sustainable
yield”.30
25 The convention contains in Article 1(1) (d) and (e) express definitions of the terms “un-
favourable conservation status” and “endangered”.
26 Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
23 June 1979, 1651 UNTS 333.
27 Articles 3 and 2(6) of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially
as Waterfowl Habitat, 2 February 1971, 996 UNTS 245.
28 Fourth paragraph of the preamble and Article II of the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243.
29 Articles 5(1) and 6(1)(f) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses, 21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997).
30 See, e.g., the Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, 29 April 1958, 559 UNTS 285, Article 1(2) and 2; UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, Article 61; United Nations Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995, 2167 UNTS 88, Article 5. For more on
this topic, see D. Freestone, R. Barnes & D.M. Ong (ed.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and
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Although these terms entail specific obligations in the fields in which they
operate, they all imply the use of natural resources in such a way and at such
a rate that the long-term survival and/or protection of the resources concerned
is ensured. Moreover, in some cases, an evolution in the meaning of the terms
can be detected. For example, this applies to the terms “maximum” or “op-
timum sustainable yield” in international fisheries law. While the 1958 Fisheries
Convention used the term “optimum sustainable yield” primarily in the context
of guaranteeing a continuous and maximum supply of food,31 the 1995 UN
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement refers to the “long-term sustainability of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks”, as well as “the object-
ive of their optimum utilization” in relation to measures to protect marine
ecosystems and the biodiversity of the sea.32
The obligation to conserve and to use natural resources in a sustainable
way was also recognised in treaties which are not aimed at the protection of
specific natural resources. Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which has now become part of the 1994 WTO Agreement, parties can,
for example, invoke environmental exceptions to the basic rules of the GATT
regarding non-discrimination between trading partners and between foreign
and domestic products. These exceptions concern measures “necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health” and measures “relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources”.33
The 1994 WTO Agreement also emphasises the relationship between
sustainable resource use and global economic growth:
“relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with
a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of
Prospects, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law
of the Sea, 3rd edition, Yonkers, New York, Juris Publishing (1999), and N.M.J. van der Burgt,
The Contribution of International Fisheries Law to Human Development: An Analysis of Multilateral
and ACP-EC Fisheries Instruments, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2012), pp.147-156.
31 Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
29 April 1958, 559 UNTS 285, Article 1(2) and 2. Article 1(2) of this Convention contains
a duty for States “to adopt […] such measures […] as may be necessary for the conservation
of the living resources of the high seas”, while Article 2 defines the expression ’conservation
of the living resources of the high seas’ as the aggregate of the measures rendering possible
the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply
of food and other marine products. Conservation programmes should be formulated with
a view to securing in the first place a supply of food for human consumption”.
32 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995,
2167 UNTS 88, Article 5.
33 See Article XX (b) and (g) of the General Agreement on Tariffs in Trade, Annex 1A to the
WTO Agreement, adopted on 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 187.
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the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing
so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels
of economic development”.34
Finally, the principle of sustainable use also to some extent forms the basis
for the notion of “usufruct” in the international law of armed conflict. The
notion of usufruct is central to the exploitation of natural resources in situations
of occupation. In this respect Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides
that an occupier must, amongst other things, “safeguard the capital’ of forests
and agricultural estates, and that he must “administer them in accordance
with the rules of usufruct”. However, it should be noted that this provision
only reflects the principle of sustainable use to a limited extent. In occupation
law the rationale for protecting natural resources is not so much to protect
the environment and its natural resources for the benefit of future generations,
but rather to preserve the rights of the occupied State and its population to
these resources. Therefore the focus is on protecting property rights rather
than on ensuring long-term sustainability.
The obligation to conserve and sustainably use natural wealth and resources
has also been appealed to in the case law of international tribunals. Although
these cases do not clarify the contents or the legal status of the principle of
sustainable use in any more detail, they do confirm the existence of the prin-
ciple itself. In the Icelandic Fisheries case, the International Court of Justice
confirmed the existence of an obligation in international fisheries law to
conserve the living resources of the sea. The Court considered that
“[i]t is one of the advances in maritime international law, resulting from the intensi-
fication of fishing, that the former laissez-faire treatment of the living resources of
the sea in the high seas has been replaced by a recognition of a duty to have due
regard to the rights of other States and the needs of conservation for the benefit
of all’.35
Furthermore, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, the International Court of Justice
pronounced on the need to take into account modern norms and standards
related to sustainable development in a paragraph that is often quoted:
“Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly
interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done without consideration of
the effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing
awareness of the risks for mankind – for present and future generations – of pursuit
34 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted on 15 April 1994, 1867
UNTS 154. Author’s emphasis added.
35 International Court of Justice, Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Judgment
of 25 July 1974, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 3, para. 72.
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of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and
standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during
the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and
such new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new
activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need
to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly
expressed in the concept of sustainable development”.36
In the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case, the International Court of Justice
interpreted the implications of the obligation of optimum and rational utiliza-
tion in freshwater law. In this respect, the Court considered that
“the attainment of optimum and rational utilization requires a balance between
the Parties’ rights and needs to use the river for economic and commercial activities
on the one hand, and the obligation to protect it from any damage to the environ-
ment that may be caused by such activities, on the other”.37
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) pronounced on the
issue of sustainable use as well. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases concerning
an experimental fishing programme started by Japan, the Tribunal noted that
“the conservation of the living resources of the sea is an element in the pro-
tection and preservation of the marine environment”. It also indicated that
“the parties should in the circumstances act with prudence and caution to
ensure that effective conservation measures are taken to prevent serious harm
to the stock of southern bluefin tuna” and that provisional measures were
necessary in order to “avert further deterioration of the southern bluefin tuna
stock”.38
Therefore in the light of this considerable and constantly growing body
of case law and the numerous provisions in treaty law relating to the obligation
to conserve and sustainably use natural wealth and resources, it is justified
to conclude that States are required under international law to properly
manage their own natural wealth and resources and to use with restraint the
natural wealth and resources that belong to several or all States, such as the
fish in the high seas.39
This has several implications for the rights of States relating to the exploita-
tion of their natural resources, both directly regarding the exploitation activities
36 International Court of Justice, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judg-
ment of 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, para. 140.
37 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 14, para. 175.
38 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand
v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Requests for Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999,
paras. 70-85.
39 Furthermore, as discussed in section 4.3.5, States are under an obligation to cooperate for
the conservation of these common resources.
Environmental law obligations relevant for the governance of natural resources 125
themselves and regarding the effects of these activities on the environment.
The principle of sustainable use requires States to use their natural resources
in a way and at a rate that allows these natural resources to regenerate, or
in the case of non-living natural resources, to safeguard these natural resources
for long-term development. However, at the same time, the principle leaves
States with a broad scope to decide what is sustainable and what is not. This
is both a strength and a weakness of the principle.
4.3.2 The obligation to safeguard natural resources for future generations
The obligation to safeguard natural resources for future generations is
expressed in the principle of equity. This principle, which is firmly established
in general international law, has a particular resonance in the context of
international environmental law. The principle of equity as a principle of
international environmental law places a dual responsibility on the present
generation to ensure, on the one hand, that all people living today have the
opportunity to benefit from the natural resources that have been left behind
by past generations, and on the other hand, to leave behind for future gener-
ations a healthy planet which they can use for their development.40
In other words, the principle of equity has two components. The intra-
generational component formulates an obligation for the present generation
to provide access to the legacy of past generations to all members of their own
generation. This component of equity is reflected in particular in concepts such
as “optimum utilisation” in the international law of the sea, “optimal use”
and “differential and more favourable treatment” in international economic
law, and “common but differentiated responsibilities” in international environ-
mental law.
However, the inter-generational component of equity is the most relevant
to the current book. It concerns the responsibility of the present generation
to safeguard the opportunities of future generations to use the natural wealth
and resources for their needs and aspirations by protecting the diversity of
40 On this principle, see, e.g., E. Brown-Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International
law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity, Tokyo: United Nations University (1989);
A. D’Amato, ‘Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environ-
ment?’ American Journal of International Law, Vol. 84 (1990), pp. 190-198; N.J. Schrijver, ‘After
Us, the Deluge? The Position of Future Generations of Humankind in International Environ-
mental Law’, in M.A.M. Salih, Climate Change and Sustainable Development: New Challenges
for Poverty Reduction, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2009), pp. 59-78; D. Shelton, ‘Equity’, in
D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law,
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007); M. Fitzmaurice, ‘International Protection of the
Environment’, Recueil des cours, Vol. 293 (2001), The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers (2002), pp. 186-201; S.A. Atapattu, Emerging Principles of International
Environmental Law, New York: Transnational Publishers, Series on International Law and
Development (2006), pp. 113-119.
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natural resources, preserving the quality of the planet and maintaining access
to the legacy of past generations.41
Inter-generational equity is one of the core principles of sustainable devel-
opment. However, it is often presented as a philosophical or political concept
rather than as a legal principle.42 This may be partly due to some of the
inherent difficulties of the principle which relate to the beneficiaries and
addressees of the associated rights and obligations.
The principle of inter-generational equity confers responsibilities on the
present generation which may be demanded by future generations. With
reference to Parfit’s paradox and the chaos theory, it can be argued that the
present generation cannot have a responsibility to an undefined group of
people whose composition is unclear and may alter as a consequence of the
actions taken by the present generation by fulfilling their obligations to future
generations.43 Although effectively refuted by Brown-Weiss, who emphasises
that the rights of future generations are not individual rights but rather group
rights or “generational rights, which must be conceived of in the temporal
context of generations”,44 problems with regard to this idea do arise with
respect to its implementation. It is for this reason that the principle of inter-
generational equity cannot be regarded as a legal principle that formulates
concrete obligations for States with regard to future generations. Rather, the
principle of inter-generational equity formulates a general responsibility for
States to take into account the long-term effects of their actions when they
contemplate activities that could have negative effects on the environment
or natural resources.
For the purposes of the present book, it is relevant to note the following
observation of the Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Com-
mission on Environment and Development, which establishes an explicit
connection between equity and the rights and obligations of parties to an
armed conflict:
“the conservation or use of the environment and natural resources for the benefit
of present and future generations also implies certain restraints for the parties to
an international or non-international armed conflict in that they shall abstain from
41 See in particular, E. Brown-Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International law, Common
Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity, Tokyo: United Nations University (1989).
42 See, e.g., D. French, Law and Policy of Sustainable Development, Melland Schill Studies in
International Law, Manchester: Manchester University Press (2005), p. 28, who distinguishes
between equity “as a recognized legal term”, referring to the use of the term in juris-
prudence, and its “political meaning” within the context of the discussion on sustainable
development. For philosophical views on the concept of intergenerational equity, see, inter
alia, J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1999).
43 See, e.g., A. D’Amato, ‘Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global
Environment?’ American Journal of International Law, Vol. 84 (1990), pp. 190-198.
44 E. Brown-Weiss, ‘Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment’,
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 84 (1990), p. 205.
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methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long-lasting or severe damage to the environment”.45
Although the accuracy of this statement can be questioned from a positivist
perspective46 it can be argued in more general terms that parties to an armed
conflict must take into account the effects of their actions on future generations.
This corresponds to the general line of reasoning of the International Court
of Justice in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. As part of its assessment
regarding the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Court
explicitly took into account the potential effects of nuclear weapons on future
generations.47 Thus the Court recognised that in their decisions and policies,
States have to have due regard for the consequences of their actions on future
generations. This includes the consequences for future generations resulting
from their actions in armed conflict.
Inter-generational equity has been recognised as a guiding principle in
several treaties. An early reference to future generations can be found in the
1946 Whaling Convention, which recognises in its preamble “the interest of
the nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations the great
natural resources represented by the whale stocks”.48 Other examples include
the 1973 CITES Convention which recognises that “wild fauna and flora in their
many beautiful and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural
systems of the earth which must be protected for this and the generations to
come”, the 1992 UN Convention on Climate Change which states that “[t]he
Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind”, and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, which states
that parties are “[d]etermined to conserve and sustainably use biological
diversity for the benefit of present and future generations”.49
45 R.D. Munro & J.G. Lammers, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal
Principles and Recommendations, Report adopted by the Experts Group on Environmental
Law of the World Commission on Environment and Development, London/Dordrecht/
Boston: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff (1986), p. 45. This issue will be discussed
in more detail in Part II of this book.
46 The statement uses the language of Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I relating
to international armed conflicts, which does not have an equivalent in Additional Protocol
II relating to non-international armed conflicts. These provisions are discussed in more
detail in Chapter 6 of this study.
47 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, paras. 35 and 36.
48 First paragraph of the preamble of the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling, 2 December 1946, 161 UNTS 72.
49 See the first paragraph of the preamble of the Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243; Article 3(1) of
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; and
the last paragraph of the preamble of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, 5 May 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79. For other references to future generations in treaty law, see the 1979 Convention
on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals which states in the second
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Reference can also be made to the 1972 World Heritage Convention, which
aims to preserve parts of the cultural and natural heritage as part of the world
heritage of mankind as a whole. Article 4 of this convention formulates an
obligation for parties to ensure “the identification, protection, conservation,
presentation and transmission to future generations of the [world] cultural
and natural heritage […] situated on its territory”.50 In addition to the refer-
ences in treaty law, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declar-
ation also contain explicit references to responsibilities owed to present and
future generations.51
While the references to inter-generational equity in these treaties serve to
emphasise the general responsibility of States with regard to the rights of future
generations, some national decisions have actually expressly recognised the
rights of future generations. Furthermore, these decisions have identified
corresponding obligations for national government authorities. In the often
cited Minors Oposa case, the Philippine Supreme Court accorded legal standing
to children, as well as unborn generations, to claim a constitutional right to
a “balanced and healthful ecology”. The Court explicitly recognised the obliga-
tion for the government to guarantee that right to future generations.52 Refer-
ence can also be made to the national case of the Fuel Retailers Association
of Southern Africa v the Director-General, in which the South African Constitu-
paragraph of the preamble that parties are “[a]ware that each generation of man holds
the resources of the earth for future generations and has an obligation to ensure that this
legacy is conserved and, where utilized, is used wisely”; the fifth paragraph of the preamble
of the 1976 ENMOD Convention, which states that the parties realise “that the use of
environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the inter-
relationship of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and improvement of
the environment for the benefit of present and future generations”; Article 4 of the 1979
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
adopted on 18 December 1979, 1363 UNTS 21, which states that in the exploration and use
of the Moon and other celestial bodies “[d]ue regard shall be paid to the interests of present
and future generations”; and the fifth paragraph of the preamble of the 1992 UN Convention
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourse, which expresses
“the conviction that a framework convention will ensure the utilisation, development,
conservation, management and protection of international watercourses and the promotion
of the optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof for present and future generations”.
50 It is further interesting to note that UNESCO’s General Conference has adopted a Declara-
tion on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations in 1997,
which outlines, inter alia, the environmental responsibilities of the present generation
towards future generations. See UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, Twenty-ninth
Session, Paris, 21 October to 12 November 1997, Vol. 1, Resolutions, p. 69.
51 Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration provides that “Man […] bears a solemn responsibil-
ity to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations”, while
Principle 2 states that “[t]he natural resources of the earth […] must be safeguarded for
the benefit of present and future generations”; Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration states that
“[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations”.
52 Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources,
The Supreme Court of the Philippines, Judgment of July 1993.
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tional Court considered that “[t]he present generation holds the earth in trust
for the next generation. This trusteeship position carries with it the responsibil-
ity to look after the environment. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that
this responsibility is carried out [by the responsible authorities]”.53 Neverthe-
less, these cases continue to be exceptional.
The principle of inter-generational equity has therefore been recognised
in international law to some extent, in particular in treaty law, where it appears
as a guiding rather than a legal principle.54 Although national judicial de-
cisions show that the principle can entail concrete legal obligations for States
as well, it is generally not considered to do so. However, the principle of inter-
generational equity has also been expressed in other concepts. It is inextricably
linked with and may be considered to be one of the principal rationales behind
the obligation of conservation and sustainable use of natural wealth and
resources.55
4.3.3 The obligation to prevent damage to the environment of other States
The obligation of States to prevent damage to the environment of other States
and of areas beyond national jurisdiction can be regarded as one of the funda-
mental principles of international environmental law.56 Based on the general
rule referred to in the Corfu Channel Case that States have an obligation not
to use their territory in a way contrary to the rights of other States, the obliga-
53 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Manage-
ment Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province,
and Others, 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC), 2007, (10) BCLR 1059 (CC), para. 102, quoted in the third
report of the International Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development
of the International Law Association, Report of the Seventy-Third Conference of the International
Law Association, Rio de Janeiro (2008), p. 904. See also the final report of the International
Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development of the International Law
Association, Sofia (2012), pp. 14-17.
54 A recent report of the UN Secretary-General on ‘Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs
of Future Generations’ illustrates this. While the report examines the principle of inter-
generational equity in depth, it does not refer to it as a legal principle. See Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs of Future Generations’, UN
Doc. A/68/322, 15 August 2013.
55 In addition, see N.J. Schrijver, ‘After Us, the Deluge? The Position of Future Generations
of Humankind in International Environmental Law’, in M.A.M. Salih, Climate Change and
Sustainable Development: New Challenges for Poverty Reduction, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
(2009), pp. 59-78.
56 See D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007), p. 9, who refer to the obligation as a “corner-
stone of international environmental law”. On this topic in more detail, see, e.g., X. Hanqin,
Transboundary Damage in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003);
and G. Handl, ‘Transboundary Impacts’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey, The Oxford
Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007), pp.
531-549.
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tion to prevent damage to the environment of other States and beyond national
jurisdiction sets limits on the sovereignty of a State regarding the use of its
territory in order to protect the sovereignty of other States.57
The obligation was formulated for the first time in the 1941 Trail Smelter
Arbitration case concerning transboundary air pollution. In this case, the arbitral
tribunal determined in its final judgment that
“under the principles of international law […] no State has the right to use or permit
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence”.58
Gradually the nature of the obligation shifted from being purely bilateral into
having a more general application, extending not only to the territory of other
States but also to areas beyond national jurisdiction.59 It is in this form that
the obligation was inserted in Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,
which formulates a responsibility for states “to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”.60
This “Principle 21 obligation”, as it is often referred to in the literature,
has since been recognised in several international conventions, including the
conventions on climate change, biodiversity and desertification, and was
restated in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration.61 In addition, the existence
of the obligation was affirmed in the case law of several international tribunals,
including the International Court of Justice and tribunals acting under the
auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).
57 International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment
of 9 April 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22. See also G. Handl, ‘Transboundary Impacts’, in
D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law,
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007), p. 533.
58 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), Judgment of 11 March 1941, Reports of
International Arbitral Awards Vol. III, United Nations (2006), p. 1965.
59 See P.W. Birnie, A.E. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, Third
Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), p. 145.
60 Principle 21 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972, 11 ILM 1416 (1972). Author’s emphasis added.
61 See the preamble of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter, 29 December 1972, 1046 UNTS 120; Article 194(2) of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3; Article 3 of
the Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 May 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79; paragraph 8 of the
preamble of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107; paragraph 15 of the preamble of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifica-
tion in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa,
17 June 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3; Article 7 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997), Principle
2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1992, 31 ILM 874 (1992).
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In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
the International Court of Justice expressly affirmed “the existence of a general
obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control
respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control’
and stated that this obligation “ is now part of the corpus of international law
relating to the environment”.62 As Duncan French noted, the Court therefore
confirmed the autonomous status of this rule in international environmental
law.63
In two subsequent contentious cases – the 1997 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case
and the 2010 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case – the Court took the op-
portunity to reaffirm its position.64 In the Iron Rhine Arbitration, the arbitral
tribunal operating under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA) also confirmed this obligation and added that it applies equally to
activities undertaken by a State on the territory of another State in the exercise
of rights guaranteed by treaty.65
As may be inferred from the text of Principle 21, which mentions environ-
mental damage resulting from “activities within [the] jurisdiction or control’
of States,66 the obligation to prevent extraterritorial damage applies both to
extraterritorial damage caused by activities undertaken within the national
jurisdiction of States and to activities undertaken by them outside their juris-
diction but within their control. As Louis Sohn noted, this implies that the
62 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 66, para. 29. For a more detailed analysis of the
court’s judgment in this respect, see the contributions of Weiss and Momtaz in L. Boisson
de Chazournes & P. Sands, International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear
Weapons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1999). It should be noted that there are
some differences between the obligation as formulated by the court on the one hand, and
Principle 21 on the other. These relate to the following points. On the one hand, the court
constrains the obligation to activities which fall both within the jurisdiction and the control
of States. On the other hand, the court extends the obligation to areas beyond national
control instead of jurisdiction. Moreover, the court formulates a more general obligation
to respect the environment instead of an obligation not to cause damage. See E. Brown
Weiss, ‘Opening the Door to the Environment and to Future Generations’, in L. Boisson
de Chazournes & P. Sands, International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear
Weapons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1999), p. 340.
63 D. French, ‘A Reappraisal of Sovereignty in the Light of Global Environmental Concerns’,
in Legal Studies, Vol. 21 (2001), p. 385.
64 International Court of Justice, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, para. 53 and International Court of Justice, Case Concerning
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 193.
65 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (“IJzeren Rijn”)
Railway (Between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands), Award
of 24 May 2005, paras. 222-224.
66 Author’s emphasis added.
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obligation “applies clearly to citizens of a state, to ships flying its flag, and
perhaps even to corporations incorporated in its territory”.67
Furthermore, and highly relevant to the current book, it can be argued
that the obligation applies to a State which exercises de facto control on (part
of) the territory of another State as well. This can be inferred from the Com-
mentary of the ILC to its Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from
Hazardous Activities, which noted that “[t]he function of the concept of “control”
in international law is to attach certain legal consequences to a State whose
jurisdiction over certain activities or events is not recognized by international
law; it covers situations in which a State is exercising de facto jurisdiction,
even though it lacks jurisdiction de jure”.68 If this is a correct interpretation
of the term ‘control’, it implies that the obligation to prevent damage to the
environment of other States applies in situations of occupation.69
The duty of prevention is central to the obligation to prevent damage to
the environment of other States and to areas beyond national jurisdiction.70
This duty of prevention, sometimes also designated as the principle of pre-
vention, is referred to in several cases relating to the prohibition against
causing transboundary environmental damage.
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, for example, the International Court of
Justice determined that “in the field of environmental protection, vigilance
and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of
damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechan-
ism of reparation of this type of damage”71 In addition, in the Pulp Mills case,
the Court even referred to the customary nature of “the principle of pre-
vention”. In this regard, the Court pointed out that “the principle of preven-
tion, as a customary rule, has its origins in the due diligence that is required
of a State in its territory.”72 Similarly, in the Iron Rhine Arbitration, the arbitral
tribunal determined that “where development may cause significant harm
to the environment there is a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate, such harm.
67 L.B. Sohn, ‘The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment’, Harvard International
Law Journal, Vol. 14 (1973), p. 493.
68 Commentary of the ILC on its Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from
Hazardous Activities, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two (2001),
p. 151, para. 12.
69 This was expressly contemplated by the ILC, who referred to cases of “unlawful interven-
tion, occupation and unlawful annexation”. Ibid.
70 According to Handl, “the obligation of prevention presents itself as an essential aspect of
the obligation not to cause significant harm to the environment beyond national jurisdiction
or control”. G. Handl, ‘Transboundary Impacts’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey, The
Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007),
p. 539.
71 International Court of Justice, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 78, para. 140.
72 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 101.
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This duty, in the opinion of the Tribunal, has now become a principle of
general international law.”73
It should be noted that the obligation to prevent transboundary environ-
mental damage does not imply a complete prohibition against States engaging
in activities that cause transboundary damage. Although not expressly in-
dicated in Principle 21, it is generally acknowledged that the obligation of
States only concerns the prevention of damage that exceeds a certain minimum
threshold.74 This threshold is usually considered to be damage that may be
designated as “significant”. According to the ILC commentary to the Draft
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, this may
be defined as “something more than ‘detectable’, but need not be at the level
of ‘serious’ or ‘substantial’”.75
Furthermore, the obligation to prevent extraterritorial damage must be
interpreted by States as an obligation to exercise due diligence with regard
to activities undertaken by them.76 In general, this implies that States are to
“use all the means at [their] disposal” or “to take all appropriate measures”
to prevent transboundary damage.77 For this purpose, States are not only
to adopt appropriate rules and procedures, but also to take on “a certain level
73 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (“IJzeren Rijn”)
Railway (Between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands), Award
of 24 May 2005, para. 59.
74 See A. Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers (2006), p. 44; See also J. Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage, Common
Concern’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée, & E. Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International Environ-
mental Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007), p. 552.
75 Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, Part Two (2001), p. 152.
See also Article 7 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, 21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997); and the judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay), I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 101, where the court states that a State
“is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take
place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to
the environment of another State”. Author’s emphasis added.
76 See P.W. Birnie, A.E. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, Third
Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), p. 147. Also see X. Hanqin, Transboundary
Damage in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003), pp. 162-187.
77 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 101; and Article 3 of the
ILC Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. See also
Article 194(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982,
1833 UNTS 3, which indicates an obligation for States to “take all measures necessary to
ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause
damage by pollution to other States and their environment”.
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of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control
applicable to public and private operators”.78
Arguably, such an obligation to act with vigilance is also relevant for the
situation of armed conflict, when armed groups operate in territory under the
control of a foreign State. In the Congo-Uganda case, the International Court
of Justice determined the existence of an obligation of vigilance incumbent
upon Uganda in territories occupied by that State. According to the Court,
this obligation of vigilance implied a duty for the occupant to prevent acts
of looting and plundering of natural resources by armed groups acting on
their own account.79 Arguably, the obligation for States to prevent damage
to the environment of other States therefore also includes a duty to prevent
environmental damage caused by armed groups in territories under their
control.
In addition to these obligations, the due diligence obligation entails several
other procedural obligations, including an obligation to notify and to inform
the affected States of the potential damage, an obligation to consult with them
on actions to be taken and an obligation to conduct a so-called “Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA)” in order to determine the risk and extent of the
damage.80
These obligations are dealt with in Principles 17 and 19 of the 1992 Rio
Declaration. In this respect, Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration states that
“[e]nvironmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be under-
taken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact
on the environment”, while Principle 19 formulates a duty for States to “pro-
vide prior and timely notification and relevant information to potentially
affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary
environmental effect and shall consult with those States at an early stage and
in good faith”.
The obligation to notify and to inform other States has also been recognised
in treaty law, inter alia, in Article 14(1)(d) of the 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity, and in the case law of international tribunals, including the judgment
78 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 197. See also P.W. Birnie,
A.E. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, Third Edition, Oxford:
Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 147-150. See also X. Hanqin, Transboundary Damage in
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003), p. 163, who refers to an
obligation to exercise “good government”, that is “evincing responsibility for its international
obligation to exercise proper care so as not to cause such effects or to prevent others in
its territory from causing such effects”.
79 International Court of Justice, Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, para. 179. This issue is discussed in more detail in the second
part of this study.
80 For more detail on these procedural obligations, see X. Hanqin, Transboundary Damage in
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003), pp. 165-178.
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of the International Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills Case, as well as the order
of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in the Land Reclamation
Case for provisional measures to be taken.81 The obligation to conduct an EIA
to prevent transboundary damage to the environment has similarly attained
a strong status in international law. It has been inserted in several treaties,
including Article 4(2)(f) and Annex V(A) of the 1989 Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Dis-
posal, Article 206 of UNCLOS and Article 12 of the 1997 UN Convention on the
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.82
Moreover, in its judgment in the Pulp Mills case, the International Court
of Justice even went so far as to state that:
“the obligation to protect and preserve [the aquatic environment] has to be inter-
preted in accordance with a practice, which in recent years has gained so much
acceptance among States that it may now be considered a requirement under
general international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment where
there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse
impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource. Moreover,
due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would
not be considered to have been exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect
the régime of the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an environ-
mental impact assessment on the potential effects of such works”.83
As the obligation to conduct an EIA is not aimed specifically at preventing
environmental damage in a transboundary context, it is discussed at greater
length in the following section dealing with the obligation to adopt a pre-
cautionary approach to protect the environment and natural resources.
In conclusion, for the purposes of the present book, it is possible to identify
three different situations in which the obligation to prevent harm to territories
outside national jurisdiction or control entails specific responsibilities for States.
81 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, paras. 67-158 con-
cerning the procedural obligations of the parties to the dispute; and International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around
the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Order of 8 October 2003, para. 99. In general
on the topic of environmental information and related duties, see P. Sands & J. Peel,
Principles of International Environmental Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Third
Edition (2012), pp. 624-664.
82 See the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, 22 March 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126; the UN Convention on the Law of
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May 1997, 36 I.L.M. 715 (1997);
and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. For
other examples, also see P. Sands & J. Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law,
Third Edition (2012), pp. 601–623.
83 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 204.
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First, the obligation is relevant for activities relating to resource exploitation
which a State undertakes within its own jurisdiction and which result in
transboundary damage, such as the pollution of an international river by
chemical substances used for the extraction of minerals.
Secondly, the obligation applies to the situation in which a State exploits
natural resources outside its jurisdiction but within its control, for example,
when a State exploits the natural resources of another State on whose territory
it exercises de facto control, including the situation in which it has occupied
that territory. Moreover, in situations of occupation, the obligation of a State
to prevent damage to the environment of other States includes an obligation
to prevent other actors, including armed groups, from causing such damage.
The third situation in which the obligation becomes relevant is in the
context of the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more states,
so-called shared or transboundary natural resources. Natural resources such
as forests, oil fields and natural gas deposits, located on the border between
two or more States, are particularly important in this respect.84 In principle,
a State is liable with respect to its neighbouring State(s) for damage caused
to the shared resource either through its own activities or through the activities
of private parties operating from within its jurisdiction.
4.3.4 The obligation to adopt a precautionary approach to protect the en-
vironment and natural resources
The obligation to prevent damage to the environment is also expressed in the
precautionary principle which requires States to act with caution, to prevent
damage not only to the territory of other States but also to their own domestic
environment.85 At the core of this principle – which is also referred to as an
“approach” by States preferring more flexibility, in particular the United
States86 – lies the need to anticipate environmental damage, even in the face
of scientific uncertainty.87
84 For the rules relating to the management of shared natural resources, see section 2.3.5 of
this chapter.
85 See N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law and its
Application and Interpretation in International Litigation’, in Liber Amicorum Jean-Pierre
Cot: Le Procès International, Brussels: Bruylant, p. 241-253; P. Sands & J. Peel, Principles of
International Environmental Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Third Edition
(2012), pp. 217-228; G. Handl, ‘Transboundary Impacts’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E.
Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford: Oxford University
Press (2007), p. 539; A. Kiss & D. Shelton, Guide to International Environmental Law, Leiden/
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2007), pp. 90-94.
86 See N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law and its
Application and Interpretation in International Litigation’, in Liber Amicorum Jean-Pierre
Cot: Le Procès International, Brussels: Bruylant, p. 243.
87 Ibid.
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The precautionary principle requires States, “[w]here there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage [not to use] lack of full scientific certainty […]
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation”.88 In other words, if there are indications that particular activities
or policies could cause severe damage to the environment, the precautionary
principle requires States to take measures to prevent the damage, even if the
scientific evidence does not make it possible to identify the precise risks
concerned.
In this way the principle extends the obligation of States to use their natural
resources in a sustainable way, in the sense that the precautionary principle
requires States to take into account the risks involved in the exploitation of
their natural wealth and resources.89 Therefore the principle significantly
extends the standard of care expected of States when undertaking activities
that could have a negative impact on the environment. More specifically, the
precautionary principle extends the duty of prevention to situations of scientific
uncertainty.90
At the same time, the principle is in some ways more restrictive than the
principle of prevention. While the principle of prevention applies to “signi-
ficant” damage, the precautionary principle sets a higher standard. It applies
only to situations where the potential damage is either “serious” or “irrevers-
ible”. In addition, precautionary action is required only when the measures
to be taken are cost-effective and is dependent on the respective capabilities
of States.91 In a way, these additional requirements are understandable, as
88 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. On the precautionary
principle, see in general, A. Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States, Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2006); A. Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary
Principle in International Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, International Environ-
mental Law and Policy Series Vol. 62 (2002); N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Status of the Precautionary
Principle in International Law and its Application and Interpretation in International
Litigation’, in Liber Amicorum Jean-Pierre Cot: Le Procès International, Brussels: Bruylant, pp.
241-253; D. Freestone & E. Hey, The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The Challenge
of Implementation, The Hague: Kluwer Law International (1996).
89 In this respect, also see P. Birnie, A.E. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the
Environment, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), p. 199, who argue that
“[t]he precautionary principle, endorsed by Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration is also an
important element of sustainable utilization, because it addresses the key question of
uncertainty in the prediction of environmental effects”.
90 In this respect, Kiss and Shelton argue that “the precautionary principle can be considered
as the most developed form of prevention that remains the general basis for environmental
law”. A. Kiss & D. Shelton, Guide to International Environmental Law, Leiden/Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers (2007), p. 95.
91 For an analysis of the relationship between the precautionary principle and socio-economic
interests, including a detailed account of the ongoing debate on this issue, see A. Trouw-
borst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2006),
pp. 229-281.
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the element of scientific uncertainty makes it more difficult to assess the risks
involved in the proposed activities.
The precautionary principle has found recognition in several international
environmental conventions, covering such diverse fields as the international
law for the protection of the ozone layer, biodiversity and the climate system,
as well as freshwater law and fisheries law.92 Precautionary considerations
underlie many of these conventions and constitute a basis for action. This can
be illustrated with reference to the legal regime to address climate change.
Even though the 1992 Climate Change Convention notes in its preamble “that
there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate change”, several parties
to this Convention have agreed to take concrete measures to reduce the
emission of greenhouse gases under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.
In most environmental conventions the threshold for the application of
the precautionary principle is serious or irreversible damage. Examples of
conventions that set a lower threshold include the 1992 Biodiversity Convention
which calls for precautionary action when there is a risk of ‘significant re-
duction or loss of biological diversity” and its 2000 Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety which refers only to “adverse effects”.93
Apart from these environmental treaties, elements of the precautionary
principle can also be found in treaties in other fields of international law.
UNCLOS Article 206 provides, for example, that States must assess the potential
effects of planned activities under their jurisdiction or control when they have
“reasonable grounds for believing” that such activities “may cause substantial
pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment”.94
Furthermore, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
92 See Article 3(3) of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S.107; Paragraph 9 of the Preamble to the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, 5 May
1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.79; Articles 1, 10.6 and 11.8 of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
29 January 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S.208; paragraph 4 of the preamble to the 2010 Nagoya Protocol
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from
their Utilization, 29 October 2010; 2(5)(a) of the 1992 Convention on the Protection and
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 17 March 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S.
269; Articles 5(c) and 6 of the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S.88; and Paragraph 8 of the preamble,
Articles 1 and 8(9) of the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,
22 May 2001, 40 ILM 532. Precautionary language can also be discerned in older legal
instruments, including paragraph 5 of the preamble of the 1985 Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S.323; paragraph 8 of the
preamble to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16
September 1987 (as amended in 1992), 26 ILM 1550 (1987); and Article IV of the 1968 African
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (revised 11 July 2003).
93 See paragraph 9 of the Preamble to the Biodiversity Convention and Article 1 of the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
94 Author’s emphasis added.
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Measures (SPS Agreement), one of the treaties of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), also contains some references to precaution, in particular in Article 5.7,
which permits members of the World Trade Organisation, to provisionally
adopt measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health “[i]n cases
where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient”.95
The concept of precaution is also found in international humanitarian law.
In addition to provisions relating to precautions in situations of armed conflict,
reference can be made to the environmental provisions of Additional Protocol
I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of
international armed conflicts. Both Article 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol
I prohibit parties to an armed conflict from employing “methods or means
of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment”.96 The more restrictive
approach that emerges from these provisions reflects battlefield practice and,
more specifically, the need to give clear instructions to the military officers
who make the decisions in the field.
Despite the fact that the principle is fairly firmly rooted in international
environmental law, international courts have so far been hesitant to expressly
apply the precautionary principle. The International Court of Justice, for
example, could have taken the opportunity to pronounce on the principle in
two cases relating to the management of shared watercourses. Both cases
involved disputes regarding projects which could have affected the aquatic
ecosystem of the river. However, in both cases the Court relied on the general
obligation of prevention, without clarifying whether this obligation could entail
precautionary action.
In the Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the Court determined
that “in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are
95 See Article 5.7 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
15 December 1993, 1867 UNTS 154. In the EC – Hormones case, the WTO Panel confirmed
that “the precautionary principle has been incorporated and given a specific meaning in
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement”. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) – Complaint by the United States – Report of the Panel, Doc. WT/DS26/R/USA,
18 August 1997. For a more detailed analysis of the role of the precautionary principle in
WTO law, see M.W. Gehring & M-C. Cordonnier-Segger, Precaution in World Trade Law:
The Precautionary Principle and Its Implications for the World Trade Organization, Montreal:
CISDL (2002).
96 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977,
1125 UNTS 3. Author’s emphasis added. It may be noted that international humanitarian
law also contains a principle of precaution, but this principle has a meaning which is distinct
from the precautionary principle discussed in this section. The international humanitarian
law principle of precaution sees to the obligation of parties to an armed conflict to take
constant care during military operations to protect the civilian population as far as possible
from (the effects of) an attack. On this subject, see F. Kalshoven & L. Zegveld, Constraints
on the Waging of War: An Introduction to international Humanitarian Law, 3rd edition, Geneva:
International Committee of the Red Cross (2001), pp. 107-11.
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required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the en-
vironment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation
of this type of damage”.97 However, the Court did not pronounce on the
standards that parties should adopt in this respect. Instead, the Court insisted
on the obligation for the parties to the dispute to look afresh at the matter
and to negotiate with a view to finding a solution to the problem. As part of
this obligation to negotiate, the Court stressed that parties must take into
account modern norms and standards derived from the concept of sustainable
development, but left it to the parties to decide which standards to apply.98
Similarly, in the Pulp Mills case, the International Court of Justice relied
entirely on the “principle of prevention, as a customary rule”, interpreted as
an obligation for States to stop their activities from causing damage to the
territory of other States.99 Moreover, although the Court did acknowledge
that “a precautionary approach may be relevant in the interpretation and
application of the Statute” – the principal legal instrument referred to by the
Court in the case – it did so only because both parties to the dispute agreed
that the instrument itself adopted a precautionary approach.100
Arguably, the Court’s hesitance to expressly rely on the precautionary
principle in these cases can be explained with reference to the subject matter
of the disputes. Both cases involved a dispute involving a shared natural
resource and the obligation to prevent extraterritorial damage to the environ-
ment of other States applies to this. As explained earlier, this obligation has
a firm status in international law, while the precautionary principle is still
controversial. Generally, the Court adopts a conservative approach, meaning
that it only embraces principles that are generally accepted by States. In these
cases, the Court had such a principle at its disposal, i.e., the principle of
prevention, interpreted as an obligation not to cause extraterritorial damage
to the environment of other States. Therefore, the Court arguably did not feel
the need to pronounce on the status or applicability of the precautionary
principle to these disputes.
While the International Court of Justice was able to settle the disputes
brought before it without pronouncing on the precautionary principle, the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism was expressly called upon to apply the
precautionary principle in two cases brought before it. In the EC – Hormones
case the European Communities relied on the precautionary principle as a
general customary rule of international law, or at least as a general principle
of international law in order to introduce an import ban on meat treated with
97 International Court of Justice, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judg-
ment of 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, para. 140.
98 Ibid.
99 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 101.
100 Ibid., paras. 160-164.
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hormones from the US and Canada. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body
confirmed that the precautionary principle is reflected in the SPS Agreement,
in particular in Article 5.7 concerning the right of States to provisionally adopt
sanitary and phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent in-
formation. Moreover, the Appellate Body concluded that the precautionary
principle is also reflected in the sixth paragraph of the preamble of the APS
Agreement, as well as in its Article 3.3, which “explicitly recognize the right
of Members to establish their own appropriate level of sanitary protection,
which level may be higher (i.e., more cautious) than that implied in existing
international standards, guidelines and recommendations”.101
However, the Appellate Body did not accept the contention of the European
Communities that other provisions of the SPS Agreement – i.e., concerning the
assessment of risks – must be interpreted in light of the precautionary
principle, because, in the view of the Appellate Body, the precautionary
principle was not part of the general principles of law and “at least outside
the field of international environmental law, still awaits authoritative formula-
tion as a customary principle of international law”.102 This was the point
of view of the Appellate Body in 1998.
In 2006, in the EC – Biotech case the Panel gave ample consideration to the
contention of the European Communities that the precautionary principle had
“‘by now’ become a fully-fledged and general principle of international
law”.103 Nevertheless, the Panel still did not find sufficient evidence to con-
clude that the status of the precautionary principle had changed since the
decision of the Appellate Body in the EC – Hormones case. Therefore it decided
to act with prudence and not to take a stand on this complex issue.104
Finally, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was also
called upon to apply the precautionary principle in three cases relating to the
effects of activities on the marine environment.105 ITLOS did not explicitly
pronounce on the status of the precautionary principle in any of there cases.
101 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Complaint by the United
States – Report of the Appellate Body, Doc. WT/DS26/R/USA, 16 January 1998, para. 124.
102 Ibid., para. 123. The Appellate Body refers more specifically to the rules for treaty interpreta-
tion as incorporated in Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
In this regard, Article 31(3)(c) stipulates that “any relevant rules of international law
applicable between the parties” should be taken into account when interpreting the treaty.
However, according to the Appellate body, it is far from clear that the precautionary
principle constitutes a principle of general or customary international law and that it thus
constitutes such “a rule of international law”.
103 EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Panel Reports, Docs. WT/DS/291/R, WT/
DS/292/R , WT/DS/293/R , 29 September 2006, para. 786.
104 Ibid., para. 789.
105 These are the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan),
Request for Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999; the Mox Plant Case (Ireland
v. United Kingdom), Request for Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001; and
the Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor
(Malaysia v. Singapore), Request for Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003.
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However, it did refer to “prudence and caution” as a legal basis for ordering
precautionary measures.106
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, the decision of ITLOS to impose pro-
visional measures on the parties to the dispute in order “to preserve the rights
of the parties and to avert further deterioration of the southern bluefin tuna
stock” was based on the existence of scientific uncertainty regarding measures
to be taken to conserve the stock of southern bluefin tuna.107 In addition,
in the Mox Plant Case, the tribunal used “prudence and caution” as a legal
basis for imposing an obligation on parties to exchange information concerning
risks or effects from the operation of a radioactive plant.108 Finally, in the
case concerning the Straits of Johor, ITLOS itself advocated a broader application
of the preventive approach when it considered that “given the possible implica-
tions of land reclamation on the marine environment, prudence and caution
require that Malaysia and Singapore establish mechanisms for exchanging
information and assessing the risks or effects of land reclamation works and
devising ways to deal with them in the areas concerned”.109
Although these judicial decisions demonstrate that international courts
are hesitant to apply the precautionary principle expressis verbis, the decisions
also demonstrate a general willingness of courts to apply precautionary
measures. The reliance of ITLOS on “prudence and caution”, as well as the
pronouncements of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism on the role of
precaution in WTO law, attest to this.
Furthermore, as referred to in the previous section, the International Court
of Justice considered in the Pulp Mills case that parties “must, for the purposes
of protecting and preserving the aquatic environment with respect to activities
which may be liable to cause transboundary harm, carry out an environmental
impact assessment”.110 Although many uncertainties remain regarding the
precise content of the obligation to conduct an Environmental Impact Assess-
106 See the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, para. 77; the Mox Plant case, para. 84; and the Land
Reclamation case, para. 99.
107 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, (New Zealand
v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Request for Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999,
paras. 79-80.
108 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Mox Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom),
Request for Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, para. 84.
109 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case Concerning Land Reclamation by
Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Request for Pro-
visional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, para. 99. Emphasis added. For a more thorough
review of these cases, see N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Status of the Precautionary Principle in
International Law and its Application and Interpretation in International Litigation’, in
Liber Amicorum Jean-Pierre Cot: Le Procès International, Brussels: Bruylant, pp. 246-250; and
A. Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law, The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, International Environmental Law and Policy Series Vol.
62 (2002), pp. 156-178.
110 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 204.
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ment (EIA),111 as the Court explicitly recognised in its judgement, it did ack-
nowledge the existence of such a basic obligation for States to prevent extra-
territorial damage to the environment.112 According to the Court, such an
obligation exists prior to the implementation of a project, while it continues
to exist once “operations have started and, where necessary, throughout the
life of the project” in the form of the continuous monitoring of the effects of
the operations on the environment.113
Although the statement of the Court regarding the obligation to conduct
an EIA is limited to the prevention of extraterritorial damage to the environ-
ment, the obligation to conduct an EIA also applies to other situations. This
is clear from Principle 17 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, which states in general
terms that “[e]nvironmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall
be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant
adverse impact on the environment”. Furthermore, Article 14 of the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity provides that each party shall:
“[i]ntroduce appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment
of its proposed projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on bio-
logical diversity with a view to avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where
appropriate, allow for public participation in such procedures”.
Guidelines were also adopted by the Conference of the Parties in the context
of the 1971 Ramsar Convention on the Protection of Wetlands, calling on
parties “to ensure that any projects, plans, programmes and policies with the
potential to alter the ecological character of wetlands in the Ramsar List [...]
are subjected to rigorous impact assessment procedures”.114 In addition, the
World Bank prescribes that environmental impact assessments must be carried
out “to examine the potential environmental risks and benefits associated with
Bank investment lending operations”.115
111 Ibid., para 205 and A. Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States, Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers (2006), p. 175.
112 Also see A. Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers (2006), p. 175, who argues that an “EIA […] can either provide the basis for
precautionary action or constitute a precautionary measure in itself”. In the first instance,
the EIA aims to determine the scale of the potential damage (significant, serious or severe)
in order to decide on the measures to be taken. In the latter case, the EIA aims to determine
whether at all a particular activity or policy carries a risk of causing of damage to the
environment.
113 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 205.
114 Resolution VII.16 of the Conference of the Parties on Impact Assessment (1999).
115 See <http://web.worldbank.org/> under ‘Environmental Assessment in Operational Policy’.
Also see P. Sands & J. Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, Third Edition (2012), pp. 617-619.
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There is no standard procedure for conducting an EIA. As the International
Court of Justice noted in the Pulp Mills case:
“it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization
process for the project, the specific content of the environmental impact assessment
required in each case, having regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed
development and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well as to the
need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment”.116
The flexibility of an EIA as an instrument to assess risks to the environment
resulting from proposed projects makes it suitable for application in situations
of armed conflict as well. The precise requirements can be accommodated to
the specific circumstances, while leaving intact the basic obligation to assess
the impacts of a proposed project on the environment on the basis of available
scientific information.
In conclusion it can be argued that the legal status of the precautionary
principle, either as a general principle of international law or as a principle
of customary international law, has not yet fully materialised. Although it
seems that an increasing number of States – including all the States belonging
to the European Union – consider the principle to be part of customary inter-
national law, there is as yet no worldwide agreement on its precise contents.
Nevertheless, there is general agreement on the need to act with precaution
in order to preserve and protect the environment. A precautionary approach
to environmental damage is reflected in many treaties and has also found
recognition in international case law. Moreover, specialised procedures have
been developed in order to assess the risks involved in particular projects.
Environmental Impact Assessments can be effective tools to implement the
precautionary principle.
4.4 COMMON REGIMES
International environmental law contains several specialised regimes aimed
at protecting particular species or parts of the environment for the benefit of
a larger community of States. Most of these treaties assign a special status to
the objects they aim to protect. For example, international environmental law
has designated specific areas and their natural resources as “world heritage”.
Some treaties deal with natural resources that are shared by two or more states.
In addition, certain environmental processes such as climate change and the
loss of biological diversity have been proclaimed a “common concern of
humankind”.
116 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 205.
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In all these cases, States are required to take special measures in order to
protect a common interest. Some of these measures have a direct impact on
the right of States to use their natural resources freely, while others are aimed
at giving States a fair share in the benefits resulting from common resources.
A distinction should be made in this respect between natural resources that
are situated within the national territory of States and natural resources that
fall outside State sovereignty. First, natural resources that are situated within
State territory fall under the permanent sovereignty of the State where they
are located. If such natural resources are located in more than one territory
– or, in the case of species, if they migrate from one territory to another – they
should be regarded as shared natural resources. These natural resources fall
under the permanent sovereignty of more than one State. Finally, some natural
resources do not belong to particular States, because they fall entirely outside
State territory.117
Natural resources that are located within State territory are protected by
regimes for “world heritage”, “shared natural resources” and the “common
concern of mankind”, while natural resources that are located outside the
territory of a State are protected either by the notion of the “common heritage
of humankind”,118 or by the notion of the “common concern of mankind”.
This section discusses some of these specialised regimes, focusing on the
measures they impose on States for the protection of the common interests
of a larger community of States.
4.4.1 Natural resources situated within State territory with special importance
for the international community
Some natural resources that are situated within the territory of a State have
been attributed a special status because of their outstanding importance for
the international community as a whole. Examples of such regimes include
those for “wetlands of international importance” under the Ramsar Convention
on Wetlands of International Importance and “world heritage” under the
UNESCO Convention for the Protection of World Heritage. The primary aim
of these regimes is to preserve sites either “on account of their international
significance in terms of ecology, botany, zoology, limnology or hydrology”
117 Also see N.J. Schrijver, Development without Destruction: The UN and Global Resource Manage-
ment, United Nations Intellectual History Project Series, Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press (2010), pp. 34-113.
118 The notion of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ is not discussed, because it applies only
to natural resources that are located in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
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or because of their “outstanding universal value” from the point of view of
science, conservation or natural beauty.119
The Ramsar and UNESCO Conventions both function on the basis of lists.
Under the Ramsar Convention, it is the State itself which decides on the listing,
while the UNESCO Convention has designated a committee for this purpose.
However, the committee decides only on the basis of a proposal by the State
party on whose territory the natural heritage is situated.120 The primary
characteristic of both regimes is that the protection of the sites is based on
the principle of sovereignty. Both regimes place the primary responsibility
for preserving the sites on the national State and reserve a complementary
role for the international community to assist in the protection of the sites.121
Under the Ramsar Convention, the role of the international community
is limited. International cooperation for the protection of wetlands consists
mainly of mutual consultation and coordination of policies and regulations.
The World Heritage Convention contains a more far-reaching system of co-
operation. While Article 6(1) formulates a general duty of cooperation for the
international community as a whole, Article 6(2) formulates an obligation for
all States parties to help the State on whose territory the heritage is situated
to implement its obligations under the convention, if that State so requests.
In addition, the Convention establishes a fund for the protection of the world
heritage, financed by the States parties to the Convention. This fund is used
to provide assistance to States for the preservation of their world heritage.122
The World Heritage Convention also contains some provisions that have
special relevance for the protection of world heritage in situations of armed
conflict. First, States parties are prohibited from taking “any deliberate
measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural
heritage […] situated on the territory of other States Parties to this Conven-
119 Article 2(2) of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat, 2 February 1971, 996 UNTS 245; Article 2 of the UNESCO Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16 November 1972,
1037 UNTS 151. It should be noted that the UNESCO World Heritage Convention does
not only protect natural but also cultural properties of special significance. In addition,
the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict (14 May 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240) has been specifically adopted to protect cultural
properties in situations of armed conflict. A cultural property that is under threat at this
moment is the ancient city of Aleppo in Syria, which requires protection under the UNESCO
World Heritage Convention. In addition, Syria is a party to the 1954 Hague Convention,
referred to above. No specific convention has been adopted to protect natural heritage in
situations of armed conflict. See K. Hulme, War Torn Environement: Interpreting the Legal
Threshold, Leiden: Nijhoff (2004), p. 113-116, on the relevance of the 1954 Hague Convention
for the protection of the environment.
120 Article 2 of the Ramsar Convention; Article 11 of the World Heritage Convention.
121 Articles 2(3) and 5 of the Ramsar Convention; Articles 4, 6 and 7 of the World Heritage
Convention.
122 See Part IV of the World Heritage Convention.
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tion”.123 In other words, States may not deliberately harm the world heritage.
A similar prohibition for States with regard to the world heritage situated
within their own borders can be deduced from the general obligation contained
in Article 4 for States parties to ensure “the identification, protection, conserva-
tion, presentation and transmission to future generations” of the world heritage
situated within their territories.124
The possibility provided by the Convention to enter natural heritage
threatened by “the outbreak or the threat of an armed conflict” on a list of
“World Heritage in Danger” is of particular interest for the protection of
natural resources in situations of armed conflict.125 The inclusion of a site
in this list enables the World Heritage Committee to immediately allocate
assistance to the endangered site from the Convention’s Fund. Five nature
reserves in the DR Congo have been placed on this list.126
The last treaty that should be mentioned in this category is the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna
(CITES).127 This Convention is aimed at protecting endangered species of flora
and fauna against over-exploitation in international trade. Some of these species
are migratory and therefore fall into the category of shared natural resources,
while other species are found exclusively within the jurisdiction of a single
State. The Convention recognises that wild fauna and flora are “an irreplace-
able part of the natural systems of the earth [and therefore] must be protected
for this and the generations to come”.128 The Convention therefore has a list-
ing system similar to the systems of the Ramsar and World Heritage Conven-
tions. It makes a distinction between three categories of species, based on their
conservation status. The most threatened species are listed in Appendix I and
are subject to particularly strict international regulation, while Appendix II and
III species can be traded, provided that national authorities certify that the
species have a legal origin and that trade is not detrimental to their survival.
CITES is of particular relevance to this book, because it can be used to curtail
the trade in specific conflict resources, especially wildlife and timber. Although
123 Article 6(3) of the World Heritage Convention.
124 It should however be noted that this obligation can only be said to work erga omnes partes.
See R. O’Keefe, ‘World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International Community as
a Whole?’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 53 (Jan., 2004), pp. 189-209.
Reference should further be made to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, referred to above.
125 Article 11(4) of the World Heritage Convention.
126 For the role of the World Heritage Convention in protecting the Virunga Park in the DR
Congo, see B. Sjöstedt, ‘The Role of Multilateral Environmental Agreements in Armed
Conflict: ‘Green-keeping’ in Virunga Park. Applying the UNESCO World Heritage Conven-
tion in the Armed Conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Nordic Journal of
International Law, Vol. 82 (2013), pp. 129–153.
127 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, 3 March
1973, 993 UNTS 243.
128 Ibid., first paragraph of the preamble.
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the focus of CITES is on protecting endangered species, including commercial
species in the lists covered by the Convention is certainly not out of the ques-
tion. In fact, almost 200 commercial timber species have been listed in one
of the CITES Appendices.129 The CITES system works on the basis of export
and import permits, which must be verified by management and scientific
authorities in the countries of origin and destination. CITES can perform two
different functions in preventing the trade in conflict resources. First, it can
help national authorities to halt the trade in timber by rebel groups, as only
the national authorities can grant export permits. Furthermore, the permit
system of the Convention can assist the Security Council when it establishes
a ban on timber originating from a particular country, provided that other
States exporting the species under embargo adhere to CITES as well.130 In
that case, all the timber that is traded without an official permit must be
considered suspicious.
4.4.2 Common concern
Other common regimes are based on the notion of “common concern”.131
Common concern regimes are aimed at creating a system of cooperation to
address specific problems that concern the international community as a whole
by dealing with matters of common concern at an international level. Common
concern regimes qualify State sovereignty in a similar way to the World
Heritage and Ramsar Conventions in the sense that States retain primary
responsibility for the protection of their natural resources.
129 See International Tropical Timber Organization, ‘Tracking Sustainability: Review of
Electronic and Semi-Electronic Timber Tracking Technologies’, ITTO Technical Series 40,
October 2012, p. 3.
130 It is relevant to note that Article X of the Convention contains a provision on trade with
non-parties to CITES. This provision stipulates as follows: “Where export or re-export is
to, or import is from, a State not a Party to the present Convention, comparable documenta-
tion issued by the competent authorities in that State which substantially conforms with
the requirements of the present Convention for permits and certificates may be accepted
in lieu thereof by any Party”. This means, for example, that a party to CITES that imports
a particular species must ask the exporting State for documentation proving that the species
is traded legally and has been harvested in a sustainable way.
131 For a more detailed analysis of the notion of common concern, see F. Biermann, ‘Common
Concern of Humankind: The Emergence of a New Concept of International Environmental
Law’, Archiv des Völkerrechts, Vol. 34, issue 4 (1996), pp. 426-481; D. Shelton, ‘Common
Concern of Humanity’, Environmental Policy and Law, Vol. 39, issue 2 (2009), pp. 83-90; J.
Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage and Common Concern’, in D. Bodansky,
J. Brunnée & E. Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2007), pp. 550-573; and P.W. Birnie, A.E. Boyle and C. Redgwell, Inter-
national Law and the Environment, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009),
pp. 128-130.
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The Convention on Biological Diversity is a good example. In its preamble,
the Convention affirms that “the conservation of biological diversity is a
common concern of humankind”, while reaffirming that “States have sovereign
rights over their own biological resources”. In addition, the preamble qualifies
these sovereign rights by “[r]eaffirming also that States are responsible for
conserving their biological diversity and for using their biological resources
in a sustainable manner”. The provisions elaborate on this by imposing obliga-
tions upon States regarding the conservation and sustainable use of (com-
ponents of) biological diversity, while defining “the sovereign right [of States]
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies”
as a principle.
In addition to the conservation of biological diversity, the common concern
concept has also been applied to climate change . In its preamble, the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change acknowledges that “change in
the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of human-
kind”, while it reaffirms “the principle of sovereignty of States in international
cooperation to address climate change”. Moreover, obligations for States
concerning the formulation of policies regarding the mitigation of climate
change have been inserted in the provisions. However, despite the application
of the concept in these conventions, its significance as a system for international
cooperation has remained modest. The concept has not been applied to other
environmental problems.
Common concern regimes are important to this book because these regimes
impose obligations upon States to protect their natural resources for the benefit
of the entire community of States. Relevant obligations in the Convention on
Biological Diversity and under the Climate Convention include monitoring
and reporting obligations, as well as financial assistance and technology
transfer to developing countries. The Convention on Biological Diversity, and
in particular the constraints it places on the use of biological diversity and
biological resources are the most important for the purposes of the present
book. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, States involved in an armed
conflict should at the very least refrain from actions that cause a serious threat
to biological diversity.
4.4.3 Shared natural resources
Shared natural resources fall into two different categories. The first category
concerns natural resources that are situated on the border between two or more
States, such as transboundary forests or wetlands. The second category con-
cerns natural resources that are present within different States’ borders at
different times, such as migratory (land) animals, straddling fish stocks and
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fresh water resources.132 In both cases, States must take special protective
measures and must cooperate to protect their interests in the shared natural
resources. The protection of shared natural resources has two major objectives:
1) to preserve the natural resources; and 2) to guarantee a fair share in the
resources for the States where these natural resources are found. One major
difference from the regimes discussed in the previous sections is therefore that
the natural resources are not protected in order to protect a special interest
of the international community as a whole, but rather to protect the rights
of directly affected States.
Although the issue of shared natural resources is also addressed to some
extent in older conventions,133 the 1978 Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field
of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious
Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States are the first to
address the issue of shared natural resources in a systematic way. These
principles were prepared by UNEP in response to a request by the UN General
Assembly to report on measures to be adopted for the implementation of a
system for the effective cooperation between States for the conservation and
harmonious utilisation of shared natural resources.134 In its Resolution 34/186
of 18 December 1979, the UN General Assembly took note of the principles
while requesting States “to use the principles as guidelines and recommenda-
tions in the formulation of bilateral or multilateral conventions regarding
natural resources shared by two or more States”.135
Many of the UNEP principles reflect modern obligations in international
law, such as the obligation not to cause transboundary damage and the obliga-
tion to conduct an environmental impact assessment. The principles also
formulate standards for cooperation between States for the protection of shared
132 See the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 23 June
1979, 1651 UNTS 333; the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Pro-
visions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995, 2167 UNTS 88; and the UN Convention on the Law
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997).
133 See, in particular, Article 5 of the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 2 February 1971, 996 UNTS 245, which em-
phasises that a duty of consultation about the implementation of obligations arising from
the Convention exists “especially in the case of a wetland extending over the territories
of more than one Contracting Party or where a water system is shared by Contracting
Parties”.
134 Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in
the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More
States, 17 ILM 1097 (1978). For the request of the UN General Assembly, see UN General
Assembly Resolution 3129 (XXVIII) of 13 December 1973 concerning Co-operation in the
field of the environment concerning natural resources shared by two or more States.
135 UN General Assembly Resolution 34/186 concerning Cooperation in the Field of the
Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, 18 December
1979, especially paragraphs 2 and 3.
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natural resources, including the exchange of information, notification and
consultation between States which share resources. In addition, they cover
the peaceful settlement of disputes relating to shared natural resources and
the liability of States for environmental damage resulting from violations of
their international obligations with regard to the conservation and utilisation
of shared natural resources.
Since the adoption of the UNEP principles, several treaties have been
adopted that deal specifically with the management of shared natural
resources. One of the most sophisticated legal regimes in this respect relates
to the use of international rivers, lakes and groundwater sources. Specific
reference can be made to the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which formulates a dual
obligation for States to utilise the watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner and to cooperate in its protection and development.136 Arguably,
these obligations not only apply to the use of the watercourse itself, but also
have implications for the use of the natural resources found within the water-
course, such as alluvial minerals. The obligation of equitable use implies, inter
alia, that States must ensure that other States can enjoy the shared resource
on the basis of equality.137 It can be assumed that the obligation of equitable
use implies a prohibition for States against seriously upsetting the ecological
balance of the watercourse, e.g., by exploiting the natural resources found
within the watercourse.
Furthermore, reference can be made to the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which contains some basic rules for the
protection of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. Relevant obligations for States
bordering on an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea include a duty to coordinate
the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living
resources of the sea, as well as a duty to coordinate the implementation of
their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the
136 See Article 5 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Inter-
national Watercourses. For an analysis of international law relating to the non-navigational
use of international watercourses, see S.C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses,
2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007) and L. Boisson de Chazournes & S.M.L.
Salman (ed.), Les Ressources en Eau et le Droit International, The Hague: Nijhoff Publishers
(2005).
137 See the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997,
p. 7, para. 85, in which the court determines the existence of “a common legal right, the
essential features of which are the perfect equality of al1 riparian States in the use of the
whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian
State in relation to the others”, referring to the 1929 Lac Lanoux case rendered by the
Permanent Court of Justice, and that “Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control
of a shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and
reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube […] failed to respect the proportion-
ality which is required by international law”.
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marine environment.138 These rules complement the general provisions on
the protection and preservation of the marine environment, included in Part
XII of the Convention. This part deals primarily with the prevention of pollu-
tion in the marine environment.
There are several other regimes for the management and protection of
shared natural resources. These include the Convention on the Conservation
of Migratory Species of Wild Animals and the 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks
Agreement.139 For other shared natural resources, such as forests, oil or gas
there are still no specific rules. There are a few regional treaties concerning
transboundary forests, including the Amazon Cooperation Treaty and the
Congo Basin Conservation Treaty.140 In contrast, controversy regarding the
delimitation of geographical boundaries between States and political sensitiv-
ities have so far prevented the adoption of specific rules for shared oil and
natural gas deposits altogether.141
In conclusion, legal regimes for the management and protection of shared
natural resources are based on a dual obligation to protect these resources
and to cooperate with regard to their protection. This obligation to cooperate
with regard to the protection and management of shared natural resources
is firmly rooted in international law. In the Pulp Mills case, the International
Court of Justice stated that “the procedural obligations of informing, notifying
and negotiating […] are all the more vital when a shared resource is at issue
[…] which can only be protected through close and continuous co-operation”
between the interested States.142 In the Mox Plant case, the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) also indicated that “the duty to cooperate
is a fundamental principle […] under […] general international law”.143 Ar-
guably, as explored in more detail in Chapter 5, this obligation does not cease
to exist in situations of armed conflict.
138 See Part IX of the UN Convention on the Law on the Sea concerning enclosed or semi-
enclosed seas, in particular Article 123. It should be noted that the non-living resources
of the sea, such as minerals, oil and gas, are exempted from the regime for cooperation.
139 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 23 June 1979, 1651
UNTS 333; United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
4 August 1995, 2167 UNTS 88.
140 For example, see the Amazon Cooperation Treaty of 3 July 1978, concluded between the
States on whose territory the Amazon is situated.
141 The topic of oil and natural gas was originally envisaged by the ILC in 2002 as part of its
work on shared natural resources, but in the end it was not considered feasible to draft
articles relating to the use of such shared oil and gas deposits.
142 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), I.C.J. Reports 2010, para 81.
143 The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Request for provisional measures, Order
of 3 December 2001, para. 82. The tribunal confirmed this judgment in its Case Concerning
Land Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore),
Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, para. 92.
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4.5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has discussed several principles arising from the field of inter-
national environmental law that qualify the right of States to exploit their
natural resources. These principles formulate obligations of care for States with
regard to the use of their own natural resources and those of other States.
Relevant principles include the principle of conservation and sustainable use
of natural resources, the principle of inter-generational equity, the principle
of prevention, and the precautionary principle.
Of the principles discussed in this chapter, two can be considered to have
become part of customary international law. These are the principles of
sustainable use and the principle of prevention. While the principle of
sustainable use is aimed at preserving natural wealth and resources for long-
term development, the principle of prevention formulates an obligation of due
diligence for States with regard to the prevention of damage to the environ-
ment of other States. These principles apply even when States have not sub-
scribed to the relevant treaties in which the principles are embodied.
The principles of inter-generational equity, as well as the precautionary
principle, do not have such a firm status in international law. Nevertheless,
the principle of inter-generational equity can be regarded as an important
argument for most measures that aim at protecting the environment. The
precautionary principle for its part has also become increasingly important
in the last decade. It has been inserted in several international environmental
treaties, while elements of the principle can also be found in treaties in other
fields of international law. Furthermore, international courts are cautiously
starting to attach more weight to the principle. The most important develop-
ment is that there is now an obligation under international law to perform
an environmental impact assessment in order to assess the risks of a proposed
activity on the environment.
Arguably, these principles are not only relevant for the exploitation of
natural resources by States in times of peace, but also in situations of armed
conflict. Only a few of the armed conflicts examined in this book have
amounted to full-scale wars affecting the whole territory of a State. In most
of the armed conflicts examined in this book the violence was limited to
specific parts of the State territory. In these situations, national authorities must
continue to respect their obligations under international environmental law
when conducting commercial activities in parts of the territory under their
control.
In addition, some of the principles examined in this chapter are also
relevant for territories that are occupied by other States. As explained in more
detail in Part II of this book, occupants are de facto authorities whose legal
position can be compared in many ways with that of the national authorities
of a State. Although their legal position is primarily governed by international
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humanitarian law, international environmental law is relevant to situations
of occupation as well, both directly and indirectly.
Furthermore, this chapter has examined legal regimes aimed at protecting
a common interest of two or more States. Some of these common regimes are
aimed at protecting natural resources that are only important to specific States,
while others are aimed at protecting natural resources that are important to
the international community as a whole. This chapter has examined three
categories of common regimes. These are regimes aimed at protecting specific
natural resources situated within the territory of a single State, but which have
special importance for the international community as a whole, regimes that
are aimed at addressing a concern that is common to the international com-
munity, and regimes for the management of shared natural resources. All these
regimes are based on an obligation to individually and collectively protect
the natural resources in the interests of all the States concerned. Arguably,
this obligation does not cease to exist in situations of armed conflict. Further-
more, the common interest that these regimes are aimed at protecting entails
a presumption that they will not be susceptible to unilateral suspension in
situations of armed conflict.
Concluding remarks to Part I
This part examined the legal framework for the governance of natural resources
within sovereign States. Chapter 2 examined the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, which is the organizing principle for the
governance of natural resources within States. This principle formulates a right
for States and peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources. Normally
this right is exercised by the government of a State on behalf of the State and
its people. This only changes when a government is not or is no longer
recognised by the international community.
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources can first
of all be upheld vis-à-vis other States. In this sense, the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources formulates a right for both States and
peoples that have not yet organized themselves within sovereign States to
exercise control over their natural resources, without interference from other
States. This is the horizontal, or external, dimension of the principle of per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources.
A vertical – or internal – dimension can be added to this horizontal dimen-
sion. The 1962 Declaration on the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources assigns permanent sovereignty not only to States but also
to peoples. In addition, the 1962 Declaration formulates an important condition
for the exercise of permanent sovereignty by States, viz. that natural resources
must be exploited for national development and the well-being of the people
of the State. This condition was repeated in several subsequent resolutions
and treaties, including those relating to armed conflicts involving natural
resources. On the basis of the 1962 Declaration and subsequent instruments,
peoples can therefore be identified as subjects and beneficiaries of the principle
of permanent sovereignty.
Chapter 3 examined the implications of peoples as subjects and beneficiaries
of the principle of permanent sovereignty for the governance of natural
resources within sovereign States. It did so from the perspective of human
rights law, as this field of international law formulates rights for ‘peoples’,
to be exercised in their relations with States. The chapter concluded that the
notion of ‘peoples’ is a dynamic concept that can designate different groups
depending on the precise right that is invoked. With regard to the right to
external self-determination, the term ‘peoples’ is reserved for colonial peoples
and peoples under foreign subjugation. As soon as these peoples have attained
an international status, the right to self-determination becomes: 1) a right of
156 Concluding remarks to Part I
the State and its peoples to be free of foreign interference; and 2) a right for
the peoples living within the State to freely determine their political system,
also referred to as internal self-determination.
Chapter 3 argued that the right to internal self-determination accrues in
particular to four groups. These are first, the whole population of a State, both
as the sum of the peoples living in that State and as succeeding the people
who attained the right to external self-determination. Furthermore, the right
to internal self-determination accrues to specific communities within a State
– including in particular, peoples, minorities and indigenous peoples.
Furthermore, the right to self-determination as enshrined in the identical
Articles 1 of the ICESCR and the ICCPR entails a right for peoples “to freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. It was argued that
within an independent State, this right must be interpreted as a right to be
involved in decision-making processes pertaining to development, including
decision-making processes regarding the use of the State’s natural resources
as the capital for development.
The special position of peoples as subjects and beneficiaries of the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources therefore has two important
implications for the governance of natural resources. First, it entails an obliga-
tion for the government to put in place procedures that allow for public
participation in decision-making regarding the exploitation of natural resources.
Public participation can be defined broadly so as to include access to informa-
tion and to justice. These participatory rights must be regarded as a logical
consequence of the right to self-determination of peoples. In addition, the right
to freely pursue economic, social and cultural development, as embodied in
the right to self-determination and the emerging right to development, entails
an additional obligation for governments not only to involve peoples and
individuals in the process of development, but also to ensure that the popula-
tion as a whole, as well as specific groups within society, benefit from the
resulting development. The first obligation is firmly established in international
law, inter alia, in Security Council resolutions relating to particular conflicts,
while the second obligation finds some resonance in relevant Security Council
resolutions.
In addition to human rights law, international environmental law has
developed principles that have an impact on the governance of natural
resources within States. These principles were examined in Chapter 4 of this
book. This chapter demonstrated that international environmental law formu-
lates duties of care for the environment which States must respect when they
exploit their natural resources. Chapter 4 discussed the following principles:
the principle of sustainable use, the principle of inter-generational equity, the
principle of prevention and the precautionary principle.
The principle of sustainable use and the principle of inter-generational
equity qualify the right of States to exploit their natural resources in order
to safeguard a State’s natural resource capital for future development. In
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addition, the principle of prevention formulates an obligation for States to take
measures to prevent damage to the environment of other States. Furthermore,
States must act with caution to prevent damage to the environment. Although
the precautionary principle is not generally accepted, it entails an obligation
to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment for resource projects that
are likely to cause significant damage to the environment. Today this obligation
represents customary international law. All these principles qualify the right
of States to exploit their natural resources.
In addition, Chapter 4 examined the concept of common regimes which
have been set up to protect a specific interest of a broader community of States.
Relevant common regimes include those for the protection of natural resources
that have been designated “world heritage” or “wetlands of special import-
ance”, as well as those for the protection of endangered species. These common
regimes share similar characteristics: 1) they were set up to protect natural
resources that represent a special interest to the international community as
a whole; 2) they are situated within the territory of a State. Common regimes
that were set up to address a “common concern” of the international commun-
ity share these characteristics. Finally, common regimes that were set up to
protect natural resources shared by two or more States primarily serve to
preserve the interests of those States that have a share in the natural resources.
However, in all cases these regimes protect natural resources because they
are important to a broader community of States. It is for this reason that these
regimes can be seen as qualifying the right of States to freely dispose of these
natural resources.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the legal regime for the governance
of natural resources within States is based on the right for States and peoples
to freely dispose of their natural resources. This right is normally exercised
by the government on behalf of the State and its people. However, the right
of a government to dispose of the State’s natural resources is qualified by
several obligations arising from international human rights and environmental
law. These obligations are aimed at ensuring that the government effectively
exercises the right of the State to freely dispose of its natural resources for
the purpose of promoting sustainable development, in the sense of long-term
and inclusive development. It is argued that respect for this framework is
paramount, both for the prevention of armed conflicts and for post-conflict
reconstruction. Part II of this book examines the applicability of this legal
framework in situations of armed conflict.

Part II
The governance of natural wealth and
resources in situations of armed conflict
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS TO PART II
The current part of this book discusses the legal framework for the governance
of natural resources in situations of armed conflict, which pose major chal-
lenges to the governance of natural resources within States. In many of the
conflicts referred to in this book, parts of State territory were brought under
the control of armed groups or foreign troops, making it impossible for the
government to exercise control over the natural resources situated within these
territories. The occupation of Eastern Congo by Uganda and Rwanda is one
example of this. The situation in Côte d’Ivore between 2002 and 2007, where
the northern part of Côte d’Ivoire was under the control of the rebel forces
that made up the Forces Nouvelles is another example.
The extent to which contemporary international law is able to address these
challenges is examined in this part of the book. To what extent does inter-
national law formulate obligations for non-state armed groups and foreign
States regarding the use of their adversary’s natural resources? In addition,
to what extent does international law formulate obligations for States in
relation to the exploitation of their own natural resources in situations of armed
conflict?
The previous part of this book argued that it is the government of a State
that should exploit the State’s natural resources on behalf of the State and its
people. However, it also demonstrated that the government cannot in all
situations be considered to constitute the legitimate representative of the people
of the State. Specific problems may arise in internal armed conflicts, where
the government is a party to the armed conflict as well. As a party to an armed
conflict, a government can have interests that do not coincide with the interests
of the people living in the State.
All these situations – occupation by foreign States, territories under the
control of armed groups and the exercise of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources by governments that are parties to an armed conflict – pose
challenges for the premises on which the legal framework for the governance
of natural resources are based, in particular the basic premise that natural
resources must be exploited for national development and the well-being of
the people.
The current legal framework governing the exploitation of natural resources
in situations of armed conflict is made up of rules from various fields of
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international law. Chapter 5 discusses the effects of armed conflict on the
general legal framework for the governance of natural resources as discussed
in Part I of this book. The legal framework as set out in Part I of this book
defines the rights and obligations of governments with regard to the manage-
ment of the State’s natural resources, as well as the effects of particular ex-
ploitation activities on the environment of other States. For the purposes of
this book, it is especially relevant to examine to what extent this legal frame-
work continues to apply in situations of armed conflict for: 1) the actions of
governments involved in internal armed conflicts and; 2) the actions of States
intervening in an armed conflict on the territory of another State.
Chapter 6 discusses the rules of the law of armed conflict, or international
humanitarian law. This field of international law sets out the rights and obliga-
tions of parties to an armed conflict. Although its principal focus is on regu-
lating military operations and their effects on vulnerable groups, international
humanitarian law does contain some rules that are relevant for the exploitation
of natural resources by parties to an armed conflict. In the first place, it con-
tains a well-developed body of rules to regulate the powers of occupants in
occupied territory. Moreover, international humanitarian law is the only body
of international law that applies directly to non-state armed groups.
5 The role of international human rights and
environmental law in situations of armed
conflict
5.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Pursuant to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources,
States and peoples have the right to exploit their natural resources within the
limits set by international law, including limits set by international human
rights and environmental law. International human rights law formulates as
a minimum obligation that “[i]n no case may a people be deprived of its own
means of existence”.1 In addition, both international human rights and
environmental law formulate rights relating to public participation in decision
making. Furthermore, international environmental law formulates several
obligations of care with regard to the use of natural resources. These include
an obligation to conserve and sustainably use particular natural resources that
are considered important to several States or to the international community
as a whole, including biological diversity, international watercourses, wetlands
of international importance, threatened species and natural heritage.2
These obligations are not only relevant for States exploiting their own
natural resources, but also for occupants. Although the rights and obligations
of occupants are primarily regulated through international humanitarian law,
it can be argued that international human rights and environmental law
constitute additional sources of obligations for them because of the special
responsibility of occupants as de facto authorities in occupied territory. This
is also explicitly provided in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Conventions, which
stipulates that occupants must respect the laws in force in occupied territory
unless they are “absolutely prevented” from doing so.
However, it is generally acknowledged that the outbreak of an armed
conflict may alter the extent to which obligations under international law have
to be fulfilled. The principal question posed in this chapter is therefore: to what
1 See the identical Articles 1(2) of the ICESCR and the ICCPR, discussed in Chapter 1 of this
study.
2 Relevant obligations can be inferred from the following treaties: the 1992 Convention on
Biological Diversity, the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses, the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals and the 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage. Also see Chapter 4 of this study.
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extent do norms of international human rights and environmental law continue
to apply during armed conflict and what are the implications for the legal
framework regarding the exploitation of natural resources in situations of
armed conflict?
The effects of armed conflict on treaties constitute a longstanding issue,
which has not yet been fully resolved. The Institut de Droit International (IDI)
issued a first set of draft articles dealing with the matter as early as 1912,
followed by a second set in 1985.3 Despite the early work of the IDI in this
respect, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties dodges the issue.
Article 73 of the Vienna Convention stipulates that “[t]he provisions of the
present Convention shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard
to a treaty […] from the outbreak of hostilities between States”.
During the drafting process of the Vienna Convention, the International
Law Commission (ILC) took – in the words of Anthony Aust – an “ostrich-like”
position by arguing that the outbreak of hostilities between States should be
considered as an “entirely abnormal condition”, which should not be regulated
in a treaty dealing with “the general rules of international law applicable in
the normal relations between states”.4 Indeed, the reports of the Special Rap-
porteurs on the law of treaties Gerald Fitzmaurice and Humphrey Waldock
both repeatedly emphasise that the effect of armed conflict on treaties raises
special issues which should be addressed in a separate study.5
In 2004, the ILC finally decided to include the topic in its long-term pro-
gramme of work, a decision that was endorsed by the UN General Assembly.6
It led to the drafting of eighteen articles on the effects of armed conflict on
treaties. These draft articles were adopted at the sixty-third session of the
International Law Commission in 2011.7 The UN General Assembly
subsequently took note of the draft articles and decided to consider the form
to be given to the articles at its session in 2014.8
3 See Règlement Concernant les Effets de la Guerre Sur les Traités, Christiania (1912); and The
Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, Helsinki (1985).
4 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press (2007), p. 308.
5 See the Second Report on the Law of Treaties of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey
Waldock, UN Doc. A/CN.4/156 and Add.1-3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission
1957, Vol. II, p. 79; and the Second Report on the Law of Treaties of the Special Rapporteur,
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107, Yearbook of the International Law Commission
1957 Vol. II, p. 30.
6 See UN General Assembly Resolution 59/41 of 2 December 2004 on the Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-sixth session, para. 5.
7 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session, UN
Doc. A/66/10 (2011), paras. 89-101.
8 See UN General Assembly Resolution 66/99 of 9 December 2011, paras. 3 and 4. The draft
articles are included in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly’s sixty-ninth session,
to be held in 2014.
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The draft ILC articles on the effects of armed conflict on treaties are clearly
based on earlier work of the ILC, especially on its work in relation to the law
on treaties and the law on state responsibility. The draft articles mirror several
of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as well
as the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Conduct, also known as the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. The close
connection established by the ILC between its new draft articles on the effects
of armed conflict on treaties and its earlier work considerably strengthens the
authority of the draft articles and might prove conducive to their acceptance
by States.
One innovative feature of the ILC draft articles is that they formulate the
basic principle that the outbreak of an armed conflict does not ipso facto sus-
pend or terminate the operation of treaties in force either between the parties
to an armed conflict themselves or between parties to the conflict and third
States. More specifically, the treaty relations between a belligerent State on
the one hand, and third states on the other, continue to be governed by the
law of peace, supplemented by the law of neutrality in international armed
conflict.9 Thus as a matter of principle, States involved in an armed conflict
– whether international or internal10– remain under a duty to abide by their
9 See, inter alia, M. Bothe; C. Bruch; J. Diamond; and D. Jensen, ‘International Law Protecting
the Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’, International Review
of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 879 (2010), p. 581; E.V. Koppe, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and
the Protection of the Environment During International Armed Conflict, Oxford: Hart Publishing,
p. 336. Specifically on the law of neutrality, which is based on a duty of non-participation
and impartiality for the neutral State as well as a right not to be adversely affected by the
armed conflict, see M. Bothe, ‘Neutrality, Concept and General Rules’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law
and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), Vol. VII, pp. 617-634; P.
Hostettler, O. Danai, ‘Neutrality in Land Warfare’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law,
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), Vol. VII, pp. 638-643, para. 1; L. Oppenheim,
International Law: A Treatise, Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality, seventh edition, edited
By H. Lauterpacht, London/New York/Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co (1952); and
E. Chadwick, Traditional Neutrality Revisited: Law, Theory and Case Studies, The Hague: Kluwer
Law International (2002). Of course, the general principle of the continued applicability
of treaty relations between a State involved in armed conflict and third States does not
imply that these treaty relations remain unaffected in all circumstances. The following
section discusses the suspension of treaties during armed conflict as well as circumstances
precluding the wrongfulness of a State’s acts.
10 A remarkable novelty of the ILC draft articles on the effects of armed conflict on treaties
– as compared to those of IDI – is that these not only cover international armed conflict,
but also internal armed conflicts in which government authorities are involved. Compare
Article 1 of the Helsinki Resolution of the Institut de Droit International with Article 2 of
the draft articles of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.777 of 11 May
2011 on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles
on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second
Reading. It should be noted that the ILC draft articles exclude armed conflicts between
non-state armed groups without the involvement of government forces. This restriction
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treaty obligations with regard to third States. Moreover, the articles formulate
the principle that even between belligerent States inter se, whose relations are
of course primarily regulated by international humanitarian law, the operation
of treaties is considered not to be ipso facto terminated or suspended upon the
outbreak of armed conflict.11
This chapter examines the implications of the basic principle formulated
by the ILC for the legal framework governing the management and protection
of natural resources during armed conflict. The ILC draft articles on the effects
of armed conflict on treaties serve as a guideline throughout this chapter. There
are two specific reasons for taking the ILC articles as a point of reference. In
the first place, the ILC is a committee set up by the UN General Assembly
pursuant to Article 13 of the UN Charter with the specific mandate to promote
“the progressive development of international law and its codification”.12
In accordance with its mandate, the ILC has been engaged in the preparation
of a number of “draft articles”, some of which have subsequently been adopted
by States in the form of treaties. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties is a relevant example. Others, such as the ILC articles on State respons-
ibility, are directly relied on by States and international courts, despite the
fact that the articles are not contained in a legally binding document.
The second reason for taking the articles on the effects of armed conflict
as a point of reference relates to the working method of the ILC, which is
characterised by a constant dialogue with governments throughout the drafting
process and which includes an extensive consideration of State practice. The
drafting process of ILC articles – and in particular the views expressed by States
with regard to the draft articles – therefore offers important insights into the
process of customary international law making.
Section 2 examines the outbreak of armed conflict as grounds for the
termination or suspension of treaties. Section 3 then takes a closer look at the
general rules on the termination and suspension of treaties, codified in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Section 4 examines circumstances
precluding wrongfulness under the law of State responsibility for the non-
relates to the scope of the draft articles as specified in draft Article 3, i.e., that the articles
apply only to situations in which at least one State party to a treaty is also a party to the
conflict. See draft Article 3 and the first report on the effects of armed conflict on treaties
prepared by Special Rapporteur Mr. Lucius Caflisch, UN Doc. A/CN.4/627 of 22 March 2010,
para. 21.
11 See, e.g., Lassa Oppenheim, who had already declared in 1912 that “the opinion is pretty
general that war by no means annuls every treaty”. See L. Oppenheim, International Law:
A Treatise, Vol. II, War and Neutrality, second edition, New York/Bombay/Calcutta: Long-
mans, Green and Co. (1912), p. 129. Also see C. Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application of
Humanitarian Law’, in D. Fleck, (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Second
Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2008), p. 73; and A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and
Practice, Second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007), p. 310.
12 Statute of the International Law Commission, UN General Assembly Resolution 174 (II)
of 21 November 1947, last amended by resolution 36/39 of 18 November 1981, Article 1.
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performance of treaty obligations. Section 5 assesses the effects of armed
conflict on obligations under customary international law. Finally, section 6
evaluates the role of international human rights and environmental law for
the legal regime regarding the exploitation of natural resources in situations
of armed conflict.
5.2 THE OUTBREAK OF ARMED CONFLICT AS GROUNDS FOR THE TERMINATION
OR SUSPENSION OF TREATIES
This section assesses the outbreak of armed conflict as autonomous grounds
for the termination or suspension of the operation of treaties. It first assesses
the general rules formulated in the ILC draft articles and then examines the
effects of armed conflict on human rights and environmental treaties specific-
ally, looking both at the rules formulated in the ILC draft articles and at
relevant case law.
5.2.1 General principles concerning the effects of armed conflict on treaties
In order to assess the precise effects of armed conflict on the applicability of
individual treaties, the ILC draft articles formulate guidelines on the susceptibil-
ity of treaties to suspension, withdrawal or termination as a consequence of
the outbreak of an armed conflict.13 According to Article 4 of the ILC draft
Articles, reference should first be made to the provisions of the relevant treaty.
It states that “where a treaty itself contains provisions on its operation in
situations of armed conflict, those provisions shall apply”. In this way, the
ILC draft Articles follow the system set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which determines that the termination, withdrawal
from or suspension of the operation of a treaty may take place “in conformity
with the provisions of the treaty”.14
Secondly, if the treaty does not contain an express provision on its opera-
tion, Article 5 of the ILC draft Articles prescribes that recourse must be made
to the rules of international law on treaty interpretation in order to determine
whether the treaty is susceptible to termination, withdrawal or suspension
13 This may be considered one of the most innovative features of the ILC draft Articles on
the Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties, since it breaks away from the traditional approach
consisting of a negative assumption that treaty relations will be discontinued during armed
conflict.
14 See Article 54 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331) on termination and withdrawal and Article 57 on suspension.
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in the event of an armed conflict.15 Thus the text of the provisions should
be seen in context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.16
If the treaty itself does not provide any indication of its susceptibility to
termination, withdrawal or suspension in the event of an armed conflict,
recourse should be made to Article 6 of the draft Articles. This provision
determines that regard shall be had to external factors indicating the suscept-
ibility of a treaty to termination, withdrawal or suspension in the event of an
armed conflict, including the nature of the treaty – in particular its subject
matter, its object and purpose, its content and the number of parties to the
treaty – as well as the characteristics of the armed conflict, such as its territorial
extent, its scale and intensity, its duration, and, in the case of a non-inter-
national armed conflict, the degree of outside involvement.17
This provision should be read together with Article 7, and the annex
containing an indicative list of treaties “the subject matter of which involves
an implication that they continue in operation, in whole or in part, during
armed conflict”. These treaties include international human rights and environ-
mental treaties, but also treaties which may cover these subject-matters, namely
15 This refers to the customary rules on treaty interpretation. Although these rules have been
codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the ILC
preferred to include a general reference to the customary rules in the draft articles rather
than a specific reference to the Vienna Convention. The reason for including such a general
reference is twofold. First of all, it is intended to ensure that the provision also addresses
those States that are not a party to the Vienna Convention. Secondly, it is meant as a
concession to the committee members favouring a subjective approach to the question of
continued applicability of treaties, focusing on the intention of the parties to the treaty rather
than on the – objective – question whether the treaty is compatible with the situation of
armed conflict. See the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, Statement of the Chairman
of the Drafting Committee of 17 May 2011, pp. 9-10. For the customary international law
status of these provisions, see, inter alia, the judgment of the International Court of Justice
in Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment of 6
November 2003, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 161, para. 41, in which the Court refers to “the general
rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties”. For references to other ICJcases confirming the customary international law status
of these provisions, see M.E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2009), p. 440, note 121.
16 Compare Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. For a discussion of
the rules on interpretation, see inter alia R.K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2008); and U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern
International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Law and
Philosophy Library, Vol. 83, Dordrecht: Springer (2007).
17 The Commentary to the draft articles indicates that recourse to Article 6 may be made only
when interpretation under Article 5 has not provided a conclusive answer. See the Statement
of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee on the Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties
of 17 May 2011, p. 11. The present author expresses serious doubts with regard to this
approach. Several of the factors mentioned in Article 6 are already part of the interpretation
exercise under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention to which Article 5 of the draft
articles refers, including the subject matter of the treaty, its object and purpose and its
content.
The role of international human rights and environmental law in situations of armed conflict 167
treaties declaring, creating or regulating a permanent regime or status and
multilateral law-making treaties.18 It is ultimately the subject-matter of the
treaty which determines to what extent a treaty continues to apply during
armed conflict. Special Rapporteur Lucius Caflisch indicates that “the survival
of a treaty belonging to a category included in the list may be limited to only
some of its provisions”.19 This implies that parties to an armed conflict must
carefully consider to what extent they must continue to respect their obligations
under a particular treaty.
Although the list of treaties included in Article 7 is merely indicative and
has also met with some criticism,20 the inclusion in the list of international
human rights treaties and environmental treaties, as well as categories which
may cover these subject-matters, may be interpreted as a strong presumption
in favour of the continued applicability of these types of treaties, in whole
or in part, during an armed conflict. The following subsections examine the
question of the continued applicability of these types of treaties in more detail.
5.2.2 Human rights instruments
This section discusses two issues. The first concerns the effects of armed
conflict on human rights instruments in general, with a particular emphasis
on the effects of armed conflict on the rights protected under the ICESCR and
the ICCPR. The second part discusses the implications of this general framework
for the right of a people not to be deprived of its means of subsistence, while
18 In this regard, see the comments made by Switzerland, arguing that international environ-
mental treaties may be said to fall within the category of multilateral law-making treaties.
See Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties, Comments and information received from
Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/622, 15 March 2010, comments concerning draft Article 5
and its annex. For a study of the effects of armed conflict on international environmental
agreements in particular, see S. Vöneky, ‘A New Shield for the Environment: Peacetime
Treaties as Legal Restraints of Wartime Damage’, Review of European Community & Inter-
national Environmental Law 9 (1) 2000, pp. 20–32.
19 International Law Commission, First report on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties,
by Mr. Lucius Caflisch, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/627 of 22 March 2010, para.
69.
20 For comments by governments in respect of the list, see Effects of Armed Conflict on
Treaties, Comments and information received from Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/622,
15 March 2010, comments concerning draft Article 5 and its annex; and UN Doc. A/C.6/60/
SR.20 of 29 November 2005, para. 1 for critical remarks made by the United Kingdom in
respect of the inclusion of international environmental treaties. See also the commentary
of the United States in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly: “Such a categorization
of treaties was problematic, since treaties did not automatically fall into one of several
categories. […] It would be more useful, for the guidance of States, to enumerate the factors
that might lead to the conclusion that a treaty or some of its provisions should continue
or should be suspended or terminated in the event of armed conflict”. See UN Doc. A/C.6/60/
SR.2 of 29 November 2005, para. 34.
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the third part focuses on rights relating to public participation in decision-
making.
General remarks concerning the effects of armed conflict on human rights instruments
The ILC draft articles on the effects of armed conflict suggest that human rights
treaties continue to apply during armed conflict. This is supported first of all
in the preamble of Additional Protocol II, which recalls that “international
instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the human
person”. The legal effect of armed conflict on the operation of international
human rights treaties has also been dealt with extensively in the case law of
international tribunals, in particular in the case law of the International Court
of Justice.
With regard to the operation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the ICJ made a distinction between the derogable and
non-derogable rights listed in the Convention.21 In its Nuclear Weapons Ad-
visory Opinion, the Court observed that the protection of the ICCPR “does not
cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby
certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency”.22
In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the Court also commented on
the relationship between international human rights law and international
humanitarian law. In this respect it should be remembered that both inter-
national humanitarian law and international human rights law provide pro-
tection to human beings. However, they do so in very different ways. The
primary aim of international humanitarian law is to regulate the horizontal
relationship between parties to an armed conflict, and in doing so, to prevent
unnecessary suffering for those not directly involved in the armed conflict.
21 Article 4 (1) of the ICCPR permits States to derogate from their obligations under the
Covenant “[i]n time of public emergency” – which may include an armed conflict. See
General Comment No. 29 of the Human Rights Committee on Art. 4 (Derogations during
a State of Emergency), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001. It must be noted
that derogation and suspension, strictly speaking, have different legal effects. Where
suspension temporarily sets aside the legal obligation, derogation does not affect the binding
nature of the legal obligation as such. In the former case, a State is completely exempted
from compliance with the legal obligation, while in the latter case it will have to justify
non-compliance for each individual case. However, it may be argued that when a treaty
provides for derogation from its provisions in situations of armed conflict, this must be
interpreted as a strong indication against the susceptibility of the treaty to suspension in
these particular circumstances. This conclusion is supported by the ILC in its commentary
to the draft articles, which state that “ the competence to derogate “in time of war or other
public emergency threatening the life of the nation” certainly provides evidence that an
armed conflict as such may not result in suspension or termination”. See Draft articles on
the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission (2011), Vol. II, Part Two, para. 50. Therefore, this section focuses on deroga-
tion rather than suspension of human rights treaties.
22 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, para. 25.
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On the other hand, international human rights law regulates the vertical
relationship between governmental authorities and the persons falling within
their jurisdiction.
In this particular case, the Court was confronted with the application of
a right from which no derogation is permitted during armed conflict under
Article 4 of the ICCPR, i.e., the right to life. The Court determined that:
“the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The
test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined
by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which
is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss
of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an
arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be
decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from
the terms of the Covenant itself”.23
It can be concluded from this case that – whenever obligations under human
rights law are in conflict with obligations under international humanitarian
law in situations of armed conflict – the relevant obligations under human
rights law must be interpreted in the light of concurring rights or obligations
under international humanitarian law.
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court based its views on its previous
opinion in Nuclear Weapons and considered that there are three possible
scenarios with respect to the relations between international human rights law
and international humanitarian law: international humanitarian law is
exclusively applicable, international human rights law is exclusively applicable,
or both these branches of international law are concurrently applicable.24 The
Court further extended the protection of human rights instruments, including
23 Ibid.
24 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136,
para. 106. Also see E.V. Koppe, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environ-
ment During International Armed Conflict, Studies in International Law, Vol. 18, Oxford, Hart
(2008), p. 347, who distinguishes a fourth situation, namely a situation in which neither
international human rights law nor international humanitarian law would be applicable.
The present author doubts whether such a situation would be possible, at least with regard
to the rights protected under the ICCPR, because the possibility to derogate from particular
human rights in situations of public emergency under this convention – including situations
of internal disturbances not amounting to armed conflict – does not render the rights as
such completely inoperative. After all, Article 4 (1) determines that the provisions may
only be derogated from “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”.
In this respect also see: Minimum humanitarian standards, Analytical report of the Secretary-
General submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/21, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/87, 5 January 1998, para. 54.
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the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), to situations of occupation.25
The Court confirmed its earlier case law in its judgment in the Case concern-
ing Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, when it concluded that “both
branches of international law, namely international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consideration”
in situations of armed conflict and that “international human rights instruments
are applicable ‘in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its juris-
diction outside its own territory”, particularly in occupied territories”.26
In addition to the case law of the International Court of Justice, several
judgments of regional human rights courts have dealt with the application
of human rights to conflict situations.27 First, in its order for provisional
measures against Libya issued during the internal conflict that broke out in
February 2011, the newly set-up African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
ordered the Gaddafi regime to “immediately refrain from any action that
would result in loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons, which
could be a breach of the provisions of the Charter or of other international
human rights instruments to which it is a party”.28 Similarly, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights consistently applies the Inter-American
Convention on Human Rights in situations of internal armed conflict.29
Finally, the European Court of Human Rights has also applied the rights
protected under the European Convention on Human Rights in conflict
situations, in particular in situations of internal armed conflict and occupa-
tion.30
25 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136,
paras. 111-112.
26 International Court of Justice, Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, para. 216. It is interesting to note that, by applying the ICCPR
to situations of occupation, the International Court of Justice explicitly departs from the
original intentions of the parties to the ICCPR. See on this M.J. Dennis, ‘Application of
Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupa-
tion’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 1, pp. 119-141.
27 Where the current section deals with the application of human rights law to situations of
armed conflicts by human rights bodies, see C. Byron, ‘A Blurring of the Boundaries: The
Application of International Humanitarian Law by Human Rights Bodies’, Virginia Journal
of International Law, Vol. 47(4) (2006-2007), pp. 839-896 for an analysis of the application
of international humanitarian law by human rights bodies.
28 Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiria, Application No. 004/2011, Order for provisional measures, 25 March 2011.
29 See the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Las Palmeras Case,
Judgment of 4 February 2000 (preliminary objections), para. 32 and the Case of Bámaca-
Velasquez v. Guatemala, Judgment of 25 November 2000 (merits), para. 207.
30 For occupation, see, e.g., the judgments of the European Court for Human Rights in Loizidou
v. Turkey (preliminary objections), Application No. 15318/89, Judgment of 23 March 1995
and in Al-Skeini and Others v. the UK, Application No. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011.
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Special reference should be made in this respect to the Chechnya cases
before the European Court of Human Rights. Several cases have been filed
before the Court against Russia for violations of the European Convention
on Human Rights as a result of its military operations in Chechnya, including
violations of the right to life.31 The situation in Chechnya clearly suggests
the application of both the common Articles 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocol II. In other words, the
situation can be characterised as an internal armed conflict to which the less
stringent rules of international humanitarian law apply when it comes to the
protection of human lives. Nevertheless, the European Court directly applied
human rights standards to assess the legality of the conduct of the Russian
security forces. In this respect, one of the important considerations of the Court
was that Russia had not declared a state of “war or other public emergency”,
as required under the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights to derogate from the Convention’s provisions.32
It may therefore be concluded that human rights treaties continue to apply
during armed conflict. This is particularly the case for situations of internal
armed conflict and for situations of occupation. In situations of occupation,
the case law of the ICJ shows that in occupied territory an occupant must
respect its own obligations arising from treaties to which it is a party, at least
those with extraterritorial effects. In addition, international humanitarian law
– in particular, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations – provides that an
occupant must respect the laws in force in occupied territory. As argued above,
this may include relevant treaties to which the occupied State is a party.
Although the continued applicability of human rights treaties certainly
covers the non-derogable rights protected under the ICCPR, a similar conclusion
can be drawn with regard to the derogable rights protected under the ICCPR
and, to a lesser extent, for economic, social and cultural rights protected under
the ICESCR. As regards derogable rights under the ICCPR, it should be noted
that derogation is permitted only under exceptional circumstances and to the
extent necessary in view of the situation, which implies that derogation must
31 See, e.g., the following cases before the European Court of Human Rights: Khashiyev and
Akayeva v. Russia, Applications nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, Judgment of 24 February
2005; Isayeva v. Russia, Application no. 57950/00, Judgment of 24 February 2005; and
Estamirov and Others v. Russia, Application no. 60272/00, Judgment of 12 October 2006.
32 See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, Isayeva v. Russia, Application no. 57950/00,
Judgment of 24 February 2005, para. 191: “The Court considers that using this kind of
weapon in a populated area, outside wartime and without prior evacuation of the civilians,
is impossible to reconcile with the degree of caution expected from a law-enforcement body
in a democratic society. No martial law and no state of emergency has been declared in
Chechnya, and no derogation has been made under Article 15 of the Convention (see §
133). The operation in question therefore has to be judged against a normal legal back-
ground”.
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be justified in each individual case.33 In addition, as the Chechnya cases before
the European Court for Human Rights show, a State may only derogate from
its obligations under human rights treaties when it explicitly invokes this right.
As regards rights protected under the ICESCR, the Israeli Wall Opinion confirms
their applicability to situations of occupation, depending on the nature and
duration of the occupation. From the Israeli Wall Opinion it can be inferred
that a State exercising jurisdiction over an occupied territory over a longer
period of time is considered bound by the provisions of the ICESCR.34
It can be concluded from the case law examined in this section that inter-
national law contains two basic principles for determining the applicable law
in situations where both international humanitarian law and international
human rights law contain relevant rules. First, it is necessary to determine
whether there is any conflict between the rules of international humanitarian
and human rights law. A conflict occurs when the rules from the two fields
of international law point in different directions. This was the case in the
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, where the right to life protected under the
ICCPR clashed with the rules regarding the use of weapons under international
humanitarian law. In these situations, the lex specialis principle must be applied,
implying that the relevant rules of international humanitarian law prevail over
the rules of international human rights law. However, in many cases, rules
of international humanitarian and human rights law that apply to similar
situations complement each other. In these cases, the principle of harmonious
interpretation must be applied, implying that the rules from the two fields
33 Article 4 (1) of the ICCPR permits States to take measures derogating from their obligations
under the Covenant in case of a public emergency which “threatens the life of the nation”,
but these measures may not be inconsistent with their other obligations under international
law – including under international humanitarian law – and may only be taken “to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”. See General Comment No. 31
of the Human Rights Committee on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed
on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004, para.
11 for an express confirmation that the Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict.
Also see General Comment No. 29 of the Human Rights Committee on Art. 4 (Derogations
during a State of Emergency), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001, para. 3,
which stipulates that “[t]he Covenant requires that even during an armed conflict measures
derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the situation
constitutes a threat to the life of the nation”. See also E.V. Koppe, The Use of Nuclear Weapons
and the Protection of the Environment During International Armed Conflict, Studies in Inter-
national Law, Vol. 18, Oxford: Hart (2008), p. 347.
34 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
I.C.J. Reports 2004, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, p. 136, para. 112. For more details,
see S. Vité, ‘The Interrelation of the Law of Occupation and Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871 (2008), pp. 629-651.
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of international law should be interpreted in such a way as “to give rise to
a single set of compatible obligations”.35
Implications for the prohibition against depriving a people of its means of subsistence
As regards the implications of these general rules set out in the case law of
international tribunals for the right of peoples not to be deprived of their
means of subsistence, as protected under Article 1(2) of the ICESCR and the
ICCPR, it should first of all be noted that Article 1 of the ICCPR is not listed in
Article 4 among the rights from which no derogation is permitted. Neverthe-
less, at the same time, the prohibition against depriving peoples of their means
of subsistence is framed in absolute terms. The identical Articles 1(2) of the
ICESCR and the ICCPR provide that in no case may a people be deprived of its
means of subsistence. This may be regarded as a strong presumption in favour
of its continued applicability during armed conflict.
This presumption is further strengthened by Article 25 of the ICESCR and
Article 47 of the ICCPR, which expressly provide that “[n]othing in the present
Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples
to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources”. It
may therefore be concluded that Article 1 has a special status compared to
other rights protected under the Covenants.
The special status of the identical Articles 1 of the ICESCR and the ICCPR
has been confirmed on several occasions. For example, in its General Comment
No. 24 regarding reservations, the Human Rights Committee, stated that a
“reservation to article 1 denying peoples the right to determine their own
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development,
would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant”.36
Furthermore, in its commentary on the draft articles on State responsibility
the ILC argued that, in relation to the permissibility of countermeasures, the
prohibition against depriving peoples of their means of subsistence constitutes
a fundamental human right which may not be affected by – otherwise lawful –
countermeasures.37
The question arises what the special status of Article 1(2) of the 1966
Covenants implies for the application of the provision in situations of armed
35 International Law Commission, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Frag-
mentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion
of International Law, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006, Vol. II, Part
Two, p. 408.
36 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 on Issues Relating to Reservations
Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto,
or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, 4 November 1994, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), para. 9.
37 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, UN Doc. A/56/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol.
II, Part Two, p. 132, para. 7.
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conflict. Current case law of the International Court of Justice, and in particular
the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, indicates that in situations of armed
conflict, human rights law must be interpreted with reference to relevant rules
of international humanitarian law. However, as explained in the previous
section, this is only the case when there is a conflict between the relevant rules
of these fields of law, as in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, where the
prohibition against arbitrarily depriving someone of his life under international
human rights law was thought to be at odds with the right under international
humanitarian law to use weapons that cause civilian casualties. The question
is therefore whether there is a conflict between the prohibition against de-
priving peoples of their means of subsistence and a relevant rule of inter-
national humanitarian law. It is only then that the lex specialis principle applies.
International humanitarian law does not contain provisions that expressly
allow parties to an armed conflict to deprive the civilian population of its
means of subsistence. Rather, it contains several rules that are aimed at pro-
tecting the civilian population against such practices. As the very least, parties
to an armed conflict may not attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. In addition, inter-
national humanitarian law contains prohibitions against pillage and the seizure
of property outside situations of military necessity that go beyond the pro-
hibition to remove objects indispensable to the civilian population.38
It can therefore be argued that the prohibition against depriving peoples
of their means of subsistence incorporated in Article 1(2) of the ICESCR and
the ICCPR remains fully applicable in situations of armed conflict. The pro-
hibition against attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population must be regarded as
a minimum guarantee, while the prohibitions against pillage and against
seizing property outside situations of military necessity can be regarded as
providing complementary protection.
Implications for rights relating to public participation in decision making
Chapter 3 discussed the right to internal self-determination and argued that
this right entails a right for the population of a State and for specific groups
within society to participate in decision making regarding exploitation projects.
For indigenous peoples this right is inextricably linked to their right to enjoy
their culture under Article 27 of the ICCPR. For individual members of the
population, it can be argued that their right to be involved in decision making
is expressed in the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs under
Article 25 of the ICCPR.
As far as Article 27 of the ICCPR is concerned, the Human Rights Committee
explicitly stated that “a State may not reserve the right to […] deny to minor-
38 These prohibitions are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
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ities the right to enjoy their own culture, profess their own religion, or use
their own language”.39 The Committee also noted that Article 27 of the ICCPR
is a right “of profound importance”.40 However, the Committee’s Comment
relates to the subject of treaty reservations, rather than the issue of the sus-
pension of treaties as a result of armed conflict. Moreover, the Comment relates
to the right of minorities to enjoy their culture in general and not to the right
to public participation arising from this.
Furthermore, none of the provisions cited above provides for a direct right
to public participation. Pursuant to Article 1 of the ICCPR, States are required
to establish procedures that allow the exercise of the right to internal self-
determination in practice, but this obligation does not automatically afford
citizens a direct right to participate in decision making. That right cannot be
automatically inferred from Article 25 of the ICCPR either, as that provision
deals only with the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs in a
general way.
Generally speaking, it may be argued that the right of a State to derogate
from relevant provisions of the human rights covenants providing indirectly
for public participation in decision making, in particular, Articles 1, 25 and
27 of the ICCPR, is only permitted to the extent necessary in view of the
situation. The right of a government to limit the exercise of specific rights in
situations of armed conflict does not relieve a government of its obligations
under human rights law in general. Therefore, arguably a State must respect
its obligation to consult local communities regarding projects that directly affect
them, but only insofar as this obligation is compatible with the situation of
armed conflict.
5.2.3 International environmental treaties
The ILC draft articles on the effects of armed conflict on treaties not only
formulate a presumption of continued applicability for international human
rights instruments, but also for international environmental treaties. The
decision of the ILC to include environmental treaties in the indicative list
annexed to Article 7 is quite remarkable, as there is hardly any conclusive case
law or practice to base this presumption on. The ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion is an exception in this respect. In this opinion, the Court briefly
touched upon the legal effects of armed conflict on international environmental
treaties.
39 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24: Issues relating to reservations made
upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in
relation to declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, 4 November 1994, CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.6, para. 8.
40 Ibid., para. 10.
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The Court took a cautious view and only addressed the actual question
put to it, namely whether the obligations stemming from environmental treaties
would preclude the threat or use of nuclear weapons in legitimate self-
defence.41 It argued “that the issue is not whether the treaties relating to the
protection of the environment are or are not applicable during an armed
conflict, but rather whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were
intended to be obligations of total restraint during military conflict”.42
The Court also stated that it did “not consider that the treaties in question
could have intended to deprive a State of the exercise of its right of self-defence
under international law because of its obligations to protect the environment”,
but that nevertheless, “States must take environmental considerations into
account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit
of legitimate military objectives”. It went on to consider that “respect for the
environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is
in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality”. Therefore
this Opinion implies that environmental standards must be taken into account
in the interpretation of the international humanitarian law principles of
necessity and proportionality.
A similar approach was adopted by an ICTY Committee established to
review the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia.43 This Committee used the international humanitarian law principles
of necessity and proportionality in order to assess the legitimacy of the en-
vironmental damage inflicted by the NATO bombing campaign in former
Yugoslavia.44 It concluded that the principle of proportionality requires a
balancing exercise between the military advantage obtained by an attack on
the one hand, and damage to the environment on the other. The Committee
stated in this respect that “in order to satisfy the requirement of
proportionality, attacks against military targets which are known or can
reasonably be assumed to cause grave environmental harm may need to confer
41 The original request for an Advisory Opinion asked the Court to render its opinion on
the following question: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance
permitted under international law?” See UN General Assembly Resolution 49/75 of 15
December 1994. In this respect, also see the written statement of the United Kingdom to
the request for an advisory opinion, which contains a clear exposé of the issues to be
considered by the International Court of Justice.
42 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J.
Reports 1996, para. 30.
43 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, published on 14 June 2000, available
through <http://www.icty.org> (last consulted on 23 November 2012).
44 The Committee considered in this regard that the environmental effects of the NATO
bombing campaign “are best considered from the underlying principles of the law of armed
conflict such as necessity and proportionality”. Ibid., para. 15. For a critical assessment of
the report on this point, see M. Bothe, ‘The Protection of the Civilian Population and NATO
Bombing on Yugoslavia: Comments on a Report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY’, European
Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2001), pp. 531-535.
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a very substantial military advantage in order to be considered legitimate”.45
From the perspective of environmental protection, this interpretation of the
principle of proportionality at first seems highly unsatisfactory. It implies that,
when the stakes are sufficiently high, causing grave harm to the environment
can be considered legitimate, as long as this harm does not reach the threshold
of “widespread, long-term and severe” damage to the environment. However,
at the same time it also implies that the threshold for environmental damage
is considerably lower when such a “very substantial military advantage”
cannot be anticipated.
Both the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, as well as the report of the ICTY
Committee, focus on environmental damage resulting from military attacks.
The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion addressed the question of permissible
environmental damage only against the background of the right to self-defence,
which is too narrow a context to deal with this question. Neither the ICJ nor
the ICTY Committee addressed the broader question of the continued applicabil-
ity of international environmental law as such in situations of armed conflict.
This question is highly relevant for the purposes of the present book, as
international environmental treaties formulate obligations of care that may
qualify the right of States to exploit natural resources in situations of armed
conflict. In addition, combined environmental and trade treaties, like CITES,
can be instrumental in curbing the trade in conflict resources. In the light of
the general presumption of the ILC in favour of the continued applicability
of international environmental law in situations of armed conflict and in the
absence of specific guidelines arising from the case law of the ICJ or any other
authority, the best way to proceed is to take a closer look at the relevant
treaties themselves.
Looking at international environmental treaties, it becomes apparent first
of all that these treaties rarely contain express provisions on their applicability
in situations of armed conflict.46 CITES, for example, is completely silent on
the matter. However, there are a few treaties that do contain provisions which
implicitly provide for their applicability – or inapplicability – in situations
of armed conflict. The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, which contains a renvoi to the relevant
rules of international humanitarian law, is an example of this.47 Article 29
of this Convention provides that “international watercourses and related
installations, facilities and other works shall enjoy the protection accorded by
45 Ibid., para. 22.
46 A study by UNEP indicates that around 20 per cent of international environmental treaties
provide for their discontinuance during armed conflict, while the remaining 80 per cent
either does not provide any answer or is inconclusive on its operation during armed conflict.
See UNEP, ‘Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis
of International Law’, Nairobi (2009).
47 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997).
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the principles and rules of international law applicable in international and
non-international armed conflict and shall not be used in violation of those
principles and rules”.
This provision can be interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation
regards this provision as a confirmation of the complementary protection
afforded by international humanitarian law to international waterways in
situations of armed conflict. It should be noted that international waterways
can have strategic relevance to parties to an armed conflict, e.g., as supply lines
or transportation routes. In contrast, the second interpretation regards this
provision as a confirmation of the inapplicability of the convention in situations
of armed conflict in favour of the application of the relevant rules of inter-
national humanitarian law.
The Commentary of the ILC, which was responsible for drafting the conven-
tion, shows a preference for the first interpretation. The Commentary indicates
in this respect that Article 29 “simply serves as a reminder that the principles
and rules of international law applicable in international and internal armed
conflict contain important provisions concerning international watercourses
and related works”, but that “[o]f course, the present articles themselves remain
in effect even in time of armed conflict”.48
When there is no conflict between the relevant rules of international human-
itarian law and the Watercourses Convention,49 there is no reason to assume
that the latter ceases to apply. The Watercourses Convention contains several
obligations that are relevant for the protection of watercourses in situations
of peace as well as in situations of armed conflict. For example, Article 5 of
the Convention, formulates an obligation for watercourse States to utilise an
international watercourse in their territories “in an equitable and reasonable
manner”. Furthermore, Article 7 stipulates that “[w]atercourse States shall,
in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate
measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse
States”. These obligations qualify the right of States parties to the Watercourses
Convention to exploit the natural resources of international watercourses,
including alluvial diamonds.
The UNESCO World Heritage Convention is another example. It includes
a provision on safeguarding of world heritage threatened by armed conflict.
Article 11(4) of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention provides for the
48 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses
of International Watercourses and Commentaries thereto, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission 1994, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 131, paras. 1 and 3.
49 A conflict may occur if an international watercourse is used by one of the parties to an
armed conflict in a way as to make an effective contribution to an armed conflict, for
example, when an international watercourse is used to transport weapons. In these cases,
the watercourse can become a military objective, which means that it can be subject to a
military attack. See Chapter 6 of this study for the definition of a military objective and
the relevant rules that apply to these objectives.
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possibility of placing natural heritage threatened by “the outbreak or the threat
of an armed conflict” on a list of “World Heritage in Danger”.50 In this way,
the convention implicitly provides for its continued application in conflict
situations. Several World Heritage sites in the DR Congo and Côte d’Ivoire
have been placed on the list because of threats associated with the conflicts
raging in those States.
The continued applicability of this convention in situations of armed conflict
also directly affects the obligations of States involved in an international armed
conflict. Article 6(3) of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention formulates a
prohibition for States against taking “any deliberate measures which might
damage directly or indirectly” natural heritage “situated on the territory of
other States Parties to this Convention”. In the first place, this means that States
may not deliberately launch an attack which could cause damage to World
Heritage sites. However, it also implies that States may not exploit natural
resources situated in world heritage parks, if such exploitation would cause
damage to the natural heritage. This implies, for example, that Uganda and
Rwanda may have acted in violation of the convention when they undertook
the exploitation of natural resources within and around UNESCO World Heritage
sites in the DR Congo, including ivory poaching, logging and mining. These
activities have posed a significant threat to the integrity of these biodiversity
reserves.51
In addition to provisions that indicate the continued applicability of en-
vironmental treaties, there may be conflict clauses in these treaties which
indicate their operation during armed conflict. Article 22 (1) of the Biodiversity
Convention, for example, determines that the provisions of the convention
“shall not affect the rights and obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from
any existing international agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and
obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity”.
It is relevant to note that the 1907 Hague Regulations, the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols contain several rights for parties
to an armed conflict which could be in conflict with their obligations under
the Biodiversity Convention. Examples include the right of parties to an armed
conflict to destroy property of the hostile party in cases of military necessity;
as well as the right of parties to launch an attack against parts of the environ-
ment that constitute military objectives. Article 22 of the Biodiversity Conven-
50 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, 16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151.
51 Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2002/565, paras.
50 and 52.
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tion makes it clear that the exercise of these rights may not cause a serious
damage or threat to biological diversity.52
It can be concluded that international environmental conventions generally
remain applicable in situations of armed conflict, unless the relevant convention
provides otherwise. However, it should be noted that the obligations of the
parties to these conventions can change as a result of an armed conflict. Many
international environmental conventions contain clauses which are more lenient
to States with regard to the implementation of their obligations in view of
special circumstances. Article 6 of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, for
example, provides that parties have to implement the general measures for
conservation and sustainable use “in accordance with [their] particular con-
ditions and capabilities”. Of course, such clauses could be invoked by parties
to the convention in situations of armed conflict as a reason not to implement
part of their obligations under the convention.
5.2.4 Conclusions on the outbreak of armed conflict as a ground for the
termination or suspension of treaties
This section has shown that the outbreak of an armed conflict does not auto-
matically suspend the obligations for States under relevant international human
rights and environmental treaties. However, this does not imply that these
two fields of law apply fully in situations of armed conflict. In some cases
international human rights law expressly grants States the right to derogate
from their obligations under relevant conventions. The ICCPR contains an
express provision allowing for the derogation of rights under the convention
in cases of national emergency, including armed conflicts. For the purposes
of this book, the right of States to derogate from their obligations under the
ICCPR includes a right to derogate to a certain extent from provisions that
indirectly provide for public participation by the population of a State.
Furthermore, some of the obligations of States under international human
rights treaties may be at odds with rights formulated by international human-
itarian law for parties to an armed conflict. This can be illustrated with refer-
ence to the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, where the International
Court of Justice had to consider whether the use of nuclear weapons in
situations of armed conflict would constitute a violation of the right to life
under international human rights law. In cases where a particular right under
international humanitarian law (i.e., the right to cause casualties in situations
of armed conflict) is at odds with an obligation under international human
52 What constitutes “serious damage or threat” can be discerned from the ILC commentary
to the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities,
discussed in Chapter 4 of this book. Damage to the environment can be considered “serious”
when it is substantial in the sense of encompassing “significant” damage.
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rights law (i.e., the prohibition against arbitrarily depriving someone of his
life), the rules of human rights law must be applied in the light of the relevant
provisions of international humanitarian law. No such express conflict was
established in relation to the rights that are relevant to this book. In fact, it
appears that the relevant prohibitions under international human rights law
and international humanitarian law are complementary.
Whether particular obligations of international environmental law continue
to apply must be established first of all with reference to the treaties them-
selves. It is relevant to note that some of the environmental conventions that
contain relevant obligations for States with respect to the exploitation of natural
resources contain provisions indicating their continued applicability in
situations of armed conflict. The most relevant examples are the 1972 UNESCO
World Heritage Convention and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity.
Both conventions contain provisions that in practice qualify the right of States
to exploit natural resources in situations of armed conflict, most notably by
prohibiting certain forms of environmental damage. These apply in all circum-
stances.
Therefore it can be concluded that the outbreak of an armed conflict has
some effect on the applicability of international human rights law and inter-
national environmental law, but that most obligations continue to apply to
some extent. The following section discusses other grounds for the termination
or suspension of treaties under general international law and assesses their
relevance for the applicability of international human rights and environmental
law in situations of armed conflict.
5.3 TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF TREATIES UNDER THE 1969 VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
Article 18 of the draft ILC articles on the effects of armed conflict on treaties
provides that the draft articles “are without prejudice to the termination,
withdrawal or suspension of treaties as a consequence of, inter alia: (a) a
material breach; (b) supervening impossibility of performance; or (c) a funda-
mental change of circumstances”. The current section addresses all these
grounds for the termination, withdrawal or suspension of a treaty which are
codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
5.3.1 Material breach
A material breach by a party to a treaty entitles the other parties to terminate
or suspend the operation of the treaty. Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties defines a material breach as either “a repudiation
of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention”, meaning a contrario
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that repudiations that are sanctioned by the Vienna Convention do not con-
stitute material breaches for the purposes of Article 60,53 or – and this is more
relevant to the present book – “the violation of a provision essential to the
accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty”. A provision is con-
sidered “essential’ if it is “considered by a party to be essential to the effective
execution of the treaty”.54 This includes provisions that touch directly on the
central purposes of the treaty, as well as provisions of an ancillary character.
Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention clearly delineates the circum-
stances in which parties may invoke material breach as a reason to terminate
a treaty or suspend its operation. In the case of multilateral treaties, which
are most relevant to the current study, Article 60(2)(a) provides that a treaty
may be suspended or terminated by all the parties to the treaty by unanimous
agreement, either between themselves and the defaulting State only, or between
all the parties. This possibility is of limited relevance for the current study,
as it is not directly related to the circumstances regarding the outbreak of an
armed conflict.
In addition, Article 60(2)(b) and (c) recognise two circumstances for uni-
lateral responses, which are limited to suspension. A right to suspend the
operation of a treaty in case of material breach accrues first to specially affected
parties under section 2(b). The pollution of a State’s territory as a result of
the violation of an obligation under a multilateral environmental treaty is a
relevant example of this.55
Secondly, according to Article 60(2)(c) of the Vienna Convention, such a
right accrues to other parties “if the treaty is of such a character that a material
breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every
party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the
treaty”. The drafting history of Article 60 shows that this provision specifically
referred to so-called “integral agreements”, i.e., treaties which require the
53 Bruno Simma and Christian Tams state in this respect that “[t]he reference to repudiation
‘sanctioned by the present Convention’ makes clear that claims of invalidity of treaties
pursuant to Articles 46 to 53 of the Convention, or for the suspension and/or termination
of treaties pursuant to Articles 54 to 64, do not constitute material breaches. In addition,
it follows from Article 73 of the Convention that repudiations justified under the law of
State responsibility or the United Nations Charter cannot bring Article 60 into operation
either”. See B. Simma & C.J. Tams, ‘Article 60: Termination or Suspension of the Operation
of a Treaty as a Consequence of its Breach’, in O. Corten & P. Klein (eds.), The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Vol. II,
p. 1358.
54 International Law Commission, Reports of the International Law Commission on the second
part of its seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.l, in
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966), Vol. II, p. 255.
55 See B. Simma & C.J. Tams, ‘Article 60: Termination or Suspension of the Operation of a
Treaty as a Consequence of its Breach’, in O. Corten & P. Klein (eds.), The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Vol. II, pp. 1364-1365
for this and other examples.
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interdependent performance of obligations by all parties for the achievement
of its objective.56 Typical examples include disarmament treaties.
For the purposes of the present study, the question arises whether Article
60 allows a party to suspend the operation of the treaty in the case of a breach
of erga omnes obligations. As argued above, several environmental conventions
contain erga omnes partes obligations. In this respect, Bruno Simma and
Christian Tams argue that, for the purposes of Article 60(2)(b), the fact that
all States can be held to have a legal interest in the observation of the treaty
does not make these States specially affected in the case of a breach of the
treaty.57 Therefore it can be argued that this provision cannot be invoked
by a State as a ground to suspend the operation of environmental treaties.
Article 60(2)(c) raises another question. Can a breach of an erga omnes
obligation have the effect of “radically changing the position of all other parties
with respect to the performance of their obligations under the treaty”? This
question could be rephrased to ask whether those environmental treaties that
protect common goods can be considered to constitute integral treaties. In
general this is not the case, as obligations under international environmental
law are usually not interdependent in the sense that the parties have made
their performance of the treaty dependent on the performance by other parties,
as is the case with regard to disarmament treaties. Therefore it can be argued
that Article 60(2)(c) does not provide grounds for the suspension of the
operation of such treaties either.
There may, however, be exceptions to this rule, in particular when parties
have agreed to achieve particular targets, as in the case of the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. This
instrument could be considered an integral treaty in the sense of Article 60(2)(c)
of the Vienna Convention. However, it should be noted that a material breach
of a specialised instrument such as the Kyoto Protocol would not affect the
general obligations of States under the Climate Convention itself.
The final issue relates to the suspension of humanitarian treaties. Article
60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides that a treaty cannot be sus-
pended in the case of a material breach of “provisions relating to the protection
of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character”. The
term “treaties of a humanitarian character” refers primarily to international
humanitarian law treaties. However, arguably, it refers to human rights treaties
56 Ibid., p. 1365. Simma and Tams define integral treaties as treaties “the objective of which
can only be achieved through the interdependent performance of obligations by all parties”.
57 Ibid., p. 1366.
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as well.58 This implies that human rights treaties cannot be suspended in
response to a material breach by another party.
In conclusion, it may be argued that Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion formulates the general rule that a treaty may be suspended – and in some
cases terminated – in response to a material breach by one of the parties.
However, the provision sets out clear and strict rules for the legality of such
responses. Most importantly, suspension is mainly open to parties that are
specially affected by the breach. For the purposes of the present book, the
provision is therefore primarily relevant in situations of international armed
conflict. It affords a belligerent State a right to suspend the operation of a treaty
in the case of a material breach committed by another State, provided that
the former State suffers damage from the breach of obligations. For the pur-
poses of this book, such damage will usually concern extraterritorial damage
to the environment.
5.3.2 Supervening impossibility of performance
According to Article 61 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, supervening impossibil-
ity of performance can be invoked as a reason to terminate, withdraw from
or suspend the operation of a treaty if the performance of the treaty has
become impossible due to the temporary or permanent disappearance or
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty.59
Thus the impossibility of performance must be directly linked to the
disappearance or destruction of an object which was essential for the perform-
ance of the treaty.60 Relevant examples for the purposes of the current book
include the destruction of a particular site protected under the Ramsar or the
World Heritage Convention or the extinction of a species protected by a
wildlife treaty. Therefore the mere loss of control by a State over territory in
which the site or species is situated does not meet the requirements of the
Vienna Convention.
58 See the drafting history of Article 60 (5) of the Vienna Convention. United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/11, p. 354, para. 12. The
Swiss delegate proposing the insertion of Article 60(5) did not only mention the Geneva
Conventions, but also “conventions of equal importance concerning the status of refugees,
the prevention of slavery, the prohibition of genocide and the protection of human rights
in general”.
59 In the case of the temporary disappearance of an object indispensable for the operation
of a treaty, a party may only suspend the operation of the treaty.
60 See P. Bodeau-Livinec & J. Morgan-Foster, ‘Article 61: Supervening Impossibility of Perfor-
mance’, in O. Corten & P. Klein (eds.), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A
Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Vol. II, p. 1383.
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One question that arises is whether the impossibility can be of a juridical
nature as well. This possibility was originally rejected by the ILC. According
to Fitzmaurice, admitting a juridical impossibility would have the result
“that a country could always obtain release from its treaty obligation by entering
into other incompatible obligations. In such cases there is not impossibility in the
sense that the treaty cannot be executed, but merely in the sense that it cannot be
executed without involving a breach of another treaty”.61
In other words, a State may not invoke supervening impossibility of perform-
ance as a ground to suspend its obligations under one treaty, for example,
a human rights or environmental treaty, because of a perceived conflict with
its obligations under another treaty, for example, an international humanitarian
law treaty.
However, it is possible to envisage situations in which the juridical im-
possibility is not linked to a conflict of norms, but to the actual disappearance
of a juridical object indispensable to the execution of the treaty. The termination
of a legal regime or a radical change in the situation on which the performance
of the treaty was based would be an example of this.
This issue was raised by Hungary before the International Court of Justice
in the case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project. Hungary argued that
“the essential object of the Treaty […] had permanently disappeared and that
the Treaty had thus become impossible to perform”.62 Although the Court
rejected Hungary’s argument in this particular case, it did not as such refute
the possibility that the disappearance of a juridical object could fall within
the scope of Article 61 of the Vienna Convention.
According to Pierre Bodeau-Livinec and Jordan Morgan-Foster: “What
matters is that the impossibility of performance is material, due to the absence
of a necessary element for the implementation of the treaty”.63 Within these
strict confines, it does not matter whether the object that disappeared was of
a physical or juridical nature.
Furthermore, according to Article 61 (2), a State may not invoke the ground
if the impossibility results from its own behaviour, because the impossibility
is the result either of a breach by that State of its obligations under the relevant
treaty or of its other international law obligations. In the case concerning the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the International Court of Justice expressly relied
61 Second Report on the Law of Treaties of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/107, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1957, Vol. II, p. 50.
62 International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary
v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, para.103.
63 P. Bodeau-Livinec & J. Morgan-Foster, ‘Article 61: Supervening Impossibility of Perform-
ance’, in O. Corten & P. Klein (eds.), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Comment-
ary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Vol. II, p. 1391.
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on this provision in response to Hungary’s claim that the essential object of
the treaty between itself and Slovakia had permanently disappeared.64
For the purposes of the present book, this limitation implies, inter alia, that
an aggressor State cannot invoke supervening impossibility of performance
as a ground for suspending its obligations under treaties to which it is a
party.65 It also implies that a State that destroys World Heritage sites within
its own territory because these protected sites are used by non-state armed
groups as a shelter, for example, cannot invoke the justification to terminate
or suspend the operation of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention.
Therefore it is clear that Article 61 of the Vienna Convention only in very
exceptional circumstances allows States to invoke supervening impossibility
of performance as a justification for the termination, withdrawal or suspension
of treaty obligations. Indeed, it is hard to imagine situations relevant to this
book that would meet the requirements set by this provision.
5.3.3 Fundamental change of circumstances
According to Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, the principle of rebus sic
stantibus or fundamental change of circumstances can be invoked when the
circumstances existing at the time that the treaty was concluded constituted
an essential basis for the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty and
if the effect of the change were radically to transform the extent of obligations
still to be performed under the treaty.66 Furthermore, the fundamental change
may not relate to circumstances which the parties to the treaty must have been
able to foresee.
According to the ILC, the provision serves as a “safety valve” for “cases
in which, failing any agreement, one party may be left powerless under the
treaty to obtain any legal relief from outmoded and burdensome provisions”.67
64 A claim which was refuted all together by the ICJ. See the International Court of Justice,
Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of
25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports, 1997, p. 7, para. 103.
65 Compare in this regard Article 15 of the ILC draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflict
to Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.777, 11 May 2011, which prohibits an aggressor State from
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty or suspending its operation as a consequence
of an armed conflict that results from the act of aggression if the effect would be to the
benefit of that State.
66 For an explanation of these conditions, see the Second Report on the Law of Treaties of
the Special Rapporteur, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 1957, Vol. II, pp. 32-33.
67 International Law Commission, Document A/6309/Rev. l: Reports of the International Law
Commission on the second part of its seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966), Vol. II, p. 258. See also the Second Report
on the Law of Treaties of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, UN Doc. A/CN.4/
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This was also recognised by the International Court of Justice in the case
concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, in which the Court reasoned that
“the stability of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental change
of circumstances be applied only in exceptional cases”.68 Thus a plea of funda-
mental change of circumstances can only be considered as a last resort.
The exceptional nature of a justification for the termination, withdrawal
from or suspension of the operation of a treaty is reflected in the conditions
set by Article 62 of the Vienna Convention. The conditions are cumulative
and must be interpreted narrowly. First, the change of circumstances must
be objective. It must refer to “external elements independent of the will of the
parties”.69 Furthermore, the change must be fundamental in the sense of affect-
ing circumstances which constituted the essential basis of the consent of the
parties to be bound by the treaty and in the sense of radically transforming
the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
Therefore, in the first place, the change must alter the core of the agreement
between the parties. Secondly, the change must radically transform the obliga-
tions under the treaty, meaning that “[t]he change must have increased the
burden of the obligations to be executed to the extent of rendering the perform-
ance something essentially different from that originally undertaken”.70
The last condition for invoking the plea of fundamental change of circum-
stances is that the change may not relate to circumstances that the parties to
the treaty should have been able to foresee. The outbreak of an armed conflict
is generally considered to constitute a circumstance that the parties were not
able to foresee when they concluded a treaty, which makes the provision
relevant to this book. Finally, Article 62 contains a provision similar to Article
61, providing that a party invoking the ground cannot take advantage of its
own breach of an obligation.71
For the purposes of the current book, the question whether the existence
of a peaceful situation in a State “constituted an essential basis of the consent
of the parties to be bound by the treaty” and whether the effect of the outbreak
of armed conflict radically transforms “the extent of obligations still to be
performed under the treaty” are both crucial. In these circumstances, the
question whether the outbreak of an armed conflict radically alters the relation-
107, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1957), Vol. II, p. 32, which already recog-
nized the residual nature of the justification.
68 International Court of Justice, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judg-
ment of 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, para. 104.
69 M.N. Shaw & C. Fournet, ‘Article 62: Fundamental Change of Circumstances’, in O. Corten
& P. Klein (eds.), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, Vol. II, p. 1424.
70 International Court of Justice, Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Federal Republic of Germany
v. Iceland), Judgment of 2 February 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, para. 43.
71 Statement in Vienna by the Dutch delegation, reported in M.E. Villiger, Commentary on the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
(2009), p. 776.
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ships between the parties to the treaty is a decisive element.72 This is not
automatically the case. While the outbreak of an armed conflict can certainly
affect the capacity of the State to respect its obligations under international
and human rights obligations, it does not necessarily affect the relationship
between the belligerent State and other States to the treaty. Therefore this
ground for the suspension of a treaty is primarily relevant in the relationship
between belligerents inter se.
5.3.4 Conclusions on the relevance of other grounds for the termination or
suspension of treaties in situations of armed conflict
The previous section demonstrated that the outbreak of an armed conflict does
not automatically suspend the operation of international human rights or
environmental treaties, except where relevant treaties provide otherwise. States
wishing to suspend the operation of their obligations under international
human rights or environmental law therefore have to resort to the general
grounds for the termination or suspension of treaties, codified in the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
This section has shown that the primary objective of the system established
by the 1969 Vienna Convention for the termination and suspension of treaties
is to maintain stability in treaty relations. Therefore States can invoke the
grounds for the termination or suspension of treaties only in exceptional
circumstances. For the purposes of this book, there are some situations that
would allow States to suspend their obligations under relevant treaties.
First, States can suspend their treaty obligations in response to a material
breach by another State. However, this possibility exists only for a material
breach that directly affects the State concerned. A material breach of a treaty
that protects a natural resource shared by two or more States is an example
of this. Secondly, supervening impossibility of performance can be invoked
if the object of protection of a treaty has disappeared. The destruction of a
wetland protected under the Ramsar Convention or a natural heritage site
protected under the UNESCO World Heritage Convention are relevant examples.
Finally, a fundamental change of circumstances can be invoked if the outbreak
of an armed conflict radically alters the relationships between the parties to
a treaty and their mutual obligations. A treaty regulating the common use
of a shared natural resource, concluded between States that have subsequently
engaged in an armed conflict with each other, is an example of this.
It can therefore be concluded that in most cases States remain bound by
their obligations under relevant treaties. The main exceptions are international
72 See M.N. Shaw & C. Fournet, ‘Article 62: Fundamental Change of Circumstances’, in
O. Corten & P. Klein (eds.), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, Vol. II, p. 1430.
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environmental treaties and concern the relationship between belligerent States
inter se. States must continue to respect their obligations to neutral States. In
addition, internal armed conflicts do not generally entail a right for States to
suspend their obligations under international environmental or human rights
treaties.
5.4 CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDING WRONGFULNESS
If a treaty cannot be terminated or suspended on the basis of one of the
grounds discussed in the previous section, a State involved in an armed conflict
may wish to preclude the wrongfulness of its conduct by invoking one of the
circumstances discussed in this section. This argument lasts only as long as
the circumstances persist. In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the Inter-
national Court of Justice emphasised that a State must resume its international
obligations as soon as the situation changes.73
Circumstances precluding wrongfulness are based on the domain of State
responsibility. Their function is not to affect treaty obligations as such, but
rather to remove the responsibility of a State for the breach of an obligation.
In its commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility, the International
Law Commission emphasised that circumstances precluding wrongfulness
“act as a shield rather than a sword”.74
The Articles on State Responsibility list six circumstances precluding the
wrongfulness of an act that would otherwise constitute a breach of the inter-
national obligations of the State concerned. These are consent (Article 20), self-
defence (Article 21), countermeasures (Article 22), force majeure (Article 23),
distress (Article 24) and necessity (Article 25). The situations of force majeure
and necessity are the most relevant for this book.75
5.4.1 Force majeure
A situation of force majeure is defined in Article 23 of the ILC Articles on State
Responsibility as “the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen
event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the
circumstances to perform the obligation”. Therefore there are three criteria
73 International Court of Justice, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, para. 101.
74 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with comment-
aries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 71.
75 Self-defence, as relevant as it is in general to a situation of armed conflict, is left out of
consideration. It seems too far-fetched to argue that the exploitation of the natural resources
of another State constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence, as required by Article 21 of
the Articles on State Responsibility.
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that have to be met. First, the situation concerned must be brought about by
an irresistible force or an unforeseen event. The outbreak of an armed conflict
could qualify as such an “unforeseen event” if it was not easily foreseeable.76
Secondly, the unforeseen event must be beyond the control of the State con-
cerned. This criterion is not elaborated in any further detail, but it implies that
the State must be in a position in which it has no reasonable means at its
disposal to alter the situation. Finally, there must be a direct link between the
unforeseen event and the material impossibility of performance. The ILC
Commentary explicitly mentions the loss of control over a portion of the State’s
territory as a result of an insurrection as an example of a material impossibil-
ity.77
For the purposes of the present study, force majeure could therefore be
invoked by a State for breaches of its obligations under international human
rights and environmental conventions in territories under the control of armed
groups. While these situations do not justify the suspension of a treaty based
on supervening impossibility of performance, the State can preclude the
wrongfulness of its acts by invoking force majeure. Of course, as soon as the
State regains control over its territory, it must resume its obligations under
the relevant conventions.
There is, however, one important additional condition that must be fulfilled
for a State to be able to successfully appeal to force majeure. Article 61 (2) of
the ILC Articles excludes a plea of force majeure if the situation of force majeure
is due, either solely or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of
the State invoking it, or if the State has assumed the risk of that situation
occurring. A considerable degree of responsibility is therefore required before
a State can be assumed to have brought about the situation of force majeure.
According to the ILC Commentary, the State must either have played a sub-
stantial role in bringing about the situation of force majeure or it must have
explicitly accepted responsibility for the occurrence of a particular risk.78
For the purposes of the present study, this would imply, for example, that
a government that does not actively attempt to stop the violations of inter-
national human rights and environmental treaties in territories under the
control of armed groups could be barred from invoking a plea of force majeure.
Côte d’Ivoire provides a relevant example in this respect. In 2003, a govern-
ment of national unity was installed in the country as part of the peace process
which included the government in control of the south of the country, and
the rebel group Forces Nouvelles in control of the north of the country. However,
the subsequent report of the Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire concluded that
the government of national unity’s efforts to redeploy local government ad-
76 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with comment-
aries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 76.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., p. 78.
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ministration in the north of the country were inadequate, as a result of which
local warlords were able to remain in control over this part of the territory.79
This example illustrates that a government can indirectly be responsible for
the occurrence of a situation of force majeure because of its lax attitude.
5.4.2 Necessity
Necessity arises only in exceptional circumstances where there is an irrecon-
cilable conflict between an essential interest, either of the State invoking
necessity or of the international community on the one hand, and a legal
obligation on the other.80
According to Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, a plea
of necessity must meet the following cumulative requirements. First, the breach
of an international obligation must be “the only way for the State to safeguard
an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril’. The question of what
constitutes an “essential interest” of a State must be determined on a case-by-
case basis.81 Obviously the national security of a State would certainly consti-
tute such an interest. For the purposes of the present study, it is interesting
to note that the preservation of the environment has expressly been recognized
as an essential interest within the scope of this provision.82
In addition, the essential interest of the State must be protected against
a “grave and imminent peril’. In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the
International Court of Justice stated that the terms “grave and imminent peril’
imply that a state of necessity cannot exist without a peril “duly established
at the relevant point in time”, although a degree of uncertainty about the future
is permitted as long as the peril
“appearing in the long term might be held to be “imminent” as soon as it is estab-
lished, at the relevant point in time, that the realization of that peril, however far
off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and inevitable”.83
Moreover, the wrongful conduct must be the “only way” open to the State
to protect its essential interest. Therefore necessity may not be invoked to
79 See in particular: Final report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with
paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008) of 9 October 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/
521, paras. 30-41.
80 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with comment-
aries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 80.
81 Ibid., p. 83.
82 International Court of Justice, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judg-
ment of 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, para. 53.
83 Ibid., para. 54.
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excuse behaviour for which reasonable, and more proportionate, alternatives
were available.
In addition to these requirements, Article 25 of the ILC Articles provides
that a State invoking necessity may not “seriously impair an essential interest
of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international
community as a whole”. Thus a State may not invoke necessity to justify a
breach of obligations relating to the essential interests of other States or of the
international community as a whole. Finally, according to Article 25, no appeal
can be made to necessity if “the international obligation in question excludes
the possibility of invoking necessity” – which is, for example, the case for
certain provisions under international humanitarian law – or if “the State has
contributed to the situation of necessity”.
These requirements entail two important consequences for the purposes
of the present study. First, a State that breaches an international obligation
in order to protect the environment against a grave and imminent danger could
in principle invoke the plea of necessity. This is because the preservation of
the environment has expressly been recognised to constitute an “essential
interest”. In contrast, States cannot invoke necessity to justify particular actions
that harm the environment for reasons of national security, because such
actions would touch upon the essential interests of other States. This is parti-
cularly the case when their actions are directed against an object that is subject
to a common regime, such as the regimes protecting natural heritage, en-
dangered species or biological diversity.
Therefore it can be concluded that necessity cannot be invoked by States
to justify breaches of international environmental agreements which affect the
essential interests of the international community, such as the Biodiversity
Convention. Nor can it be invoked by States that have contributed to the
occurrence of an armed conflict.84 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that
a plea of necessity could in theory be invoked by another State as a justification
for taking action to safeguard a natural heritage site against its destruction
by the parties to the armed conflict. However, whether such action would
include entering the territory of a State involved in an armed conflict without
its permission is doubtful, as the State that undertook such an operation would
have to demonstrate that there was no other reasonable alternative to prevent
the destruction of the natural heritage site.
84 Compare Koppe, who asserts for the situation of international armed conflict that “[o]nly
states using force in self-defense comply with the requirement that the non-performance
of their obligations under conventional and customary international law is not the result
of their own behavior”. See E.V. Koppe, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of
the Environment During International Armed Conflict, Studies in International Law, Vol. 18,
Oxford: Hart (2008), p. 364.
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5.5 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The previous sections discussed the continued applicability of treaty law in
situations of armed conflict. However, this book has also identified some
principles that apply independently from treaties. Relevant principles of
customary international law include the principle of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources, the principle of sustainable use of natural resources
and the principle of prevention of environmental damage. Arguably, these
principles could continue to apply irrespective of the applicability of the treaty
in which they are incorporated.85
5.5.1 The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources
The principle of permanent sovereignty is relevant to the situation of armed
conflict in several ways. First, it entails an obligation for third States to respect
a State’s sovereignty over natural resources. This obligation imposes clear limits
on what a State involved in an international armed conflict is permitted to
do with the natural resources of its adversary. Secondly, the principle of
permanent sovereignty entails obligations for the national government with
regard to the exploitation of natural resources. One condition inherent in the
principle of permanent sovereignty is the obligation to exercise sovereignty
over natural resources for national development and the well-being of the
people of the State. It is this condition that is of particular relevance for the
current book.
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has been
applied to situations of armed conflict on several occasions. First, it was
referred to in several UN Security Council resolutions relating to the armed
conflict in the DR Congo.86 Furthermore, in a more general vein, the sovereign
right of states to exploit their own natural resources was reaffirmed in a
presidential statement of the Security Council concerning the maintenance
of international peace and security.87
85 Compare Article 10 (Obligations imposed by international law independently of a treaty)
of the ILC draft articles on the effects of armed conflict on treaties and Article 43 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
86 See, e.g., UN Security Council Resolutions 1291 (2000), 1304 (2000), 1332 (2000), 1341 (2001),
1355 (2001), 1493 (2003), and 1533 (2004).
87 Statement by the President of the Security Council made in connection with the Council’s
consideration of the item entitled Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UN
Doc. S/PRST/2007/22, 25 June 2007. See in this regard also ‘The Plundering of Natural
Resources and Destruction of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict’, in W.J.M. van
Genugten, M.P. Scharf, and S.E. Radin (ed.), Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years after the 1907
Hague Peace Conference, Proceedings of the 2007 Hague Joint Conference on Contemporary
Issues of International Law, p. 242 (2009).
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In addition, in its resolutions concerning the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian territory, the UN General Assembly expressly declared the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources to be applicable to the natural
resources of territories under occupation. Resolution 66/225 of 29 March 2012,
in which the UN General Assembly reaffirms “the principle of the permanent
sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural
resources”88 is one example.
Similarly, in a report on the implications of the United Nations resolutions
on permanent sovereignty over natural resources on the occupied Palestinian
and other Arab territories and on the obligations of Israel concerning its
conduct in these territories under international law, the UN Secretary-General
stated that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and
the law of belligerent occupation “strengthen and reinforce each other”.89
The decision of the International Court of Justice in the Congo-Uganda
case does not appear to be in line with this. In that case, the DR Congo had
invoked the principle of permanent sovereignty as a principle relevant to the
situation of the illegal exploitation, looting and plundering of natural resources
by members of the Ugandan army. After the Court determined that the prin-
ciple of permanent sovereignty was part of customary international law, it
noted that there was nothing in the UNGA resolutions defining the principle
of permanent sovereignty to suggest “that they are applicable to the specific
situation of looting, pillage and exploitation of certain natural resources by
members of the army of a State militarily intervening in another State [...] The
Court does not believe that this principle is applicable to this type of
situation.”90
The precise meaning of the Court’s judgment in this respect remains
unclear. Does the Court say that the principle of permanent sovereignty is
not applicable at all to the situation of armed conflict or is its inapplicability
confined to the specific situation at hand?91 In this respect, it should be noted
that in general the Court does not exclude the applicability of the principle
of permanent sovereignty to the situation of armed conflict. Instead, it refers
to “this” type of situation. The decision could therefore be determined by the
specific circumstances of the case –i.e., that the looting, pillage, and exploitation
88 UN General Assembly Resolution 66/225 on ‘Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources,’ adopted on 29 March
2012.
89 UN Secretary-General, Report on the implications, under international law, of the United
Nations resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, on the occupied
Palestinian and other Arab territories and on the obligations of Israel concerning its conduct
in these territories, UN Doc. A/38/265, 21 June 1983, para. 47.
90 Congo-Uganda case, supra, note 11 at para. 244.
91 Compare N.J. Schrijver, ‘Natural Resources, Permanent Sovereignty over’, in R. Wolfrum
(ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public
Law and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), para. 18.
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were committed by individual members of the Ugandan army in the absence
of sufficient evidence of a systematic policy of the Ugandan government aimed
at the plunder of the natural resources of the DRC.92
Moreover, the Court’s decision does not appear to affect the rights and
obligations inherent in the principle of permanent sovereignty. This conclusion
follows, first of all, from the decision itself. When it comes to determining
Uganda’s international responsibility, the Court explicitly refers to Article 21
of the 1981 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, which formulates
the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources and, in case
of spoliation, formulates a right for a dispossessed people to the lawful re-
covery of its property, as well as to adequate compensation.93
In other words, the Court seems to acknowledge that the right of peoples
to freely dispose of their natural resources does impose specific obligations
on Uganda as an occupying power, if not on the basis of custom, then at least
on the basis of treaty law. Furthermore, in his declaration, Judge Koroma stated
that the rights and interests arising from the 1962 Declaration on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources “remain in effect at all times, including
during armed conflict and during occupation.”94
Therefore it can be argued that the principle of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources continues to apply in times of armed conflict, both in
relation to third States and in relation to a State’s own natural resources. Of
course, the obligation to exploit natural resources for the well-being of the
people does not prohibit a government from using the proceeds of resource
exploitation for military expenditure. Fighting rebel groups that undermine
State authority can perfectly well be “for the well-being of the people”. Never-
theless, the obligation for a government to act for the well-being of the people
arguably does entail a general obligation for the government to account for
its decisions in this respect.
5.5.2 The environmental principles of sustainable use and prevention of
environmental damage
Other principles that are of particular relevance for the exploitation of natural
resources in situations of armed conflict are the principles of sustainable use
and prevention of environmental damage. Arguably these principles apply
both to the exploitation by a State of its own natural resources and in relation
to the natural resources of a third State. Despite their relevance for situations
of armed conflict, there have not been many references to these principles in
92 Compare Ibid. and P.N. Okowa, ‘Natural Resources in Situations of Armed Conflict: Is there
a Coherent Framework for Protection?’ International Community Law Review 9 (2007), p. 2.
93 Congo-Uganda case, supra, note 11 at para. 245.
94 Ibid., (declaration of Judge Koroma) [emphasis in original].
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the practice of UN bodies in relation to specific armed conflicts. The UN Security
Council has referred to the concept of sustainability only in a few of its resolu-
tions, mainly with indirect references.95 Nevertheless, the systematic exploita-
tion of natural resources “with little regard to sustainable […] practices”, as
happened in Liberia under Charles Taylor, is arguably not permitted except
in situations of military necessity.96
The obligation to prevent damage to the environment of other States has
been explicitly applied to situations where a State exercises de facto control
in another State. Arguably this principle therefore applies in situations of
occupation.97 Moreover, there is no reason why it would cease to apply in
the relationship between a belligerent State and third States. In this respect,
it should be noted that the law of neutrality even assures the territorial in-
violability of neutral States.98
One important implication of the obligation to prevent damage to the
environment of other States concerns the related obligation to conduct an
Environmental Impact Assessment, an obligation which, according to the
International Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills case, constitutes a “requirement
under general international law […] where there is a risk that the proposed
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary
context”.99 Arguably the obligation to conduct an EIA not only applies when
there is a risk of damage to the environment of other States, but also when
there is a risk of damage to natural resources or parts of the environment that
are important to the larger community of States, even if these natural resources
are found entirely within the territory of a single State. Reference can be made
to natural resources that are subject to common regimes, such as biological
diversity and particular ecosystems and species.
The obligation to conduct an EIA requires States to conduct an assessment
of the risks of the project for the environment both before the start of the
project and during its exploitation. A situation of armed conflict does not
relieve States of this responsibility, especially not for the exploitation projects
that are to be conducted in parts of the State territory where no fighting occurs.
Moreover, an EIA is a flexible instrument that can be adapted to all circum-
95 These resolutions relate to armed conflicts in Cambodia and Liberia respectively. For more
details, see Chapter 7 of this study.
96 Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia established pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/2001/1015 of 26 October 2001,
para. 33.
97 See the commentary of the ILC on its Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm
from Hazardous Activities, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two
(2001), p. 151, para. 12, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this study.
98 E.V. Koppe, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment During Inter-
national Armed Conflict, Studies in International Law, Vol. 18, Oxford: Hart (2008), p. 361.
99 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina
v. Uruguay), I.C.J. Reports, 2010, para. 204.
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stances. Therefore, the extent to which States have to assess the risks arising
from a project will depend on the factual circumstances.
5.6 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT
This chapter has examined whether and to what extent States remain bound
by international human rights and environmental law when conducting
exploitation activities in situations of armed conflict. It argued that the exploita-
tion of natural resources by States as a commercial activity continues to be
regulated by the legal framework that applies to the management of natural
resources in situations of peace. This implies that States remain bound by their
obligations under international human rights and environmental law in
situations of armed conflict. There are two exceptions to this basic assumption.
First, as the case law of the International Court of Justice shows, situations
of armed conflict are primarily governed by the rules of international human-
itarian law. In cases where the relevant rules of international human rights
and environmental law clash with this field of international law, there is a
presumption that the rules of international humanitarian law prevail. However,
in cases where there is no apparent clash between the relevant rules from the
different fields of international law, the relevant rules complement each other.
As the following chapter will show, international humanitarian law contains
only few specialised rules that apply to the management of natural resources.
In addition, these rules do not directly conflict with relevant rules of inter-
national human rights and environmental law.
The existence of an armed conflict may alter the extent of the obligations
to be fulfilled by States under international human rights and environmental
law. There are factors that are inherent in international human rights and
environmental treaties which have an impact on the performance of their
obligations during an armed conflict. For obligations under international
human rights law, the principal issue affecting the operation of human rights
instruments during an armed conflict concerns the possibility of derogating
from the provisions of the treaties. This applies particularly to the ICCPR, which
contains an express provision on derogation.
Derogation permits States to deviate from their obligations under human
rights treaties in situations of public emergency, including armed conflicts.
Derogation is permitted in exceptional circumstances only after a situation
of public emergency has been announced. Moreover, derogation does not annul
the obligation itself. States have to justify not respecting their obligations in
each individual case.
This chapter has argued that the possibility of derogating from particular
human rights may have an impact on the rights of individuals and minorities
to participate in decision making, but it does not affect the basic prohibition
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against depriving a people of their means of subsistence, incorporated in the
identical Articles 1(2) of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. This prohibition is framed
in absolute terms, which implies that derogation from the prohibition is not
permitted under any circumstance.
As far as environmental obligations are concerned, it should be noted that
many provisions in environmental treaties are lenient with regard to the
implementation of the substantive obligations by States. This leniency can be
seen at two levels. First, environmental obligations are generally not executed
automatically. The implementation of environmental obligations often requires
the formulation of plans and policies at the national level. Examples include
the provisions of the Biodiversity Convention relating to the in situ (Article
8) and ex situ (Article 9) conservation of biological diversity, the provisions
in the UNESCO World Heritage Convention on the protection, conservation and
preservation of world heritage (in particular, Article 5) and the provisions in
the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands on the listing and conservation of wet-
lands (i.e., Articles 2 and 4).
Secondly, the implementation of obligations under international environ-
mental treaties is often conditional on the respective capabilities of States.
Examples include obligations incorporated in the Convention on the Conserva-
tion of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, the Biodiversity Convention and
the Climate Change Convention, which require implementation only as far
as this is possible and appropriate.100 This implies that States could deviate
from these obligations in situations of armed conflict, if their implementation
were not possible or appropriate.
However, as a minimum, it can be argued that States cannot act contrary
to their core obligations under international environmental treaties. This results
from their general obligation to act in good faith with regard to the imple-
mentation of their treaty obligations. This not only applies for exploitation
activities in inter-state armed conflicts, but also for the exploitation of public
natural resources in intra-state conflicts. In both cases, the rationale for the
continued applicability of international environmental law is based on the need
to protect the interests of third States. As argued above, many obligations
under international environmental law serve to protect the interests of a larger
community of States. The occurrence of an armed conflict does not diminish
these obligations.
This chapter also examined the possibilities for States to terminate or
suspend the operation of treaties in situations of armed conflict. More in
100 See, for example. Article III (4) of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species
of Wild Animals, which determined that Parties “shall endeavour […] where feasible and
appropriate; […] as appropriate…; and to the extent feasible and appropriate…”. Similarly,
Articles 8 to 11 of the Biodiversity Convention formulate obligations for parties to be
implemented “as far as possible and appropriate”. Similarly, the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, expressed in the Climate Change Convention, implies a degree
of leniency as well.
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particular, it examined three possibilities for suspension: the suspension of
a treaty in the case of a material breach of that treaty by another party to the
treaty; supervening impossibility of performance; and fundamental change
in circumstances. Arguably States can only suspend their treaty obligations
in exceptional circumstances. Therefore in most cases States remain bound
by their obligations under relevant treaties. The exceptions mainly affect
international environmental treaties and concern the relationship between
belligerent States inter se.
In addition, this chapter examined circumstances precluding the wrong-
fulness of otherwise illegal conduct. More in particular, it examined force
majeure and necessity as circumstances that would preclude the wrongfulness
of acts of States contrary to their treaty obligations under international human
rights and environmental treaties. Most relevant to the current study is the
conclusion that a State can invoke force majeure for breaches of its obligations
under international human rights and environmental conventions in territories
under the control of armed groups, but only to the extent that it was factually
impossible for the State to prevent the violation of the relevant obligations.
Furthermore, States continue to be bound by their obligations under cus-
tomary international law in situations of armed conflict. The most relevant
example of a customary international law obligation concerns the principle
of permanent sovereignty and the inherent condition that a government must
exercise permanent sovereignty for national development and the well-being
of the population. As a minimum, this implies that a government remains
accountable for its use of the proceeds of natural resources exploitation.
Another example concerns the obligation to conserve and sustainably use
natural resources, as incorporated, inter alia, in the Ramsar Convention on the
Protection of Wetlands, the UNESCO World Heritage Convention and CITES.
Arguably, this principle qualifies the right of States to exploit their natural
resources, even in situations of armed conflict.
Another customary international law obligation which continues to apply
for States involved in an armed conflict is the obligation to prevent damage
to the environment of other States resulting from exploitation activities, in-
cluding an obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment when
an activity could entail risks for the environment. These obligations continue
to be relevant in situations of armed conflict.
In conclusion, it can be argued that international human rights and environ-
mental law provide a basic framework qualifying the right of governments
to freely dispose of the State’s natural resources in situations of armed conflict.
The extent to which these fields of international law can in fact regulate the
commercial exploitation of natural resources by governments in situations of
armed conflict in a meaningful way depends on a number of factors. This
chapter has discussed several of these factors. In a more general vein, it can
be argued that the extent to which international human rights and environ-
mental law continue to effectively regulate the management of natural
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resources by governments depends on the gravity of the conflict situation,
including the measure of control exercised by a government over the State’s
territory.




The law of armed conflict – or international humanitarian law (IHL) – regulates
the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. It limits the methods and means
that parties to an armed conflict may use to weaken the adversary and it
provides rules that aim to limit the effects of warfare on vulnerable groups,
in particular the civilian population as well as persons that no longer take part
in hostilities. In other words, IHL primarily regulates the use of violence by
parties to an armed conflict.1 This specific focus of IHL is decisive for the way
in which this field of international law addresses activities relating to the
exploitation of natural resources by parties to an armed conflict. It also imme-
diately reveals the limits of IHL in this respect.
The exploitation of natural resources by parties to an armed conflict is not
an act of war in itself, but rather, an activity that sustains conflict. Natural
resources provide parties to an armed conflict with the means to finance their
armed struggle. Therefore IHL appears to be ill suited to regulate the exploita-
tion of natural resources by parties to an armed conflict, in contrast with
occupation law, which has a different aim, namely to define the rights and
obligations for occupants as de facto State authorities. This field of IHL does
include rules defining the rights of an occupant with regard to the natural
resources situated in occupied territory.
The limits of IHL for the scope of this book are also evident from its en-
vironmental provisions. The few international humanitarian law provisions
which were specifically designed to protect the environment during armed
conflict focus on the effects of military operations on the environment.2 Their
1 See the following definition provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), which defines IHL as “the branch of international law limiting the use of violence
in armed conflicts by: a) sparing those who do not or no longer directly participate in
hostilities; b) restricting it to the amount necessary to achieve the aim of the conflict, which
– independently of the causes fought for – can only be to weaken the military potential
of the enemy”. See M. Sassòli; A.A. Bouvier & A. Quintin, How Does Law Protect in War?
Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian
Law, Third Edition, Volume I, Geneva: ICRC (2011), p. 1.
2 Articles 35 (3) and 55, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June
1977, 1125 UNTS 3. Besides these provisions, mention must be made of the Convention
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purpose is to prevent “widespread, long-term and severe” damage to the
environment resulting from acts of warfare.3 They were not designed to protect
the environment against other threats resulting from the conduct of parties
to an armed conflict, such as environmental damage resulting from the ex-
ploitation of natural resources by parties to an armed conflict. Furthermore,
it should be noted that these provisions were adopted in 1977, when modern
international environmental law was at an early stage of development.
Despite all these apparent limitations, IHL is important for the protection
of natural resources and the environment during armed conflict. First, it is
the only field of international law that contains directly binding obligations
for non-state armed groups. In addition, it is the primary field of international
law that is applicable to States which occupy or intervene militarily in other
States.
Therefore the current chapter examines the few provisions of IHL which
are relevant for the protection of natural resources and the environment during
armed conflict. These are Article 23 (g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations, contain-
ing a prohibition against destroying or seizing the property of the enemy,
Article 28 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, Article 33 (2) of the 1949 Geneva
Convention IV and Article 4 (2) (g) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the
Geneva Conventions on the prohibition against pillage, Article 55 of the 1907
Hague Regulations defining the right of usufruct of an occupant, Article 54
of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and Article 14 of the 1977 Additional Proto-
col II on the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques (ENMOD), concluded on 10 December 1976 in New York (entry into force:
5 October 1978), 1108 UNTS 151. This convention aims to prevent the environment being
used as a weapon.
3 For proposals regarding current Article 55 of Additional Protocol I, see CDDH/III/60 of
19 March 1974 (Proposal by Australia to insert a new provision Article 49 bis in Additional
Protocol I) and CDDH/III/64 of 19 March 1974 (Proposal by Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic and Hungary to add a new paragraph to Article 48 of Additional
Protocol I). For proposals with regard to current Article 35 (3) of Additional Protocol I,
see CDDH/III/108 of 11 September 1974 (Amendment by the German Democratic Republic
to Article 33 of Protocol I); CDDH/III/222 of 24 February 1975 (Amendment by the Arab
Republic of Egypt, Australia, Czechoslovakia, Finland, German Democratic Republic,
Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Sudan, Yugoslavia to Article 33 of Additional Protocol I) and
CDDH/III/238 and Add. 1 of 25 February 1975 (Amendment by the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam and Uganda to Article 33 of Additional Protocol I). Official Records of the Diplom-
atic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable
in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol. III, p. 220, 155-157. For a proposal regarding the
insertion of a new paragraph to current Article 14 of Additional Protocol II, see CDDH/III/55
of 19 March 1974 (proposal by Australia to insert a new provision Article 28 bis in Addi-
tional Protocol II). Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Develop-
ment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol.
IV, Amendments, p. 91.
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population, and finally, Articles 35(3) and 55 of the 1997 Additional Protocol I
on the protection of the natural environment.
The current chapter aims to determine to what extent international human-
itarian law contains rules that prohibit the illicit exploitation, looting and
plundering of natural resources by parties to an armed conflict and address
the related environmental damage. Of course, as explained above, IHL was
not specifically designed to address instances of natural resources exploitation
by parties to an armed conflict. As a specialised branch of international law,
IHL is however part of the broader system of international law. This implies
that it must be interpreted and applied in the light of the relevant rules of
general international law and other specialised branches of international law.
International environmental and human rights law in particular can be instru-
mental in filling the gaps in IHL. This applies particularly for international
environmental law, as the standards set by this field of law are more specific
and more recent than those set by international humanitarian law.
Before embarking on an in-depth analysis of substantive international
humanitarian law, section 2 analyses the classical dichotomy made in inter-
national humanitarian law between international and non-international armed
conflicts from the perspective of resource-related armed conflicts. Section 3
then discusses the relevant rules of IHL, while section 4 takes a closer look at
the Martens clause as a means of integrating rules from international human
rights and environmental law in the law of armed conflict. Finally, section 5
assesses the protection provided by IHL to natural resources and the environ-
ment.
6.2 QUALIFICATION OF THE LEGAL SITUATION
International humanitarian law makes a fundamental distinction between
international and non-international armed conflicts. The classification of a
conflict as international or non-international determines which law is applicable
to the conflict. Article 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines
“international armed conflict” as a situation of “declared war or […] any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties” or a situation of “total or partial occupation of a territory”. Article 3
common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines “non-international armed
conflict” as an armed conflict “occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties”.
Most of the armed conflicts discussed in this chapter are internal in nature.
However, some are internationalised through the intervention of foreign States.
This intervention is sometimes direct, in the sense that the foreign State sends
its army into the territory of another State. This is what Uganda and Rwanda
did during the 1990s, when they entered the territory of the DR Congo and
even occupied parts of the DR Congo’s territory. However, the intervention
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can also be indirect, in the sense that a foreign State provides support to armed
groups engaged in an internal armed conflict. Again, Rwanda serves as an
example. A recent report by the Group of Experts on the DR Congo revealed
Rwanda’s support for armed groups operating in the DR Congo.4 Liberia’s
support for the RUF between 1998 and 2002 is another example of a State
providing indirect support to armed groups.
The extent to which foreign States are involved in an internal armed conflict
determines whether it is qualified as an international or internal conflict. The
current section examines this distinction between internal and international
armed conflicts. It looks in particular at the following questions. What consti-
tutes an internal armed conflict? When can such an armed conflict be deemed
to become internationalised? What are the legal implications of the distinction
between internal and international armed conflicts?
6.2.1 Internal armed conflict
For a long time, internal armed conflicts were not subject to international
regulation. These conflicts were considered to fall within the domaine réservé
of the State concerned.5 The treatment of insurgents was left to the discretion
of the incumbent government, which could freely choose whether or not to
4 Group of Experts on the DR Congo, Addendum to the Interim report of the Group of
Experts on the DRC submitted in accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolu-
tion 2021 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/348/Add.1 of 27 June 2012.
5 See J. Pictet and O.M. Uhler, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, Part
4 on the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, Geneva:
International Committee of the Red Cross (1958), pp. 26-30. There is one early instrument
that regulates internal armed conflict, but this is a State’s military manual rather than a
legal instrument. The Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field
(General Orders No. 100) of 24 April 1863, also known as the ‘Lieber Code’, contains a section
X on ‘insurrection, civil war and rebellion’. For reasons of “humanity” rather than out of
a sense of legal obligation, this section proposed to apply the rules of international armed
conflict to the situation of internal armed conflict. This is reflected in Article 52, one of the
key provisions of Section X, which provides as follows: “When humanity induces the
adoption of the rules of regular war to ward rebels, whether the adoption is partial or entire,
it does in no way whatever imply a partial or complete acknowledgement of their govern-
ment, if they have set up one, or of them, as an independent and sovereign power. Neutrals
have no right to make the adoption of the rules of war by the assailed government toward
rebels the ground of their own acknowledgment of the revolted people as an independent
power”. On this subject, see L. Perna, The formation of the Treaty Law of Non-International
Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law Series, Vol. 14, Leiden/Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers (2006), pp. 31-33 and L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, Cambrid-
ge: Cambridge University Press (2002), p. 19. The Lieber Code is available through the
International Humanitarian Law Database of the ICRC. See <http://www.icrc.org/ihl>.
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grant its opponent rights by conferring belligerent status on him.6 Third States
were prohibited altogether from interfering in these “internal affairs”, which
were subject to domestic regulation.7
This gradually changed during the course of the nineteenth century, when
the duty of non-interference started to give way to the doctrine of recognition
of belligerency. If the hostilities in the armed conflict had attained a certain
level, close to that of an international armed conflict, third States declared
recognition of belligerency to both parties, thus bringing into effect the corpus
of international humanitarian law.8 Recognition of belligerency required careful
consideration, as the legal conditions were stringent and the legal consequences
of premature or unfounded recognition could be severe.9
This is the background against which the delegations at the 1949 Geneva
Diplomatic Conference negotiated a special provision applicable to internal
armed conflicts which was to be inserted in all four Conventions. Article 3
common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions offered protection to all persons
taking no active part in hostilities – including members of armed groups,
whether they were recognised by their government or not.
6 On the subject of recognition of belligerency, see H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International
Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1947), pp. 175-200; E.H. Riedel, ‘Recognition
of Belligerency’, R. Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. IV, Max Planck
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Amsterdam: Elsevier (2000),
pp. 47-50; L. Perna, The Formation of the Treaty Law of Non-International Armed Conflict,
International Humanitarian Law Series, Vol. 14, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
(2006), pp. 29-30; and L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2002), pp. 4-11. In most cases, the incumbent government was not willing
to grant its opponents belligerent status, because it would give them extensive rights. See
L. Perna, The Formation of the Treaty Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, International
Humanitarian Law Series, Vol. 14, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2006), p. 30.
7 Lauterpacht points to a resolution of the Institute of International Law, adopted in 1900,
which clearly states that “every third Power, at peace with an independent nation, is bound
not to interfere with the measures which this nation takes for the re-establishing of internal
peace”. See Resolutions of the Institute, Carnegie Endowment (1916), p. 156, quoted in H.
Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1947),
p. 230.
8 See H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
(1947), p. 175-176 and E.H. Riedel, ‘Recognition of Belligerency’, R. Bernhardt, Encyclopedia
of Public International Law, Vol. IV, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, Amsterdam: Elsevier (2000), p. 47. Lauterpacht mentions the following
conditions (p. 176): “First, there must exist within the State an armed conflict of a general
(as distinguished from a purely local) character; secondly, the insurgents must occupy and
administer a substantial portion of national territory; thirdly, they must conduct the hostil-
ities in accordance with the rules of war and through organized armed forces acting under
a responsible authority; fourthly, there must exist circumstances which make it necessary
for outside States to define their attitude by means of recognition of belligerency”.
9 Premature or unfounded recognition constituted and internationally wrongful act against
the incumbent government. See H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (1947), p. 176.
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Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines internal armed
conflicts as armed conflicts “occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties”. There was considerable discussion about this definition
during the drafting of common Article 3.10 According to the Commentary
on the Geneva Conventions, some States feared that the term “conflict not of
an international character” might be interpreted as covering any act committed
by force of arms, including minor insurgencies or even plain banditry.11
Therefore several delegations proposed inserting amendments containing
conditions for the applicability of the Conventions. These amendments were
concerned with various aspects, including recognition of belligerency, the form
of organization of armed groups and even the recognition by the Security
Council that the dispute constituted a threat to international peace, a breach
of the peace or act of aggression.12 Ultimately, none of these amendments
were included in the Conventions, leaving a large measure of flexibility for
the provision to apply.
Thus what constitutes an internal armed conflict for the purposes of Artic-
le 3 is left wide open. However, as was clear from the start, a certain threshold
must be met for Article 3 to apply. In this respect the Commentary on the
Geneva Conventions states that “it must be recognized that the conflicts re-
ferred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side
engaged in hostilities […] In many cases, each of the Parties is in possession
of a portion of the national territory, and there is often some sort of front”.13
The ICRC description indicates that there are specific requirements relating
to the organization of the parties to the conflict and the intensity of the
violence. Both requirements were identified and elaborated upon in subsequent
case law of international criminal tribunals, in particular in the case law of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
In this respect the ICTY’s Tadić case, which defined a non-international armed
conflict as “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State” was a land-
mark case.14 This definition was subsequently inserted in Article 8 of the ICC
10 For a full account of the drafting history of Article 3, see A. Cullen, The Concept of Non-
International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2010), pp. 27-51.
11 See J. Pictet and O.M. Uhler, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, Part
4 on the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, Geneva:
International Committee of the Red Cross (1958), p. 35.
12 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
13 Ibid., p. 36.
14 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Appeals Chamber Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 70. Emphasis added.
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Statute, dealing with war crimes.15 The term “protracted armed violence”
has become the standard for assessing the intensity of the violence. In order
to distinguish armed conflict from internal disturbances, the violence must
be carried out over a longer period of time. The violence must exceed sporadic
acts of violence, but it does not have to involve sustained military opera-
tions.16 As regards the degree of organization of armed groups, reference
can be made to indicators such as the command structure and the operational
effectiveness of the group.17
All the conflicts discussed in the current book satisfy these requirements.
In many resource-related armed conflicts, non-state armed groups even control
a portion of State territory, in particular those regions where natural resources
are located. Examples include the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire between 2002 and
2007, where the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire occupied most of the northern
part of the country. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone also
exercised control over a region of Sierra Leone bordering Liberia, where most
of the diamonds are located.
This means that these conflicts are governed by the rules stipulated in
Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This provision contains
a set of fundamental rules for parties to an internal armed conflict regarding
the humane treatment of persons taking no active part in hostilities. In the
words of the International Court of Justice, these rules reflect “elementary
considerations of humanity”, which can be interpreted as a recognition of their
customary international law status.18 The rules formulated in Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions apply automatically and without any requirement of
reciprocity.19 Other provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply only to non-
15 Article 8(2)(f) of the ICC Statute defines internal armed conflicts as “armed conflicts that
take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups”. In the
case against Thomas Lubanga, the ICC Trial Chamber clarified the concept of ‘non-inter-
national armed conflict’ for the purposes of the ICC Statute. See International Criminal
Court, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to
Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, paras. 534-538.
16 For a full discussion of relevant case law and literature, see A. Cullen, The Concept of Non-
International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2010), pp. 122-133.
17 Ibid.
18 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America), judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 218.
19 In general, see E.H. Riedel, ‘Recognition of Belligerency’, R. Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law,
Amsterdam: Elsevier (2000), Vol. IV p. 47-50. See also J. Pictet and O.M. Uhler, The Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, Part 4 on the Geneva Convention relative to the
protection of civilian persons in time of war, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross
(1958), p. 35.
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international armed conflicts with the express consent of all parties to the
armed conflict.20
In order to increase the humanitarian protection offered by the common
Article 3 of the 1994 Geneva Conventions, a second Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions was adopted in 1977 after extensive negotiations. Today, Addi-
tional Protocol II has been ratified by the majority of States, including nearly
all States which have been involved in resource-related armed conflicts in the
last decades.21 Based on the rules provided by common Article 3, the more
detailed provisions of Additional Protocol II on the treatment of prisoners and
civilians significantly raise the level of protection for these categories of per-
sons.
At the same time, Additional Protocol II sets a much higher threshold for
application than the common Articles 3. While Article 3 common to the 1949
Geneva Conventions is generally assumed to apply to all internal conflicts,
whether the State army is involved or not, Additional Protocol II applies only
to situations of armed conflict between governments on the one hand, and
non-state armed groups on the other. In addition, the conflict must take place
within the territory of the government concerned. Finally, armed groups must
be “under responsible command” and “exercise such control over a part of
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations”.22
This degree of organization of armed groups that is required can pose
difficulties in practice. Even if an armed group exercises control over part of
the State territory, it may not have an adequate command structure or be
unable to carry out “sustained and concerted” military operations.23 In the
DR Congo in particular, many different armed groups are active. Some of these
are highly organised, but many do not satisfy the criteria set by Additional
20 The common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions urges parties to conclude “special
agreements” by means of which they bring into operation “all or part of the other provisions
of the Geneva Conventions”.
21 As of November 2012, Protocol II has been ratified by 166 States. For an overview of the
State parties to Protocol II, see <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView>
(consulted on 8 November 2012). It must be noted that the United States has not ratified
the Protocol, but it did sign it. For its negotiating history, see D. Momtaz, ‘Le droit inter-
national humanitaire applicable aux conflits armés non internationaux’, in Recueil des cours,
Vol. 292 (2001), pp. 30-33. Momtaz argues that the reason for many states to have ratified
the Protocol in recent years is due to the formation of new customary rules which have
made the provisions of Protocol II rather obsolete. At the same time, it could be argued
that the formation of customary rules similar to the rules incorporated in the Protocol may
also confirm the Protocols’ legal significance. Its provisions may then to a certain extent
be considered an expression of customary law.
22 Article 1, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977,
1125 UNTS 609.
23 Also see D. Momtaz, ‘Le Droit International Humanitaire Applicable aux Conflits Armés
Non Internationaux’, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 292 (2001), pp. 49-51.
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Protocol II. This leads to confusing situations, where different rules apply in
the relationship between the State and different armed groups. The situation
becomes even more complex when foreign States are involved. This situation
is examined below.
6.2.2 International armed conflict
Article 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines “international
armed conflict” as a situation of “declared war or […] any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties” or
a situation of “total or partial occupation of a territory”. A large body of
international humanitarian law applies to these situations, including the 1907
Hague Conventions, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Proto-
col I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as a large number of specialised
conventions. Some of the rules contained in these instruments apply to inter-
national armed conflicts in general, while other rules are specific to the
situation of invasion or occupation respectively.
The definition of international armed conflict as set out in Article 2 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions is quite straightforward. An armed conflict is inter-
national when two or more States are fighting each other and/or when a State
occupies (part of) the territory of another State. However, for the purposes
of the present book the definition is not so clear. In the late 1990s, for example,
Uganda and Rwanda were invited by the Congolese government to enter its
territory in order to fight irregular Ugandan and Rwandese armed groups
operating from Congolese territory. However, these States decided to stay in
the DR Congo after the government had requested them to leave, and even
occupied parts of Congolese territory.
How should this situation be characterised? There are no particular prob-
lems as regards the term “occupation”. Occupation is a factual situation which
is determined on the basis of the transfer of de facto State authority.24 As soon
as a State exercises de facto authority in a particular region, the law on occupa-
tion applies. However, in other parts of Congolese territory, the classical
definition does pose some difficulties. Uganda and Rwanda were not actually
fighting the Congolese government, but were actually fighting armed groups
launching attacks on these countries from Congolese territory. Does this mean
that the law on international armed conflict does not apply?
24 Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, determines in this regard: “[t]he authority
of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter
shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country”.
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The International Court of Justice had the opportunity to pronounce on
this issue in the case concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo
(hereafter: the Congo-Uganda case), at least in relation to Uganda.25 In that
case, the Court considered whether Uganda was responsible for acts committed
by its troops during its military intervention in the DRC. In this respect the
Court concluded that “a party to an armed conflict shall be responsible for
all acts by persons forming part of its armed forces”.26 Therefore it found
that Uganda was “internationally responsible for violations of international
human rights law and international humanitarian law committed by the UPDF
and by its members in the territory of the DRC”.27 Provisions of IHL mentioned
by the Court were all part of the body of law regulating international armed
conflict. This case implies that a State intervening in a foreign State is bound
by the law regulating international armed conflict, even if the foreign State
is not its opponent as such.
An internal armed conflict can also be internationalised as a result of a
State providing support to armed groups, either directly, by means of armed
intervention on behalf of a non-state armed group, or indirectly, in the form
of financial and strategic military support for operations of armed groups.28
In the case of indirect intervention, a conflict can be qualified as international
if it is determined that the armed group is acting on behalf of the foreign State.
There are two different criteria to establish whether an armed group is
acting on behalf of a foreign State. To determine the criminal responsibility
of individuals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
introduced the “overall control’ test. In the 1999 Tadić Case the ICTY determined
that an armed group can be considered to act on behalf of a State when that
State exercises general strategic control over the operations of the armed
group.29 This is the case when the foreign State “has a role in organizing, co-
ordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to
25 It must be noted that a similar case instituted by the DR Congo against Rwanda was
dismissed on the basis of jurisdiction. See International Court of Justice, Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Rwanda), Judgment of 3 February 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6.
26 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 214.
27 Ibid., para. 220.
28 See D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Second Edition, Oxford:
Oxford University Press (2008), p. 606; and J. Stewart, ‘Towards a Single Definition of Armed
Conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict’,
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No 850 (2003), p. 315. See Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, paras. 402-406.
29 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić,
Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 15 July 1999, para. 131.
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financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that
group”.30
By introducing this test, the ICTY departed from the more stringent “effect-
ive control’ test introduced by the International Court of Justice in the 1986
Nicaragua Case. This test was established to determine the responsibility of
a State for the actions of an armed group; in other words, to determine whether
an armed group was acting as a de facto State organ. According to the “effective
control’ test, a State is responsible only for those violations of international
law committed by an armed group in the course of military operations over
which the State exercised effective control.31
In the 2007 Genocide Case the International Court of Justice pronounced
on the relationship between the two tests. The Court considered that the
effective control test must be applied in order to attribute responsibility to
a State for actions committed by an armed group. However, to determine
“whether or not an armed conflict is international’, the ICJ stated that the
overall control test “may well be applicable and suitable”.32 According to
the Court, each test has its own purpose. In this respect it considered that:
“the degree and nature of a State’s involvement in an armed conflict on another
State’s territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as inter-
national, can very well, and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree
and nature of involvement required to give rise to that State’s responsibility for
a specific act committed in the course of the conflict”.33
Thus a conflict can be characterised as being international if it is established
that a State is exercising overall control over the operations of an armed group,
which means that the State has a role in organizing, co-ordinating or planning
the military actions.
However, the following question arises regarding the implications for the
law that is applicable in a conflict between a government and an armed group
that is supported by a third State. In the Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice made a clear
distinction between two conflict situations:
30 Ibid., para. 137. Emphasis in original. These criteria have been confirmed in other cases
before the ICTY as well. See e.g. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment of 17 December 2004, paras. 306-308.
31 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United states), Judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 115.
32 International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
Judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, paras. 402-406.
33 Ibid., para. 405.
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“The conflict between the Contras’ forces and those of the Government of Nicaragua
is an armed conflict which is "not of an international character". The acts of the
Contras towards the Nicaraguan Government are therefore governed by the law
applicable to conflicts of that character; whereas the actions of the United States
in and against Nicaragua fall under the legal rules relating to international con-
flicts”.34
Thus the case implies that indirect third State intervention does not alter the
classification of the conflict between the State and the opposing armed group.
Arguably, this definition cannot be distinguished from the earlier conclusion
reached by the Court that the United States did not exercise effective control
over the Contras. If the Court had reached a different conclusion on the issue
of control, it might well have reached a different conclusion regarding the
classification of the armed conflict.
Case law does not fully clarify the implications of indirect State intervention
on the law applicable to the relationship between a State and a rebel group.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, for example, did not deal in any of its cases
with the question whether the support from the Liberian President Charles
Taylor internationalised the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, although there
was sufficient evidence of Taylor’s financial and strategic involvement in the
operations of the RUF. In these cases it was not necessary to deal with the
question of the internationalisation of the armed conflict, because the Statute
of the SCSL does not distinguish between crimes committed in the course of
an international or an internal armed conflict.
The ICC has dealt with the issue in a few cases, especially in the case against
Thomas Lubanga, the leader of a Congolese rebel group that received support
from Uganda. In an early decision, the ICC Pre-trial Chamber discussed the
issue extensively. The Chamber applied the overall control test of the ICTY to
the situation. It also relied on the judgment of the ICJ in the Congo-Uganda
case to establish that Uganda had effectively intervened in the armed conflict
in the DR Congo, turning it into an international armed conflict. The Pre-trial
Chamber decided to apply Article 8(2)(b) of the ICC Statute on war crimes
committed in the context of an international armed conflict, to Lubanga’s acts
committed between July 2002 and June 2003, when Uganda occupied parts
of Congolese territory.35
34 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1986, para. 219.
35 See International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial
Chamber I, Decision of on the confirmation of charges, 29 January 2007, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-
tEN, paras. 205-226. The Pre-trial Chamber made a similar determination in the cases against
Katanga and Chui, more than a year later. See International Criminal Court, Prosecutor
v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, Case No. ICC- 01/04-01/07-717. Also see R.
Heinsch, Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, Volume I, Oxford: Oxford University
Press (2009), pp. 394-403.
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However, the Trial Chamber reversed the earlier judgment of the Pre-trial
Chamber. Although it stated that the “overall control’ test was decisive for
establishing whether armed groups were acting under the control of a foreign
State, the Trial Chamber decided that it had not been demonstrated that either
Rwanda or Uganda exercised sufficient control over the Congolese rebel groups
to turn the conflict into an international armed conflict.36 Arguably the de-
cision of the Trial Chamber can be interpreted as providing support for the
thesis that indirect third State intervention changes the relationship between
the government and an armed group. In these situations, the law applicable
to international rather than internal armed conflicts applies. However, the de-
cision also demonstrates that the evidentiary standards are high.
The last way in which an internal armed conflict can be internationalised
is when third States grant recognition to an armed group as a formal belliger-
ent. The theory of recognition of belligerency has become outdated as a result
of the adoption of rules regulating the situation of internal armed conflict.
Since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, internal armed conflicts
are no longer considered to be a matter of domestic concern, but are properly
regulated under international law. However, even today, recognition of
belligerency is more than a theoretical option. Chapter 2 argued that the
recognition of the opposition forces as the official representative of the people
by a large number of States, both in the recent armed conflict in Libya in 2011
and in the ongoing armed conflict in Syria, can be considered as acts of recog-
nition of belligerency by these States. These examples show that recognition
of belligerency is still one of the principal ways in which an internal armed
conflict can be internationalised.
6.2.3 The relevance of the distinction between international and internal
armed conflicts
The relevance of the distinction between international and internal armed
conflict has declined in recent years. Three developments have been instru-
mental in bridging the gaps between the rules applicable to international and
internal armed conflicts. The first development concerns the harmonisation
of the treaty rules relevant to both types of armed conflict, especially those
relating to the use of weapons in international and internal armed conflicts.
Since the 1990s several conventions prohibiting the use of certain weapons
have either been amended to encompass the situation of non-international
conflict or have been amended with an express provision to this effect. Relevant
examples include the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1997 Anti-
36 International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber
I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, paras.
541-542 (on the law) and 552-567 (on the facts).
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Personnel Mines Convention, which prohibit “in any circumstances” the
development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons
or of anti-personnel mines respectively.37 Both types of weapons are parti-
cularly harmful to the environment and seriously hamper post-conflict recon-
struction.
Furthermore, in 2001, the scope of application of the 1980 Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons and its five protocols was extended to the
situation of non-international armed conflict.38 The 1996 Amended Protocol
II on Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices and the 1980 Protocol III on
Incendiary Weapons are particularly relevant for the protection of the environ-
ment during armed conflict.39 Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons, for
example, includes an express prohibition against making “forests or other kinds
of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons”.40
More relevant to the current study, however, is the second development,
viz. the crystallisation of relevant treaty rules into customary international
law. There has been increasing recognition in recent years that particular rules
applicable to international armed conflicts have also become applicable to
internal armed conflicts. An important study by the ICRC on customary inter-
national humanitarian law demonstrated that many rules regulating inter-
national armed conflict are applied to internal armed conflicts as well.41
Although the ICRC study is contentious in some respects and therefore cannot
be relied upon directly, it provides a wealth of information regarding the
application of IHL in practice.42
37 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 13 January 1993, 1974 UNTS 45, Article 1;
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), 18 September 1997, 2056
UNTS 241, Article 1.
38 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 10
October 1980, 19 ILM 1823 (1980).
39 Protocol II to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996, 3 May
1996, 35 ILM 1209 (1996); Protocol III to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, 10 April 1981, 1342
U.N.T.S. 171.
40 Article 2(4) of Protocol III.
41 See J.M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law,
International Committee of the Red Cross, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005),
Vols. I & II.
42 Criticism on the methodology has been voiced notably by the United States. See Joint letter
from John Bellinger and William Haynes to Jakob Kellenberger on Customary International
Law Study, 46 ILM 514 (2007). For critical assessments of the study, see M. Bothe, ‘Custom-
ary International Humanitarian Law: Some Reflections on the ICRC Study’, Yearbook of
International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 8 (2005), pp. 143-178; E. Newalsing, ‘Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol.21(1) (2008), pp. 255-279.
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In this respect the case law of international criminal tribunals is especially
relevant. This case law has applied and interpreted rules of IHL in the context
of particular conflict situations. While the post-war criminal tribunals dealt
exclusively with international armed conflict, many of the present day inter-
national criminal tribunals deal with internal armed conflicts as well. Examples
include the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and, of course, the International Criminal Court
(ICC).
The interpretation of rules of IHL by these international criminal tribunals
is closely linked to the third development that has been instrumental in bridg-
ing the gaps between the law applicable to international and internal armed
conflicts. This development is related to the evolution of international criminal
law as a distinct branch of international law. Not all of the war crimes listed
in Statutes of international criminal tribunals that apply to situations of internal
armed conflict are directly based on express provisions in international human-
itarian law conventions.
One example concerns the war crime of destroying or seizing the property
of an adversary, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded
by the necessities of the conflict, as codified in Article 8(2)(e)(xii) of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute).43 This war crime,
which applies to internal armed conflicts, follows from Article 23(g) of the
1907 Hague Regulations, applicable only to international armed conflicts. There
is no IHL equivalent for this war crime related to internal armed conflicts. In
this way, international criminal law can be said to progressively develop
international humanitarian law as well.
6.3 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW PROTECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
This section assesses the protection afforded by international humanitarian
law to natural resources and to the environment against (the effects of) the
exploitation and plundering of natural resources. Protection is provided
primarily by provisions on the protection of property and civilian objects.
This section starts with the provisions on the protection of property and
in particular with the prohibition against pillage, which is the most cited
provision in relation to the plundering of natural resources by parties to an
armed conflict. It argues that the prohibition against pillage is primarily
applicable to the plundering of natural resources for the purposes of self-
enrichment. It then turns to the prohibition against destroying or seizing
property to see if this provision can fill the gap left open by the prohibition
43 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998 (entry into force:
1 July 2002), 2187 UNTS 90.
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against pillage. Furthermore, this section discusses the right of an occupant
to exploit natural resources on the basis of usufruct.
The section goes on to discuss two provisions which provide protection
to civilian objects. It looks at the extent to which the prohibition against
attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population provides residual protection to natural
resources because of their significance to the civilian population. Secondly,
it examines to what extent the duty of care with regard to protecting the
natural environment includes environmental damage caused by the exploitation
of natural resources by parties to an armed conflict.
It should be noted that the rules of international humanitarian law which
have a bearing on the exploitation of natural resources are deficient in several
respects. The most important deficiency is their lack of precision. They are
not specifically designed to address instances of natural resource exploitation
by parties to an armed conflict. This is partly due to the fact that most of the
rules of the law of armed conflict predate important developments in inter-
national environmental law which qualified the right of States to exploit natural
resources. It is therefore important to interpret the relevant rules of inter-
national humanitarian law in the broader context of public international law
and, more specifically, to take more recent developments in international law
into account in the interpretation of the provisions.
Therefore the current section interprets the provisions of international
humanitarian law in the light of relevant provisions of international human
rights and environmental law. The means of interpretation used in this section
include a dynamic-evolutionary method to interpret treaty terms, as well as
the systemic method of interpretation to interpret the substantive rules con-
tained in the provisions, as described in the introduction to this book.
6.3.1 The protection of property
International humanitarian law conventions contain several provisions aimed
at protecting property against unjustified destruction or appropriation by
parties to an armed conflict. In international law property can be broadly
defined to include movable and immovable, as well as public and private
property.44 In addition, the case law of the Nuremberg Tribunal established
that property includes both physical and intangible property.45 The term
‘property’ is therefore sufficiently broad to capture all types of natural
44 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (ed.), Commentary on the additional protocols
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers
(1987), p. 1376.
45 See the I.G. Farben case, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under
Control Council Law No. 10, vol. VIII (1952), p. 1134.
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resources, whether state owned or privately held, extracted natural resources
or natural resources which have not yet been removed, as well as rights
relating to the exploitation of natural resources, such as concessions.
The term ‘property’ is presumed to cover natural resources. Despite the
lack of a formal definition, the conventions provide sufficient indications to
support this. Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, for example, expressly
defines forests as properties. Moreover, the relevant provisions have all been
considered to be applicable to the protection of the environment.46 Mutatis
mutandis they must also cover materials which are part of that environment.
The current book proposes making a further distinction between natural
resources in situ and ex situ.47 As long as the natural resources are not
extracted (in situ), they are part of the environment and therefore qualify as
immovable property. However, as soon as they have been extracted (ex situ),
natural resources become tangible objects and therefore fall into the category
of movable property. This means that the exploitation of natural resources
is governed by the rules concerning immovable property, while the rules on
movable property regulate the (il)legality of the appropriation of natural
resources which have already been extracted.
Prohibition against pillage
The prohibition against pillage is codified in Articles 28 and 47 of the 1907
Hague Regulations, Article 33 (2) of 1949 Geneva Convention IV and Article 4
(2) (g) of 1977 Additional Protocol II. Some of these provisions are aimed at
providing protection for particular persons, especially civilians and persons
who no longer take part in hostilities, while others have a more general
scope.48 In addition, the prohibition has been recognised as having customary
46 See the Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of the environment in times of
armed conflict, UN General Assembly Document A/48/269 of 29 July 1993, pp. 5-6; and the
Memorandum on International Law Providing Protection of the Environment in Times
of Armed Conflict, Annex to a Letter dated 28 September 1992 from the permanent missions
of the Hasjemite Kingdom of Jordan and of the United States of America addressed to the
Chairman of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/47/3 of 28
September 1992.
47 See the 1956 judgment from the Court of Appeal of Singapore in the Singapore Oil Stocks
Case, regarding the exploitation of oil in the Netherlands Indies by the Japanese occupant
during the Second World War. In this case, the Court determined that crude oil in the
ground constituted immovable property. N.V. De Bataafsche Petrolium Maatschappij &
Ors. v. The War Damage Commission, Court of Appeal, Singapore, April 13, 1956, reprinted
in the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 51 (1957), p, 809. For more details, see I.
Scobbie, ‘Natural Resources and Belligerent Occupation: Mutation Through Permanent
Sovereignty’, S. Bowen (ed.), Human Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, International Studies
in Human Rights (1997), pp. 235-237.
48 General protection is provided through Article 28 of the Hague Regulations, applicable
to international armed conflicts, which provides that “the pillage of a town or place, even
when taken by assault, is prohibited” and Article 47 of the Hague Regulations, applicable
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international law status, both for international and non-international armed
conflicts.49
Traditionally the prohibition against pillage was applied to acts of theft
during armed conflict, either by individual soldiers or in the form of organized
plundering.50 The main purpose of the drafters of the 1907 Hague Regulations
was to ban the practice of rewarding troops for their services by authorising
them to loot villages and towns. The Nuremberg Tribunal cast the net much
wider. The Tribunal applied the war crime of plunder to all forms of appro-
priation of public or private property – whether this concerns physical property
or rights attached to property51 – without the consent of the owner, in the
context of an armed conflict. The prohibition against pillage is also the most
cited provision in relation to the illegal exploitation, looting and plundering
of natural resources by foreign troops and armed groups.52
The prohibition against pillage is one of the few provisions of IHL that
prohibits the appropriation of a State’s natural resources by parties acting
without the consent of the State. However, despite the broad scope of the
prohibition, it is important to remember its original purpose, which was to
to occupation, which provides that “pillage is formally forbidden”. Specific protection is
provided to civilian persons through Article 33 (2) of Geneva Convention IV, applicable
to international armed conflicts, and to civilians as well as persons who do not actively
take part in hostilities through Article 4 (2) (g) of Additional Protocol II, applicable to non-
international armed conflicts.
49 For international armed conflict, the customary nature of the prohibition stems primarily
from its inclusion in the 1907 Hague Regulations, which have been affirmed to constitute
customary law. The customary status of the Regulations has been affirmed by the Inter-
national Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 172, para. 89,
where the Court considered “that the provisions of the Hague Regulations have become
part of customary law”. For non-international armed conflict, both the Appeals Chamber
of the ICTY and the SCSL have expressly held this prohibition to be part of customary
law applicable to non-international armed conflict. ICTY, Hadzihasanovic, Alagic and Kubura
(IT-01-47), Decision on Joint Defence Interlocutory Appeal of Trial Chamber Decision on
Rule 98bis Motions for Acquittal, para. 37; SCSL, The Prosecutor vs. Moinina Fofana and Allieu
Kondewa, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 28 May 2008, para. 390.
50 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (ed.), Commentary on the additional protocols
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers
(1987), p. 1376; and G. Carducci, ‘Pillage’, in R.Wolfrum, Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Oxford:
Oxford University Press (2012), Vol. VIII, pp. 299-304.
51 See the I.G. Farben case, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under
Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. VIII (1952), p. 1134.
52 See, e.g,. J.G. Stewart, Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources, New
York: Open Society Justice Initiative Publication (2011); M.A. Lundberg, ‘The Plunder of
Natural Resources During War: A War Crime (?)’ 39 Georgetown Journal of International Law
Vol. 39, Issue 3 (2008, pp. 495-526; and L.J. van den Herik & D.A. Dam-de Jong, ‘Revitalizing
the Antique War Crime of Pillage: The Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal
Law to Address Illegal Resource Exploitation during Armed Conflict’, Criminal Law Forum,
Vol. 22(3) (2011), pp. 237-273.
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prohibit theft. The prohibition therefore contains an important restriction: it
applies only to the appropriation of property for personal gain. This restriction
is based on the system of international humanitarian law itself, which makes
a distinction between “pillage” on the one hand, and “seizure” and “requi-
sition” on the other. While pillage is prohibited in absolute terms, the seizure
or requisition of property is permitted under particular circumstances. The
ICRC Commentary to Article 33 of Geneva Convention IV explicitly states that
the prohibition against pillage “leaves intact the right of requisition or
seizure”.53
This distinction is retained in international criminal law as well. The ICC
Statute lists pillage on the one hand, and the destruction or seizure of the
property of the hostile party outside a situation of military necessity on the
other, as two separate war crimes.54 Furthermore, the Elements of Crime de-
fining the crimes listed in the ICC Statute restrict pillage to appropriation for
private or personal use.55 This interpretation of pillage is confirmed in the
case law of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. According to the Appeals
Chamber of the SCSL, ‘pillage’ refers to the appropriation of property for private
purposes.56 It is also in this context that the prohibition against pillage was
considered by the International Court of Justice in the case of the DR Congo
against Uganda. In that case, the DR Congo claimed that members of the
Ugandan army had systematically exploited the DRC’s natural resources for
their personal benefit.57 The International Court of Justice concluded that
“whenever members of the UPDF were involved in the looting, plundering and
exploitation of natural resources in the territory of the DRC”, they acted in
violation of the prohibition against pillage.58
There is no specific case law from modern international criminal tribunals
which has determined that the war crime of pillage applies to the exploitation
53 J. Pictet and O.M. Uhler, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, Part 4 on
the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, Geneva:
International Committee of the Red Cross (1958), p. 227.
54 See Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) and (xvi) and Article 8(2)(e)(v) and (xii) of the ICC Statute.
55 Elements of Crimes, Official Journal of the International Criminal Court, available at <www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf>(lastconsultedon
1 August 2012). Also see K. Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary, International Committee of the Red
Cross (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002).
56 Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Prosecutor vs. Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Appeals
Chamber Judgment of 28 May 2008, para. 392, note 770. The Appeals Chamber departed
from the decision of the Trial Chamber on this point, which held that “the inclusion of
the requirement that the appropriation be for private or personal use is an unwarranted
restriction on the application of the offence of pillage”. Special Court for Sierra Leone, The
Prosecutor vs. Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Trials Chamber Judgment of 2 August
2007, para. 160.
57 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
I.C.J., 19 December 2005, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, paras. 222-229.
58 Ibid., para. 245.
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of natural resources. Up to now, none of these tribunals has applied the
provision to instances of natural resource exploitation. Despite the fact that
the war crime could cover them, instances of pillage before modern inter-
national criminal tribunals have been limited to the appropriation of personal
belongings of civilians, mainly in relation to the raiding of villages.59 Even
in the cases against Charles Taylor and the leaders of the RUF and the AFRC
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where there was a close connection
between the exploitation of natural resources and the committing of other
crimes, the pillage of natural resources was not one of the charges.60
In the absence of modern case law from international criminal tribunals
which may provide more specific guidance for the interpretation of pillage
in relation to natural resources, it may be concluded from the judgment of
the International Court of Justice in the Congo-Uganda case that the prohibition
against pillage applies first and foremost to the exploitation of natural
resources by members of rebel groups or foreign armies for the purpose of
self-enrichment. Arguably, it applies equally to the misappropriation of natural
resources or their proceeds by public officials of the domestic State, including
members of the government or the State’s armed forces, in view of the fact
that natural resources belong to the State and not to its representatives. Further-
more, pillage may be interpreted broadly to include all appropriation of
property that does not – directly or indirectly – serve a military purpose. As
the case law of the Nuremberg Tribunal showed, appropriation of property
by a foreign army to benefit the economy of the foreign State therefore also
constitutes pillage. However, it seems less appropriate to apply the prohibition
against pillage to the exploitation of natural resources for military purposes,
including the funding of an armed conflict. In the light of the system of inter-
national humanitarian law as a whole, these instances are covered by the
prohibition against seizing the property of the adversary, which is discussed
in the following section.
Prohibition against destroying or seizing the property of a hostile party
Article 23 (g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations formulates a prohibition against
destroying or seizing “enemy property” in situations of international armed
conflict “unless imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”. In addition,
Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV contains an express prohibition for occu-
pants against destroying “real or personal property belonging individually
59 For examples of relevant practice by international criminal tribunals, see the ICRC Customary
International Humanitarian Law Database, Rule 52, available through www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/home (last consulted on 9 June 2013).
60 For a detailed discussion of the crime of pillage and its applicability to the exploitation
of natural resources, see L.J. van den Herik and D.A. Dam-de Jong, ‘Revitalizing the Antique
War Crime of Pillage: The Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal Law to
Address Illegal Resource Exploitation During Armed Conflict’, Criminal Law Forum, Vol.
22(3) (2011), pp. 237-273.
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or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities,
or to social or cooperative organizations […], except where such destruction
is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”.61
Although there is no express provision for internal armed conflicts, the applic-
ability of the prohibition against destroying or seizing the property of a hostile
party in internal armed conflicts can be deduced from international criminal
law, and more specifically from Article 8(2) (e)(xii) of the ICC Statute, which
criminalises the destruction and seizure of the property of an “adversary”,
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively required by the necessities
of the conflict. Both the ICTY and the SCSL also expressly determined that the
prohibition against destroying the property of a hostile party is part of custom-
ary international law applicable to both international and non-international
armed conflict.62 By analogy, the customary international law status of the
prohibition could also extend to the appropriation of property. Furthermore,
as the customary international law prohibition addresses parties to an armed
conflict in general, it can be interpreted to be binding on non-state armed
groups.63
These provisions, as well as the system of international humanitarian law
as a whole, imply that the prohibition against seizing or destroying the
property of a hostile party is aimed at prohibiting the destruction or seizure
of property only outside situations of military necessity. Mutatis mutandis, the
prohibition formulates an indirect right for belligerents to destroy or seize the
property of the hostile party when it is imperative from a military perspective.
It is important to note beforehand that the right for belligerents to destroy
or seize particular property in cases of imperative military necessity does not
depend upon the characteristics of the property itself. Whereas international
humanitarian law generally distinguishes between civilian objects and military
objectives, determining that civilian objects may not be the subject of attack,
this distinction does not affect the application of the current provisions.
61 One of the main differences between the two provisions is their formal scope of application.
Whereas Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations applies to international armed conflict
in general, including the situation of occupation, Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV applies
exclusively to the situation of occupation. Thus the prohibition contained in Article 23 (g)
extends to all phases of an armed conflict, while Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV does
not bind a party to an armed conflict until he actually takes over the authority in (part
of) its enemy’s territory. After all, Article 42 of the Hague Regulations determines that
“territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile
army”.
62 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Kordić and Čerkez case, Judgment
of 26 February 2001, para. 205; Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Prosecutor vs. Moinina
Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 28 May 2008, para. 390.
63 On the binding nature of customary international law in relation to non-state armed groups,
see Chapter 1 of this study.
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The question whether an object is civilian or military depends on the
nature, location, purpose or use of the object. If the object does not make an
effective contribution to military action by any of these factors, it may normally
not be the subject of attack.64 However, for the application of the current
provisions, it does not matter whether or not the objects make an effective
contribution to military action. The decisive criterion is the existence of a
situation of imperative military necessity. In these circumstances, belligerents
may seize or destroy the property of the hostile party, whether this property
is a military objective or a civilian object. In this sense, it must be regarded
as an exception to the general rule prohibiting the attack of civilian objects.
Given the exceptional nature of the right that ensues from the prohibition
to seize or destroy the property of a hostile party, it is of great importance
to carefully delineate the objects covered by the provisions and the circum-
stances that allow for the exception to be invoked. The first question that arises
concerns the interpretation of the terms “enemy property” in international
armed conflicts and “property of an adversary” in internal armed conflicts.
Although both terms cover all types of property – whether movable or immov-
able, public or private65 –there are important differences as regards the scope
of the two terms. In international armed conflicts, all property situated within
the territory of the “enemy” State is considered to be “enemy property” for
the purposes of international humanitarian law. In other words, in international
armed conflicts, belligerents are prohibited from seizing or destroying any
property found within the territory of their adversary, including both publicly
and privately owned property, unless the seizure or destruction is strictly
necessary from a military perspective.
In internal armed conflicts, the situation is more complex, as ownership
of the property must be determined by national law.66 Where international
law attributes ownership of natural resources to the State on the basis of the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, it is for the State
to decide on issues of ownership within the national context. In relation to
64 See section 6.3.2 of this chapter.
65 See Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV, which expressly prohibits the destruction of “real”
and “personal” property. Also see the judgment of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in
the Hostage case, which determined that Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations applied
to such diverse objects as “railways, lines of communication, or any other property that
might be utilized by the enemy” as well as “private homes and churches”. Trials of War
Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nurem-
berg, October 1946-April 1949, Vol. XI, Washington: Government Printing Office (1959),
p. 1254.
66 According to Zimmerman, in the context of Article 8(2)(e)(xii) of the ICC Statute, the term
“adversary” refers to “any person, who is considered to belong to another party to the
conflict, such as the government, insurgents or, as article 8 para. 2(f) of the Statute demon-
strates, belongs to an opposing organized armed group”. A. Zimmerman, ‘article 8 - para. 2
(e)’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (1999), margin no. 326-327, p. 284.
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natural resources, many national constitutions vest the ownership of natural
resources in the State, which is formally represented by the government. This
means that in internal armed conflicts the prohibition against destroying or
seizing the property of an adversary primarily covers natural resources that
belong to the State or to private persons affiliated to the State. In other words,
the prohibition against seizing or destroying natural resources, except in cases
of imperative military necessity, will therefore primarily apply to non-state
armed groups, provided that they are actually fighting the government.67
Conversely, it also means that these armed groups can justify the seizure or
destruction of natural resources in cases of imperative military necessity.
The second question that must be addressed concerns the interpretation
of “imperative military necessity”. The concept of military necessity can be
traced back to the American Lieber Code of 1863, which defined military
necessity as “those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends
of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages
of war”.68 In other words, military necessity excuses actions that are otherwise
prohibited if the relevant provision provides for such an excuse and if the
actions would help the belligerent party to gain a military advantage.69
Although the concept of military necessity was inserted in all subsequent
legal instruments regulating the conduct of hostilities, the definition was not
retained. This makes it difficult to determine the precise contents and limits
of the exception contained in the prohibition against seizing or destroying the
property of the hostile party. Some guidance on the interpretation of military
necessity can be found in the case law of the Nuremberg Tribunals. The
exception of military necessity to excuse particular behaviour was invoked
in several proceedings before the Nuremberg Tribunals. The tribunals also
dealt with the interpretation of the phrase “imperative military necessity” as
part of the prohibition against destroying or seizing the property of a hostile
party.
Reference can be made in particular to the Hostage case, which dealt, inter
alia, with charges against high-ranking officers in the German army for wanton
destruction of cities, towns and villages, as well as other acts of devastation.
67 Since natural resources generally do not belong to armed groups, a right to seize or destroy
natural resources in cases of military necessity does not apply to conflicts between armed
groups. Mutatis mutandis, the prohibition to seize or destroy the natural resources of the
adversary does not apply to these situations either.
68 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code),
24 April 1863. Available through <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf>.
69 Of course, implicit in the notion of military necessity is further that property of the hostile
party can be seized or destroyed solely for military purposes. See Y. Dinstein, ‘Military
Necessity’, in R.Wolfrum, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012),
Vol. VII, p. 201-207, paras. 25-26. This requirement that the property is appropriated for
military purposes is also what distinguishes the qualified prohibition to seize the property
of a hostile party from the absolute prohibition of pillage.
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In this case the Military Tribunal considered that “[m]ilitary necessity permits
a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force
to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible
expenditure of time, life and money. In general, it sanctions measures by an
occupant necessary to protect the safety of his forces and to facilitate the
success of his operations”.70 It also considered that the Hague Regulations
require the military necessity to be “urgent” and that there must be a “reason-
able connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of
the enemy forces”.71
Two principal requirements can be derived from this case law. First, the
seizure or destruction of property must make an effective contribution to
military action.72 Secondly, whether the seizure or destruction of property
is permitted in particular circumstances depends on the urgency of the
situation. The requirement of “urgency” concerns both the time element and
the existence of alternatives to attain the objective. As regards the time element,
reference can be made to the Caroline criteria generally used to assess the need
for an act of self-defence. According to the Caroline criteria, military action
can be justified if the necessity is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice
of means and no moment for deliberation”.73 As regards proportionality,
“urgency” means, at the very least, that the belligerent did not have any less
injurious alternatives at his disposal to achieve the objective.74 According
to Otto Triffterer, military necessity even implies that “there are no other means
to secure military safety”.75
For the purposes of the present study, the excuse of imperative military
necessity is of limited relevance to armed groups seeking to justify the appro-
priation or destruction of natural resources. The contribution of natural
resources to an armed conflict is in most cases indirect, in the sense that they
cannot be directly used in military operations or to guarantee the safety or
70 The Tribunal also recognised that destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international
law. Hostage case, Judgment of 19 February 1948, Trials of War Criminals before the Nurem-
berg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg, October 1946-April
1949, Vol. XI, Washington: Government Printing Office (1959), pp. 1253-1254.
71 Ibid. Also see O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (1999), margin no. 105, p. 232.
72 See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Strugar Case, Case No. IT-01-
42, Trial Judgment of 31 January 2005, para. 295. The Chamber defined “military necessity”
with reference to the definition of military objects in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions, discussed in the following section.
73 Correspondence between Great Britain and the United States, respecting the Arrest and
Imprisonment of Mr. McLeod, for the Destruction of the Steamboat Caroline, March, April
1841.
74 See G. Werle & F. Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law, The Hague: T.M.C.
Asser Press (2005), p. 340, margin no. 1003, who argue that military necessity implies that
destruction is not permitted if alternative means to achieve the military goal are open.
75 O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’
Notes, Article by Article, Baden-Baden : Nomos (1999), p. 232, margin nos. 154 and 155.
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survival of members of an armed group. Rather, they provide the means to
finance military operations and to provide food and shelter. Therefore their
destruction or appropriation may secure a military advantage, but does not
satisfy the requirement of urgency. The Krupp case before Nuremberg Military
Tribunal III confirms this interpretation. In that case, the Tribunal quoted and
approved the following passage from Garner’s International Law and the World
War:
“...it is quite clear from the language and context of Article 23(g) as well as the
discussions on it in the Conference that it was never intended to authorize a military
occupant to despoil on an extensive scale the industrial establishments of occupied territory
or to transfer their machinery to his home country for use in his home industries. What
was intended merely was to authorize the seizure or destruction of private property only
in exceptional cases when it was an imperative necessity for the conduct of military
operations in the territory under occupation. This view is further strengthened by
Article 46 which requires belligerents to respect enemy private property and which
forbids confiscation, and by Article 47 which prohibits pillage”.76
In conclusion, the excuse of imperative military necessity is primarily relevant
in emergency situations, where there is a reasonable connection between the
appropriation or destruction of natural resources and a military purpose. This
means that it may be a justification for the appropriation of natural resources
that can be directly used to satisfy the basic needs of members of armed
groups, such as the poaching of wild animals or the cutting of trees in a State
forest for firewood. However, the excuse of imperative military necessity is
too narrowly formulated to justify the systematic exploitation of natural re-
sources for the purpose of financing military operations.
Administration of public property in territories under occupation
The most detailed regime for the protection of property is set out for territories
under foreign occupation. One of the basic tenets of occupation law is that
private property must be respected.77 An occupant may only appropriate
76 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Tribunals under Control Council Law No.
10, Vol. IX, the Krupp case, Washington: Government Printing Office (1950), pp. 1344-1345.
Author’s emphasis added.
77 M. Bothe, ‘Occupation, Belligerent’, R. Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
Vol. III, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Amster-
dam: Elsevier (2000), p. 766. Article 46 (2) of the 1907 Hague Regulations prohibits the
confiscation of such property and Article 47 prohibits pillage of property in general. The
Hague Regulations contain only two exceptions to the principle of the inviolability of private
property. First, Article 52 of the Hague Regulations permits the occupant to requisition
private property against financial compensation in order to satisfy “the needs of the army
of occupation”, provided such requisitions “shall be in proportion to the resources of the
country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking
part in military operations against their own country”. The second exception concerns
property which may be qualified as “munitions of war” under Article 53 (2) of the Hague
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private property in exceptional circumstances, and providing financial compen-
sation. In contrast, as the principal governmental authority in territory under
occupation,78 an occupant may to a certain extent dispose of public property.
First, Article 53 of the 1907 Hague Regulations authorises the occupant to take
possession of particular objects, such as State-owned cash, funds and realisable
securities as well as all public movable property “which may be used for
military operations” and munitions of war.79 Secondly, Article 55 of the 1907
Hague Regulations grants the occupant a right of usufruct over immovable
public property.
The latter provision is key to the occupant’s right to exploit natural
resources. It reads in full:
“The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary
of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the
hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital
of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct”.
The right of usufruct, as set out in Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations,
grants the occupant the right to administer the immovable properties of the
occupied State, including state-owned forests and mines, and to enjoy their
proceeds as long as he “safeguards the capital of these properties”.
Thus it is clear that the concept of usufruct imposes limits on the right of
an occupant to use the property of the territory under occupation. As Lassa
Oppenheim noted as early as 1952, the occupant is “prohibited from exercising
its right [of usufruct] in a wasteful or negligent way so as to decrease the value
of the stock and plant. Thus, for instance, he must not cut down a whole forest,
Regulations – which applies equally to public property. These properties may be seized
without offering immediate compensation, provided the objects are restored and compensa-
tion is fixed after the war.
78 This authority is based on de facto rather than de jure power. See Y. Dinstein, The International
Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2009), p. 49; and
M. Bothe, ‘Occupation, Belligerent’, R. Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
Vol. III, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Amster-
dam: Elsevier (2000), p. 764. Furthermore, according to Bothe, “international law does not
grant rights to the occupying power, but limits the occupant’s exercise of its de facto powers”
(p. 764). Also see E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press (2004), pp. 5-6. Benvenisti compares the occupant’s status to
that of a trustee. According to Benvenisti, the occupant administers the territory on behalf
of the sovereign.
79 Article 53 of the Hague Regulations reads in full: “An army of occupation can only take
possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the
State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable
property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations.
All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news,
or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots
of arms, and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized, even if they belong
to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made”.
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unless the necessities of war compel him”.80 This is still the prevailing view
in academic literature today.81
Arguably, the requirement that an occupant must safeguard the capital
of the properties it administers should be interpreted in the light of the relevant
obligations of the occupant under customary international law, including
customary international law obligations arising from other fields of inter-
national law. This would require an occupant to use the natural resources in
a sustainable way and to exploit them with respect for the principle of per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources and the right to self-determination
of the people under occupation, meaning that an occupant must exploit the
natural resources in occupied territory for the benefit of the occupied territory
and its population.82
Furthermore, the principle of sustainable use is today one of the basic tenets
underlying the obligation of an occupant to safeguard the capital of the State’s
natural resources. The principle creates a balance between the right of an
occupant to use the natural resources in occupied territory to cover the costs
of the occupation and the obligation to safeguard these resources for the benefit
of future generations.
One long-standing issue in international law concerns the right of an
occupant to exploit non-renewable natural resources. This issue received much
scholarly attention, especially in relation to Israel’s right to exploit oil resources
in the occupied Sinaï Peninsula in the 1970s.83 Nico Schrijver remarks that
“while usufruct of renewable resources may give no rise to particular problems,
its application to non-renewable resources such as minerals is controversial’.84
80 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. II Disputes, War and Neutrality, Seventh
Edition, Edited by H. Lauterpacht, London/New York/Toronto: Longmans, Green and
Co (1952), p. 398. Obviously the obligation to safeguard the capital of the properties in
occupied territory does not impede the right of an occupant to destroy property in occupied
territory in cases of military necessity as incorporated in Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regula-
tions and Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV.
81 See, e.g., Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International
Humanitarian Law, and its Interaction with Human Rights Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers (2009), pp. 209-215; Y. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2009), p. 214.
82 For the impact of the principle of permanent sovereignty on the interpretation of the right
of usufruct, see Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, and its Interaction with Human Rights Law, The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers (2009), pp. 215-216.
83 See in particular B. Sloan, ‘Study on the Implications, under International Law, of the United
Nations Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, on the Occupied
Palestinian and other Arab Territories and on the Obligations of Israel Concerning its
Conduct in these Territories, UN Doc. A/38/85, 21 June 1983; and US Department of State,
‘Memorandum of Law on Israel’s Right to Develop New Oil Fields in Sinai and the Gulf
of Suez’, 17 ILM 2 (1978), pp. 432-444.
84 N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (1997), p. 268.
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Indeed, the opinions differ considerably in this respect. An examination of
the scholarly debate reveals that the obligation to safeguard the capital of non-
renewable natural resources may either be interpreted narrowly to prohibit
the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources altogether, based on the
idea that exploitation would ipso facto reduce their capital, or it may be inter-
preted broadly to prohibit only excessive exploitation.85 Based on the principle
of sustainable use, this book argues that contemporary international law allows
an occupant to exploit the natural resources of occupied territory, including
its non-renewable natural resources, insofar as this would not harm the options
of future generations to exploit the natural resources for their development.
On the other hand, the principle of permanent sovereignty serves to under-
line the obligation of occupants to administer the natural resources in occupied
territory for the benefit of the people.86 This implies that the right of usufruct
precludes exploitation of the natural resources of a country by an occupant
for its own benefit, a prohibition that is also confirmed in the relevant case
law of the Nuremberg tribunals.87 The International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg considered that “the economy of an occupied country can only
be required to bear the expense(s) of the occupation, and these should not be
greater than the economy of the country can reasonably be expected to
bear”.88 This judgment should be read in conjunction with the Krupp case,
decided by a lower military tribunal at Nuremberg. This tribunal considered
that an occupied country’s economic assets could never be used for military
85 See N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (1997), pp. 268-269; B. Sloan, ‘Study on the Implications, under
International Law, of the United Nations Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, on the Occupied Palestinian and other Arab Territories and on the
Obligations of Israel Concerning its Conduct in these Territories, UN Doc. A/38/85, 21 June
1983, in particular pp. 15 and 16; A. Cassese, ‘Powers and Duties of an Occupant in Relation
to Land and Natural Resources’, in E. Playfair (ed.), International law and the Administration
of Occupied Territories: Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
proceedings of a conference organized by al-Haq in Jerusalem in January 1988 (1992), pp.
419-442; E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, second edition, Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2013), pp. 81-82.
86 See Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Human-
itarian Law, and its Interaction with Human Rights Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
(2009), pp. 215-216.
87 See e.g. A. Cassese, ‘Powers and Duties of an Occupant in Relation to Land and Natural
Resources’, in E. Playfair (ed.), International law and the Administration of Occupied Territories:
Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, proceedings of a conference
organized by al-Haq in Jerusalem in January 1988 (1992), p. 426, who argues that the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, in the context of belligerent
occupation, “tends to support a restrictive interpretation of the occupant’s powers to exploit
and dispose of immovable property. Even if the occupant has reservations about the
‘statehood’ of its enemy, this principle should serve to restrain the occupant from exploiting
resources in contravention of the rights of an alien people in occupied territory”.
88 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg,
14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Official Documents, Vol. I, Nuremberg (1947), p. 239.
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operations against the occupied territory.89 The International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg also considered that excessive exploitation of natural resources
could even amount to plunder. According to the Tribunal, Germany had
exploited the occupied territories for the German war effort “in the most
ruthless way, without consideration of the local economy, and in consequence
of a deliberate design and policy”. The Tribunal held that this amounted in
reality to “a systematic ‘plunder of public and private property’”.90
A modern interpretation of these judgments suggests that an occupant is
permitted to use the proceeds from exploiting resources for the purposes of
maintaining a civilian administration in occupied territory, but not to cover
the costs associated with military operations. This can be illustrated with
reference to the Development Fund for Iraq, set up and administered by the
US-UK occupying authority in Iraq in 2003 with the specific purpose of meeting
“the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction
and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, and
for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting
the people of Iraq”.91 The Development Fund was primarily funded with
the proceeds from the sale of Iraqi oil.92 Although it may be questioned
whether all the stated purposes of the fund are in conformity with the limited
powers conferred upon an occupant by the international law on occupation,93
89 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Tribunals under Control Council Law No.
10, Vol. IX, the Krupp case, Washington: Government Printing Office (1950), p. 1341. The
tribunal held in relevant part: “Just as the inhabitants of the occupied territory must not
be forced to help the enemy in waging the war against their own country or their own
country’s allies, so must the economic assets of the occupied territory not be used in such
a manner”.
90 Ibid. Today, as a consequence of the narrow definition of pillage in the ICC Elements of Crime,
the conduct of Germany would be more likely to fall under the war crime of destruction
or seizure of the property of a hostile party, a crime which was not included in the Statute
of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
91 UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), especially paragraph 14.
92 UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) determined that “all proceeds from [export
sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas from Iraq] shall be deposited into
the Development Fund for Iraq until such time as an internationally recognized, representat-
ive government of Iraq is properly constituted”.
93 Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which sets out the general obligations of an
occupant, prescribes an occupant to “take all the measures in his power to restore, and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country”. Whether the measures regarding Iraq are in
conformity with the law of occupation, depends on the interpretation of Article 43. Does
it imply an obligation for the occupant to preserve as much as possible the status quo ante
bellum or does the obligation to “ensure… public order and safety” also bring about positive
obligations for occupants to enact legislation and to set up economic and social policies?
See on this issue. e.g., E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2013); and A. Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying
the Laws of War and Human Rights, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100 (2006),
p. 580-622. On the occupation of Iraq and the relationship between international occupation
law and UN Security Council Resolutions, see D.J. Scheffer, ‘Beyond Occupation Law’,
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it is relevant to note that the Development Fund underlines the basic idea that
the natural resources in occupied territory must be exploited for the benefit
of the people of the occupied territory.
Thus Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations formulates a right for
occupants to exploit the natural resources within occupied territory, but only
for the benefit of the population. The proceeds from the exploitation of natural
resources may therefore be used to cover costs related to civilian administra-
tion, but not to cover costs associated with the occupation itself. An occupant
cannot escape this restriction by claiming that particular natural resources are
“munitions of war” under Article 53 of the Hague Regulations, which would
mean that they could be seized by the occupant at all times. In this respect,
Elihu Lauterpacht remarks that
“belligerent occupation is essentially a temporary affair. For that reason, an Occu-
pant is not entitled to diminish or retard the prospects of the economic recovery
of the territory by draining it of its resources of minerals and raw materials on
the pretext that they constitute munitions de guerre. It is this factor which underlies,
for example, the limitation of powers of an Occupant in respect of public immovable
property to the rights of an usufructuary and no more”.94
It is generally accepted that the term “munitions de guerre” has a narrow scope
and only includes objects which can be of direct military use, in the sense that
they can be used for military operations.95 Precious minerals, such as
diamonds, cobalt or tin, are therefore excluded from the definition. After all,
these minerals do not have any direct military use, as opposed to oil, which
can serve as fuel for military vehicles. In this respect, reference can be made
to the distinction made in the often-cited 1956 Singapore Oil Stocks Case
between natural resources in situ (immovable property) and ex situ (movable
property).96 This case implies that only extracted oil – as a movable property –
can qualify as munitions de guerre. Furthermore, only processed oil can actually
be directly used for military purposes and thus qualifies as munitions de guerre.
American Journal of International Law. Vol. 97 (2003), p. 842-860; and M. Zwanenburg,
‘Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the Law of Occupation’,
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86 (2004), p. 745-768. On the management of Iraqi
natural resources, in particular oil and water, see E. Benvenisti, The International Law of
Occupation, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), pp. 264-266.
94 E. Lauterpacht, ‘The Hague Regulations and the Seizure of Munitions de Guerre’, 32 British
Yearbook of International Law 218 (1955-1956), p. 240.
95 See e.g. E. Lauterpacht, ‘The Hague Regulations and the Seizure of Munitions de Guerre’,
32 British Yearbook of International Law 218 (1955-1956), pp. 219-243; Y. Dinstein, The
International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2009),
p. 233.
96 Singapore Court of Appeal, N.V. De Bataafsche Petrolium Maatschappij & Ors. v. The War
Damage Commission, Judgment of 13 April 1956, reprinted in the American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 51 (1957), p. 809.
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It is also important to note, as indicated in Chapter 5, that occupants have
a general obligation to respect the laws in force of the occupied State “unless
absolutely prevented”.97 Arguably, this also implies an obligation to respect
the treaties to which the occupied State is a party, including relevant environ-
mental and human rights treaties.98 For example, this implies that an occupant
must respect the rights of indigenous peoples over their lands and the
resources situated in their lands, ensuing from Article 27 of the ICCPR, provided
that the occupied State is a party to this treaty.
Finally, an occupant is not only responsible for its own conduct in occupied
territory, but also for the conduct of other actors operating in the territory,
including non-state armed groups. Its role as the principal governmental
authority in occupied territory entails an obligation for the occupant to prevent
other actors operating in the territory from violating international humanitarian
law. In the Congo-Uganda Case, the ICJ determined that, as Uganda was an
occupying power in part of the territory of the DR Congo at the relevant time,
“Uganda’s responsibility is engaged both for any acts of its military that violated
its international obligations and for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the
occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account”.99
According to the Court, Uganda was under an obligation to “take appropriate
measures to prevent the looting, plundering and exploitation of natural
resources in the occupied territory to cover private persons in the district”.
Thus the “duty of vigilance” of an occupant seems to entail an obligation to
prevent other actors from exploiting, looting or plundering natural resources
in occupied territory.
97 Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations reads in full: “The authority of the legitimate
power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country”.
98 Some support for this proposition can be found in T. Meron, ‘Applicability of Multilateral
Conventions to Occupied Territories’, American Journal of International Law Vol. 72 (1978),
pp. 550-551. He argues that an occupant must respect a Convention ratified by the sovereign
authorities of the occupied territory if the authorities have adopted the necessary imple-
menting legislation. If they have not done so, Meron argues that the “ratification should
be regarded as determining that the convention is suitable for the local social and economic
conditions”. However, in these circumstances, he does not consider the occupant bound
to apply the Convention. Actually, this position is not very helpful, since it can be argued
that a treaty that is implemented through national legislation has automatically become
part of “the laws in force”. In these circumstances, it is not the treaty that has to be respected
by the occupant, but rather the domestic legislation.
99 Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 179.
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6.3.2 The protection of civilian objects
Parts IV of Additional Protocols I and II deal with the protection of the civilian
population. Both protocols contain provisions that provide protection for
objects that are important for the civilian population. In international armed
conflicts, a general provision provides protection for civilian objects. Article
52 of Additional Protocol I provides that hostilities may only be directed at
military objectives. It defines civilian objects as “all objects which are not
military objectives”. According to paragraph 2 of the same provision, “military
objectives” are “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage”.
Thus Article 52 of Additional Protocol I sets a dual standard for deter-
mining whether objects are military objectives. They must “make an effective
contribution to military action” in relation to one of the factors mentioned in
the provision,100 and in addition, their “destruction, capture or neutralization”
must offer “a definite military advantage”.101 If these conditions are satisfied,
civilian objects are no longer protected and become military objectives.
It is not difficult to imagine instances where natural resources constitute
military objectives rather than civil objects. This is the case particularly when
natural resources are exploited by parties to an armed conflict in order to
finance their armed struggle. In these cases, natural resources make an effective
contribution to military action, both in terms of their use and purpose. In
addition, destroying or capturing those natural resources offers a definite
military advantage, because such action cuts off the financial means of the
hostile party. Thus for the purposes of the current study, the general protection
provided by Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to civilian objects is of little
relevance.
In addition to the general protection afforded to civilian objects, Additional
Protocol I and II also identify particular objects for which special protection
is provided, regardless of whether such objects constitute civilian objects or
military objectives. Objects that are deemed indispensable for the survival of
100 According to the Commentary on the Additional Protocols, objects which by their nature
make an effective contribution to military action comprise all objects directly used by armed
forces, such as weapons, means of transport or buildings used by the armed forces. Objects
which by their location make an effective contribution to military action include strategic
objects like bridges. Furthermore, according to the commentary, “purpose” refers to “the
intended future use of an object”, while “use” refers to “its present function”. Y. Sandoz,
C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (ed.), Commentary on the additional protocols of 8 June 1977
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers (1987), Art. 52,
p. 636.
101 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (ed.), Commentary on the additional protocols
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers
(1987), Art. 52, p. 636.
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the civilian population, are protected under Article 54 of Additional Protocol I
and Article 14 of Additional Protocol II, while the natural environment is
protected under Article 55 of Additional Protocol I. These provisions are more
relevant for the protection of natural resources and the environment than those
providing general protection to civilian objects, since they also apply to natural
resources or parts of the environment that are considered to be military object-
ives.
Prohibition against attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population
Article 54 (2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 14 of Additional Protocol II
contains a prohibition which states that parties to an armed conflict may not
“attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population”. The provisions are aimed at providing a safety
net for the population of a State involved in an armed conflict, ensuring their
right to retain access to the basic needs for survival.
The argument for providing protection for objects which are indispensable
to the civilian population is therefore to ensure the survival of the population.
According to Article 54(2) of Additional Protocol I, parties to an armed conflict
may not attack, destroy, remove or render useless such objects “for the specific
purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population
or to the adverse Party”. The provisions are therefore primarily aimed at
prohibiting practices such as targeting water supply systems and destroying
crops, as the rebel group RUF reportedly did during the conflict in Sierra
Leone.102
In order to establish whether and to what extent the provisions qualify
the right of parties to an armed conflict to exploit natural resources, it is
necessary to consider three different issues. The first concerns the limitations
related to the objective of the provisions, the second concerns the type of
objects that are protected, and the third concerns the exceptions formulated
in the provisions.
Both provisions formulate a prohibition against attacking, destroying,
removing or rendering useless objects that are indispensable for the survival
of the population. More specifically, Article 14 of Additional Protocol II makes
the protection of such objects subordinate to the all-encompassing prohibition
against starving the population as a method of combat.103 The prohibition
102 UNEP, Sierra Leone, Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding Assessment, Technical Report,
February 2010, p. 45.
103 The original draft provision did not subordinate the protection of objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population to the prohibition to use starvation of the popula-
tion as a method of combat. It simply prohibited parties to attack or destroy those objects
with the intention “to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away or for any other
reason”. Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
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is formulated more loosely for international armed conflict. Article 54 (2) of
Additional Protocol I provides that such objects may not be attacked,
destroyed, removed or rendered useless “for the specific purpose of denying
them for their sustenance value to the civilian population […] whatever the
motive”.104 In both cases, the provisions imply a certain degree of immediacy,
in the sense that the survival of the civilian population must be at stake.
Furthermore, it therefore has to be established that parties to an armed conflict
have the intention of starving the population (internal armed conflict) or
denying the population certain objects for their sustenance value (international
armed conflict).
It is not clear to what extent these requirements qualify the prohibition.
If a specific intent is required, it must be assumed that the prohibition does
not cover the appropriation of natural resources for the purpose of financing
an armed conflict or for personal gain, as in these cases the removal of natural
resources is not carried out with the specific intent to deprive the population
of their means of subsistence. A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard
to damage to the environment caused by such activities, if such damage has
the effect of destroying objects indispensable to the civilian population. If,
however, it is accepted that reckless disregard by a party for an armed conflict
for the consequences of its actions can be considered to reflect intent, the
provisions may cover the removal of natural resources for economic purposes,
as well as environmental damage caused by such activities. From the perspect-
ive of protecting the civilian population, a broad interpretation of ‘intent’ is
therefore to be preferred.
Although State practice is not uniform, the customary international human-
itarian law study conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) shows that the majority of military manuals do not state that the pro-
hibition requires a specific intent to starve the civilian population or prevent
it from being supplied.105 Although the extent to which military manuals
accurately reflect State practice is still open to debate, these manuals do pro-
vide indications arguing in favour of a broad rather than a stringent interpreta-
tion of the provisions.
The second issue concerns the types of objects that are covered by the
provisions. The ICRC Commentary indicates that the provisions apply to objects
that are “of basic importance for the population from the point of view of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol. I, Part
three, p. 16 and 40.
104 Author’s emphasis added.
105 See J-M. Henckaerts. & L. Doswald-Beck (ed.), Customary International Humanitarian Law,
International Committee of the Red Cross, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005),
Vol. I, p. 190.
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providing the means of existence”.106 The notion of “basic importance” is
not defined in any further detail. The provisions refer to objects like foodstuffs,
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops and drinking water
installations, but this list is by no means exhaustive. The Diplomatic Conference
that adopted the Additional Protocols did not want to narrow down the
categories of objects to which the provisions should apply, as “an exhaustive
list might well have resulted in omissions or in making a somewhat arbitrary
choice of objects”.107
It is evident from the express reference in the provisions to objects such
as foodstuffs and drinking water installations that particular natural resources,
such as lakes and rivers, which provide for drinking water and fish, should
fall within the ambit of the provisions.108 Arguably, forests, which provide
food, timber, firewood, and medicinal plants, may also constitute indispensable
“objects” in the sense of the provisions.109
One interesting question in this respect is whether the prohibition also
covers economically valuable natural resources that cannot be directly con-
sumed, such as diamonds or coltan. Can such natural resources be considered
“indispensable to the survival of the population”? Although this may initially
seem far-fetched, it must be remembered that many civilians in conflict regions
are highly dependent on particular natural resources to generate a basic
income. In fact, it seems that the dependency of the local population on
artisanal mining in the DR Congo was one of the principal reasons for the
106 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (ed.), Commentary on the additional protocols
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers
(1987), Art. 14, p. 1458.
107 Ibid, Art. 14, p. 1458. It is interesting to note that the original draft provision proposed by
the ICRC contained an exhaustive list of objects, consisting of “food stuffs and food-pro-
ducing areas, crops, livestock, drinking water supplies and irrigation works”. Official Records
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol. I, Part three, pp. 16 and 40.
108 Compare K. Mollard-Bannelier, La Protection de l’Environnement en Temps de Conflit Armé,
Publication de la Revue Générale de Droit International Public, Nouvelle Série No. 53, Paris
: Editions A. Pedone (2001), p. 189. Mollard-Bannelier argues that certain natural resources
could clearly be considered to constitute indispensable objects, but she does not provide
examples.
109 The Democratic Republic of Vietnam explicitly mentioned the destruction of forests “for
the purpose of starving the civilian population and forcing them to become refugees”. Official
Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol. XIV, CDDH/III/SR.17,
p. 143. Furthermore, the Additional Protocols themselves consider objects such as medicines
and means of shelter essential to the survival of the civilian population. In this regard,
Article 18 (2) of Additional Protocol II mentions medical supplies, while Article 69 (1) of
Additional Protocol I also points to clothing, bedding, means of shelter and other supplies.
See J-M. Henckaerts. & L. Doswald-Beck (ed.), Customary International Humanitarian Law,
International Committee of the Red Cross, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005),
Vol. I, p. 193.
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Security Council to abstain from imposing commodity sanctions to curb the
trade in natural resources originating from the DR Congo.110
It should also be noted that the provisions themselves leave ample dis-
cretion for the parties to an armed conflict to interpret the objects they consider
“indispensable for the survival of the population” in their own way. During
the negotiations on the draft text of Article 54 of Additional Protocol I, Egypt
and several other oil producing States proposed including fuel reservoirs and
refineries in the text of the provision “since fuel concerned the whole inter-
national community, which depended on oil in all spheres”.111 Therefore
it can be argued that the phrase “objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population” in Article 54(2) of Additional Protocol I and in Article
14 of Additional Protocol II should be broadly interpreted to cover natural
resources that provide a basic income for the local population.
This broad interpretation also follows from the interpretation of Article
54(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 14 of Additional Protocol II in the
light of the identical Articles 1(2) of the ICESCR and the ICCPR. This provision
is of particular relevance because it determines that “in no case, may a people
be deprived of its own means of subsistence”.112 An interpretation of Article
54(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 14 of Additional Protocol II in the
light of Article 1(2) of the ICESCR and the ICCPR would extend the protection
provided by the provision to all objects which provide the population with
the means of subsistence, including particular natural resources that generate
a basic income for the local population. Following this interpretation, parties
to an armed conflict may, under certain circumstances, be prohibited from
cutting off the civilian population from the mining sites or forests under their
control.
The last relevant issue concerns the exceptions formulated in Article 54
of Additional Protocol I. The first exception is formulated in Article 54 (3) of
110 A report prepared by the Secretary-General had warned against the negative impacts of
such sanctions on the local population. See the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to
paragraph 8 of resolution 1698 (2006) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc.
S/2007/68 of 8 February 2007, paras. 62-63.
111 Egypt and several other oil producing States proposed to include fuel reservoirs and
refineries in Article 54 of Protocol I “since fuel concerned the whole international commun-
ity, which depended on oil in all spheres”. Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol. III, CDDH/III/63, p. 218 and Vol. XIV, CDDH/III/SR.16,
p. 139. Also see K. Mollard-Bannelier, La Protection de l’Environnement en Temps de Conflit
Armé, Publication de la Revue Générale de Droit International Public, Nouvelle Série No
53, Paris: Editions A. Pedone (2001), pp. 188-189. The interpretation of what constitute
“indispensable” objects is largely left to the discretion of the parties to an armed conflict.
Besides the major advantage of flexibility, this system has some important drawbacks.
Mollard-Bannelier argues that it creates a legal uncertainty for parties to an armed conflict
regarding the application of the provision. One could also argue that it gives parties to
an armed conflict a loophole with regard to the obligations incumbent on them.
112 Author’s emphasis added.
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Additional Protocol I and is also implicit in Article 14 of Additional Protocol II.
This provision determines that the prohibition does not apply to objects which
are used “as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces” or “in
direct support of military action”. The latter phrase is particularly relevant
for the subject of this book. The ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols
points to the following examples: a food producing area which the enemy uses
as it advances through it, or a food storage barn used by the enemy for cover
or as an arms depot.113 Objects used in these ways lose their immunity unless
actions against these objects could “leave the civilian population with such
inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement”.
This implies that Article 54 of Additional Protocol I does not prohibit parties
to an international armed conflict from destroying areas where natural
resources are exploited by the hostile party, unless this could lead to the
starvation or forced removal of the population. Of course, it should be noted
that such a right should be interpreted consistently with Article 23(g) of the
1907 Hague Regulations, which allows parties to an armed conflict to destroy
property of a hostile party only in situations of imperative military neces-
sity.114
The second exception concerns the defence of national territory against
invasion by a foreign State. In these circumstances, Article 54 (5) of Additional
Protocol I allows a party to an armed conflict to derogate from the prohibitions
of paragraph 2 on its own territory if “imperative military necessity” so
requires. De facto, this permits a party to an armed conflict to resort to a
“scorched earth” policy.115 However, the exception is formulated in such
a restrictive way as to apply only in exceptional circumstances. It only covers
the situation of defence of national territory which is under the control of the
party to the armed conflict against invasion.116 Furthermore, such action may
under no circumstances result in the starvation of the population.117 For the
113 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (ed.), Commentary on the additional protocols
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers
(1987), Art. 54, p. 657. These exceptions were inserted at the proposal of the United States,
which wanted to prevent “combatants to seek protection under provisions intended solely
for the protection and benefit of the civilian population”. Official Records of the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable
in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol. XIV, CDDH/III/SR.16, p. 138.
114 As discussed in section 6.3.1, Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations contains a prohibition
to destroy the property of a hostile party, except in cases of imperative military necessity.
115 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (ed.), Commentary on the additional protocols
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers
(1987), Art. 54, p. 659. For an analysis of military necessity, see section 2.3.2 of this study.
116 Emphasis added.
117 The prohibition of starvation is formulated in Article 54(1) of Additional Protocol I, while
this provision derogates from Article 54(2). Also see K. Mollard-Bannelier, La Protection
de l’Environnement en Temps de Conflit Armé, Publication de la Revue Générale de Droit
International Public, Nouvelle Série No. 53, Paris: Editions A. Pedone (2001), p. 190.
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purposes of the present study, it is hard to imagine a situation where a State
would destroy its own natural resources to defend itself against an invasion
by a third State.
Prohibition to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment
Articles 35 (3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I formulate a prohibition against
causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment.118
Article 35 (3) of Additional Protocol I provides that “it is prohibited to employ
methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”, while
Article 55 provides that “care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural
environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage”. In addition,
Article 55 specifies that “this protection includes a prohibition of the use of
methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause
such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health
or survival of the population”. It also prohibits attacks against the environment
in the form of reprisals.
The prohibition against causing widespread, long-term and severe damage
to the environment applies exclusively to the situation of international armed
conflict. A proposal from Australia to introduce a similar provision to Articles
35 (3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I in Additional Protocol II relating to
internal armed conflicts met with resistance from several delegations.119 For
example, Canada considered the provision superfluous, as it considered that
both the government and rebels would have a good reason not to risk alien-
ating the population by causing ecological damage.120
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the prohibition can be considered to
apply to internal armed conflicts as a matter of customary international law,
as argued by the ICRC in its customary international humanitarian law
study.121 The prohibition is referred to in only two other international human-
118 Only Article 55 on the protection of the natural environment is actually part of Chapter
III on the protection of civilian objects. Article 35, on the other hand, lays down the basic
rules of armed conflict and is part of Section I of Part III on the “Methods and means of
warfare”. However, despite these different perspectives, the two provisions both incorporate
the prohibition to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment.
Therefore this study deals with both provisions.
119 The amendment provided: “It is forbidden to despoil the natural environment as a technique
of warfare”. Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol. IV,
Amendments, p. 91, Doc. CDDH/III/55, 19 March 1974.
120 For this and other comments, see Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirma-
tion and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva
(1974-77), Vol. XIV, CDDH/III/SR.12, pp. 176-179 and CDDH/III/SR.18, p. 153.
121 See J-M. Henckaerts. & L. Doswald-Beck (ed.), Customary International Humanitarian Law,
International Committee of the Red Cross, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005),
Vol. I, pp. 151-155. The ICRC customary law study argues that, for international armed
conflicts, the prohibition has attained customary law status and posits that a similar
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itarian law conventions, of which only one applies to the situation of internal
armed conflict.122 In addition, in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice expressly
stated that Articles 35 (3) and 55 were “powerful constraints for all the States
having subscribed to these provisions”.123 This is indicative of the Court’s belief
that neither of the provisions has attained customary international law status,
not even for international armed conflicts. At most, there are indications that
the prohibition expresses an emerging custom.124
Thus Articles 35 (3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I are the only provisions
which formulate the prohibition against causing widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the environment. They do so in different ways. While Article
35 (3) sets limits on the means and methods of warfare, Article 55 provides
protection to the environment because of its importance to human beings.125
conclusion can be drawn for internal armed conflicts. It should, however, be noted that
for a rule to become part of customary international law, there should be, in the words
of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, “a general practice accepted
as law”. The ICRC study argues that the prohibition has been inserted in many military
manuals of States, but, as argued before, insertion in a military manual does not prove
that States consider themselves legally bound by the prohibition. On the contrary, the United
States, for example, has inserted the prohibition in its military manual, but it has also
explicitly stated that it does not consider the prohibition to be part of customary inter-
national law.
122 See the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, adopted in Geneva on 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 163, as amended in 2001, which
recalls in its preamble “that it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which
are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment”. See also, for the situation of international armed conflict only,
the Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques (ENMOD), concluded on 10 December 1976 in New York (entry
into force: 5 October 1978), 1108 UNTS 151. Article 1 of this convention determines that
“each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party”. Author’s
emphasis added.
123 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 8 July 1996, para. 30, I.C.J. Reports 1996. Author’s emphasis added.
124 E.V. Koppe, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment During Inter-
national Armed Conflict, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 235. For an extensive analysis regarding
the status of the prohibition, see pp. 177-197.
125 It must be noted that this does not imply that the environment is protected only in so far
as damage would prejudice the health or survival of the population, as argued by some
authors. See, e.g., W.D. Verwey, ‘Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict:
In Search of a New Legal Perspective’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1995),
p. 13, who argues that the reference to the health or survival of the population in the second
part of Article 55 must be read as a limitation to the protection afforded to the environment
under this provision. However, the official records of the diplomatic conference that adopted
the provisions note that “the first sentence enjoining the taking of care lays down a general
norm, which is then particularized in the second sentence. Care must be taken to protect
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Most importantly, Article 55 formulates a general duty of care for the environ-
ment.126 In this sense, Article 55 is broader in scope than Article 35 (3) of
Additional Protocol I, because it encompasses all activities that cause “wide-
spread, long-term and severe damage” to the environment, not only damage
caused by the means and methods of warfare. Furthermore, it includes a
positive obligation to protect the environment.127 This makes this provision
more relevant for the purposes of the current study.
One important question that arises with respect to Article 55 of Additional
Protocol I is what this “duty of care” for the environment actually implies.
In this respect, Karen Hulme argues that the duty of care first and foremost
serves as “a lasting reminder of th[e] recognition that humankind must con-
tinue to protect the environment in armed conflict”.128 From this perspective,
the duty of care formulated in Article 55 of Additional Protocol I should be
achieved on the basis of the general standards of care formulated in inter-
national environmental law. The principles of prevention and precaution are
most relevant in this regard. Both require States to exercise due diligence in
the activities they undertake.129 As indicated in Chapter 4 of this book, “due
the natural environment against the sort of harm specified even if the health or survival
of the population is not prejudiced”. See the Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol. XV, Report to the Third Committee on the Work of the
Working Group, Committee 3, April 1975, CDDH/III/275, p. 4. Also see E.V. Koppe, The
Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment During International Armed
Conflict, Oxford: Hart Publishing (2008), p. 148, who argues that the prohibition formulated
in the second sentence of Article 55 (1) “is illustrative and exemplary for the duty of care
of Article 55 (1), first sentence”; Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (ed.), Comment-
ary on the additional protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers (1987), Art. 55, p. 663, who note that “the expression “care
shall be taken” is not used in Article 35 paragraph 3, which is therefore more stringent”;
and Y. Dinstein, ‘Protection of the Environment in International Armed Conflict’, Max
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 5 (2001), pp. 531-532, who argues that the
first phrase of Article 55 is not reduced to cases in which damage to the natural environment
prejudices human health or survival. In his opinion, “the injury to human beings should
be regarded not as a condition for the application of the injunction against causing environ-
mental damage, but as the paramount category included within the bounds of a larger
injunction”.
126 See K. Hulme, ‘Taking Care to Protect the Environment Against Damage: a Meaningless
Obligation?’ International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 879 (2010), pp. 675-691. Also
see E.V. Koppe, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment During
International Armed Conflict, Oxford: Hart Publishing (2008), p. 148; and Y. Dinstein, ‘Pro-
tection of the Environment in International Armed Conflict’, Max Planck Yearbook of United
Nations Law, Vol. 5 (2001), p. 530.
127 K. Hulme, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, Leiden: Nijhoff, Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Series (2004), p. 73.
128 See K. Hulme, ‘Taking Care to Protect the Environment Against Damage: a Meaningless
Obligation?’ International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 879 (2010), p. 677.
129 See K. Hulme, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, Leiden: Nijhoff,
International Humanitarian Law Series (2004), pp. 80-88.
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diligence” implies that States are to “use all the means at [their] disposal’ or
“to take all appropriate measures” in order to prevent damage.130 Of course,
what is considered “appropriate” in situations of armed conflict can differ
significantly from what is expected in situations of peace.
The next question is whether this provision applies to the exploitation of
natural resources by parties to an armed conflict, and if so, what this entails.
First, it is relevant to note that Article 55 provides that “care shall be taken
in warfare…”.131 The exploitation of natural resources by parties to an armed
conflict for financial purposes cannot in itself be considered to constitute an
act of warfare. However, the exploitation of the natural resources that belong
to the hostile party could be regarded as a form of economic warfare aimed
at strengthening its own military capacity, while weakening the capacity of
the enemy with economic measures.132 Thus Article 55 arguably covers
instances of resource exploitation. This means that a party to an armed conflict
that engages in the exploitation of the natural resources of the enemy must
take appropriate measures to prevent “long-term, widespread and severe”
damage to the environment.
The last relevant question concerns the kind of standard implied by the
terms “long-term, widespread and severe”. At the very least, the cumulative
criteria rule out the possibility that the prohibition applies to incidental damage
resulting from conventional military operations.133 However, there is no gen-
eral understanding regarding the threshold that does apply. Neither the
provision itself nor the travaux préparatoires give any further indication of how
the criteria are interpreted. The travaux merely indicate that the term “long-
term” refers to damage lasting several decades.134
Only ENMOD provides some indications, although the travaux do indicate
that the threshold for damage envisaged for Protocol I was to be higher than
130 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), I.C.J. Reports
2010, para. 101; and Article 3 of the ILC Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm
from Hazardous Activities. See also Article 194(2) of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, which indicates an obligation for States
to “take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control
are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environ-
ment”.
131 Author’s emphasis added.
132 On the notion of economic warfare, see V. Lowe and A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Economic Warfare’,
in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for Com-
parative Public Law and International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press (2012).
133 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol. XV, CDDH/215/Rev.1,
para. 27, pp. 268-269. It should be noted that Articles 35 (3) and 55 of Additional Protocol
I both embody to a certain extent the precautionary principle, by allowing a degree of
latitude as to the actual occurrence of damage. See Chapter 4 of this study for a more
comprehensive discussion on this principle.
134 Ibid.
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that for ENMOD.135 The Understandings which States adopted regarding certain
provisions of the ENMOD Convention defined “widespread” as “encompassing
an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometres” and “severe” to
involve ‘serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and
economic resources or other assets”.136
Thus if these definitions can be considered to provide a minimum threshold
for the prohibition contained in Additional Protocol I, as a minimum the
prohibition seems to require damage that covers a considerable area,
encompasses serious damage and lasts for several decades.137 These require-
ments limit the scope of application of the prohibition against causing wide-
spread, long-term and severe damage to the more extreme cases of environ-
mental damage. Therefore Phoebe Okowa, amongst others, argues that “the
so-called natural resource/ environmental protection provisions in AP I, in
particular Articles 35 (3) and 55, are set at such a high threshold with a wide
margin of discretion during military operations, making them of marginal
relevance as effective constraints in most conflicts”.138
On the other hand, they do not rule out that certain damage caused by
natural resource exploitation, such as large-scale deforestation and loss of
biodiversity caused by timber extraction or the poisoning of groundwater in
a region caused by the extraction of minerals, may be included in the scope
of this prohibition. This applies particularly if the damage threshold is inter-
preted in a dynamic and evolutionary way. Arguably, a correct interpretation
of the provision and its damage threshold would take into account modern
views on environmental protection, calling for the adoption of an ecosystem
approach. The starting point for this is that damage to components of an
ecosystem can disrupt the balance of the ecosystem as a whole. From this
perspective, environmental damage can be considered to be widespread, long-
term and severe if it seriously upsets the balance of an ecosystem that
135 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-77), Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.39,
Annex, pp. 113-118. Also see K. Hulme, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold,
Leiden: Nijhoff, International Humanitarian Law Series (2004), pp. 89-91.
136 Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Volume I, General Assembly
Official records, Thirty-first session, Supplement No. 27, Doc. A/31/27, New York, United
Nations, 1976, pp. 91-92.
137 The terms have also been incorporated in Article 20 (g) of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind of the International Law Commission and in Articles
8 (2) (b) (iv) of the ICC Statute. Unfortunately, the preparatory works of these instruments
fail to clarify the meaning of the threshold. It should further be noted that the protocol
does not define the meaning of the term ‘damage’. It is therefore not clear what constitutes
‘damage’ for the purposes of the protocol and whether ‘damage’ includes alterations to
the environment. For a thorough analysis of the damage criteria, see K. Hulme, War Torn
Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, Leiden: Nijhoff, International Humanitarian
Law Series (2004), pp. 17-40.
138 P.N. Okowa, ‘Natural Resources in Situations of Armed Conflict: Is there a Coherent
Framework for Protection?’ International Community Law Review 9 (2007), p. 250.
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encompasses a considerable area in such a way that the damage lasts for
several decades.
Of course, this still is a fairly high threshold. Therefore Article 55 of Addi-
tional Protocol I cannot be expected to provide meaningful protection to the
environment against damage resulting from the commercial exploitation of
natural resources in situations of armed conflict. Moreover, since the provision
does not apply to internal armed conflicts, its use is relatively limited. In view
of these limitations, the provision can be considered of relatively little use for
the purposes of this study.
6.4 THE MARTENS CLAUSE
The previous section showed how standards in international human rights
and environmental law impact upon obligations of parties to an armed conflict
under international humanitarian law. In addition, reference can be made to
another way of incorporating external norms in international humanitarian
law treaties, i.e., by way of express provisions in the treaty itself. In this respect
the so-called “Martens Clause” is of particular interest. It was named after
the Russian delegate at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference who introduced the
clause in order to break a deadlock in the negotiations concerning the right
of populations in occupied territories to rebel against the occupying forces.139
Since then it has been inserted in a number of international humanitarian law
treaties.
The original clause, as included in the preamble of the 1899 Hague Conven-
tion, states as follows:
“Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted
by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire
of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established
between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the
public conscience”.140
Over time, the Martens clause has been used to avoid a legal vacuum in the
protection of human beings in cases not dealt with in international human-
itarian law conventions and to prevent these cases being left – in the words
of the 1899 Hague Convention – to “the arbitrary judgment of the military
139 For a thorough analysis of the genesis of the Martens Clause, see A. Cassese, ‘The Martens
Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’ European Journal of International Law, Vol.
11 (2000), pp. 187-216.
140 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex:
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899.
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commanders”.141 The clause was mainly interpreted in this way by the Nur-
emberg Military Tribunal III in the Krupp case. The Nuremberg Tribunal used
the Martens Clause to reject the argument of the defence that certain provisions
applicable to occupied territories did not apply in cases of “total war”, referring
to a conduct of war that leaves no room for considerations of humanity. With
regard to the Martens Clause the tribunal stated:
“It is a general clause, making the usages established among civilized nations, the
laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience into the legal yardstick to
be applied if and when the specific provisions of the Conventions […] do not cover
specific cases occurring in warfare, or concomitant to warfare”.142
Although this passage of the judgment does not specifically refer to the pro-
tection of human beings, it is clear from the context of the passage that the
Nuremberg Tribunal did not intend to apply the Martens clause to all cases
occurring in or concomitant to warfare. The Martens clause was invoked
directly in relation to the protection of private property.
Providing protection to the civilian population was also the rationale for
the International Court of Justice to apply the Martens clause in its Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion. In this Advisory Opinion, the International Court
of Justice referred to the Martens Clause to interpret the humanitarian law
principles of distinction and necessity in the light of new technological develop-
ments in warfare not dealt with in the relevant conventions. The Court con-
sidered that the Martens clause “has proved to be an effective means of addres-
sing the rapid evolution of military technology”.143 In other words, the Court
used the Martens Clause to justify a dynamic-evolutionary interpretation of
two of the core principles of international humanitarian law.
Furthermore, the Martens clause has been relied on in case law in order
to confirm the applicability of customary international law principles alongside
treaty law. It is in this sense that the Martens clause was relied on in the
Nicaragua case. The Court referred to the version of it inserted in the Geneva
Conventions, dealing with the legal effects of denunciation of the conven-
tions.144 In this case, it was principally called upon to confirm that the core
141 Ibid.
142 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Tribunals under Control Council Law No.
10, Vol. IX, the Krupp case, Washington: Government Printing Office (1950), p. 1341.
143 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1996, p. 226, para. 78.
144 See Article 158 of Geneva Convention IV: “The denunciation shall have effect only in respect
of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to
the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of the law of nations,
as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience”.
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principles of international humanitarian law can be applied, even when the
conventions of which they are part cannot.145
However, the primary significance of the Martens clause is not so much
its confirmation of the applicability of customary international law in situations
of armed conflict in general. Today it is generally accepted that armed conflicts
are regulated not only by treaty law, but also by customary international law.
Many rules that were codified in the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949
Geneva Conventions have been recognised as reflecting customary international
law in international case law. In addition, modern criminal tribunals have
confirmed the existence of principles of customary international law applicable
to situations of international and internal armed conflicts.
The primary significance of the Martens clause is rather its reference to
“the laws of humanity” and “the requirements of the public conscience” – or,
in their modern formulations, “the principles of humanity” and “the dictates
of the public conscience”, as foundations of the principles of international law
that provide protection to populations and belligerents in cases not covered
by treaty law.146 The question is what is meant by these terms. The wording
of the Martens Clause as a whole clearly shows that the principles of humanity
and the dictates of public conscience are not to be considered as “new” or
additional sources of international law. Rather, their purpose is to help shape
the content of the customary international law principles to be applied when-
ever a particular situation is not covered by the existing treaty rules – either
because the treaty rules are imprecise or incomplete or, as in the case of the
Geneva Conventions, because a party to an armed conflict has denounced the
treaty in question.
145 International Court of Justice, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua, Judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 218.
146 See Article 1 (2) of Additional Protocol I and the preamble of Additional Protocol II. It is
further to be noted that Additional Protocol II contains a shortened version of the Martens
clause. It simply states that “in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person
remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience”. The Commentary to Additional Protocol II indicates that the absence of a
reference to custom “should not be interpreted as a rejection on the part of the Conference,
as the ICRC had not made a proposal to that effect in its initial draft”. See Y. Sandoz,
C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (ed.), Commentary on the additional protocols of 8 June 1977
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers (1987), p. 1337.
The reasons for the absence of such a proposal in the draft Convention are not entirely
clear. They could be related to the particular nature of internal armed conflicts as compared
to the one-sided focus of the process of international customary norm creation on State
practice and State opinio juris or there could be other reasons. In any case, the absence of
a reference to established custom should not be interpreted as a rejection of the applicability
of international customary law to internal armed conflicts.
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The emphasis placed by the Martens Clause on the moral foundations of
legal principles has two significant implications.147 First, as argued by both
Meron and Cassese, the emphasis in the Martens Clause on the moral founda-
tions of legal principles raises the conceptual element of the customary inter-
national law process to a higher level, while relaxing the requirements pre-
scribed for state practice.148 In addition, these authors argue that the reference
to the “law” or “principles” of “humanity” denotes a strong presumption in
favour of applying international humanitarian law consistently with human
rights norms, as well as using human rights law to fill the gaps in international
humanitarian law treaties.149
It is for these reasons that the Martens clause retains its relevance in
modern armed conflicts. The Martens clause recognises the paramount import-
ance of providing protection to human beings in situations of armed conflict,
even in cases where the law of armed conflict is silent. Most importantly, it
applies to international as well as internal armed conflicts. The body of inter-
national humanitarian law is much less developed for internal armed conflicts
than for international armed conflicts. Therefore the Martens clause can play
an important role in ensuring basic protection to the civilian population in
internal armed conflicts in addition to the protection provided by Article 3
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and, if applicable, the provisions of 1977
Additional Protocol II. At the very least, the Martens clause clearly shows that
even though they are not formally bound by international human rights law,
armed groups may not abuse gaps in the law of armed conflict in order to
commit human rights violations.
The Martens clause could also be relevant for a coherent reading of inter-
national humanitarian law. For example, one issue that is not adequately
addressed in current international humanitarian law applicable to internal
armed conflicts concerns the protection of private property. In the law applic-
able to international armed conflicts, private property has a special status. This
is most apparent in international occupation law, which prohibits the taking
of private property altogether. In contrast, in internal armed conflicts, private
147 For a discussion of the moral imperatives of the Martens clause, see also M. Salter, ‘Reinter-
preting Competing Interpretations of the Scope and Potential of the Martens Clause’, Journal
of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 17(3) (2012), pp. 433–436.
148 Cassese argues that the Martens Clause “loosens the requirements prescribed for usus, while
at the same time elevating opinio (iuris or necessitates) to a rank higher than that normally
admitted”. See A. Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11 (2000), p. 214. Meron argues that the Martens
Clause “reinforces a trend, […], toward basing the existence of customary law primarily
on opinio juris (principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience) rather than actual
battlefield practice”. See T. Meron, ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and
Dictates of Public Conscience’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94, No. 1, p. 88.
149 Cassese further argues in favour of deducing the principles of humanity from existing
international human rights standards. See A. Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf
or Simply Pie in the Sky?’ European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11 (2000), p. 212.
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property is only expressly protected by the prohibition against pillage, which,
as argued above, does not apply to the taking of property for military pur-
poses. The prohibition against seizing the property of an adversary, which
does apply to the taking of property for military purposes, is however more
difficult to apply to the protection of private property in internal armed
conflicts because one needs to determine that the owner is somehow affiliated
to a party to the armed conflict. A consistent reading of international human-
itarian law would result in the assumption that taking private property is not
permitted for military purposes either, regardless of any particular affiliation
to a party to an armed conflict, except in situations of imperative military
necessity. It is in these cases that the Martens clause is useful, in the sense
that the dictates of public conscience prescribe that the law applicable to the
protection of private property in internal armed conflicts is interpreted consist-
ently with the relevant provisions relating to the protection of private property
in international armed conflicts.
In conclusion, the Martens clause provides protection to human beings
in situations not dealt with by international humanitarian law treaties. Its
purpose is to provide basic protection to civilians and combatants in the
conduct of hostilities, where such protection is not provided by relevant
international humanitarian law treaties. The question arises whether the
Martens clause could be used to fill other gaps in the law of armed conflict.
Certainly some authors propose using the Martens clause as a tool to
protect the environment and natural resources. Iain Scobbie, for example, refers
to the seemingly broad interpretation given to the Martens clause by the
Nuremberg Tribunal in the Krupp case, quoted above, in order to support his
argument that the Martens clause “is a dynamic mechanism by which general
international law is imported into the [Hague] Regulations in matters ‘con-
comitant to warfare’”. Therefore, in his opinion “[g]eneral international law
regarding natural resources, as it has developed since 1907, must now accord-
ingly form part of the provisions set out in Section III of the Regulations
[relating to the law of occupation]”.150 However, as argued above, the
relevant passage in the Krupp case should not be interpreted as an attempt
to broaden the application of the Martens clause. Moreover, such an overly
broad interpretation would run counter to a textual interpretation of the
Martens clause, as inserted in both prior and subsequent legal instruments.
150 See, e.g., Iain Scobbie, who argues that general international law regarding natural resources,
as it has developed since 1907, must be inserted through the Martens clause into the section
of the 1907 Hague Regulations covering occupation. I. Scobbie, ‘Natural Resources and
Belligerent Occupation: Mutation Through Permanent Sovereignty’, in S. Bowen (ed.), Human
Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, International Studies in Human Rights (1997), p. 247. Also see
Simonds, S.N., ‘Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for Inter-
national Legal Reform’, Stanford Journal of International Law Vol. 29 (1992-1993), p. 188.
248 Chapter 6
The Martens clause cannot be seen as a magic wand which can be used
to fill all the gaps in international humanitarian law. The principal objective
of the clause is to provide protection to human beings during an armed conflict
against unnecessary suffering or abuse in cases not dealt with in relevant
treaties. This is also clear from the emphasis placed by the clause on the laws
of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, both of which have a strong
humanitarian connotation. Thus, insofar as general natural resources law
provides protection to human beings where international humanitarian law
does not, it can be applied by virtue of the Martens clause. However, in
general, it should be concluded that the Martens clause is not the appropriate
mechanism for the introduction of norms other than those with a humanitarian
character in international humanitarian law.
6.5 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
International humanitarian law contains a number of obligations for parties
to an armed conflict which are applicable to the exploitation and plundering
of natural resources in situations of armed conflict. These obligations follow
from provisions which afford protection to property and to civilian objects.
However, upon closer examination, three problems immediately become
apparent. The first concerns the general ability of international humanitarian
law to regulate the exploitation of natural resources, which is principally a
commercial activity and not an act of warfare. International humanitarian law
is not designed to address these types of activities. This is only different for
occupation law, which regulates the position of an occupant as a de facto
authority. Most importantly, the right of an occupant to exploit natural re-
sources is limited to a right of “usufruct” to cover the costs of civilian admin-
istration in occupied territory.
The second issue that immediately becomes apparent concerns the
enormous range of obligations under international humanitarian law. Although
there are actually not many rules that apply to the exploitation of natural
resources in situations of armed conflict, different rules apply to different
conflict situations. Moreover, some of the rules target only one party to the
conflict. This asymmetry of obligations for parties to an armed conflict is most
apparent in situations of internal armed conflict. For example, the prohibition
against seizing or destroying the property of an “adversary” restricts its
application to the exploitation of natural resources by non-state armed groups,
while the prohibition has no direct relevance for governments.
The final problem that is apparent is the failure of IHL to provide adequate
protection to the environment in situations of armed conflict. The prohibition
against causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment
applies only to situations of international armed conflict. Moreover, it has such
a high threshold that it would only cover the most extreme cases of environ-
mental damage resulting from the exploitation of natural resources. The mass-
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ive pollution of a river caused by the use of chemicals or the cutting down of
a forest encompassing at least several hundred square kilometres are examples
of this. More general provisions regarding the protection of property or of
objects that are indispensable to the civilian population could fill some of the
gaps, but these provisions do not primarily serve environmental purposes.
Some possibilities for the reform of international humanitarian law have
been proposed in order to provide better protection to the environment.
Michael Bothe et al., for example, propose the creation of protected zones and
non-defended localities under Articles 59 and 60 of Additional Protocol I in
order to provide protection to the environment in situations of armed con-
flict.151 Such protected zones may not be the subject of attack. However, this
does not seem to be a viable option in areas of high economic importance,
which form the subject matter of this book.
Other options include the adoption of a new legal instrument to protect
the environment during armed conflict. Reference can be made to specific calls
for the adoption of a fifth Geneva Convention on the protection of the environ-
ment or of a “green” Additional Protocol.152 Although these proposals focus
mainly on the effects of warfare on the environment, their scope could be
broadened to encompass environmental damage caused by parties to an armed
conflict by other activities as well. In this sense it could be construed as a
legally binding code of conduct for parties to an armed conflict with regard
to the environment.
However, it remains to be seen whether the adoption of a new legal instru-
ment to protect the environment in situations of armed conflict is a viable
option. Discussions on this subject date back to 1991, when a round table
debate was organized by the London School of Economics. Since then, the
subject has remained on the agenda, but the debate has been confined to
academic and civil society circles.
Apart from these policy considerations, a more fundamental objection can
be made to this sort of legislative effort in relation to the subject matter of this
book. A Convention focusing on the protection of the environment in situations
of armed conflict could be very useful in providing better protection to the
environment in these situations. From this perspective, the initiative is to be
applauded. However, it does not solve the other problems identified in this
chapter, in particular the lack of clarity with regard to the existing rules for
the exploitation of natural resources by parties to an armed conflict. A conven-
tion focusing on the protection of the environment is not an appropriate
instrument to address issues related to an essentially economic activity. Fur-
151 M. Bothe; C. Bruch; J. Diamond; and D. Jensen, ‘International law protecting the environ-
ment during armed conflict: gaps and opportunities’, International Review of the Red Cross,
Vol. 92, No. 879 (2010), p. 577.
152 G. Plant, Environmental Protection and the Law of War: A ’Fifth Geneva’ Convention on the
Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict, London: Belhaven Press (1992).
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thermore, what is needed is not so much a codification of relevant rules
belonging to the field of international humanitarian law relating to the exploita-
tion of natural resources, but rather a reassessment of the existing rules from
all relevant fields of international law. This issue is explored in greater detail
in the final conclusions to this part of the book.
Finally, it can be argued that international humanitarian law contributes
to the protection of natural resources in two important ways. First, it contains
an elaborate regime for the situation of occupation which explicitly deals with
the exploitation of natural resources in occupied territories. Secondly, it is the
only field of international law that contains binding obligations for non-state
armed groups, including rules that are relevant for the exploitation of natural
resources. According to these rules, armed groups are not allowed to exploit
natural resources, except in cases of imperative military necessity. However,
in reality it is difficult to imagine situations where the exploitation of natural
resources could ever satisfy the criteria of imperative military necessity, in
particular the “urgency” requirement. Although these restrictions are under-
standable from the point of view of the States that have negotiated the relevant
treaties which embody these rules, the question arises whether these restrictions
are effective. If there is a quasi- prohibition against armed groups exploiting
natural resources in order to finance their armed struggle, why should they
then bother to abide by the law at all? From the point of view of environmental
protection, it may therefore be more useful to provide those armed groups
that satisfy the criteria of Additional Protocol II with a qualified right to exploit
natural resources in territories under their control. This point is taken up in
greater detail in the concluding remarks to this part of the book.
Concluding remarks to Part II
This part of the book examined the legal framework governing the exploitation
of natural resources in situations of armed conflict. Chapter 5 showed that
the foundations of the general legal framework for the governance of natural
resources are only partially affected in situations of armed conflict. The ILC
draft articles on the effects of armed conflict on treaties show a strong pre-
sumption in favour of the continued applicability of both international human
rights and environmental treaties. Furthermore, the rules for the suspension
of treaties, as well as the circumstances precluding wrongfulness, are sufficient-
ly stringent to preclude any easy ways out. However, there are other factors
that affect the operation of international human rights and environmental
treaties in situations of armed conflict. First, human rights treaties provide
for the possibility of derogating from obligations in situations of public emerg-
ency. This means that domestic governments can, for example, derogate from
provisions on public participation in these treaties. Secondly, international
environmental treaties often contain clauses that are lenient with regard to
States implementing their obligations. Such clauses call on States to implement
their obligations as far as this is appropriate or depending on their capabilities.
As a minimum requirement, States remain bound by their core obligations
under these treaties. These include a prohibition against depriving a people
of its means of subsistence under the 1966 Human Rights Covenants, as well
as a prohibition against inflicting harm on particular natural resources that
are protected under relevant environmental conventions, including the 1972
UNESCO World Heritage Convention and the 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity. Furthermore, States remain bound by their obligations under custom-
ary international law. These include the principle of permanent sovereignty
and the inherent condition that a government must exercise permanent sover-
eignty for national development and the well-being of the population, as well
as the principle of sustainable use, which qualifies the right of States to exploit
their natural resources, even in situations of armed conflict.
One major deficiency of international human rights and environmental
law is that these fields of international law do not contain direct obligations
for armed groups. Furthermore, their obligations are only partially relevant
for the conduct of foreign States in situations of armed conflict. Therefore
Chapter 6 has addressed the role of international humanitarian law in pro-
viding relevant rules. It demonstrated that on the whole, international human-
itarian law does not directly address issues related to the exploitation of natural
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resources by parties to an armed conflict. This is different only for the situation
of occupation, which does contain express rules for occupants relating to the
exploitation of natural resources. The key provision in this respect is Article
55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which provides occupants with a right to
usufruct on the natural resources situated in occupied territory. According
to the right of usufruct, occupants are allowed to exploit natural resources
in occupied territory for two purposes: 1) to cover the costs of civilian admin-
istration, within reasonable limits and in proportion to the available natural
resources; and 2) for other purposes benefitting the population living in
occupied territory.
Rules that apply to other States with a military presence on the territory
of a foreign State, as well as to armed groups, must be derived from more
general provisions relating to the protection of property and civilian objects.
Protection of natural resources is provided first of all by the prohibition against
pillage, which prohibits the taking of property for personal gain. Furthermore,
parties to an armed conflict are prohibited from taking or destroying property
that belongs to a hostile party for military purposes, except in situations of
“imperative military necessity”. Although the categories of situations to which
the exception of “imperative military necessity” applies are not expressly listed,
an exception can be made only if the following conditions are met: 1) there
must be a reasonable connection between the taking or destruction of property
and the accomplishment of a military advantage; and 2) there must be a degree
of urgency. It is particularly this degree of urgency that is absent in the major-
ity of cases involving the exploitation of natural resources by parties to an
armed conflict.
In internal armed conflicts, the international humanitarian law prohibitions
mainly focus on armed groups. However, this asymmetry of obligations for
armed groups and the government is not a problem when considered in a
broader context, and in particular in the light of the view that governments
remain bound by the general framework for the exploitation of natural
resources. The virtual absence of provisions protecting the environment in
international humanitarian law is more problematic.
There are only two provisions that expressly prohibit parties to an armed
conflict from causing damage to the environment. They prohibit parties to
an armed conflict from causing long-term, widespread and severe damage
to the environment. It has been argued that these provisions suffer from two
major deficiencies. The first is that they apply only to international armed
conflict. The second is that they set a cumulative threshold for environmental
damage, which means that the provisions apply only to environmental damage
that is widespread, long-term and severe. This is a very high threshold, even
when it is interpreted in the light of modern developments in international
environmental law.
Other provisions that are relevant for the protection of the environment
include the above-mentioned prohibition against taking or destroying the
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property of a hostile party, except in cases of imperative military necessity,
and the prohibition against destroying or rendering useless objects that are
considered indispensable to the civilian population. Chapter 6 has demon-
strated that the protection provided to the environment by these provisions
is far less than what is necessary to prevent environmental degradation.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from these findings to address the
challenges involved in resource-related armed conflicts. First, it is necessary
to develop clear rules for the commercial exploitation of natural resources in
situations of armed conflict. Secondly, there is a need for adequate rules for
the protection of the environment in situations of armed conflict, particularly
internal armed conflicts. These rules can mainly be based on existing inter-
national law, but new rules also need to be developed.
The task of evaluating the existing rules and developing new rules can
best be assigned to the International Law Commission (ILC). Despite the lengthy
procedures involved in drafting its articles, it is the only international body
that combines expertise in all the relevant fields of international law with an
official mandate to progressively develop and codify international law. The
ILC could undertake this work as part of its study on the ‘Protection of the
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, a topic which it recently included
in its programme of work.153 Special Rapporteur Marie Jacobsson proposed
to include in this study an analysis of the existing rules applicable in situations
of armed conflict, with a particular emphasis on internal armed conflicts.154
As regards the development of new rules, the Special Rapporteur indicated
that “it was suggested that it was not the task of the Commission to modify
… existing legal regimes [regulating the law of armed conflict]”.155 It is
argued however that the task of the ILC includes to progressively develop
international law. Therefore, the ILC should not limit its work to an analysis
of the existing rules, but should also progressively develop those rules.
This book suggests that the mandate of the ILC should first of all include
the clarification of the implications of the existing rules of international human-
itarian, environmental and human rights law for the commercial exploitation
of natural resources during armed conflict, an issue that has not been system-
atically addressed in existing legal instruments. The ILC should address several
questions, including the meaning of “imperative military necessity” in relation
to the prohibition against appropriating or destroying the property of a hostile
party under international humanitarian law. What does this exception entail?
Does it include the exploitation of natural resources to provide for the basic
needs of hostile parties? Arguably, it does not. It is only when natural
153 See International Law Commission, Report on the work of its sixty-fifth session (2013),
UN Doc. A/68/10, Chapter IX.
154 Ibid., para. 136 and 141.
155 Ibid., para. 136.
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resources can be directly consumed, such as firewood, that the condition of
urgency is satisfied.
Furthermore, the ILC should assess the existing rules in their totality, i.e.,
it should take the existing rules from international humanitarian, human rights
and environmental law together. All too often the rules of international human-
itarian law are looked at in isolation when assessing activities that take place
in situations of armed conflict. However, rules from international human rights
and environmental law are equally important, especially when assessing the
rights and obligations of domestic governments in relation to the exploitation
of natural resources. Chapters 5 and 6 have shown that international human-
itarian law primarily creates obligations for non-state armed groups and
foreign States, while international human rights and environmental law create
obligations for domestic governments and, to a lesser extent, for foreign States
as well. For the sake of clarity and comprehensiveness, it is therefore essential
to list all the relevant rules, not only those of international humanitarian law.
In addition, the ILC should clarify the position of armed groups in relation
to the exploitation of natural resources in situations of armed conflict. The
relevant provisions of international humanitarian law applicable to internal
armed conflicts formulate an absolute prohibition for armed groups against
exploiting natural resources. However, as soon as a conflict is internationalised,
armed groups which are recognised as belligerents by third States or acting
under the control of a foreign State, become subject to the law applicable to
international armed conflict. For those armed groups that control portions of
a State’s territory, this means that they are granted a limited right to exploit
natural resources under international occupation law. From an environmental
and human rights perspective, a case could be made for the elimination of
this distinction for armed groups that satisfy the criteria of Additional Proto-
col II. These armed groups should be accorded a right similar to that of occu-
pants, whether or not the armed conflict is internationalised. It is then at the
discretion of the UN Security Council to decide whether exploitation activities
pose a risk to international peace and security in specific instances and there-
fore must be prevented altogether.
This position is reflected to some extent in the Kimberley Process Certi-
fication Scheme for the Certification of Rough Diamonds, discussed in Chap-
ter 8. This Scheme defines “conflict diamonds” as “rough diamonds used by
rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining
legitimate governments, as described in relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions…”.156 This definition implies that the determination of
what constitutes “conflict diamonds” is left to the discretion of the UN Security
Council.
156 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section I.
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Furthermore, the major advantage of taking occupation law as a point of
reference for rules regulating the behaviour of armed groups in control of
portions of the State territory is that this field of law is well developed and
is susceptible to interpretation in the light of relevant human rights and
environmental norms. Some rights are accorded to armed groups in this way,
but at the same time, these armed groups must also meet stringent obligations.
Arguably this balancing of rights and obligations is the best way to provide
protection to the environment and the civilian population in territories that
are controlled by armed groups. Furthermore, granting armed groups some
rights may give these groups a positive incentive to respect the corresponding
obligations.
Finally, the ILC should evaluate the existing rules for the protection of the
environment in internal armed conflict and formulate proposals to improve
these rules. One of the major gaps in the existing rules relate to the absence
of binding rules for armed groups in relation to environmental protection.
Arguably, governments remain bound by international environmental law,
but armed groups are not. Therefore, the ILC should examine the extent to
which existing rules of international humanitarian law protect the environment
and develop new rules in relation to environmental damage caused by acts
of warfare. It is argued that the prohibition against destroying the property
of an adversary provides basic protection to the environment, but this pro-
tection needs to be improved. The proposals for the adoption of a fifth Geneva
Convention on the protection of the environment or of a “green” Additional
Protocol could be taken as a starting point for the ILC in this respect.
Most relevant for the purposes of the present study, the ILC should define
the implications of existing rules for preventing more serious environmental
damage caused by the exploitation of natural resources by parties to an armed
conflict, including the provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocols relating to
the protection of objects indispensable to the civilian population. For example,
do these rules cover situations such as the poisoning of groundwater as a result
of irresponsible dumping of chemical substances used in the mining sector?
Arguably, they do cover such situations if the poisoning of groundwater results
in the starvation or forced movement of people. It is essential that the ILC sheds
some light on these issues and develops the law in this field.

Part III
The governance of natural resources as
part of conflict resolution and post-conflict
peacebuilding efforts
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS TO PART III
This part discusses two distinct but interrelated issues. The first concerns the
approaches to stopping the trade in natural resources that is used to finance
armed conflicts. Addressing this issue is a prerequisite for resolving those
armed conflicts. The second concerns the governance of natural resources in
countries that are recovering from resource-related armed conflicts. While
economic reconstruction must be an inherent part of any peacebuilding
strategy, specific challenges must be addressed when natural resources play
a role in armed conflicts, to either finance or sustain them. In these situations,
it is often necessary to implement institutional changes regarding the govern-
ance of natural resources in order to prevent a relapse into armed conflict.
Notwithstanding the paramount importance of addressing natural resources
governance as part of peacebuilding efforts, this issue has not been included
in the official mandate of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, an intergovern-
mental advisory body established in 2005 by the UN Security Council, together
with the UN General Assembly. The principal objective of the UN Peacebuilding
Commission is “to address the special needs of countries emerging from
conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them
in laying the foundation for sustainable development”.1 As part of its general
mandate, the UN Peacebuilding Commission has recently started to consider
issues related to natural resources management, both in a general sense and
1 UN Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005), preambular paragraph 6; UN General Assembly
Resolution 60/180 (2005), sixth preambular paragraph. For this purpose, the UN Peace-
building Commission has received three main tasks: 1) to bring together all relevant actors
to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post conflict
peacebuilding and recovery; 2) to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-
building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of
integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; and 3)
to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant
actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure
predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given
by the international community to postconflict recovery.
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in its country specific configurations.2 However, the practice of the UN Peace-
building Commission is still limited, preventing a systematic analysis of its
work in this field. Furthermore, the UN Peacebuilding Commission becomes
involved in a relatively late stage, when the situation in a former conflict
country has, to a certain extent, stabilised. It is submitted that, in order to
enhance the success of the peace process in countries emerging from armed
conflict, changes in the governance of natural resources must be initiated
already in the phases of conflict resolution and immediate post-conflict recon-
struction, which is the principal focus of this part of the study.
Recent attempts to address the governance of natural resources, and, as
a prerequisite, the trade in natural resources that finance armed conflicts as
part of conflict resolution and immediate post-conflict reconstruction efforts
have evolved around two distinctive but interrelated approaches, namely
sanctions by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter on the one hand, and voluntary agreements between States and other
entities related to the management of natural resources in States experiencing
an armed conflict, on the other.
The United Nations Charter has assigned the Security Council the primary
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.3 It has given
the Security Council a wide range of powers to perform its functions effective-
ly. In this respect the principal powers of the Security Council relate to its role
in the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and
its authority to adopt coercive measures in response to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. Together these chapters assign the Security Council a variety of
options to effectively address specific situations which constitute a threat to
international peace and security.
In practice, resource-related economic measures under Article 41 of the
UN Charter have been the principal means used by the Security Council to
2 The need for the UN Peacebuilding Commission to address these issues was emphasised
in a 2009 UNEP report, entitled ‘From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural
Resources and the Environment’. The UNEP Report further contains a number of recom-
mendations for the Peacebuilding Commission on the integration of natural resources
management and environmental protection into its peacebuilding strategies. In response
to the UNEP report, the UN Peacebuilding’s Working Group on Lessons Learned has issued
a background paper in July 2011 on ‘Economic Revitalization and Youth Employment for
Peacebuilding’, identifying natural resources management as one of the priority areas for
the Peacebuilding Commission to focus on in the near future. This background paper
expanded on preliminary work undertaken by this Working Group in cooperation with
UNEP on ‘Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding’. Nonetheless, the proposals of the
Working Group have not yet been adopted as part of the overall strategy of the Peace-
building Commission.
3 The legal basis for this function of the Security Council may be found in Article 24 of the
UN Charter.
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address the links between natural resources and armed conflict.4 Before the
end of the Cold War, the Council only used its powers under Chapter VII once
to impose resource-related coercive measures aimed at ending a conflict,
namely in the case of natural resources originating in Southern Rhodesia.5
Since 1990 the Council has increasingly used its powers for this purpose.
Examples include diamond sanctions in the cases of Angola, Sierra Leone,
Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, petroleum sanctions in the case of Iraq and timber
sanctions in the case of Liberia.6 This practice of the Security Council reveals
the recent trend towards “smart” or “targeted” rather than comprehensive
sanctions.7
In addition, voluntary agreements between States and other entities related
to the management of natural resources in fragile States have become more
important in the last decade, both as an alternative and complementary to
Security Council sanctions. The objective of some of these voluntary agreements
is to address the trade in so-called “conflict resources”, while others address
management-related issues. Examples of the former include certification
mechanisms, such as the Kimberley Scheme for the Certification of Rough
Diamonds. Examples of the latter include voluntary processes aimed at
combatting corruption in government administration, such as the Extractive
Industry Transparency Initiative.
These voluntary agreements are part of a broader movement away from
formal treaty-making procedures to informal processes that create “commit-
ments” rather than legal obligations for States. These processes are even
encouraged by formal institutions. The 2002 Johannesburg Summit on
Sustainable Development, for example, introduced the idea of partnerships
between States and private entities for sustainable development. The United
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 2012
further consolidated this practice of public-private partnerships with the
organization of a “Partnerships Forum” and encouraged the establishment
4 See P. Le Billon, ‘Natural Resources, Armed Conflicts, and the UN Security Council’, Liu
Institute for Global Issues, Briefing Paper No. 07-001, 30 May 2007, p. 2. Other tools include
peacekeeping missions. The Security Council has, so far, only in two instances expressly
included issues related to natural resources management in the mandate of a peacekeeping
mission. These are the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN Organization Stabiliza-
tion Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). For more details on
these and other peacekeeping missions, see a recent report issued by UNEP, ‘Greening
the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources and UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (2012).
5 See UN Security Council Resolution 232 (1966) concerning an import ban on certain natural
resources, including iron ore and copper and Resolution 253 (1968) concerning an import
ban on all commodities and products.
6 See, e.g., UN Security Council Resolution 1173 (1998) concerning an import ban on diamonds
originating in Angola; Resolution 1306 (2000) concerning an import ban on diamonds
originating in Sierra Leone and Resolution 1521 (2003) concerning an import ban on
diamonds and timber products from Liberia.
7 D. Cortright & G.A. Lopez (ed.), Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield (2002).
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of new partnerships.8 In other areas, informal processes are also becoming
more important, for example, global standards for the registration of drugs
aree developed through the International Conference on Harmonisation of
Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
(ICH), an informal organization that brings together regulatory authorities and
the pharmaceutical industry.
The phenomenon of informal agreements can partly be explained by a
genuine desire of States to actively involve other stakeholders, principally civil
society and the private sector, in efforts to address issues of general concern.
However, the question arises whether these initiatives are in fact as effective
as formal treaty processes in addressing issues of general concern. Since
voluntary initiatives increasingly replace formal treaty-making processes, it
is important to determine whether these voluntary initiatives actually provide
a credible alternative to treaties.
Chapter 7 examines sanctions regimes adopted by the Security Council
to stop natural resources from financing or fuelling armed conflicts. The
chapter discusses the contribution of these sanctions to conflict resolution and,
ultimately, post-conflict peacebuilding. Chapter 8 examines three categories
of informal instruments. These are certification mechanisms, anti-corruption
initiatives and corporate responsibility tools. Each category is discussed from
the perspective of one instrument which is of particular interest for the pur-
poses of this study.
One question that is central to both chapters concerns the ways in which
these mechanisms contribute to providing structural solutions for preventing
future conflicts involving natural resources in States that have experienced
armed conflicts. Throughout this book it has been argued that the issue of
resource governance is of central importance to prevent conflicts involving
natural resources. In other words, the question is how and to what extent these
mechanisms contribute to promoting adequate resource governance in countries
that have experienced armed conflict. And what does ‘adequate’ resource
governance mean within this context?
Of course, the current book can only give a glimpse into the enormous
range of initiatives that – directly or indirectly – contribute to breaking the
link between natural resources and armed conflict. The purpose of this book
is not to give an exhaustive summary of all the initiatives, but rather to provide
insight into the contribution of those approaches that have been at the forefront
of efforts to break the link between natural resources and armed conflict.
8 See UN General Assembly Resolution 66/288, ‘The Future We Want’, of 11 September 2012,
paras. 46, 64, 71, 76, 202 and 269-275.
7 UN Security Council Sanctions Regimes
7.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Sanctions constitute one of the principal tools of the Security Council to address
the links between natural resources and armed conflict. Pursuant to Article
25 of the UN Charter, UN member States are obliged to implement measures
taken by the Security Council under Article 41 of the UN Charter. This makes
sanctions prima facie a particularly effective tool to address instances in which
natural resources finance, or even fuel armed conflicts.
Sanctions can involve a variety of measures, ranging from import and
export embargoes and the freezing of assets, to travel bans and reducing
diplomatic relations. While older sanctions regimes were mainly compre-
hensive, covering all sorts of measures, most of the modern sanctions regimes
apply so-called “smart” sanctions. These consist of specific measures, taking
account of the potential impact of sanctions on vulnerable groups.9
Smart sanctions comprise “targeted sanctions” designed to target specific
persons or organizations, and “selective sanctions” which impose restrictions
on the trade in specific products.10 Obviously this implies that commodity
sanctions exclusively against particular organizations are both selective and
targeted. However, for the purposes of clarity, this chapter refers to commodity
sanctions as selective sanctions, while reserving the term “targeted” for
measures that involve designating particular individuals or organizations on
a sanctions list.
The Security Council has imposed several sanctions regimes to address
the contribution of natural resources to armed conflict, including both selective
and targeted sanctions. Examples of selective sanctions imposed by the Security
Council include diamond sanctions in the cases of Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia
and Côte d’Ivoire and timber sanctions in the cases of Cambodia and Liberia.
Examples of targeted sanctions imposed in relation to natural resources include
9 D. Cortright & G.A. Lopez (ed.), Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield (2002), p. 2.
10 For the distinction between ‘targeted’ and ‘selective’ sanctions, see, e.g., D. Cortright & G.A.
Lopez (ed.), Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
(2002), p. 172, defining selective sanctions as less-than-comprehensive measures involving
restrictions on particular products or financial flows, while targeted sanctions are described
as a subset of selective sanctions, specifically aiming for more narrow and precise effects,
usually directed at a particular segment of the population in the targeted State.
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travel bans and asset freezes in the cases of the DR Congo and Libya. In addi-
tion, in the case of the DR Congo, the Security Council developed an innovative
approach, consisting of the direct targeting of companies which do not respect
due diligence requirements.
In the Presidential Statement of 25 June 2007, the President of the Security
Council clarified the objectives of the sanctions regimes adopted by the Security
Council in order to address the link between natural resources and armed
conflict:
“[t]he Security Council, through its resolutions, has taken measures on [the issue
of natural resources contributing to armed conflict], more specifically to prevent
illegal exploitation of natural resources, especially diamonds and timber, from
fuelling armed conflicts and to encourage transparent and lawful management of
natural resources, including the clarification of the responsibility of management
of natural resources”.11
This chapter aims to explore to what extent the Security Council resolutions
have actually gone beyond merely sanctioning the illegal trafficking of natural
resources and have addressed issues relating to the governance of natural
resources. In particular, the question arises whether these resolutions have
set standards for the management of natural resources. If so, is the Security
Council the appropriate body to do so or is the Council exceeding its authority
here?
In order to answer these questions, this chapter traces the evolution in the
Security Council’s approach to addressing the role of natural resources in
financing armed conflicts. It analyses several sanctions regimes established
by the Security Council to address specific conflicts financed by natural
resources from the 1960s to the present. The chapter examines the overall
structure and objectives of the sanctions regimes, as well as the targets and
addressees of the sanctions obligations. In this way, it aims to clarify the
Security Council’s approach to tackling the trade in natural resources that
finance armed conflict.
Section 2 defines the role of sanctions in the particular context of resource-
related armed conflicts. Section 3 then takes a closer look at two older sanctions
regimes which paved the way for the new generation of smart sanctions. These
are the 232 Southern Rhodesia Sanctions Regime and the 661 Iraq Sanctions
Regime. Section 4 examines selective commodity sanctions imposed by the
Security Council in relation to resource-related armed conflicts. These are the
792 Cambodia Sanctions Regime, the 864 UNITA Sanctions Regime, the 1132
Sierra Leone Sanctions Regime, the 1343 and 1521 Liberia Sanctions Regimes,
and the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Regime. Section 5 takes a closer look at
11 Statement by the President of the Security Council of 25 June 2007, UN Doc. S/PRST/2007/22,
para. 6.
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the Security Council’s use of targeted sanctions in order to put an end to
resource driven conflicts. This section discusses the 1493 DR Congo Sanctions
Regime and the 1970 Libya Sanctions Regime. Finally, section 6 discusses the
evolution in the Security Council’s approach to sanctions in the context of
resource-related armed conflicts. It also examines the implications of the
approach developed by the Security Council for its contribution to promoting
sustainable resource governance in specific conflict situations.
7.2 GENERAL REMARKS CONCERNING SANCTIONS
Georges Abi-Saab provided a generally accepted definition of sanctions as
“coercive measures taken against a target State or entity in application of a
decision by a socially competent organ”.12 Most of the elements of this defini-
tion accurately reflect the sanctions regimes discussed in this chapter, which
target States, individuals or non-state entities, such as non-state armed groups
and corporations. They are imposed by the Security Council, on the basis of
the role assigned it by Article 24 of the UN Charter. In addition, most of the
sanctions regimes examined in this chapter are imposed pursuant to decisions
of the Security Council taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
On the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council may
adopt measures pursuant to Article 41 of the UN Charter once it has determined
the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression under Article 39 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, it may do so only
in order to “maintain or restore international peace and security”. These
requirements have two important implications for the Security Council’s ability
to act.
First of all, Article 39 defines the purposes and legal basis for Security
Council action. As Hans Kelsen had noted already in 1950: “[t]he purpose of
the enforcement action under Article 39 is not: to maintain or restore the law,
but to maintain, or restore peace, which is not necessarily identical with the
law”.13 In other words, the authority of the Security Council to take measures
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is not dependent on determining that
12 G. Abi-Saab, ‘The Concept of Sanction in International Law’, in V. Gowland-Debbas (ed.),
United Nations Sanctions and International Law, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law
International (2001), p. 39.
13 H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems,
London: Stevens and Sons (1950), p. 294. Also see J. Crawford, ‘The Relationship Between
Sanctions and Countermeasures’, in V. Gowland-Debbas (ed.), United Nations Sanctions and
International Law, Graduate Institute of International Studies Geneva, The Hague/London/
Boston: Kluwer Law International (2001), pp. 58-59; and L.J. van den Herik, ‘Individualizing
Enforcement in International Law: Progress or Peril?’ inaugural lecture Leiden University,
29 June 2012.
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there has been a violation of international law, but rather that a particular
situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
This means that the Security Council can address situations that are perfect-
ly legal – such as the exploitation of natural resources by a State and to use
the proceeds to finance an armed conflict – but which pose a threat to inter-
national peace and security anyway. For the purposes of the present study,
this means that the Security Council may qualify the right of a State to exercise
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources if necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. An internal uprising against the
government of a State is another relevant example. International law does not
formally oppose waging a civil war. However, such a situation may constitute
a threat to peace and security, and the Council can act against that. For
example, by imposing sanctions against natural resources used by the rebel
forces to finance their armed struggle.
The second implication of Article 39 of the UN Charter regarding the
Security Council’s ability to act is that it limits the powers of the Security
Council. Article 39 provides that the Security Council can only take measures
pursuant to Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter “in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security”. For internal armed conflicts, this
means that the Security Council can, in principle, impose sanctions only if
these armed conflicts pose a threat to international peace and security. In
practice, the Security Council has adopted a flexible approach in this respect.
It has imposed sanctions to address threats arising from internal situations
with a potential cross-border impact, as well as to address threats ensuing
from purely ‘internal’ situations, such as the large-scale violation of human
rights by governments.14
Furthermore, Security Council measures do not necessarily have to target
States.15 The behaviour of non-state entities, such as armed groups, can also
trigger Security Council action. Many of the sanctions regimes discussed in
this chapter target non-state armed groups. Examples include the sanctions
regime imposed against the National Union for the Total Independence of
14 This is linked to the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, as recognized in paragraphs
138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which formulates a responsibil-
ity for States to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity as well as a responsibility for the international community to
intervene when a State does not respect his responsibilities. See World Summit Outcome
Document, UN Doc. A/60/L.1 of 15 September 2005.
15 See A. Pellet & A. Miron, ‘Sanctions’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
para. 22, available through www.mpepil.com, (consulted on 3 May 2012) who argue that
“the elasticity of the notion of a threat to, or breach of, the peace was accompanied by an
enlargement of the category of targeted entities; as a consequence, it is no longer necessary
that a violation of international law amounting to a threat to the peace be attributable to
a State in order to justify the imposition of sanctions. Individuals or groups can violate
international law and be subject to sanctions”.
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Angola (UNITA) in Angola and against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
and other rebel groups in Sierra Leone.
This targeting of entities other than States also has implications for the
definition of sanctions itself. It highlights an important problem inherent in
Abi-Saab’s definition, at least for the purposes of the current study. This
problem arises from the interpretation of the term “coercive”. According to
Abi-Saab, “coercive” implies that measures are “taken against the will of the
target State at least without its consent” and “to the detriment of the target
State”.16 However, this view of sanctions, based on the idea that sanctions
are measures that intend to cause harm to a particular State, does not cor-
respond very well with the rationale behind many of the sanctions regimes
discussed in the present chapter.
Many of the sanctions regimes discussed in this chapter are in fact imposed
to assist governments in regaining control over the State’s natural resources.
Examples include the diamond sanctions imposed against UNITA in Angola
and against the RUF and other rebel groups in Sierra Leone. In some cases,
sanctions have even been imposed at the request of the government of a target
State. The diamond sanctions imposed in relation to the conflicts in Angola,
Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire are examples of this.17 Another example con-
cerns the endorsement by the Security Council of a national ban on timber
in Cambodia, imposed to cut off the Khmer Rouge from timber revenues.
Instead of defining sanctions as “coercive measures” like Abi-Saab, sanc-
tions can therefore be regarded in a less intrusive way in this context as
economic or diplomatic measures aimed at constraining the actors against
which they are imposed, whether these actors are States or non-state actors.
More in general, the sanctions imposed by the Security Council in this context
could be described as measures aimed at assisting a particular State to address
a threat to the peace coming from within its borders.
Some final remarks can be made with regard to the operation of sanctions
regimes, in particular with respect to the role of Expert Panels and Sanctions
Committees. Most contemporary sanctions regimes discussed in this chapter
make use of “smart sanctions” which are tailored to address a specific
situation. To make an informed decision about the type of measures to impose,
the Security Council has increasingly relied on Expert Panels to provide the
information necessary to tailor its sanctions. These Expert Panels are estab-
lished on the basis of Article 29 of the UN Charter, which permits the Security
Council to establish subsidiary bodies to assist it in the performance of its
functions.18
16 Ibid.
17 These examples are discussed in more detail in section 4 below.
18 For an overview of committees established pursuant to this provision, see J.M. Farrall, United
Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007), pp.
146-181.
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Panel reports have extensively documented the role played by natural
resources in the conflicts discussed in this chapter. In addition, their findings
on sanctions busting in particular conflicts, such as those in Angola, Sierra
Leone and the DR Congo, have been instrumental in the Security Council’s
embracing new approaches to tackle the trade in “conflict resources”. These
include the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds and
the due diligence requirements formulated by the Group of Experts on the
DR Congo, discussed later in this chapter.
In addition to Panels of Experts, the Security Council has established
Sanctions Committees, mandated with the monitoring and implementation
of sanctions regimes. The composition of the Sanctions Committees is similar
to that of the Security Council itself. These committees play an important role
in the application of sanctions. They are often entrusted with the task of
designating persons or entities to apply targeted sanctions. Furthermore, they
provide the Security Council with information on the implementation of the
sanctions regime by States. Their regular reports to the Security Council,
supplemented with the reports of the Panels of Experts, are vital to the proper
functioning of sanctions regimes.
7.3 EARLY EXAMPLES OF RESOURCE-RELATED SANCTIONS REGIMES
The current section discusses two early sanctions regimes imposed by the
Security Council which rely principally on comprehensive sanctions, and which
involve natural resources.19 In the case of Southern Rhodesia, selective sanc-
tions against natural resources were imposed as a first measure, before making
the sanctions regime comprehensive. In the case of Iraq, the sanctions regime
provided for a conditional exemption from the comprehensive regime for the
export of limited quantities of oil.
7.3.1 The 232 Southern Rhodesia Sanctions Regime
Structure and objectives of the sanctions regime
The sanctions regime issued against Southern Rhodesia in 1966 was the first
ever imposed by the Security Council.20 Its aim was to put an end to the white
19 The link with natural resources is what distinguishes these sanctions regimes from other
regimes with contain import prohibitions, such as the sanctions regime imposed against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) through UN Security Council
Resolution 757 (1992).
20 For more details regarding this sanctions regime, see P.J. Kuyper, The Implementation of
International Sanctions: The Netherlands and Rhodesia, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noord-
hoff (1978) and J.M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press (2007), pp. 247-253.
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minority regime established in Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and to enable the
population of Southern Rhodesia to exercise their right to self-determination.
The first resolution adopted by the Security Council with regard to the
situation in Southern Rhodesia called upon all States to break all economic
relations with Southern Rhodesia, but the associated measures did not comprise
any import prohibitions and were not taken pursuant to Chapter VII of the
UN Charter.21
It was only a year later, with the adoption of Resolution 232 (1966), that
the Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions based on Article 41 of the
UN Charter against the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia. These sanctions
included an import embargo for UN member States on a range of commodities,
including several minerals, sugar, tobacco, meat and other animal products,
targeting not only the direct import of these commodities, but also all activities
undertaken by UN member States within their territory or by their nationals
that would promote the export of the banned commodities from Southern
Rhodesia.22 The import embargo was accompanied by export embargos for
UN member States with regard to the supply of oil or oil products, arms and
military and transport material to Southern Rhodesia.23
Resolution 253 (1968) subsequently transformed the selective regime set
up by Resolution 232 into a comprehensive regime, extending sanctions to
all products and commodities originating from or destined to Southern
Rhodesia, with the exception of some products that were very important for
the local population,24 such as medical supplies, educational materials and,
under certain conditions, foodstuffs.25
The same resolution established a committee to monitor the implementation
of the sanctions regime, also known as the “Watchdog Committee”.26 The
mandate of this committee, which was to examine reports and seek information
from States and specialised agencies regarding the implementation of Resolu-
tion 253 (1968), was rather modest compared to modern sanctions com-
21 See UN Security Council Resolution 217 (1965), especially paragraph 8 and J.M. Farrall,
United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007),
p. 248, who labels these sanctions as voluntary in nature. Earlier, the UN General Assembly
had already called upon all States to refrain from rendering assistance to the white minority
regime and had, subsequently, condemned the unilateral declaration of independence made
by the racialist minority regime. See UN General Assembly Resolutions 2022 (XX) of 5
November 1965 and 2024 (XX) on the Question of Southern Rhodesia of 11 November 1965.
22 See UN Security Council Resolution 232 (1966), especially paragraph 2 (a) and (b).
23 Ibid., especially paragraph 2 (d), (e) and (f).
24 See UN Security Council Resolution 253 (1968), especially paragraph 3.
25 Ibid., especially paragraph 3 (d).
26 Ibid., especially paragraph 20. See on this committee, P.J. Kuyper, ‘The Limits of Supervision:
the Security Council Watchdog Committee on Rhodesian Sanctions’, Netherlands International
Law Review, Vol. 25 (1978), pp. 159-194.
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mittees.27 Nevertheless, the establishment of the Committee provided the
Security Council with the opportunity to experiment with the implementation
of sanctions by subsidiary bodies.
In subsequent years the Security Council adopted several resolutions
building on the sanctions regime established in Resolutions 232 and 253.
Unfortunately the sanctions were not particularly effective. Many countries,
including Portugal and South Africa, continued to trade with the illegal white
minority regime.28 In 1979, the sanctions were finally lifted after a political
solution to the situation had been reached and when Zimbabwe emerged as
a newly independent State.29
Targets and addressees of the sanctions obligations
The sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia targeted in particular the de
facto government in that country, i.e., the illegitimate white minority regime.
It was aimed at strengthening the efforts of the United Kingdom to end the
illegal situation in its former colony in order to realise the right of the black
majority in the country to self-determination pursuant to the UN Charter and
the UN General Assembly’s Decolonisation Declaration. In this way, the sanc-
tions regime indirectly provided support not only to the United Kingdom,
but also to armed groups within the country opposing the political authorities.
The obligation to implement the sanctions was imposed on all States. In
the first place, it was imposed on UN member States by Article 25 of the UN
Charter. However, the resolutions also urged non-UN member States to imple-
ment the measures with a general appeal to the principles stated in Article 2
of the UN Charter.30
Appraisal of the sanctions regime
The sanctions regime imposed against Southern Rhodesia was the first time
the Security Council adopted sanctions in order to apply economic pressure
on an entity as a response to a threat to the peace. It did so in the first instance
by imposing selective commodity sanctions. In this respect, it can be seen as
a predecessor of later sanctions regimes, targeting particular commodities in
order to restore international peace and security.
27 Ibid.; and E. de Wet, A. Nollkaemper and P. Dijkstra (eds.), Review of The Security Council
by Member States, Utrecht: Intersentia (2003), pp. 50-51.
28 See N.J. Schrijver, ‘The Use of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council: An Inter-
national Law Perspective’, in Post, H.G.H. (ed.), International Economic Law and Armed
Conflict, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1994), p. 130.
29 See UN Security Council Resolution 460 (1979).
30 See UN Security Council Resolution 232 (1966), especially paragraph 7 and Resolution 253
(1968), especially paragraph 14. It must be remembered that Article 2(6) of the UN Charter
states that the United Nations “shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United
Nations act in accordance with [the] Principles [set out in Article 2 of the UN Charter] so
far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security”.
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However, there are also important differences with later sanctions regimes.
While the sanctions regime started with the imposition of selective sanctions,
it soon became comprehensive. Furthermore, even the selective sanctions
imposed by the Security Council in relation to Southern Rhodesia were rather
blunt compared to later sanctions regimes. The Security Council simply tar-
geted all primary export products from the Southern Rhodesian State, without
examining their precise contribution to keeping the illegal minority regime
in power.
Therefore the aim of the sanctions was simply to put pressure on the
Rhodesian authorities by targeting all their sources of income. It did not take
into account the impact of the commodity sanctions on the civilian population.
The humanitarian exemptions introduced by the Security Council were not
related to the commodity sanctions, as these were introduced only after the
sanctions regime had become comprehensive.31
The sanctions regime imposed against Southern Rhodesia can therefore
be considered as the first experiment of the Security Council with the instru-
ment of economic sanctions. Arguably, the poor compliance of States with
observing the sanctions constituted an important lesson for the Security Coun-
cil. It laid the foundations for a more active role of the Security Council in
the enforcement of sanctions applied subsequently in the sanctions regime
imposed against Iraq in 1990.
7.3.2 The 661 Iraq Sanctions Regime
Structure and objectives of the sanctions regime
The sanctions regime against Iraq was imposed in 1990 after Iraq’s unlawful
invasion and occupation of neighbouring Kuwait.32 Its original purpose was
to put pressure on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and to restore Kuwait’s
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.33 The measures imposed
by the Security Council included a comprehensive import and export embargo,
as well as an assets freeze.34 Humanitarian exemptions were provided for
medicines and health supplies, as well as essential foodstuffs strictly meant
31 See UN Security Council Resolution 253 (1968), especially paragraph 3(d).
32 For more details regarding this sanctions regime, see K. M. Manusama, The United Nations
Security Council in the post-cold war era : applying the principle of legality, Leiden: Nijhoff (2006),
pp. 138-149; J.M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2007), p. 261-281 and D. Cortright, G.A. Lopez and L. Gerber-Stellingwerf,
‘Sanctions’, in T.G. Weiss & S. Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford,:
Oxford University Press (2007), pp. 350-352. See also the report of the Dutch Commission
of Inquiry upon Iraq, Rapport Commissie van onderzoek besluitvorming Irak (Commissie Davids),
Amsterdam: Boom Publishers, p. 229-236.
33 See UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990), second paragraph of the preamble.
34 Ibid., especially paragraph 3.
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for the civilian population.35 A Sanctions Committee was established to moni-
tor the implementation of the sanctions.36
After Operation Desert Storm, the sanctions regime against Iraq was
maintained but its purposes were modified to accommodate the new situation.
The new objectives included the disarmament of Iraq and the creation of a
fund to pay reparation for damage inflicted by Iraq during the Gulf War.37
In addition, the exemptions from the export embargo were broadened to cover
all foodstuffs submitted to a special committee under a “no objections pro-
cedure”.38 Furthermore, Resolution 687 (1991) provided specifically for the
possibility of lifting the import embargo when Iraq fully complied with the
requirements set out in the resolution.39
A further relaxation of the sanctions regime was realised with the adoption
of the so-called Oil-for-Food programme, which allowed Iraq to export con-
trolled quantities of oil in order to provide the population with the basic means
of subsistence.40 States wishing to import oil from Iraq were to ask the 661
Sanctions Committee to approve each individual purchase,41 and payment
was to be made to an escrow account established by the Secretary-General
exclusively to meet the purposes of Resolution 986 (1995).42
The responsibility for the distribution of humanitarian goods to the civilian
population was left with the government of Iraq, provided that Iraq effectively
guaranteed an equitable distribution of goods to every sector of the Iraqi
population throughout the country.43 However, an exception was made for
three provinces in northern Iraq, where the UN would resume responsibility
for the distribution of humanitarian goods.44
The Oil-for-Food programme was revised once more in Resolution 1409
(2002), which introduced a Goods Review List. The new scheme allowed all
35 Ibid., especially paragraph 3 (c).
36 Ibid., especially paragraph 6.
37 See UN Security Council Resolution 686 and 687 (1991). Reference is made in particular
to Iraq’s liability for environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources as a
result of the setting on fire of Kuwaiti oil wells by Iraq during the conflict. See UN Security
Council Resolution 687 (1991), especially paragraph 16.
38 See UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), especially paragraph 20. The committee
is further referred to as “the 661 sanctions committee”.
39 These requirements include the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of chemical
and biological weapons as well as a prohibition to acquire or develop nuclear weapons.
See UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), especially paragraphs 7-14 and 22.
40 This was a concession to the government of Iraq, which had not accepted the original
proposal for an Oil-for-Food-Programme as envisaged by the Security Council. The original
proposal, set out in UN Security Council Resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), granted
full control over the sale of Iraqi oil to the United Nations.
41 See UN Security Council Resolution 986 (1995), especially paragraph 1(a).
42 Ibid., especially paragraphs 1 (b), 7 and 8.
43 Ibid., preamble and especially paragraph 8 (a) (ii).
44 Ibid., especially paragraph 8 (b).
UN Security Council Sanctions Regimes 271
goods to be exported to Iraq, except those listed in the Goods Review List.45
The programme and the sanctions regime ended shortly after the fall of the
Hussein regime in 2003.46
Targets and addressees of the sanctions obligations
The sanctions regime against Iraq targeted the government of Iraq. Although
it originally also comprised products from Kuwait, it was adjusted as soon
as Kuwait was liberated from Iraqi occupation in early 1991. Furthermore,
like the regime against Southern Rhodesia, all States, including non-member
States of the United Nations, were requested to implement the regime.47
However, the most notable feature of the sanctions regime was the role
of international organizations in the implementation of the sanctions. Even
at an early stage, international organizations were expressly called upon to
implement the arms embargo.48 The role of United Nations organs – in parti-
cular of the Sanctions Committee and the Secretary-General – is the most
significant with regard to implementing the commodity-related sanctions. The
responsibilities of the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Resolution
661 (1990) to monitor the implementation of the sanctions included monitoring
the export of oil from Iraq.49 The Secretary-General was also requested to
open an escrow account for the administration of the oil revenues and to
appoint independent and certified public accountants to audit the account.50
The account was to be used by the United Nations for several purposes,
inter alia, for the provision of humanitarian relief to the Iraqi population, and
to ensure reparation for the damage caused by Iraq to Kuwait during the first
Gulf War. In this respect it is interesting to note that in addition to damage
caused to Kuwaiti assets, Iraq was also held liable for the depletion of natural
resources and environmental damage resulting from its unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait. For this reason, a special compensation fund was
established, supervised by the United Nations Compensation Commission.51
45 See UN Security Council Resolutions 1409 (2002) and 1382 (2001). For the Goods Review
List, see UN Doc. S/2002/515.
46 See UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), especially paragraphs 10 and 16.
47 See UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990), para. 5.
48 See e.g. UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), especially paragraph 25.
49 See UN Security Council Resolutions 986 (1995), especially paragraph 6.
50 Ibid., especially paragraph 7. For more details on the administration of the escrow account,
see Memorandum of understanding between the Secretariat of the United Nations and
the Government of Iraq on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 986 (1995),
UN Doc. S/1996/356 of 20 May 1996.
51 For more details, see O. Elias, ‘Sustainable Development, War Reparations and Environmen-
tal Damage’, in M. Fitzmaurice and M. Szuniewicz, Exploitation of Natural Resources in the
21st Century, The Hague: Kluwer Law International (2003), pp. 67-90 and N.J. Schrijver,
Development without Destruction: The UN and Global Resource Management, United Nations
Intellectual History Project Series, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press
(2010), pp. 179-180.
272 Chapter 7
Appraisal of the sanctions regime
The sanctions regime in Iraq is an example of a comprehensive sanctions
regime. However, as in the case of Southern Rhodesia, specific exemptions
to the sanctions regime were provided for humanitarian purposes. Interesting-
ly, these exemptions related to the export of oil, a conflict-sustaining commo-
dity. This was done through the Oil-for-Food programme, which was aimed
at mitigating the negative effects of the sanctions on the Iraqi population and
ensuring that the Iraqi population had the basic means of subsistence at its
disposal.
One interesting aspect of the sanctions regime against Iraq as it evolved
is that it upheld the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, as well as
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.52 The Oil-for-
Food programme permitted the Iraqi government to export small quantities
of oil in order to provide the Iraqi population with the basic means of sub-
sistence. This was not a deliberate choice, but one dictated by political reality.
Saddam Hussein refused to accept the scheme unless he retained a minimum
of control over the oil resources.
Another interesting aspect of the sanctions regime against Iraq is that it
was the first to envisage an active role for the United Nations in the manage-
ment of natural resources as part of conflict resolution. Although watered
down to accommodate the wishes of Saddam Hussein, the sanctions regime
still assigned a significant role to the UN. The UN assumed full responsibility
for the administration of the revenues obtained from the export of oil from
Iraq. A special fund was created for this purpose, which was maintained even
after the sanctions regime was lifted as a result of the removal of the Saddam
Hussein regime. It was then renamed “Development Fund for Iraq” and its
administration was placed in the hands of the Central Bank of Iraq, monitored
by representatives of the UN, the IMF, the Arab Fund for Social and Economic
Development and the World Bank.53
Arguably, the sanctions regime proved to be instrumental in removing
the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.54 The best proof of
this was delivered in 2003 after the US-led invasion of Iraq. Despite the sus-
picions that Iraq had a vast arsenal of weapons, no such weapons were actually
found. However, it remains unclear in what way the sanctions contributed
to this result. Were the sanctions successful because they curtailed Saddam
Hussein’s ability to stockpile weapons of mass destruction or were they suc-
cessful in compelling Iraq to comply with the conditions set out in Resolution
52 See, e.g., UN Security Council Resolutions 986 (1995), fifth preambular paragraph, which
makes a general reference to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.
53 See UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), especially paragraph 12.
54 See G. Cortright; G.A. Lopez & L. Gerber-Stellingwerf, ‘Sanctions’, in T.G. Weiss & S. Daws,
The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007), p. 351.
For a different view, see the Report of the Dutch Committee of Inquiry on Iraq (Commissie
Davids). This report signals the problem of sanctions busting by States.
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687 (1991) for the removal of the sanctions, which included the destruction
of the existing arsenal of weapons of mass destruction?
The administration of the Oil-for-Food programme by the UN proved
problematic. An Independent Inquiry Committee, established to assess the
performance of the UN in this respect, issued a very critical report in 2005
regarding the UN’s management of Iraqi oil. The Inquiry Committee found
gross irregularities in the administration of the oil proceeds. In addition, it
concluded that the operational structure of the programme had several de-
ficiencies, including a lack of clarity about the distribution of responsibilities
for the implementation of the programme.55 Other reports highlighted the
manipulation of the Oil-for-Food programme by Saddam Hussein and the
impact of the programme on the Iraqi population. All in all, the reports did
not paint a rosy picture of the Oil-for-Food programme.56
Despite its many deficiencies, the Oil-for-Food programme served as an
example for subsequent sanctions regimes. It was a precedent for the more
active involvement of the United Nations, and especially of the Security
Council, in the management of natural resources in the context of conflict
resolution.
7.3.3 Comparing the sanctions regimes
The sanctions regime against Iraq, like the regime against Southern Rhodesia,
targeted the behaviour of a State rather than non-state actors. However, the
objective of the sanctions regime against Iraq differed significantly from that
of the sanctions regime imposed against Southern Rhodesia. While the latter
was aimed at resolving an essentially internal situation, i.e., to bring the
rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,57 the former was aimed first and
foremost at reducing the threat of Iraq for other States.58
Another major difference concerns the operation of the sanctions regimes,
in particular with respect to the role of commodities. In the case of Southern
Rhodesia, the sanctions regime originally targeted selective commodities that
supported the Rhodesian economy, but the measures themselves were all
55 See Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, The
Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, Report of the Committee,
Vol. I (2005), in particular, pp. 60-62.
56 All reports are available through http://www.iic-offp.org/documents.htm (last consulted
on 17 December 2012).
57 See UN Security Council Resolution 232 (1966), second paragraph of the preamble.
58 See UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990), second paragraph of the preamble and
Resolution 687 (1991), paragraph 24 of the preamble. However, it must be noted that
Resolution 687 also mentions Iraq’s threat to use chemical weapons amongst the reasons
for imposing sanctions. This must be read against the background of Saddam Hussein’s
earlier attacks against the Kurdish population in the North.
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inclusive. No exemptions were provided for humanitarian purposes. It was
only after the regime became comprehensive that exemptions were provided,
but these exemptions concerned the import into Rhodesia of humanitarian
goods – including educational materials – and were unrelated to the targeted
commodities. In contrast, the sanctions regime was comprehensive from the
beginning in Iraq, but it did provide specific exemptions for humanitarian
purposes for the export of oil, a conflict-sustaining commodity.
In other words, the sanctions regime in Iraq established a direct link
between the sanctions themselves and exemptions to the regime. As shown
in this chapter, this direct link between sanctions and exemptions became a
characteristic of the approach developed by the Security Council in subsequent
sanctions regimes. However, the sanctions regime imposed against Iraq also
taught the Security Council some important lessons. The comprehensive regime
might have been effective, but it also led to a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. For
these reasons, the Security Council further refined its methods as part of its
policy of “smart sanctions”.59
7.4 SELECTIVE COMMODITY SANCTIONS
This section discusses sanctions regimes that have been imposed for specific
natural resources which were believed to contribute directly to sustaining
armed conflicts. Some of the decisions to impose sanctions against particular
commodities were based on reports by investigative bodies, such as Panels
of Experts and Monitoring Mechanisms established by the Security Council.
However, public concern raised by campaigns by NGOs such as Global Witness
and Partnership Africa Canada has also played a significant role in convincing
the Security Council to take action in particular cases, notably in Angola and
Sierra Leone. Finally, it is striking that in most situations, the Council’s action
was triggered by the national State itself requesting the Security Council to
take measures targeting particular commodities.
59 Mention must be made in this respect to the Interlaken, Bonn and Stockholm processes
which delivered the necessary input for the Security Council’s policy reforms. On these
processes, see the Watson’s Institute background paper on targeted sanctions, available
through<http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/Background_Paper_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf>
(last consulted on 22 March 2013) as well as the white paper prepared by this same institute,
entitled ‘Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Procedures’, 30 March
2006, available through<http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.
pdf> (last consulted on 22 March 2013).
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7.4.1 The 792 Cambodia Sanctions Regime
Structure and objectives of the sanctions regime
The sanctions regime imposed in relation to the conflict in Cambodia differs
significantly from all other sanctions regimes discussed in this chapter. The
most important difference is to be found in its legal basis. The sanctions regime
imposed in relation to the conflict in Cambodia was not imposed by the
Security Council itself. Rather, the Security Council expressed support for
sanctions imposed by the national authorities of Cambodia. This explains also
why the Security Council did not invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which
provides the legal basis for imposing sanctions.60 Furthermore, the Security
Council refrains from using hortatory language in relation to the measures
regarding natural resources, which suggests that these measures are not legally
binding on States. These choices are explained by the political background
of the conflict.
The internal armed conflict in Cambodia started in the late 1960s. In 1975,
the Khmer Rouge took over control and renamed the country “Democratic
Kampuchea”. The Khmer Rouge established a regime of terror and committed
many international crimes.61 In response to the brutalities committed by the
Khmer Rouge regime against the Cambodian population, Vietnamese troops
invaded the country in 1978 to assist Cambodian opposition forces to remove
the brutal Khmer Rouge regime from power. In 1979, the opposition forces
installed a new government and renamed the country “People’s Republic of
Kampuchea”, while the ousted Khmer Rouge regime – together with two other
resistance groups – formed the Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea.62
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia created a difficult situation for the
UN and the General Assembly was deeply divided on the issue. It finally
adopted a resolution greatly regretting the Vietnamese armed intervention
60 It must be noted that the Security Council can only impose sanctions pursuant to Article
41 of the UN Charter, which is part of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Obviously, the
Security Council need not expressly invoke Chapter VII when it imposes sanctions. More-
over, the Security Council can also take binding decisions other than sanctions, either
pursuant to Chapter VI or to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As explained in Chapter 1,
section 1.6.4, whether or not measures imposed by the Security Council are legally binding
or not has to be determined through a careful analysis of the text of the resolution, its
objectives and the context of its adoption.
61 These international crimes, including genocide and crimes against humanity, are currently
being investigated by a hybrid criminal tribunal, set up by the UN and the Cambodian
government. This tribunal is officially called the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea.
62 For more details on the situation in Cambodia, see M. Vickery, Cambodia 1975-82, Boston,
South End Press (1984).
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and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cam-
bodia.63 However, this resolution was adopted with 91 in favour, while 50
States voted against or abstained.64 Meanwhile, the UN Security Council was
paralysed due to serious tensions between China and the Soviet Union, both
supporting their respective allies.65 China, supported by the West, submitted
two draft resolutions addressing the situation in Cambodia, calling on all
parties to cease combat and to withdraw all foreign forces from Cambodia.
Neither was put to the vote.66
This deadlock lasted until the end of the Cold War in 1989, when the five
permanent members of the Security Council, together with all the Cambodian
factions and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, participated in a peace
conference in Paris in order to resolve the Cambodian conflict.67 This was
the first of several meetings aimed at reaching a political settlement. In an
unprecedented move, the five permanent members of the Security Council
issued a statement in 1990 introducing the framework for the Cambodian peace
process.68 The framework consisted of five key elements necessary for the
restoration of peace in Cambodia. These included transitional arrangements
for the administration of Cambodia during the pre-election period, military
arrangements during the transitional period, the preparation of elections under
the auspices of the United Nations, and special measures to assure the pro-
tection of human rights.69
63 UN General Assembly Resolution 34/22 of 14 November 1979, paragraph 2 of the preamble
and especially paragraph 7.
64 See E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013),
pp. 185-187. In addition, R. Falk, ‘The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New
World Order Challenge’, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 17 (1995-1996), pp. 504-
505.
65 China supported the Coalition Government, while the Soviet Union supported the new
government. Tensions ran extremely high when China invaded Vietnam on 17 February
1979 as a countermeasure to Vietnam’s foreign politics, including its invasion of Cambodia.
Chinese troops withdrew a month later. For more details on this conflict and on the difficult
relationship between China and Vietnam during these years, see K.C. Chen, China’s War
With Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications, Stanford University, Hoover Institution
Publication 357 (1987).
66 See Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1975-1980, Chapter XI, p. 396.
67 See L. Keller, ‘Cambodia Conflicts (Kampuchea)’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Inter-
national Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law,
Heidelberg and Oxford University Press (2012), para. 12.
68 Letter dated 30 August 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General, UN Doc. A/45/472 and S/21689, 31 August 1990. For more details on the Paris
Agreements, see S.R. Ratner, ‘The Cambodia Settlement Agreements’, American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 1-41.
69 For more details, see the Letter dated 30 August 1990 from the Permanent Representatives
of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations
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The framework document also outlined two important institutional arrange-
ments. The first was the establishment of a Supreme National Council of
Cambodia (SNC), consisting of all the Cambodian factions, as the legitimate
representative of Cambodia.70 The second was the proposal to increase the
role of the United Nations in the peace process with the establishment of a
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), comprising a
military and civilian component.71 After being accepted by the Cambodian
factions, the Security Council adopted Resolution 668 (1990) in which it
endorsed the framework and welcomed the commitment of the Cambodian
parties to work together with the participants of the Paris conference to elabor-
ate the framework for a comprehensive political settlement.72 This led to the
signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991.
Despite the progress made in many fields, the peace process proved cum-
bersome. One of the major factions, the Khmer Rouge, withdrew from the
peace process and continued fighting. It financed its activities by issuing timber
concessions to Thai logging companies and by smuggling gems.73 The Security
Council repeatedly stressed the need for all the factions to comply with the
peace agreements, but it did not take any further action.74
It was only after the SNC adopted a moratorium on the export of logs from
Cambodia to put pressure on the Khmer Rouge that the Security Council took
further action, although, as stated above, without invoking Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. In Resolution 792 (1992), the Security Council expressed support
for the moratorium. It also requested other States to respect the moratorium
by not importing logs from Cambodia and requested UNTAC to take appropriate
Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/45/472 and S/21689, 31 August 1990.
70 See the Letter dated 30 August 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General, UN Doc. A/45/472 and S/21689, 31 August 1990, Section 1 on transitional arrange-
ments regarding the administration of Cambodia during the pre-election period.
71 See the Letter dated 30 August 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General, UN Doc. A/45/472 and S/21689, 31 August 1990, Section 2 on military arrangements
during the transitional period. For more details on UNTAC’s mandate and its role in the
peace process, see, e.g., S.R. Ratner, ‘The Cambodia Settlement Agreements’, American Journal
of International Law Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 1-41; C. Stahn, The Law and Practice of
International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond, Cambridge Studies in
International and Comparative Law, Cambridge [etc.]: Cambridge University Press (2008),
pp. 269-279; and J. Dobbins et al, The UN’s Role in Nation-Building : From the Congo to Iraq,
Santa Monica, California [etc.] : RAND Corporation (2005), pp. 69-91.
72 UN Security Council Resolution 668 (1990), especially paragraphs 1 and 3.
73 See P. Le Billon & S. Springer, ‘Between War and Peace: Violence and Accommodation
in the Cambodian Logging Sector’, in W. de Jong, D. Donovan, and K. Abe (eds.), Extreme
Conflict and Tropical Forests, New York: Springer (2007), p. 24.
74 See e.g. UN Security Council Resolution 766 (1992), especially paragraph 2; Resolution 783
(1992), paras. 5 and 6.
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measures to ensure the implementation of the moratorium.75 In addition, the
Council requested the SNC to adopt a similar moratorium on the export of
minerals and gems – another important source of income for the Khmer rouge
rebels – “in order to protect Cambodia’s natural resources”.76
Despite the non-mandatory nature of these measures, a number of countries
followed suit by imposing import embargos on logs from Cambodia. In addi-
tion, UNTAC took several measures to implement the moratorium, including
the deployment of border control teams to monitor violations of the mora-
torium on the export of logs by land or sea and by raising the number of its
checkpoints along the Cambodia-Thailand border.77 Subsequently the SNC
adopted a moratorium on minerals and gems, as requested by the Security
Council.
The Security Council commended the decision of the SNC to adopt the
moratorium on minerals and gems in its Resolution 810 (1993). It also com-
mended the SNC on its decision to consider limits to the export of sawn timber
from Cambodia in order to protect its natural resources.78 Furthermore, it
expressed support for steps taken by the Technical Advisory Committee on
Management and Sustainable Exploitation of Natural Resources established
by UNTAC to implement these measures.79
These were the last references made by the Security Council to natural
resources. Subsequent resolutions relating to Cambodia focused on the elections
that were organized. After the establishment of a democratically elected
government in Cambodia, the Security Council ended the peacekeeping mission
with Resolution 880 (1993).
Targets and addressees of the sanctions
The commodity measures clearly targeted the Khmer Rouge because of its
failure to cooperate in the peace process. However, in practice the scope of
the sanctions was broader. The measures did not distinguish between natural
resources traded by the Khmer Rouge and natural resources traded by the
government. Instead, the measures banned all round logs, minerals and gems
originating from Cambodia. In this respect, they were rather blunt. In sub-
sequent sanctions regimes, including those for Angola, Sierra Leone and
Liberia, the Security Council refined its commodity measures in more detail.
The commodity measures were addressed to States. They were to respect
the moratorium imposed by the SNC. In addition, the Security Council assigned
75 UN Security Council 792 (1992), especially paragraph 13.
76 Ibid., especially paragraph 14.
77 Yearbook of the United Nations 1993, p. 363.
78 UN Security Council Resolution 810 (1993), especially paragraph 16 read in conjunction
with the sixth paragraph of the preamble.
79 UN Security Council Resolution 810 (1993), especially paragraph 16. For more details on
this Advisory Committee, see J. Dobbins et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the
Congo to Iraq, Santa Monica, California [etc.]: RAND Corporation (2005), p. 87.
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an important role to UNTAC, the peacekeeping mission operating in Cambodia,
to take appropriate measures to secure the implementation of the mora-
torium.80 This is the first time that a peacekeeping mission received an express
mandate to assist in implementing measures related to natural resources.81
Appraisal of the sanctions regime
The Security Council resolutions related to the Cambodian conflict were
remarkable in several respects. For the first time the Security Council focused
directly on those commodities that were primarily associated with the funding
of an armed conflict. Secondly, the resolutions related to Cambodia were the
first to target a non-state armed group rather than a State.
Another remarkable aspect concerns the references in the Security Council’s
resolutions to the protection of Cambodia’s natural resources as a reason for
the measures.82 This is the only occasion on which the Security Council has
based the adoption of commodity measures on the need to protect natural
resources for their intrinsic value.
Furthermore, none of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council to
address the situation in Cambodia invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This
was not only the case for the resolutions containing commodity measures, but
for all the resolutions adopted to further the Paris Peace Agreements. It seems
that the legal basis for the measures of the Security Council in relation to
Cambodia, which includes binding as well as non-binding measures, was
Chapter VI of the UN Charter rather than Chapter VII. The Security Council
was enacting its role as facilitator and adjudicator in the pacific settlement
of disputes, rather than its role as guardian of collective security.
These facilitating and adjudicating roles characterised the approach of the
Security Council throughout the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. During
the entire peace process, the Security Council struck a careful balance between
collective UN action in the form of a peace support mission and local ownership
of the peace process through the establishment of the Supreme National
Council of Cambodia. This is reflected in the mandate of UNTAC, which was
based on the SNC delegating the UN “all powers necessary to ensure the imple-
mentation” of the peace agreement.83 In other words, the mandate of UNTAC
was not based on the exercise of mandatory powers under the UN Charter
but on State consent.
80 UN Security Council 792 (1992), especially paragraph 13.
81 For an excellent overview of peacekeeping missions with a mandate including natural
resources, see UNEP, ‘Greening the Blue Helmets Environment, Natural Resources and
UN Peacekeeping Operations’, Part II (2012).
82 UN Security Council 792 (1992), especially paragraph 14; UN Security Council Resolution
810 (1993), especially paragraph 16 read in conjunction with the sixth paragraph of the
preamble.
83 Article 6 of the Paris Peace Agreement.
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The commodity measures should also be considered in this context. Rather
than imposing sanctions itself, the Security Council supported measures taken
at the national level; the measures were not imposed from the “outside” but
from the “inside”. The reason for the Security Council to proceed in this way
must be attributed to a large extent to ideological differences between the
permanent members regarding the Cambodian conflict. These ideological
differences prevented the Security Council from taking firmer action. China,
for example, abstained from voting in favour of Resolution 792 (1992) because
it feared that the commodity measures laid down in the resolution would
destroy the already very fragile peace process by alienating the Khmer Rouge
faction from it.84 These considerations explained the Council’s decision not
to impose mandatory commodity sanctions in relation to Cambodia.
However, this decision could also explain why the logging embargo was
not particularly effective. The non-mandatory nature of the commodity
measures did not sufficiently convince neighbouring countries, particularly
Thailand, to follow suit. It was until 1995 that Thailand finally closed its
borders to logs originating from Cambodia. Once it did, the effects on the
military capacity of the Khmer Rouge became immediately clear. The logging
embargo considerably weakened them. However, it still took years before their
resistance was finally broken down. Although the logging embargo did signi-
ficantly reduce the Khmer Rouge’s military capability, small groups remained
active until the early 2000s.85
7.4.2 The 864 UNITA Sanctions Regime
The structure and objectives of the sanctions regime
The sanctions regime imposed in relation to the conflict in Angola was
intended to put an end to the civil war between the Angolan government and
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) that had
devastated the country since its independence in 1975.86 During most of the
conflict, the country had been trapped by the rivalry between the Cold War
powers, with the United States financing UNITA and the Soviet Union backing
the Angolan government. After the end of the Cold War, with revenues drying
84 Resolution 792 did not only express support for the moratorium on logs, but also contained
a call on States to prevent the supply of petroleum products to Khmer Rouge occupied
areas (para. 10). China feared that the adoption of such measures “would further increase
differences and sharpen contradictions, and thus could lead to new, complicated problems”.
See Yearbook of the United Nations 1992, p. 259.
85 See P. Le Billon & S. Springer, ‘Between War and Peace: Violence and Accommodation
in the Cambodian Logging Sector’, in W. de Jong, D. Donovan, and K. Abe (eds.), Extreme
Conflict and Tropical Forests, New York, Springer (2007), pp. 17-36.
86 For more details regarding this sanctions regime, see J.M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions
and the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007), pp. 334-344.
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up, the parties found new ways of financing their armed struggle in revenues
generated from the extraction of natural resources such as oil and diamonds.87
Nevertheless, when the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime in
1993 to compel UNITA to cooperate with the implementation of the peace
agreements concluded two years earlier with the Angolan government, the
sanctions regime did not cover natural resources.88 Furthermore, when the
Security Council imposed additional measures on UNITA in 1997, it did not
address the trade in natural resources to fund the armed conflict.89
It was not until 1998 that the Security Council decided, as part of a larger
package of financial and representative sanctions, to directly target the trade
in natural resources. In Resolution 1173 (1998), the Security Council decided
to impose an embargo on “all diamonds that are not controlled through the
Certificate of Origin regime of the [Angolan government]”, as well as a pro-
hibition against selling or supplying mining equipment to persons or entities
in “areas of Angola to which State administration has not been extended”.90
The diamond embargo was the first of its kind in the history of the Security
Council.
Following reports on States’ violations of the sanctions on arms, petroleum
and diamonds, particularly by African and Eastern European countries, the
Security Council decided to establish a panel of experts, under the chairman-
ship of Robert Fowler, to look into the matter.91 This panel of experts investi-
gated the alleged violations of the sanctions regime in great detail, outlining
the involvement of several African and European States in busting the arms
and petroleum sanctions. In relation to diamonds, the Panel came to the
damning conclusion that the “extremely lax controls and regulations governing
the Antwerp market facilitate and perhaps even encourage illegal trading
activity”.92
The Panel also issued several recommendations, including some with regard
to diamonds. It considered that possibilities should be explored to devise a
87 See K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (ed.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed
and Grievance, (2003), Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 23–24.
88 In Resolution 864 (1993), the Security Council decided under Chapter VII that all States
were to prevent the sale or supply to UNITA of weapons and related materiel as well as
of petroleum and petroleum products. See UN Security Council Resolution 864 (1993),
especially paragraphs 16 and 19.
89 Resolution 1127 (1997) complemented the sanctions regime with travel and aviation sanc-
tions and further provided for additional measures to be taken against UNITA if it failed
to implement its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council
Resolutions.
90 UN Security Council Resolution 1173 (1998), especially para. 12(b) and (c). The diamond
embargo was brought in effect through UN Security Council Resolution 1176 (1998).
91 UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), especially paragraph 6. This panel of experts
was formally replaced by a monitoring mechanism consisting of a maximum of five experts.
See UN Security Council Resolution 1295 (2000).
92 Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA,
10 March 2000, UN Doc. S/2000/203, paragraph 87.
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system of controls “that would allow for increased transparency and
accountability in the control of diamonds from the source of origin to the
bourses”. In addition, the panel recommended that “the diamond industry
develop and implement more effective arrangements to ensure that its members
worldwide abide by the relevant sanctions against UNITA”.93
The Fowler Report was an important trigger for further developments to
curtail the trade in “conflict diamonds”. First of all, the Report’s policy of
naming and shaming, viz. the explicit identification of particular States and
companies as sanctions busters, was an important motivation for these States
and companies to stop trading with UNITA, thus depriving UNITA of its
funding.94 Secondly, it inspired the creation of an international certificate
system for rough diamonds, the Kimberley Process for the Certification of
Rough Diamonds.95
In its Resolution 1295 (2000), the Security Council implicitly endorsed the
recommendations of the Panel of Experts. It also emphasised that the imple-
mentation of the diamond embargo required “an effective Certificate of Origin
regime” and welcomed steps towards devising a more comprehensive system
of controls, “including arrangements that would allow for increased trans-
parency and accountability in the control of diamonds from their point of
origin to the bourses”.96 In this respect the Council explicitly referred to the
first meeting that led to the adoption of the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme in 2002, which was scheduled to be held in May 2000 in Kimberley,
South Africa.
In the same resolution the Security Council established a “Monitoring
Mechanism” to replace the Panel of Experts. This body published a total of
six reports, disclosing in great detail the structures for the mining of and
trading in diamonds from UNITA-controlled regions.97 One of the principal
contributions of the reports is that they helped to provide an understanding
of the methods used by UNITA to circumvent the Security Council sanctions
regarding rough diamonds. Together with the report of the Panel of Experts,
the reports of the Monitoring Mechanism contributed greatly to the design
of more effective Certificate of Origin regimes.
93 Ibid., paragraphs 113 and 114.
94 See I. Winkelmann, ‘Angola’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2012), Vol. I, pp. 400-408, para. 26.
95 The Kimberley Process is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. It can be noted
here that the Kimberley Process is a voluntary certification regime for rough diamonds,
developed by States, civil society and the diamond business in order to address the issue
of diamonds used by armed groups to fuel conflicts.
96 UN Security Council Resolution 1295 (2000), especially paragraphs 16-19. For the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme, see the following chapter.
97 For the reports of the Monitoring Mechanism, see Documents Relating to the Committee
Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola.
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The sanctions regime finally came to an end in December 2002, when UNITA
started to cooperate with the implementation of the peace accords.98 By then
the national certificate of origin had been replaced by membership of Angola
to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The introduction of this scheme,
backed by relevant Security Council resolutions, together with the Fowler’s
report policy of naming and shaming, can be regarded as important factors
that contributed to weakening UNITA, leading to the solution of the conflict.
Targets and addressees of the sanctions obligations
The sanctions regime was adopted at the request of the Angolan government
and consisted entirely of measures imposed against UNITA.99 It was the first
sanctions regime to directly target a non-state actor pursuant to Chapter VII
of the UN Charter. The reason for imposing sanctions on UNITA was because
it was failing to implement the peace accords concluded between UNITA and
the Angolan government. After losing the democratic elections held following
the peace accords which were concluded in 1991, UNITA continued to fight
the government. A second peace agreement concluded in 1994, the Lusaka
Protocol, did not change the situation in any way. The sanctions regime was
intended to put pressure on UNITA to cooperate in reaching a political settle-
ment to the conflict in Angola, inter alia, by curtailing its ability to pursue its
objectives by military means.
The Security Council measures adopted in relation to diamonds addressed
a variety of actors. Obviously States were the primary addressees responsible
for the implementation of the sanctions and also the only entities that were
addressed in mandatory terms. According to Resolution 1173 (1998), States
were to take “the necessary measures” to prohibit the “direct or indirect
import” of Angolan diamonds to their territory.100
In order to make the diamond embargo more effective, the Security Council,
called upon States in Resolution 1295 (2000), “to cooperate with the diamond
industry to develop and implement more effective arrangements” to ensure
that members of the diamond industry worldwide abide by the embargo
against UNITA. The Security Council also addressed the diamond industry,
though mainly to invite the Belgian High Diamond Council to continue its
efforts to work with the Sanctions Committee and States in order to “devise
practical measures to limit access by UNITA to the legitimate diamond mar-
ket”.101
98 See UN Security Council Resolution 1448 (2002).
99 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (1993-1995), Chapter XI, ‘Consideration of
the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, Part III on Article 41, section B, Case 4’,
available through <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/>. See also UN Doc. S/PV.3277
of 15 September 1993 for the speech of the Angolan government representative at the
Security Council on the occasion of the adoption of Resolution 864 (1993).
100 UN Security Council Resolution 1173 (1998), especially paragraph 12(b).
101 UN Security Council Resolution 1295 (2000), especially paragraph 17.
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Appraisal of the sanctions regime
The sanctions regime adopted in relation to Angola is special for several
reasons. It is the first in a series of sanctions regimes addressing the trade in
rough diamonds from conflict regions. It is also the first sanctions regime in
which the Security Council experimented with commodity sanctions targeting
specific entities, in the sense that the commodity sanctions targeted only the
trade in diamonds by rebel groups and not by the Angolan authorities. Such
a distinction was made possible by the use of a certificate of origin regime
to provide exemptions to the sanctions. This is an innovation compared with
the sanctions regime adopted in relation to Cambodia, which had also targeted
one particular commodity, but the moratorium on round logs had extended
to all logs originating from Cambodia, whether exported by the Khmer Rouge
or by the Cambodian authorities.
Furthermore, the sanctions regime against UNITA can be seen as a catalyst
for the Security Council’s structural approaches to curbing the illicit flow in
natural resources. The problem of diamond smuggling in contravention of
the Angolan sanctions regime motivated the Security Council to look beyond
its own powers and search for alternative solutions to address the problem.
The Council’s endorsement of the proposal to convene a meeting of experts
in Kimberley, South Africa to devise “a system of controls […] including
arrangements that would allow for increased transparency and accountability
in the control of diamonds from their point of origin to the bourses” should
be seen in this light.102 This was a first – cautious – movement towards what
later became the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds.
The last point of interest is that the Council set explicit requirements for
a system of controls for rough diamonds. In this respect, the Security Council
mentioned the elements of effectiveness, transparency and accountability.103
The Kimberley meeting in 2000 explicitly referred to these requirements.104
Moreover, the Angolan sanctions regime set an example for all subsequent
sanctions regimes relating to the trade in particular commodities, which all
draw on these requirements of effectiveness, transparency and accountability.
The following sections show that the Security Council has continued to develop
and refine criteria for the management of natural resources from conflict
regions.
102 Ibid., especially paragraph 18.
103 Ibid., especially paragraphs 16 and 18.
104 See Kimberley Process, Third Year Review, November 2006, p. 12, available through http//
www.kimberleyprocess.com (last consulted on 20 December 2012).
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7.4.3 The 1132 Sierra Leone Sanctions Regime
Structure and objectives of the sanctions regime
The 1132 sanctions regime imposed in relation to the conflict in Sierra Leone
aimed to put pressure on the military junta which had taken over power there
following a coup d’état in 1997, to restore the democratically elected govern-
ment.105 The military junta was composed of two rebel groups, the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
The AFRC was a rebel group of soldiers of the Sierra Leonean army, set up
in 1997 by Johnny Paul Koroma to take over power in Sierra Leone. The RUF
was a rebel group sponsored by the Liberian Charles Taylor, which had spread
terror throughout Sierra Leone since its establishment in 1991.106
The sanctions regime imposed under Resolution 1132 (1997) consisted of
a travel ban, an arms embargo and a prohibition against exporting petroleum
and petroleum products to Sierra Leone.107 It did not comprise sanctions
related to the import of natural resources from Sierra Leone, despite ample
indications that diamonds constituted an important source of income for the
rebel groups united in the military junta.108 It was not until after the military
junta had been driven from power by UN peacekeeping forces and the demo-
cratically elected government had been reinstated that the Security Council
resorted to diamond sanctions, consisting of an import embargo on rough
diamonds from Sierra Leone for all States.109
The embargo was based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter and was to be
supervised by the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Resolution
1132 (1997).110 In addition, the Security Council called for an exploratory
hearing to assess the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict and the
link between the trade in Sierra Leone diamonds and the trade in arms and
related materiél in violation of resolution 1171 (1998).111 The Council also
created a Panel of Experts, inter alia, to collect information on the link between
105 See UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997), paragraph 7 of the preamble and especially
paragraph 1.
106 On 18 May 2012, the Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone sentenced Charles
Taylor to a prison term of 50 years for its involvement in the armed conflict in Sierra Leone.
107 See UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997), especially paragraphs 5 and 6.
108 It was an NGO report, issued in January 2000 by the Canadian NGO Partnership Africa
Canada (PAC), entitled The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds, and Human Security,
that spurred the debate on Sierra Leone. A report issued in December 2000 by the Panel
of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) confirms that,
at least from 1995 on, diamonds have been a major source of funding for the RUF. The
report also shows that the AFRC, during its short reign, benefitted from the exploitation
of natural resources as well. See the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone of
20 December 2000, UN Doc. S/2000/1195, paras. 65-111.
109 See UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), especially paragraph 1.
110 Ibid., especially paragraph 7.
111 Ibid., especially paragraph 12.
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the trade in diamonds and the trade in arms, and to report on strengthening
the implementation of the sanctions with observations and recommenda-
tions.112 The Panel issued a report later that year, revealing in great detail
the ways in which diamonds funded the activities of the RUF.113
The sanctions regime comprised all rough diamonds originating in Sierra
Leone, but it exempted from the measures those rough diamonds controlled
by the government of Sierra Leone with a certificate of origin regime to be
set up by the government in cooperation with other States and relevant organ-
izations.114 As in the case of Angola, the Security Council required that the
regime should be “effective”.115
The diamond embargo was renewed twice before it was lifted in 2003 “in
the light of the Government of Sierra Leone’s increased efforts to control and
manage its diamond industry and ensure proper control over diamond mining
areas, and the Government’s full participation in the Kimberley Process”.116
The arms embargo and the travel ban were maintained until 2010, when the
Security Council finally terminated the sanctions regime, after the government
of Sierra Leone had fully re-established its control over the territory, and when
all non-governmental forces had been disarmed and demobilized.
Targets and addressees of the sanctions obligations
The sanctions regime generally prohibited the import of all rough diamonds
originating from Sierra Leone, with an exception for diamonds of which the
origin could be properly established with a Certificate of Origin. As subsequent
reports by both the Sanctions Committee and the Panel of Experts showed,117
the primary targets of the sanctions regime were non-state armed groups
fighting against the government of Sierra Leone, in particular the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF).118
112 Ibid., especially paragraph 19.
113 See the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone of 20 December 2000, UN Doc. S/2000/
1195, paras. 65-111.
114 See UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), especially paragraphs 2-5.
115 Ibid., especially paragraph 2.
116 See Resolutions 1385 (2001) and 1446 (2002) for the extensions of the diamond sanctions
and UN Doc. SC/7778 of 5 June 2003 for the press statement by the president of the Security
Council commenting upon the decision not to renew diamond sanctions against Sierra
Leone.
117 See, e.g., Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/1195, December 2000.
118 UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) refers to a report of the Secretary-General
recommending the Security Council to strengthen its sanctions regime by including “meas-
ures which would prevent RUF commanders from reaping the benefits of their illegal
exploitation of mineral resources, in particular diamonds”. Fourth Report of the Secretary
General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/455 of 19 May 2000,
para. 94.
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The obligation to implement the sanctions was imposed on States. They
were to take “the necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import
of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory”.119 Furthermore,
one novel feature of the sanctions regime was that other entities, including
in particular the diamond industry, were to play an active role in devising
structural approaches to solving the problem of conflict diamonds.
The Security Council therefore requested States, international organizations
and other bodies, including representatives from the diamond industry, to
provide assistance to the government of Sierra Leone to set up an effective
Certification of Origin Regime and invited them to “offer assistance to the
Government of Sierra Leone to contribute to the further development of a well-
structured and well-regulated diamond industry that provides for the identifi-
cation of the provenance of rough diamonds”.120
Appraisal of the sanctions regime
The 1132 Sierra Leone sanctions regime resembles the 864 Angola regime in
several respects. First, both sanctions regimes used diamond sanctions to stop
the flow of revenues to a non-state armed group. In the case of Angola, the
targeted group was UNITA; in the case of Sierra Leone, it was principally the
RUF. In addition, both regimes exempted diamonds controlled by a Certificate
of Origin Regime. Finally, both regimes welcomed the efforts of the diamond
industry to devise practical solutions to the issue of conflict diamonds.
The 1132 Sierra Leone sanctions regime went a step further than the 864
Angola sanctions regime. Resolution 1306 explicitly encouraged the diamond
industry “to work with the Government of Sierra Leone and the Committee
to develop methods and working practices to facilitate the effective implemen-
tation of this resolution”.121 As noted by the United Kingdom upon the adop-
tion of the resolution, this direct appeal to the diamond industry was an
unusual feature of Resolution 1306.122 Arguably, it shows the Security Coun-
cil’s growing awareness of the need to involve the business community in the
implementation of sanctions.
In addition, the Security Council took the unprecedented step of calling
for an exploratory hearing on the issue of diamonds in Sierra Leone, involving
representatives of interested States and regional organizations, the diamond
industry and other relevant experts. This was the first time the Security Council
organized a hearing for the purpose of gaining a better understanding on an
issue related to the perpetuation of an armed conflict. Moreover, the aim was
not only to gain a better understanding of the causes of the conflict, but also
119 UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), especially paragraph 1.
120 Ibid., especially paragraphs 3 and 11.
121 Ibid., especially paragraph 10.
122 See UN Doc. S/PV.4168 (2000), p. 4: “The draft resolution is unusual in its direct appeal
to the diamond trade.”
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to find solutions for the problem of diamonds funding it. The topics discussed
at the hearing included the ways and means of developing a sustainable and
well-regulated diamond industry in Sierra Leone.123
Another exceptional feature of the sanctions regime is that the Security
Council established a Panel of Experts only after imposing the diamond
sanctions. This implies that the decision of the Security Council to impose the
diamond sanctions was based on information from third sources, including
NGO reports.124 The Council also acted on the request of the Sierra Leonean
government, which had asked it to impose a trade embargo on Sierra Leonean
diamonds as early as 1999.125
7.4.4 The 1343 Liberia Sanctions Regime
Structure and objectives of the sanctions regimes
The sanctions regime imposed in relation to Liberia by Resolution 1343 was
the second sanctions regime to be imposed against Liberia. It immediately
followed and replaced the first sanctions regime established in 1992 with the
aim of ending the civil war between the government of Liberia and the
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), an opposition movement led by
Charles Taylor.126 When Charles Taylor took power in the country, this
sanctions regime was terminated and replaced by the new 1343 sanctions
regime.127 While the previous sanctions regime had consisted only of an arms
embargo, the new sanctions regime included diamond sanctions.
The aim of the 1343 sanctions regime was to address Liberia’s support for
the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and other rebel groups
operating in the West African region.128 Therefore in Resolution 1343 (2001),
123 See the summary report along with observations from the Chairman on the exploratory
hearing on Sierra Leonean diamonds, held on 31 July and 1 August 2000, Annex to UN
Doc. S/2000/1150 of 4 December 2000.
124 See notably the report released by the Partnership Africa Canada, The Heart of the Matter:
Sierra Leone, Diamonds, and Human Security, January 2000.
125 See the remarks of the representative of Sierra Leone at the Council debate, which preceded
the adoption of Resolution 1306 (2000) as well as the letter sent to the Council by the Sierra
Leonean government, both identifying diamonds as a root cause of the conflict in Sierra
Leone. See UN Doc. S/PV.4168 of 5 July 2000 and UN Doc. S/2000/641 of 28 June 2000.
126 See UN Security Council Resolution 788 (1992). For more details regarding this sanctions
regime, see J.M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2007), pp. 316-319.
127 See UN Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001).
128 See the preceding section of this chapter and the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra
Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/1195 of December 2000. This report concluded that the illicit trade
in Sierra Leonean diamonds through Liberia was not possible without the involvement
of high Liberian officials. On 18 May 2012, the Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra
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the Security Council determined “that the active support provided by the
Government of Liberia for armed rebel groups in neighbouring countries, and
in particular its support for the RUF in Sierra Leone, constitutes a threat to
international peace and security in the region”.129 In pursuance of Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council demanded that the government
of Liberia “cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds
which are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the
Government of Sierra Leone” and called upon the government “to establish
an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in rough diamonds that is
transparent and internationally verifiable”.130
In addition, other States were to “take the necessary measures to prevent
the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or
not such diamonds originated in Liberia” and were called upon to “take
appropriate measures to ensure that individuals and companies in their juris-
diction […] act in conformity with United Nations embargoes […] and, as
appropriate, take the necessary judicial and administrative action to end any
illegal activities by those individuals and companies”.131 Furthermore, the
Security Council urged diamond-exporting countries in West Africa to adopt
Certificate of Origin regimes for the trade in rough diamonds with the assist-
ance of other States and of relevant international organizations and bodies.132
The supervision of these sanctions was assigned to a sanctions committee
established by the same resolution.133 In addition, the Security Council
requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts with the man-
date to investigate, inter alia, violations of the sanctions and “possible links
between the exploitation of natural resources and other forms of economic
activity in Liberia, and the fuelling of conflict in Sierra Leone and neighbouring
countries”.134
In 2002, following two reports of the Panel of Experts which both concluded
that the exploitation of timber provided the government of Liberia with large
amounts of money used to provide support to the (former) RUF and other rebel
Leone sentenced Charles Taylor to a prison term of 50 years for its involvement in the
armed conflict in Sierra Leone.
129 UN Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 9 of the preamble.
130 Ibid., especially paragraphs 2 (c) and 15. For more information on the sanctions regime
imposed in relation to the conflict in Sierra Leone, see the preceding section of this chapter.
131 Ibid.,, especially paragraph 6 and 21.
132 Ibid., especially paragraph 16.
133 Ibid., especially paragraph 14.
134 Ibid., especially paragraph 19.
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groups,135 the Security Council decided to extend the 1343 regime to include
timber sanctions.
The first resolution adopted by the Security Council in this respect provided
that “the active support provided by the Government of Liberia to armed rebel
groups in the region, in particular to former Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
combatants who continue to destabilize the region, constitutes a threat to
international peace and security in the region”.136 In pursuance of Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, the Council called upon the government of Liberia to
“take urgent steps, including through the establishment of transparent and
internationally verifiable audit regimes, to ensure that revenue derived by the
Government of Liberia from the […] Liberian timber industry is used for
legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes”.137
As this resolution had no effect on the Liberian government’s practices,
the Security Council adopted a second resolution that included the timber
sanctions. Resolution 1478 (2003) considered that the government of Liberia
had not demonstrated that the revenue derived from the Liberian timber
industry “is used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development pur-
poses, and is not used in violation of Resolution 1408 (2002)”.138 Therefore
the Security Council decided in pursuance of Chapter VII that “all States shall
take the necessary measures to prevent […] the import into their territories
of all round logs and timber products originating in Liberia”.139
In addition, in response to reports indicating that the sanctions targeting
the transit of Sierra Leonean diamonds through Liberia had caused a reverse
flow of Liberian rough diamonds being smuggled out of the country and into
neighbouring certification schemes,140 the Security Council reiterated its
earlier call for the Liberian government to establish a Certificate of Origin
regime for Liberian rough diamonds.141 The Security Council explicitly called
upon the Liberian government to bear in mind “the plans for the international
certification scheme under the Kimberley Process” and proposed to exempt
from the embargo those rough diamonds controlled by a transparent and
internationally verifiable Certificate of Origin regime.142
135 Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), Para-
graph 19, concerning Liberia, 17 October 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/1015, paras. 309-315 and
319-350; Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1395 (2002), paragraph 4, in relation to Liberia, 11 April 2002, UN Doc. S/2002/470, paras.
138-150.
136 UN Security Council Resolution 1408 (2002), paragraph 11 of the preamble.
137 Ibid., especially paragraph 10.
138 UN Security Council Resolution 1478 (2003), especially paragraph 16.
139 Ibid., especially paragraph 17 (a).
140 See the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1395 (2002), paragraph 4, in relation to Liberia, UN Doc. S/2002/470, para. 136.
141 UN Security Council Resolution 1408 (2002), especially paragraph 7.
142 Ibid., especially paragraphs 7 and 8.
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In a resolution adopted after the official launch of the Kimberley Process
for the Certification of Rough Diamonds, the Security Council reiterated its
appeal to the Liberian government to adopt a transparent and internationally
verifiable Certificate of Origin Regime and also demanded that the regime
be “fully compatible with the Kimberley Process”.143
The 1343 sanctions regime was terminated later that year in response to
political changes in Liberia, in particular the departure of President Taylor
and the installation of a new transitional government. Nevertheless, in the
light of the fragile situation in the country, the timber and diamond sanctions
were brought under a new sanctions regime. As this sanctions regime had
a completely different character, it is discussed in the following section.
Targets and addressees of the sanctions obligations
The 1343 sanctions regime was aimed at preventing the Liberian government
from financing non-state armed groups, in particular the RUF. The sanctions
regime directly addressed the government of Liberia led by Charles Taylor,
which was held responsible for financing these rebel factions. Obviously the
sanctions regime indirectly targeted the rebel factions sponsored by the Taylor
government.
The responsibility for the implementation of the diamond and timber
sanctions was placed first and foremost on States. All States were to implement
the embargos on rough diamonds and round logs. Furthermore, in order to
stop the busting of sanctions on diamonds originating from Liberia when they
were smuggled to neighbouring countries, additional appeals were made to
diamond-exporting countries in West Africa. These States were requested to
adopt Certificate of Origin regimes for the trade in rough diamonds, assisted
by other States and relevant international organizations and bodies. Except
for providing assistance to States, the resolutions did not impose obligations
on international organizations or non-state actors, such as civil society and
corporations.
Appraisal of the sanctions regime
The 1343 sanctions regime addressed the role of a State in providing support
to non-state armed groups. In this sense, the sanctions regime differs from
earlier sanctions regimes imposed against States. The sanctions regimes against
Southern Rhodesia and Iraq also targeted States, but primarily as parties to
an armed conflict. In the case of Liberia, the link with an armed conflict is
indirect. The sanctions regime was aimed at preventing the Liberian State from
interfering in other conflicts in the region to which Liberia itself was not a
party.
However, subsequent Panel reports concluded that the sanctions barely
had any effect on the trade in diamonds and timber. This could partly explain
143 UN Security Council Resolution 1478 (2003), especially paragraph 13.
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why the Security Council resorted to other initiatives to strengthen the effect-
iveness of the sanctions, especially to the Kimberley Process. In fact, it is
interesting to note that the Security Council explicitly recognised the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme as the regime of preference for the certification
of rough diamonds. This is a new development compared to the sanctions
regimes adopted for Angola and Sierra Leone. Furthermore, as in the earlier
sanctions regimes, the Security Council linked the adoption of a certification
scheme to the lifting of sanctions.
The emphasis placed by the Security Council on the need to ensure that
revenue derived by the Government of Liberia from the Liberian timber
industry was used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development pur-
poses was another interesting aspect.144 The Security Council could have
confined itself to addressing the link between timber and the fuelling of the
armed conflict. However, the Security Council implicitly established a link
between the timber sanctions and the obligation of a State to use its natural
resources for national development and the well-being of the population, as
a corollary to its right to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural
resources, thus going much further than the traditional context of peace and
security. This link was confirmed in the subsequent sanctions regime in relation
to Liberia, discussed below. Thus the Security Council showed that it is pre-
pared to withhold respect for the principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources if a State fails to respect the corollary obligation to use the
natural resources for national development.
The final interesting aspect is related to the many references made by the
Security Council to improvements in governance over natural resources. In
relation to diamonds, the Security Council referred to an effective Certificate
of Origin regime that is transparent and internationally verifiable. Similarly, in
relation to the timber sanctions, the Security Council referred to the establish-
ment of transparent and internationally verifiable audit regimes. In the latter case,
these audit regimes served to introduce more general improvements in govern-
ance in the timber sector. In both cases, these improvements in governance
were linked to the possibility of lifting sanctions. These references to effective,
transparent and internationally verifiable regimes reveal a growing tendency
of the Security Council to rely on improvements in governance over natural
resources as an effective means to address the link between natural resources
and armed conflicts.
144 UN Security Council Resolution 1408 (2002), especially paragraph 10.
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7.4.5 The 1521 Liberia Sanctions Regime
Structure and objectives of the sanctions regime
Resolution 1521 (2003) ended the sanctions regime imposed against the govern-
ment of Liberia for its support to rebel groups in the West African region and
imposed a new one aimed at addressing the threat to international peace and
security in West Africa posed by the proliferation of illegal arms financed with
the illegal exploitation of timber and diamonds.145 One of the aims of the
sanctions regime was to assist the new transitional government of Liberia to
regain control over the diamond and timber industries in order to stop these
natural resources from fuelling armed conflict in the region.
Resolution 1521 (2003) was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
It included both diamond and timber sanctions. In relation to diamonds, the
Security Council instructed all States “to take the necessary measures to
prevent the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia to
their territory, whether or not such diamonds originated in Liberia”.146 Fur-
thermore, the resolution called upon the National Transitional Government
of Liberia “to establish an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in
Liberian rough diamonds that is transparent and internationally verifiable”
and encouraged the government “to take steps to join the Kimberley Process
as soon as possible”.147
In relation to timber, Resolution 1521 (2003) stipulated that all States were
to take the necessary measures “to prevent the import into their territory of
all round logs and timber products originating in Liberia”.148 The Security
Council also urged the government “to establish its full authority and control
over the timber producing areas, and to take all necessary steps to ensure that
government revenues from the Liberian timber industry are not used to fuel
conflict or otherwise in violation of the Council’s resolutions but are used for
legitimate purposes for the benefit of the Liberian people, including develop-
ment”.149 To this end, the Liberian government was encouraged “to establish
oversight mechanisms for the timber industry that will promote responsible
business practices, and to establish transparent accounting and auditing
mechanisms”.150
The Security Council called upon States, international organizations and
other relevant bodies to offer assistance to the Liberian government to achieve
the above-mentioned objectives, including assistance with regard to “the
promotion of responsible and environmentally sustainable business practices
145 UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), paragraphs 7 and 8 of the preamble.
146 Ibid., paragraph 6 of the preamble.
147 Ibid., especially paragraphs 7 and 9.
148 Ibid., especially paragraph 10.
149 Ibid., especially paragraph 11.
150 Ibid., especially paragraph 13.
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in the timber industry”,151 in order to ensure that the diamond and timber
sanctions could eventually be lifted.
In response to the Security Council’s call to assist the Liberian government
in achieving the objectives set for the timber industry, the United States,
together with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European
Commission, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation and several other inter-
national and non-governmental organizations set up the Liberia Forest Initiative
(LFI). The aim of the LFI was to assist the Liberian government to adopt the
necessary reforms in its forestry sector to allow for the sustainable and trans-
parent management of its forest resources for the benefit of the Liberian
population.152
The LFI programmes focused on every aspect of sustainable forest manage-
ment, including the three internationally recognised components of sustainable
forest management.153 The economic component of forestry was addressed
with a commercial forestry programme, the social component through a
communal forestry programme, and the environmental component through
a forest conservation programme. The LFI also addressed several interrelated
issues, including governance-related issues. Thus the LFI can be considered
to have adopted an integrated approach to forest management.
The Security Council expressed its support for the LFI in its subsequent
resolutions. In Resolution 1579 (2004), the Security Council noted with some
concern that “despite having initiated important reforms”, the Liberian govern-
ment had made only limited progress towards improving its governance of
the timber industry.154 It therefore encouraged the government to “intensify
its efforts to meet these conditions, in particular by implementing the Liberia
Forest Initiative and the necessary reforms in the Forestry Development Auth-
ority”.155
151 Ibid., especially paragraph 15.
152 For more information on this initiative, see the website of the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization, at http://www.fao.org/forestry/lfi/en/ (last consulted on 16 August 2012).
Also see S.L. Altman, S.S. Nichols and J.T. Woods, ‘Leveraging High-Value Natural Resour-
ces to Restore the Rule of Law: The Role of the Liberia Forest Initiative in Liberia’s Transi-
tion to Stability’, in P. Lujala & S.A. Rustad (eds.), High-Value Natural Resources and Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding, Oxon/New York: Earthscan (2012), pp. 337-365.
153 The Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests, UN Doc. A/C.2/62/L.5, of 22
October 2007 defines sustainable forest management in its Article III(4) as “a dynamic and
evolving concept, [which] aims to maintain and enhance the economic, social and environ-
mental values of all types of forests, for the benefit of present and future generations”.
154 UN Security Council Resolution 1579 (2004), paragraph 11 of the preamble.
155 Ibid., especially paragraph 3. For more details on the Liberia Forest Initiative, see S.L.
Altman, S.S. Nichols and J.T. Woods, ‘Leveraging High-Value Natural Resources to Restore
the Rule of Law: The Role of the Liberia Forest Initiative in Liberia’s Transition to Stability’,
in P. Lujala & S.A. Rustad (eds.), High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,
Oxon/New York: Earthscan (2012), pp. 337-365.
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The Security Council reiterated its call to the Liberian government to
continue the implementation of the LFI and related reforms in subsequent
resolutions. It added that these reforms would “ensure transparency,
accountability and sustainable forest management”.156 Furthermore, the
Security Council encouraged the Liberian government to implement the
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) as a
means to expedite the lifting of the sanctions.157 This programme was ini-
tiated by the same organizations as the LFI in order to enhance transparency
and accountability in Liberia’s public administration, also in relation to the
granting of natural resources concessions.158 Reported irregularities in the
granting of diamond concessions by the Liberian authorities, preventing
Liberia’s accession to the Kimberley Process,159 had been a cause of concern
and led to the launch of this programme.
The effective implementation of the proposed reforms by the Liberian
government finally led to the lifting of the commodity sanctions. The timber
sanctions were lifted in 2006 after extensive reforms of the forestry sector,
including the adoption of legislation and the establishment of independent
audits.160 The diamond sanctions were lifted almost a year later, upon Libe-
ria’s accession to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.161
Targets and addressees of the sanctions regime
The 1521 sanctions regime principally targeted non-state armed groups threat-
ening the peace process in Liberia and in the wider West African region.
However, these armed groups were also represented in the newly established
transitional government of Liberia.162 This led to a rather paradoxical
situation. On the one hand, the sanctions regime was set up to assist the new
government to gain control over the timber industry and the diamond fields
as part of the peace process, while on the other hand, the sanctions aimed to
156 UN Security Council Resolution 1607 (2005), especially paragraph 4; and Resolution 1647
(2004), especially paragraph 3(a).
157 See UN Security Council Resolution 1647 (2005), especially paragraph 4.
158 For more details on the GEMAP programme, see http://www.gemap-liberia.org (last
consulted on 17 August 2012).
159 In this respect, see, e.g., the Preliminary Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted
pursuant to resolution 1579 (2004) (On Diamonds) of 17 March 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/176,
in particular, paras. 17-24; and Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant
to resolution 1579 (2004) of 13 June 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/360, paras. 97-119.
160 See UN Security Council Resolution 1689 (2006), especially paragraph 1.
161 UN Security Council Resolution 1753 (2007), paragraph 2 of the preamble and especially
paragraphs 1-3.
162 The National Transitional Government of Liberia consisted of the former Government of
Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement
for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). See Resolution 1521 (2003), fourth paragraph of the
preamble.
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prevent members from that government using Liberian natural resources to
fund their war effort.163
The burden of implementing the diamond and timber sanctions was placed
on States. International organizations and other relevant bodies were assigned
an additional role. Their role was not so much related to the implementation
of the sanctions as it was to assist the government of Liberia to satisfy the
criteria for the lifting of sanctions. Their responsibilities included providing
assistance to set up a Certificate of Origin regime for diamonds and to promote
responsible and environmentally sustainable business practices in the timber
industry. For diamonds, this international action was coordinated mainly
through the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds, while
for the timber industry action was coordinated mainly through the LFI pro-
gramme.
Appraisal of the sanctions regime
The commodity sanctions in the 1521 sanctions regime served two distinct
but interrelated purposes. The first was to stop timber and diamonds from
fuelling armed conflict in Liberia and the West African Region as part of a
strategy to resolve the conflict. The second purpose was to prevent natural
resources from contributing to a relapse into armed conflict as part of a
strategy for post-conflict reconstruction. This second purpose explains why
the sanctions regime aimed to achieve real structural reforms of the diamond
and timber industries. Beyond the direct contribution of diamonds and timber
to the armed conflict, it also sought to address threats to the peace resulting
from underlying problems of governance in the Liberian diamond and timber
industries.
Thus the Security Council used sanctions as a means of putting pressure
on the Liberian government to bring about important structural reforms in
Liberia’s key economic sectors as part of a comprehensive peacebuilding
process. The Security Council’s approach was very innovative in this respect,
especially in relation to the proposed reforms for the timber sector. The first
innovative feature was that it explicitly adopted the basic principle that
“government revenues from the Liberian timber industry are [to be] used for
legitimate purposes for the benefit of the Liberian people, including develop-
ment”.164 In this way it implicitly underlined that States must use their
sovereignty over their natural resources for the benefit of their people. In this
respect the 1521 sanctions regime went one step further than the 1343 regime,
which stated in more general terms that timber revenues should be used for
legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes.
163 See the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 25 of Security
Council Resolution 1478 (2003) concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/2003/937 of 28 October 2003.
164 UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), especially paragraph 11.
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Another innovative feature of the sanctions regime was its explicit recog-
nition of the need to integrate environmental protection in regulatory mechan-
isms for the timber sector. The Security Council encouraged the Liberian
government “to establish oversight mechanisms for the timber industry that
will promote responsible business practices” and called upon States, inter-
national organizations and other bodies to offer assistance to the Liberian
government to achieve this objective, including assistance with regard to “the
promotion of responsible and environmentally sustainable business practices
in the timber industry”.165
These are major improvements in comparison with earlier sanctions
regimes, which focused principally on stopping the trade in conflict resources.
By placing the emphasis on every aspect of the governance of natural
resources, the Liberian sanctions regime contributed to peacebuilding efforts
in a more structural way, ensuring that Liberian natural resources were
managed in a sustainable way for the purposes of development rather than
conflict.
The 1521 sanctions regime is one of the few regimes discussed in this
chapter that actually succeeded in achieving the necessary changes. The success
of the sanctions regime can largely be attributed to the political will of the
newly established Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. She has been one
of the driving forces behind the reform of the Liberian natural resource sectors,
as well as of government administration in general.166 This demonstrates
that a commitment to good governance that is rooted in the political system
of a country itself is very important in bringing about change.
7.4.6 The 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Regime
Structure and objectives of the sanctions regime
The sanctions adopted by the Security Council in relation to Côte d’Ivoire were
imposed in order to end hostilities between government forces under the
command of elected president Laurent Gbagbo and the opposition forces (the
Forces Nouvelles).167 Two peace agreements between the government and the
Forces Nouvelles were signed in 2003 (the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) and
2004 (the Accra III Agreement) respectively, providing, inter alia, for the
establishment of a government of national reconciliation and a program of
disarmament. These peace agreements were supplemented with a third agree-
165 UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), especially paragraphs 13 and 15.
166 See S.L. Altman, S.S. Nichols and J.T. Woods, ‘Leveraging High-Value Natural Resources
to Restore the Rule of Law: The Role of the Liberia Forest Initiative in Liberia’s Transition
to Stability’, in P. Lujala & S.A. Rustad (eds.), High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding, Oxon/New York: Earthscan (2012), pp. 353-354.
167 For more details regarding this sanctions regime, see J.M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions
and the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007), pp. 439-447.
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ment (the Pretoria Agreement) in 2005. The aim of the Security Council sanc-
tions was precisely to secure the implementation of these peace agreements.
The sanctions regime was imposed first with Resolution 1572 (2004). The
Security Council, determining that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continued
to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided to impose an arms embargo as
well as a travel ban and an assets freeze on designated individuals and
entities.168 Furthermore, the Security Council established a Sanctions Commit-
tee in order to monitor the sanctions, to be assisted by a Group of Experts.169
A year later, with Resolution 1643 (2005), the Security Council decided to
expand the sanctions regime to include diamond sanctions, targeting the whole
diamond industry in Côte d’Ivoire.170
The diamond sanctions were taken because of the links between the illicit
exploitation of and trade in diamonds on the one hand, and the arms trade
and use of mercenaries on the other, “as one of the sources of fuelling and
exacerbating conflicts in West Africa”.171 However, interestingly, the reports
of the Group of Experts revealed that diamonds were not the only natural
resources directly linked to the arms trade and the financing of the conflict
in general. The Group of Experts also examined the role of other commodities,
with a particular emphasis on cocoa and oil, in relation to the funding of the
conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.172
The Group reported several ways in which these natural resources were
used to violate the arms embargo by both parties to the armed conflict, e.g.,
by diverting tax revenues to finance extra-budgetary military spending by the
government.173 Despite ample indications that natural resources such as cocoa
and oil were prolonging the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire in the same way as
168 UN Security Council Resolution 1572 (2004), especially paragraphs 7, 9 and 11.
169 Ibid., especially paragraph 14 and 17. This group of experts was established through
Resolution 1584 (2005), para. 7.
170 UN Security Council Resolution 1643 (2005), especially paragraph 6.
171 UN Security Council Resolution 1643 (2005), paragraph 9 of the preamble.
172 See, e.g,. Midterm report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph
11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008), UN Doc. S/2009/188, paras. 59-72; Final report
of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, prepared in accordance with paragraph 14 of
Security Council Resolution 1980 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/196, paras. 113.
173 See e.g. Report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 7 of
resolution 1584 (2005), UN Doc. S/2005/699, paras. 22-46; Report of the Group of Experts
submitted in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 1643 (2005), UN Doc. S/2006/735,
paras. 113-128; Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, prepared in accord-
ance with paragraph 14 of Security Council Resolution 1980 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/196,
paras. 92-110. The Group further identified instances in which natural resources were offered
directly in exchange for arms and noted the existence of parallel taxation systems as well
as practices of racketeering and looting. For all these instances, see the final report of the
Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, prepared in accordance with paragraph 14 of Security
Council Resolution 1980 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/196, paras. 92-110.
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diamonds,174 the Security Council did not impose sanctions on these natural
resources.
This is characteristic of the Security Council’s approach which focuses
mainly on curtailing the trade in natural resources by or for the benefit of rebel
groups. In general the Council does not look into the ways in which the
national authorities use the revenues from natural resources. In itself this is
understandable from a legal perspective, especially in the light of the principles
of State sovereignty and permanent sovereignty over natural resources, but
not in the current case, where the national authorities openly used the proceeds
from the cocoa and oil sectors to violate the arms embargo. Therefore there
was good cause to address the irregularities in the cocoa and oil sectors, either
with an embargo or with formal requests for the reform of those sectors.
The Security Council renewed the diamond sanctions several times before
it introduced an exemption to the sanctions regime in Resolution 1893
(2009),175 though only for diamond samples necessary for scientific research,
in order to facilitate the implementation of the Kimberley Process. In Resolution
1893 (2009), the Security Council decided to exclude from the embargo
diamond imports “that will be used solely for the purposes of scientific
research and analysis to facilitate the development of specific technical informa-
tion concerning Ivorian diamond production”.176 This research was to be
coordinated by the Kimberley Process.177 In addition, a request to exempt
from the embargo a particular import of diamonds was to be submitted to
the Committee “jointly by the Kimberley Process and the importing Member
State”.178
In November 2010, elections were finally held in Côte d’Ivoire as part of
the implementation of the Ouagadougou peace agreement concluded in March
2007. However, when the defeated President Laurent Gbagbo refused to step
down, a crisis broke out. It was only after the crisis ended with the help of
UNOCI and ECOWAS troops that Alassane Dramane Ouattara could be installed
as the newly elected President of Côte d’Ivoire in April 2011. From then on,
the sanctions regime entered a new phase. The measures were no longer
174 See in particular the Report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph
7 of Resolution 1584 (2005), UN Doc. S/2005/699, paras. 22-46; the Midterm report of the
Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution
1842 (2008) of 8 April 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/188, paras. 59-64; Final report of the Group
of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842
(2008) of 9 October 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/521, paras. 170-188, which establish direct links
between the trade in natural resources by the government and the violation of the arms
embargo, e.g., through extra-budgetary military spending.
175 The sanctions were renewed through UN Security Council Resolution 1727 (2006); Resolution
1782 (2007); and Resolution 1842 (2008).
176 UN Security Council Resolution 1893 (2009), especially paragraph 16.
177 Ibid., especially paragraph 16.
178 Ibid., especially paragraph 17.
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intended to contribute to ending the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, but instead, to
support the peace process.179
In Resolution 1980 (2011), adopted soon after the installation of President
Ouattara, the Security Council emphasised the contribution that the diamond
sanctions had made to achieving stability in Côte d’Ivoire and encouraged
the Ivorian authorities “to work with the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme to conduct a review and assessment of Côte d’Ivoire’s internal controls
system for trade in rough diamonds and a comprehensive geologic study of
Côte d’Ivoire’s potential diamond resources and production capacity, with
a view to possibly modifying or lifting [the diamond sanctions]”.180 Resolu-
tion 2045 (2012) extended the diamond sanctions even further and urged the
Ivorian authorities to “create and implement an action plan to enforce the
Kimberley Process rules in Côte d’Ivoire”.181
In response to a recent report by the Group of Experts indicating that
diamond smuggling by military-economic networks in Côte d’Ivoire continues
to pose a threat to the stability of the country,182 the UN Security Council
decided to extend the diamond sanctions until 30 April 2014.183 However,
the Council did express its “readiness to review measures in light of progress
made towards Kimberley Process implementation”, thus making the lifting
of the diamond sanctions conditional upon effective implementation of the
minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process in Côte d’Ivoire.184 Further-
more, the Council requested the Kimberley Process and national and inter-
national agencies to help the Group of Experts with “its enquiries concerning
the individuals and networks involved in the production, trading and illicit
export of diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire” and to communicate such matters
to the Sanctions Committee.185
In addition to the diamond measures, the Resolution also addressed the
threats to the peace process resulting from the smuggling and illegal taxation
of other natural resources by military networks. Although the Resolution did
not impose any concrete measures with respect to these natural resources, it
is relevant to note that the Security Council did express its concern about the
smuggling of cocoa, cashew nuts, cotton, timber and gold, thus paving the
way for the adoption of more concrete measures in the future.186
Furthermore, in response to a recommendation by the Group of Experts
regarding the problems faced by Côte d’Ivoire with regard to artisanal mining
179 UN Security Council Resolution 1980 (2011), paragraph 4 of the preamble.
180 Ibid., especially paragraph 19.
181 UN Security Council Resolution 2045 (2012), especially paragraphs 6 and 21.
182 Final report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 16 of Security
Council Resolution 2045 (2012), UN Doc. S/2013/228 of 17 April 2013.
183 UN Security Council Resolution 2101 (2013), especially paragraph 6.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid., especially paragraphs 23 and 24.
186 Ibid., paragraph 14 of the preamble.
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in its gold and diamond sectors,187 the Security Council “encourages the
Ivorian authorities to participate in the OECD-hosted implementation pro-
gramme with regard to the due diligence guidelines for responsible supply
chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas”.188 This recom-
mendation refers to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance that was developed
for companies as a tool to mitigate the risk that their mineral procurement
policies could contribute to instability and armed conflict in a country. The
Security Council’s reference to this programme indicates its commitment to
the promotion of more structural solutions for the illegal exploitation of natural
resources beyond the financing of conflict.189
Targets and addressees of the sanctions obligations
The diamond embargo imposed against Côte d’Ivoire targets all diamonds
originating from the country. During the armed conflict, this meant that the
embargo de facto exclusively targeted the Forces Nouvelles, since they were in
control of the diamond production. In fact, the embargo issued by the Security
Council complemented an already existing national ban on the export of
diamonds, issued by the Ivorian government in 2002.190
The primary addressees of the sanctions regime are States. However, in
relation to the diamonds sanctions the Security Council also assigned a promi-
nent role to the Kimberley Process. In order to prevent the introduction of
diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire into the legitimate diamond trade, the Security
Council expressly referred to measures taken within the framework of the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.191 Although Côte d’Ivoire has been
a formal participant in the Kimberley Process since its launch in 2003, the
country has never exported diamonds under the scheme.192
In addition, the Security Council directly addressed the Kimberley Process.
The primary role of the Kimberley Process was to provide the Council with
information concerning the production and illicit export of diamonds from
Côte d’Ivoire, as well as information about possible violations of the arms and
diamond embargoes.193 In addition, the Kimberley Process was assigned the
187 Final report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 16 of Security
Council Resolution 2045 (2012), UN Doc. S/2013/228 of 17 April 2013.
188 UN Security Council Resolution 2101 (2013), especially paragraph 25.
189 For more details on the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, see the following section and
Chapter 8.
190 Report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 7 of Resolution
1584 (2005), UN Doc. S/2005/699, para. 48.
191 UN Security Council Resolution 1893 (2009), especially paragraph 16; Resolution 1980 (2011),
para. 19; and Resolution 2045 (2012), para. 21.
192 Report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 7 of Resolution
1584 (2005), UN Doc. S/2005/699, para. 48.
193 See, e.g., UN Security Council Resolution 1727 (2006), especially paragraphs 10-11; Resolution
1782 (2007), paras. 13-14; Resolution 1842 (2008), paras. 14-15; and Resolution 2045 (2012),
para. 20.
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task of coordinating research on diamonds exempted from the regime “for
the purposes of scientific research and analysis to facilitate the development
of specific technical information concerning Ivorian diamond production”.194
Appraisal of the sanctions regime
The sanctions regime imposed in relation to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire clearly
builds upon earlier sanctions regimes addressing the trade in diamonds. There
are some differences, but most of these can be based on the particularities of
the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. The first difference relates to the scope of the
diamond embargo. While earlier sanctions regimes exempted from the ban
diamonds controlled by a certificate of origin regime, the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire
sanctions regime covered all diamonds originating from that country. The
reason for this difference can be traced back to the internal situation in Côte
d’Ivoire. The lack of government control over the diamond mining sites
necessitated a comprehensive ban on diamonds.
The second difference relates to the role of the Kimberley Process in the
sanctions regime. While earlier sanctions regimes made the modification or
lifting of sanctions conditional upon the implementation of an effective certi-
ficate of origin regime, the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire sanctions regime required the
implementation of the Kimberley Process. Again this difference can be under-
stood in the light of Côte d’Ivoire’s membership of the Kimberley Process.
Côte d’Ivoire had already joined the Kimberley Process in 2003, but has not
yet been able to meet the requirements of the process.
Furthermore, it is important to note that throughout the conflict in Côte
d’Ivoire the Security Council never addressed the role of other natural
resources besides diamonds in fuelling the conflict, despite ample indications
that the government used the proceeds from these natural resources to violate
the arms embargo. It is only now, in the phase of post-conflict reconstruction,
that the Security Council has started to consider the role of natural resources
such as cocoa and gold in perpetuating the violence in Côte d’Ivoire. The
attention devoted by the Security Council to the role of key economic sectors
in hampering the prospects for sustainable peace is encouraging, as reforms
in the governance of these sectors would make a significant contribution to
the reconstruction of Côte d’Ivoire.
7.4.7 Comparing the sanctions regimes
The sanctions regimes discussed in the current section all applied sanctions
targeting selected commodities which were thought to make a direct contri-
194 UN Security Council Resolution 1893 (2009), especially paragraph 16. See also Resolution
1946 (2010), para. 14, which confirms that the export of Ivorian diamonds for scientific
research is to be seen as an exemption to the ban.
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bution to the financing of the armed conflicts. In all cases, the ultimate objective
of the sanctions was to cut off revenues for armed groups. This was even the
case for Liberia, the only sanctions regime targeting a State. The objective of
the 1343 Liberia sanctions regime was to stop the Liberian authorities from
actively providing financial support to armed groups operating in the region,
while the 1521 Liberia sanctions regime was aimed at preventing Liberian
natural resources beyond the control of the Liberian authorities from being
used to finance these armed groups.
Thus the sanctions regimes discussed in this section show that the Security
Council is prepared to address the contribution of natural resources to armed
conflict, but only insofar as a link can be established between natural resources
and the funding of non-state armed groups. There seems to be a general
reluctance on the part of the Security Council to address a government’s
mismanagement of natural resources revenues in the absence of a link with
rebel funding. This explains why the Security Council did resort to the use
of sanctions on natural resources exploited by the national authorities in the
case of Liberia, while it did not in the case of Côte d’Ivoire. The sanctions
regarding Côte d’Ivoire exclusively targeted diamonds, the main source of
rebel funding. In contrast, the Security Council did not act against the govern-
ment, which used revenues from the oil and cocoa industry to fund extra-
budgetary military expenditure in contravention of the UN arms embargo.
These examples show that the Security Council is prepared to uphold the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in most circum-
stances, even when a State contravenes Security Council Resolutions.
Most of the sanctions regimes discussed in this section targeted diamonds.
With the exception of Côte d’Ivoire, the Security Council in each case provided
for the possibility of exempting from the sanctions regime diamonds regulated
by a certificate of origin regime. The Security Council also set standards for
such a regime, viz. it had to be effective, transparent and accountable. In later
sanctions regimes, these requirements were complemented with the require-
ment that the certificate of origin must be fully compatible with the Kimberley
Process.
Two of the sanctions regimes discussed in this section also included timber
sanctions. It is interesting to note that these are also the only cases – and
during quite different periods of time – that have regard for environmental
sustainability. In the case of Cambodia, the protection of Cambodia’s natural
resources was an underlying reason for the adoption of the measures. In the
case of Liberia, the measures aimed to enhance sustainable forest management
and to promote responsible and environmentally sustainable business practices
in the timber sector.
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7.5 FROM COMMODITY SANCTIONS TO TARGETED SANCTIONS
This section discusses sanctions regimes that have addressed the links between
natural resources and armed conflict through sanctions targeting individuals
and entities rather than commodities.
7.5.1 The 1493 DR Congo Sanctions Regime
Structure and objectives of the sanctions regime
The 1493 DR Congo sanctions regime was adopted in 2003, when the armed
conflict in the DRC had entered the phase of a gradual transition to peace.195
Joseph Kabila had succeeded his father as president of the DR Congo. Under
his leadership, agreements had been signed with Rwanda and Uganda, and
international troops from neighbouring countries had started to withdraw from
Congolese territory.196 In addition, Kabila Jr. had signed a peace agreement
with different Congolese militias, the Global and All Inclusive Agreement on
the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and had established
a Government of National Unity and Transition. In this context, the adoption
of the sanctions regime should therefore be seen as an attempt by the Security
Council to support the peace process in the DR Congo.
The sanctions regime consisted of an arms embargo targeting particular
armed groups.197 The Council also condemned the illegal exploitation of the
natural resources and other sources of wealth of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and expressed its intention to consider possible ways of ending
it.198 However, it did not adopt specific measures in this regard.
In 2004, the Security Council established a Sanctions Commission to oversee
the implementation of the arms embargo, as well as a Group of Experts to
assist the Commission.199 It again condemned the continuing illegal exploita-
tion of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Further-
more, it reaffirmed “the importance of bringing an end to these illegal
195 For an overview of the different phases in the armed conflict in the DR Congo between
March 1993 and June 2003, see the Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, United Nations Human
Rights Office of the High Commissioner, August 2010.
196 The Pretoria Accord with Rwanda was signed on 30 July 2002, while the Luanda Agreement
with Uganda was signed on 6 September 2002.
197 UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003), especially paragraph 20. For an overview of
the sanctions regime, see J.M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambrid-
ge: Cambridge University Press (2007), pp. 411-418. See also N.J. Schrijver, Development
without Destruction: The UN and Global Resource Management, United Nations Intellectual
History Project Series, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press (2010), pp.
184-186.
198 UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003), especially paragraph 28.
199 UN Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004), especially paragraphs 8 and 10.
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activities, including by applying the necessary pressure on the armed groups,
traffickers and all other actors involved” and urged “all States, and especially
those in the region, to take the appropriate steps to end these illegal activities,
including through judicial means where possible, and, if necessary, to report
to the Council’.200 However, no mandatory measures were introduced.
A year later Resolution 1596 (2005) renewed and broadened the arms
embargo to include all recipients on the territory of the DR Congo.201 In
addition, it contained several auxiliary measures to strengthen the embargo,
including measures concerning aviation and border controls, as well as travel
and financial sanctions against persons suspected of violating the arms
embargo.202 A subsequent resolution extended the travel and financial sanc-
tions to all political and military leaders of armed groups who were preventing
the demobilisation of their members.203
Moreover, this resolution contained measures relating to the transit of
Congolese natural resources through neighbouring countries. In this respect,
the Security Council demanded that neighbouring States as well as the Congo-
lese government “impede any kind of support to the illegal exploitation of
Congolese natural resources, particularly by preventing the flow of such
resources through their respective territories”.204 The Security Council re-
affirmed its demand in Resolution 1698 (2006).205 However, neither of these
resolutions contained any specific measures that States should take in order
to implement the obligation, and they did not specify the types of natural
resources that were targeted by the resolutions.
Nevertheless, it seems that from that moment on, the Security Council
started to address the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources in
a more coherent manner, looking for more direct ways to stop the exploitation
of natural resources from financing armed groups in the DR Congo. The first
step can be found in Resolution 1698 (2006), in which the Council expressed
its intention to consider possible measures to stem the flow of financing of
armed groups and militias operating in the eastern part of the DR Congo,
including commodity sanctions.206
The Council requested two reports in order to make an informed decision
on the type of measures to impose. The Group of Experts was requested to
report on feasible and effective measures that the Council could impose, and
the Secretary-General was asked to assess the economic, humanitarian and
social impacts of such measures on the Congolese population.207 On the basis
200 Ibid., especially paragraphs 6 and 7.
201 UN Security Council Resolution 1596 (2005), especially paragraph 1.
202 Ibid., especially paragraphs 6, 10, 13 and 15.
203 UN Security Council Resolution 1649 (2005), especially paragraph 2.
204 Ibid., especially paragraph 16.
205 UN Security Council Resolution 1698 (2006), especially paragraph 1.
206 Ibid., especially paragraph 9.
207 Ibid., especially paragraphs 6 and 8.
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of the recommendations contained in these reports, the Security Council
decided to address the illegal exploitation of natural resources principally
through the existing financial and travel sanctions.208
The Security Council specifically decided to extend these sanctions to
“individuals or entities supporting the illegal armed groups [operating] in the
eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the illicit trade
of natural resources”.209 In this way it intended to directly target those
responsible for the illicit trade in natural resources from the DR Congo.
This decision has had major consequences for companies operating in or
sourcing from the DR Congo, because it set in motion a process leading to the
adoption of due diligence guidelines for companies. Where Resolution 1857
(2008) encouraged States to take measures “to ensure that importers, processing
industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products under their juris-
diction exercise due diligence on their suppliers and on the origin of the
minerals they purchase”,210 Resolution 1896 (2009) addressed the minerals
industry directly. It recommended that importers and processing industries
adopt policies and practices to prevent their businesses from providing indirect
support to armed groups.211 More importantly, the Council mandated the
Group of Experts to draw up guidelines for the exercise of due diligence by
the importers, processing industries and consumers of mineral products from
the DR Congo.212
In its final report of 2010 the Group of Experts presented two sets of due
diligence guidelines. The first focused exclusively on preventing the purchase
of minerals from individuals and entities suspected of providing support to
illegal armed groups through the illicit trade in natural resources. The other
set also addressed purchases from criminal networks and perpetrators of
serious human rights abuses within the Congolese army. Both sets of guidelines
followed the same five-step risk-based approach to due diligence. These five
steps consisted of strengthening company management systems, identifying
208 The Security Council acted here upon a recommendation of the Group of Experts. See the
Report of the Group of experts submitted pursuant to resolution 1654 (2006), UN Doc. S/
2006/525, para. 159; and the Interim report of the Group of Experts submitted pursuant
to resolution 1698 (2006), UN Doc. S/2007/40, para. 52. The Group of Expert had also
recommended the imposition of selective commodity sanctions, but the report of the
Secretary-General dissuaded the Security Council from imposing such sanctions. This report
concluded that commodity sanctions would have negative impacts on artisanal miners and
on the fragile peace process in the DR Congo. See the Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1698 (2006) concerning the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, UN Doc. S/2007/68 of 8 February 2007, paras. 62-63.
209 UN Security Council Resolution 1857 (2008), especially paragraph 4(g).
210 Ibid., especially paragraph 15.
211 UN Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009), especially paragraph 16, which reads in full:
“Recommends that importers and processing industries adopt policies and practices, as well
as codes of conduct, to prevent indirect support to armed groups in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo through the exploitation and trafficking of natural resources”.
212 Ibid., especially paragraph 7.
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and assessing supply chain risks, designing and implementing strategies to
respond to identified risks, conducting independent audits, and publicly
disclosing supply chain due diligence and findings.213
The guidelines required companies to adopt appropriate procedures to
identify the risk of their purchases of minerals providing any sort of support
to armed groups, sanctioned individuals or entities, and criminal networks
or perpetrators of serious human rights abuses in the eastern part of the DR
Congo. If a risk was identified, the guidelines required that companies suspend
their contracts with their suppliers until the risk was removed. Furthermore,
independent audits had to be performed in order to verify that the due
diligence applied by the company was sufficient to identify and prevent the
risk of providing support to an individual or entity identified by the Group
as contributing to the violence in the eastern part of the DR Congo. Finally,
companies had to publish their due diligence policies as part of their annual
sustainability or corporate responsibility reports.214
These due diligence guidelines received the express support of the Security
Council.215 In this respect it is interesting to note that the Council opted for
the second and most far-reaching set of guidelines, thus targeting not only
the trade with armed groups, but also the trade with subversive elements
within the Congolese army.216 In addition, the Council made several decisions
regarding the implementation of the guidelines. First, it called upon States
“to take appropriate steps to raise awareness of the due diligence guidelines”
presented by the Group of Experts, “to urge importers, processing industries
and consumers of Congolese mineral products to exercise due diligence by
applying the aforementioned guidelines, or equivalent guidelines” and to
regularly report to the Sanctions Committee on the actions they were taking
to implement these recommendations.217
More significantly, the Security Council established an express link between
compliance with the due diligence guidelines on the one hand, and the im-
position of financial and travel sanctions on the other. In this respect it decided
that the failure of an individual or entity to exercise due diligence consistent
with the steps set out in the resolution could be a reason for them to be placed
213 See the Final report of the Group of Experts prepared pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security
Council Resolution 1896 (2009), UN Doc. S/2010/596, para. 318. For more details on this
five-step approach, see the following chapter of this study.
214 For more details, see the final report of the Group of Experts prepared pursuant to para-
graph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009), UN Doc. S/2010/596, paras. 328-355 for
the first set of guidelines and paras. 356-369 for the second set.
215 The Security Council supported “taking forward the Group of Experts’ recommendations
on guidelines for due diligence for importers, processing industries and consumers of
Congolese mineral products”. See UN Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010), especially
paragraph 7.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid., especially paragraphs 8 and 20.
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on the sanctions list.218 This meant that companies operating in or sourcing
from the DR Congo were obliged to adhere to the due diligence guidelines.
So far the Sanctions Committee has only placed two companies involved
in the trade in minerals on the sanctions list. These are two gold trading
companies, located in neighbouring Uganda. It justified placing these com-
panies on the list because they “bought gold through a regular commercial
relationship with traders in the DRC tightly linked to militias [which] constitutes
‘provision of assistance’ to illegal armed groups in breach of the arms embargo
of resolutions 1493 (2003) and 1596 (2005)”.219
The Security Council’s subsequent resolutions focused strongly on ways
to implement the due diligence guidelines adopted by the Group of Experts.
Two particular measures taken by the Security Council deserve special
attention. The first concerns the question of traceability of the minerals supply
chain, “a key element of any due diligence exercise” according to the Group
of Experts.220 The Council did not take any specific measures in this regard,
but rather expressed its support for the efforts of the Congolese government
and the wider region “to address the tracing and certification of minerals”.221
Thus it implicitly referred to instruments adopted under the auspices of the
International Conference for the Great Lakes Region and showed its willingness
to let the affected countries decide for themselves on the design of an instru-
ment addressing the tracing and certification of minerals.
The second measure concerns the decision of the Security Council to
include the inspection of mining sites in the mandate of the UN military opera-
tion in the DR Congo, MONUSCO.222 This measure is not directly related to
the implementation of the due diligence guidelines, but is part of a broader
package of measures involving MONUSCO – and before that, MONUC – aimed
at preventing the provision of support to illegal armed groups.223 Another
measure in this package relating to the measures discussed above was the
involvement of MONUSCO in a project of the Congolese government to bring
218 Ibid., especially paragraph 9.
219 List of Individuals and Entities Subject to the Measures Imposed by Paragraphs 13 and
15 of Security Council Resolution 1596 (2005) as Renewed by Paragraph 3 of Resolution
2021 (2011), last updated on 12 November 2012, available through http://www.un.org/sc/
committees/1533/pdf/1533_list.pdf (last consulted on 29 November 2012).
220 See the Interim Report of the Group of Experts prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 of
Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010), UN Doc. S/2011/345, para. 77.
221 UN Security Council Resolution 1991 (2011), especially paragraph 17.
222 See UN Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011), especially paragraph 10. The UN operation
in the DR Congo was originally called MONUC but was renamed in 2010 to reflect the
new situation in the DR Congo’s transition to peace. For more information on the mission,
see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/ and http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/monusco/ (consulted on 25 May 2012).
223 See, e.g., UN Security Council Resolution 1756 (2007), especially paragraph 2(l) and Resolu-
tion 1856 (2008), para. 3(g).
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together all State services in a limited number of trading counters in order
to improve the traceability of mineral products.224
Targets and addressees of the sanctions
The 1493 DR Congo sanctions regime has consistently targeted individuals and
entities impeding the peace process in the DR Congo. All the measures taken
by the Security Council, including the due diligence guidelines, should be seen
in this light. The Security Council gradually increased the number of indi-
viduals against whom the sanctions were imposed. The adoption of the due
diligence guidelines had two important implications in this respect. It showed
that the sanctions targeted not only members of non-state armed groups, but
also subversive elements from within the Congolese army. In addition, the
Council clearly indicated that “providing support to armed groups” must be
broadly interpreted, including providing indirect support to these groups by
irresponsible mineral sourcing practices.
The addressees of the sanctions were primarily States, including the Congo-
lese State. They were to implement the arms embargo, as well as the travel
and financial sanctions. Indirectly, companies were also addressees of the
sanctions. They were to implement the due diligence guidelines, thus prevent-
ing armed groups from obtaining the revenues to violate the arms embargo.
The final addressee of the sanctions was the United Nations Organization
(Stabilization) Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC/
MONUSCO). The relevant tasks include military action aimed at “preventing
the provision of support to illegal armed groups, including support derived
from illicit economic activities”.225
Appraisal of the sanctions regime
In order to break the link between the exploitation of natural resources and
the ongoing violence in the DR Congo, the Security Council opted for a new
approach, compared with earlier sanctions regimes. Instead of imposing
commodity sanctions, the Security Council opted for targeted sanctions against
individuals and companies in order to address the link between natural
resources and armed conflict. In this way, the Security Council broke away
from the trend it had set with its earlier sanctions regimes.
Another striking aspect of the sanctions regime is that it paved the way
for imposing sanctions on the business community for conducting irresponsible
business practices. Companies that did not respect the due diligence guidelines
risked being added to the sanctions list. Although this was not the first sanc-
tions regime to directly target companies, it was the first to target companies
further up the supply chain as well. Earlier sanctions regimes imposed sanc-
224 UN Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010), especially paragraph 12.
225 UN Security Council Resolution 1756 (2007), especially paragraph 2(l); and Resolution 1856
(2008), para. 3(g).
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tions only on companies that were directly implicated in the busting of sanc-
tions. Examples include asset freezes imposed against aviation companies
suspected of transporting arms in violation of the arms embargo imposed in
relation to Liberia.226
In the 1493 DR Congo sanctions regime the Security Council went a step
further. It stretched the causal link between the practices of companies and
the violation of sanctions by armed groups. This was an interesting develop-
ment, especially in the light of the earlier sanctions regimes addressing the
trade in rough diamonds, which relied on voluntary measures to engage the
diamond industry in the proper implementation of sanctions.
In the case of the DR Congo, the Security Council moved away from a
voluntary approach to industry self-regulation as articulated in Resolution
1896 (2009) in favour of sanctions to induce the minerals industry to modify
their sourcing practices. However, it is too early to tell whether this move away
from voluntary measures to sanctions can be regarded as a response to the
particular circumstances in the DR Congo, or whether it indicates a change
in the approach of the Security Council which extends beyond the specific
case of the DR Congo.
Similarly, it is too early to tell whether this new approach adopted by the
Council in relation to the DR Congo will actually lead to a change in the
behaviour of companies sourcing from the DR Congo. The 2011 Final Report
of the Group of Experts reveals a mixed picture. On the one hand, it concluded
that the implementation by the Congolese government of the due diligence
guidelines has halted nearly all tin, tantalum and tungsten exports from the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. On the other hand, it concluded
that these minerals were increasingly being smuggled into neighbouring
countries, impairing the objective of the due diligence guidelines.227 Therefore
the success of the due diligence guidelines was impaired by the smuggling
practices. This indicates that the due diligence guidelines can only be success-
fully implemented when improvements are carried out in the transparency
of the extractive industry in the DR Congo and in neighbouring countries as
well. An effective tracing and certification system for minerals is a first require-
ment in this respect. However, other factors are important as well, especially
combating corruption in the minerals sectors.
226 See the List of Individuals and Entities Subject to the Measures Contained in Paragraph 1
of Security Council Resolution 1532 (2004) Concerning Liberia (The Assets Freeze List),
last updated on 20 July 2012, available through http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1521/
aflist.shtml (last consulted on 23 August 2012).
227 Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC submitted in accordance with paragraph
4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/843, 15 November 2012, paras.
159-242.
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7.5.2 The 1970 Libya Sanctions Regime
Structure and objectives of the sanctions regime
The sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council against Libya in 2011
was not the first sanctions regime imposed against the Libyan authorities. An
earlier sanctions regime had addressed the alleged role of the Libyan govern-
ment in supporting terrorist groups, as part of the response to the Lockerbie
incident.228 However, the 2011 sanctions regime differed from the earlier
one in the sense that it was directly related to a situation of armed conflict.
In February 2011, civil protests against the regime of Colonel Muammar
Gaddafi resulted in an internal armed conflict between Gadhafi’s forces on
the one side, and an insurrectional movement labelling itself the National
Transitional Council (NTC) on the other.229 Reports on gross and systematic
violations of human rights committed by the Libyan government, including
widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population, prompted
the Security Council to take action.
On 26 February 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970. This
Resolution referred the situation in Libya to the ICC and imposed “biting”
sanctions against the Gaddafi government as “a clear warning to the Libyan
Government that it must stop the killing”.230 These sanctions included an
arms embargo, a travel ban and an asset freeze.231 The asset freeze applied
to all persons “involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise
directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses” against the Libyan
population.232 The sanctions list annexed to the resolution targeted exclusively
members of Colonel Gaddafi’s family. The Security Council further appointed
a Sanctions Committee to oversee the implementation of the sanctions and
to designate other individuals subject to the sanctions.233
A few weeks later, Resolution 1973 was adopted in response to Gaddafi’s
failure to put an end to the violence and to fulfil the legitimate demands of
228 For more details, see J.M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (2007), pp. 297-305.
229 For a timeline of the conflict in Libya, see the Economist, ‘The Birth of Free Libya’, 25 August
2011; and BBC, ‘Libya: The Fall of Gaddafi’, available through http://www.bbc.co.uk
(consulted on 16 July 2012).
230 See the statement of the representative of the United States in the Security Council Meeting
that adopted Resolution 1970, UN Doc S/PV.6491: “Tonight, acting under Chapter VII, the
Security Council has come together to condemn the violence, pursue accountability and
adopt biting sanctions targeting Libya’s unrepentant leadership. This is a clear warning
to the Libyan Government that it must stop the killing. Those who slaughter civilians will
be held personally accountable. The international community will not tolerate violence
of any sort against the Libyan people by their Government or security forces”.
231 See UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011, paras. 9-14 (arms
embargo); 15-16 (travel ban); and 17-21 (asset freeze).
232 Ibid., para. 22.
233 Ibid., para. 24.
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the population. Resolution 1973 established a Panel of Experts to assist the
Sanctions Committee and further strengthened the sanctions, including the
asset freeze.234 From that moment on, the asset freeze applied to all assets
belonging to the Libyan authorities, including the assets of high government
officials and entities under the control of the Libyan authorities.235
Most interesting in this respect is the inclusion in the list of the Libyan
National Oil Corporation as a “potential source of funding for [Gaddafi’s]
regime”.236 In addition, the Security Council decided that States must require
all individuals and entities under their jurisdiction doing business with Libya
to exercise vigilance if they have reasonable grounds to believe that such
business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians.237
Since the oil business constituted Libya’s principal source of income, these
measures first and foremost addressed the responsibility of foreign oil com-
panies operating in Libya.238
One of the principal questions that arises in relation to these measures
concerns their implications for the trade in Libyan oil. The asset freeze targeted
only one of the parties to the conflict, i.e., the Libyan authorities. In other
words, the assets freeze did not affect the trade in Libyan oil to the benefit
of other actors, such as the National Transitional Council. At the same time,
the assets freeze against the Libyan authorities was comprehensive: it applied
to all assets of the Libyan authorities that were located abroad and it included
a prohibition for foreign individuals and entities to make assets available to
the Libyan authorities. This prohibition extended to payments made by foreign
234 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, para. 24.
235 The Security Council decides that the asset freeze “shall apply to all funds, other financial
assets and economic resources […] which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly,
by the Libyan authorities […] or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their
direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them”. See UN Security Council Resolution
1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, para. 19.
236 Ibid., Annex II. On 24 June 2011, the Sanctions Committee extended the assets freeze to
a subsidiary of the Libyan National Oil Corporation. See in this regard the following press
release: ‘Security Council Committee Concerning Libya Adds Names of Individuals and
Entities to Its Travel Ban and Assets Freeze List’, UN Doc. SC/10302, 28 June 2011.
237 The resolution stated that “all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their
jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise
vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
or subject to its jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their
direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that
provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence
and use of force against civilians”. See UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), 17 March
2011, para. 21.
238 The Panel of Experts concerning Libya observed that Libya was one of the “less diversified
oil-producing economies in the world”. It further noted that the oil sector was responsible
for 93 per cent of government revenues and 95 per cent of Libya’s export earnings. See
the Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1973 (2011) concerning Libya, UN Doc. S/2012/163, para. 163.
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companies to the Libyan authorities or entities under their control, including
payments made to the National Oil Corporation.
The effects of this prohibition should not be underestimated, since the
National Oil Corporation was implicated in most oil operations in Libya,
mostly through joint ventures with foreign oil companies. In addition, Resolu-
tion 1973 (2011) decided that States must require their companies to “exercise
vigilance” when doing business in Libya in order to prevent these companies
from contributing to “violence and use of force against civilians”.239 This
requirement amounts to an obligation of “due care” for companies. Although
not watertight, it entails an obligation for companies doing business in Libya
to choose their business partners carefully, irrespective of the inclusion of these
companies on the sanctions list or not.
The sanctions against the Libyan National Oil Corporation and its subsi-
diaries were lifted after the National Transitional Council had taken over
power in Libya. Resolution 2009, adopted on 16 September 2011, determined
that the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC) and Zueitina Oil Company
were no longer to be subject to the asset freeze.240 Sanctions against other
entities, including financial institutions, have been lifted subsequently. Some
remaining sanctions, notably against Libyan investment companies, are still
in place.
Targets and addressees of the sanctions regime
As noted above, the sanctions regime against Libya exclusively targeted the
Gadhafi regime. No measures were imposed against the opposition forces.
The sanctions regime was to be implemented by all States. Specific obligations
relating to the implementation of the asset freeze included the freezing of all
assets belonging to the Libyan authorities that were found on their territories
and preventing their nationals from making available funds to the Libyan
authorities.241 In addition, States were to require all persons and entities
under their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with Libyan
persons and entities.242
Interestingly enough, the resolutions do not directly call upon individuals
or companies to exercise vigilance. Instead, the resolutions ask the home States
of these companies to enact relevant legislation. This is a departure from other
sanctions regimes, discussed in this chapter, which have made direct calls upon
individuals and companies to assist in implementing sanctions. Examples
include the sanctions regimes imposed against Sierra Leone and Liberia. The
sanctions regime against the DR Congo even went a step further through the
239 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), especially paragraph 21.
240 UN Security Council Resolution 2009, 16 September 2011, para. 14.
241 See UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), especially paragraph 19.
242 Ibid., especially paragraph 21.
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designation of persons and companies on a sanctions list for not respecting
due diligence in the choice of their business partners.
How can this departure from earlier sanctions regimes be explained? A
closer look at the objectives and targets of the sanctions regimes may provide
a partial answer. Whereas the sanctions regime against Libya was adopted
in order to put pressure on the Gaddafi government to end the violence, the
sanctions regimes for Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DR Congo were adopted
in order to assist these States in addressing a threat to their peace. The due
diligence measures in relation to the DR Congo, for example, were adopted
at the request of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region and
in support of national legislation. In other words, the sanctions were there
to help these States in enforcing national legislation, which was of course not
the case in Libya. Nevertheless, the differences in nature between the sanctions
regimes only provide a partial explanation. In addition to the adoption of
measures addressing the home States of companies doing business with the
Gaddafi regime, the Security Council could have addressed companies directly.
In this sense, the sanctions regime imposed against Libya can be regarded
as a step back in the process of involving individuals and companies in sanc-
tions implementation.
Appraisal of the sanctions regime
In the case of Libya, the Security Council opted for an asset freeze rather than
an oil embargo in order to curtail the oil revenues of the Libyan authorities.
The reasons for the Security Council to refrain from imposing an oil embargo
on Libya may be manifold. Some of these may be politically motivated. It’s
not a secret that foreign oil companies operating in Libya have conducted a
fierce lobby in order to safeguard their business interests. Nevertheless, this
would only partially explain the motivation of the Security Council to choose
an asset freeze as a lesser means to achieve its objectives.243
Another reason may be found in the effects of the sanctions on the Libyan
population. In view of the prime significance of oil revenues for the Libyan
economy, fully-fledged oil sanctions would have had severe consequences for
the Libyan population. A further reason could be related to the objectives of
the sanctions regime. The Security Council’s main concern was to target the
Gaddafi regime in order to stop the violence against the Libyan civilian popula-
tion. An asset freeze is a more appropriate instrument to target a specific actor
than an oil embargo, since such an embargo would have affected both sides
to the conflict.
243 This may be exemplified by the position of the European Union as one of the main consu-
mers of Libyan oil. The European Union has extended the asset freeze to include almost
the entire Libyan oil industry. See ‘Libya: EU imposes additional sanctions following the
adoption of UNSCR 1973’, Council of the European Union Press Release, 24 March 2011,
Doc. 8110/11 PRESSE 79.
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Even if the Security Council could have solved this problem by exempting
oil extracted under authorisation of the NTC from the embargo, it would have
encountered both practical and legal problems. The practical problem relates
to determining the distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” oil.
Certification measures, like those used in the diamond sanctions regimes
discussed above, would not have been a viable option in this situation, because
these are normally implemented by the government of a State. The legal
problem relates to the question of sovereignty. Providing exemptions to an
oil embargo for oil traded by an insurrectional movement would have required
the Security Council to make a formal statement recognising this movement
as the new Libyan government – or at least as the legitimate representative
of the Libyan people.244 The asset freeze avoids these problems while at the
same time contributing to the overall objectives of the sanctions regime, i.e.,
to put an end to the violence in Libya.
A further aspect of interest in relation to the sanctions regime is that the
Security Council in both resolutions explicitly expressed its intention to make
available at a later stage the frozen assets “to and for the benefit of the people
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”.245 This reference arguably constitutes an
implicit recognition that the assets belonging to the Libyan authorities belong
to and must be used for the benefit of the Libyan people. The reference is
reiterated in subsequent resolutions that gradually terminate the asset freeze.
In Resolution 2040 (2012), for example, the Security Council decides that the
Sanctions Committee must lift the freezing of assets of particular entities “as
soon as practical to ensure the assets are made available to and for the benefit
of the people of Libya”.246
It is further interesting to note that the Security Council underscores the
importance of making the assets available “in a transparent and responsible
manner in conformity with the needs and wishes of the Libyan people”.247
Moreover, the Council requests the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank “to work with the Libyan authorities on an assessment of Libya’s public
financial management framework, which would recommend steps to be taken
by Libya to ensure a system of transparency and accountability with respect
to the funds held by Libyan governmental institutions”.248 These statements
demonstrate the Security Council’s adherence to the principles of transparency
and accountability.
244 For a more detailed analysis of the legal impacts of recognition of the NTC during the
Libyan civil war, see Chapter 2 and S. Talmon, ‘Recognition of the Libyan National Transi-
tional Council’, ASIL Insights Vol. 15 (16), 16 June 2011.
245 UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), especially paragraph 18; and S/RES/1973
(2011), para. 20.
246 See UN Security Resolution 2040 (2012), para. 9. Also see UN Security Council Resolution
2009 (2011), paras. 14-19.
247 See UN Security Council Resolution 2009 (2011), paragraph 14 of the preamble.
248 Ibid., especially paragraph 18.
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7.5.3 Comparing the sanctions regimes
The sanctions regimes against the DR Congo and Libya use targeted sanctions
rather than commodity sanctions to achieve their purposes. In addition, both
sanctions regimes cover natural resources. However, the role of natural
resources in the sanctions regimes differs significantly. In the case of the DR
Congo, individuals and entities are targeted because of their involvement in
the illegal trade in natural resources. In the case of Libya, natural resources
are targeted because they are owned by individuals placed on the sanctions
list.
The regimes also present differences in other respects. One example con-
cerns the targets of the sanctions. In the case of the DR Congo, the sanctions
regime targets non-state armed groups and subversive elements of the Congo-
lese army as well as individuals and entities that provide support to these
groups. In the case of Libya, the sanctions target the Libyan authorities and
those associated with them.
The final difference concerns the role of the private sector in the sanctions
regimes. Both regimes target the private sector, but the extent to which and
the way in which they do so differs considerably. The 1493 DR Congo sanctions
regime targets all companies providing support to armed groups, whether
directly or through their mineral procurement policies. If there are grounds
for believing that a company is providing support to armed groups and the
company has not exercised due diligence, it can be placed on the sanctions
list. This implies that the sanctions have a potentially broad reach, targeting
companies worldwide that source minerals from the DR Congo. In the case
of Libya, the sanctions list includes only those companies that have a direct
connection to the Libyan authorities. The guiding principle for placing a
company on the list is “ownership” or “control’. The Security Council insists
that States require their companies to exercise due care in the choice of their
business partners, but the Council does not provide for the possibility of
placing these companies on the sanctions list. Thus in this respect the Security
Council can be considered to have watered down the 1970 Libya sanctions
regime compared to the 1493 DR Congo regime.
7.6 APPRAISAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S APPROACH TO ADDRESSING THE
LINKS BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES AND ARMED CONFLICT
This chapter has analysed the sanctions regimes imposed by the Security
Council to address the links between natural resources and armed conflict.
In most of the cases discussed in this chapter natural resources were at the
heart of the conflict. Relevant examples include Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia
and the DR Congo. In other cases, the links between natural resources and
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conflict can be considered more remote. The sanctions regime in Southern
Rhodesia is an example of a regime targeting natural resources merely because
of their general contribution to the Southern Rhodesian economy. The same
applies for the situation in Cambodia.
7.6.1 Legal basis
In all cases except Cambodia, the legal basis for imposing sanctions can be
found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In most cases, the Security Council
referred to Chapter VII in a general sense, while in relation to Southern
Rhodesia the Council based the sanctions explicitly on Article 41 of the UN
Charter. In the case of Cambodia, no reference was made to Chapter VII.
Furthermore, the Security Council did not impose sanctions itself, but merely
expressed support for a national moratorium. Therefore, the commodity
measures imposed in relation to Cambodia do not qualify as sanctions in the
sense of Article 41 of the Charter.
In addition, in all cases except Iraq and Cambodia, the Security Council
determined the existence of a threat to the peace under Article 39 of the UN
Charter before imposing sanctions. In the case of Iraq, the Council referred
to “a breach of the peace” because of Iraq’s unlawful invasion in Kuwait. In
the case of Cambodia, no reference was made to Article 39 of the UN Charter.
7.6.2 Objectives
In its Presidential Statement of 11 February 2011 on the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, the Security Council stated that:
“The Security Council recalls the role played by the illegal exploitation of natural
resources in fuelling some past and current conflicts. In this regard, it recognizes
that the United Nations can play a role in helping the States concerned, as appro-
priate, upon their request and with full respect for their sovereignty over natural
resources and under national ownership, to prevent illegal access to those resources
and to lay the basis for their legal exploitation with a view to promoting develop-
ment, in particular through the empowerment of governments in post-conflict
situations to better manage their resources”.249
This Presidential Statement clearly formulates two of the most important
objectives of the Security Council sanctions regimes discussed in this chapter.
The first is to help States involved in an internal armed conflict to prevent
249 Presidential Statement on Maintenance of international peace and security: the interde-
pendence between security and development, 11 February 2011, UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/4.
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illegal access by armed groups to the States’ natural resources, while the second
objective seeks to strengthen the State’s governance over natural resources
with a view to promoting development.
Curtailing “conflict resources”
The majority of the sanctions regimes discussed in this chapter address the
trade in so-called “conflict resources”. These are natural resources traded by
armed groups in order to finance their armed struggle. Examples of these
sanctions regimes include Cambodia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and
the DR Congo. Therefore in many cases sanctions regimes are in fact established
to help governments restore the State’s sovereignty over its natural resources.
The sanctions regimes are often even imposed at the request of the national
authorities.
In internal armed conflicts, the Security Council has been hesitant to impose
sanctions targeting the national authorities and has done so only in the cases
of Southern Rhodesia and Libya. In Southern Rhodesia, sanctions were
imposed against a regime that was considered illegal. Similarly, the sanctions
imposed in the case of Libya targeted a regime that had lost its legitimacy
due to its own actions.
However, in other similar cases, the Security Council refrained from
imposing sanctions against the national authorities. In Côte d’Ivoire, it did
not take any action against the national authorities during the armed conflict,
despite ample evidence of the government violating the arms embargo.
Another example concerns the armed conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan
between 2003 and 2011, which has not been discussed previously in this
chapter.
In the Darfur region, government-supported militias, notably the Janjaweed,
were carrying out gross and systematic attacks on the civilian population.250
In order to put an end to the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur Region, the
Security Council imposed an arms embargo against the Janjaweed and pro-
vided for the possibility of lifting these sanctions on condition that the govern-
ment of Sudan fulfilled its commitments to “disarm the Janjaweed militias
and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who
have incited and carried out human rights and international humanitarian
law violations and other atrocities”.251 In a subsequent resolution, the Security
Council expressly contemplated “actions to affect Sudan’s petroleum sector”
in order to put pressure on the Sudanese government to disarm the militias
and stop the atrocities, but the Council never actually imposed such sanc-
250 For more details on the Darfur conflict, see S. Straus, ‘Darfur and the Genocide Debate’,
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2005), pp. 123-133; and A. Abass, ‘The United
Nations, the African Union and the Darfur Crisis: Of Apology and Utopia’, Netherlands
International Law Review (2007), pp. 415-440.
251 UN Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004).
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tions.252 Instead, it extended the arms embargo to include the Sudanese
government.253
These examples show that the Security Council is committed to upholding
the principle of a State’s sovereignty over its natural resources in most circum-
stances, even in cases where governments use the proceeds from natural
resources in ways that threaten international peace and security. However,
they also show that political motivations sometimes prevent the Security
Council from taking appropriate action. There is no objective reason that
explains the difference in the approach used in Libya on the one hand, where
the Security Council did impose sanctions against the national oil company,
and in Sudan on the other, where the Security Council did not impose such
targeted sanctions. In both situations, the government was involved in gross
human rights violations. This arbitrary approach undermines the credibility
of the Security Council.
Strengthening governance over natural resources
Another relevant issue for the purposes of this chapter is the Security Council’s
approach to the governance of natural resources. In several cases discussed
in this chapter, the Security Council referred to improvements in governance
as a reason to exempt natural resources from the sanctions or to lift the sanc-
tions altogether. In the case of diamond sanctions, the Security Council
exempted from the sanctions those diamonds that were controlled with an
effective, transparent, accountable and internationally verifiable certificate of
origin regime. Furthermore, in the case of Liberia, the Security Council made
the lifting of the sanctions dependent on the implementation of reform plans
for the forestry sector and for public administration in general. Liberia in
particular is an example of a sanctions regime where the Security Council used
sanctions as a tool to bring about great structural reforms in the governance
of natural resources. These reforms also addressed environmental protection
as a way of safeguarding the natural resources of Liberia for development.
Another relevant example concerns the DR Congo where the Security
Council is engaged in structural reforms of the minerals sector. However, the
methods used by the Security Council in relation to the DR Congo differ from
the sanctions regimes discussed above. The Council aims to restore the govern-
ance of the Congolese State over its mines through a combination of measures,
including the introduction of due diligence requirements to companies. In-
directly, the implementation of these due diligence requirements by companies
will increase transparency in the Congolese mineral sector.
252 Ibid., especially paragraph 14.
253 UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005), especially paragraph 7. See also A. Abass,
‘The United Nations, the African Union and the Darfur Crisis: Of Apology and Utopia’,
Netherlands International Law Review (2007), p. 429.
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The approach of the Security Council in these cases is commendable. Its
engagement in structural reforms of natural resources sectors is an essential
part of strategies aimed at addressing the links between natural resources and
armed conflict. The role of sanctions is important in this respect. They can
serve as a catalyst for improvements in the governance of natural resources
in States affected by conflicts. The 1521 Liberia sanctions regime serves as an
example for future action by the Security Council in this respect. The sanctions
against Liberia have prompted important changes in the governance of Liberian
resources, mainly by supporting reforms undertaken by other organizations.
7.6.3 Evolution in the approach of the Security Council
The sanctions regimes signal an important evolution in the approach of the
Security Council in addressing the links between natural resources and armed
conflict. This evolution is linked to the Council’s efforts to find ways to address
these links effectively, while minimising the negative effects of the sanctions
on the civilian population. Thus where the earlier sanctions regimes were
mainly comprehensive in nature, the Security Council soon switched to more
selective sanctions regimes. These commodity sanctions regimes targeted
specific commodities based on their particular contribution to an armed con-
flict.
The first time the Security Council used such selective commodity sanctions
was in the case of Cambodia, where it particularly targeted round logs and
gems. In subsequent sanctions regimes, it refined its approach, at least in
relation to diamonds. The Council introduced a distinction between diamonds
traded by armed groups and by a State’s authorities. Diamonds traded by the
latter were exempted from the regime. The Security Council introduced an
important innovation for this purpose: the Certificate of Origin Regime. This
enabled it to directly target those responsible for causing a threat to the peace,
while minimising the negative effects of the sanctions on the civilian popula-
tion.
However, more recent sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council
started to move away from commodity sanctions in favour of sanctions tar-
geting individuals and organizations. In 2008 when the Security Council
decided to impose measures to address the illegal exploitation of natural
resources in the DR Congo, it opted for an assets freeze and a travel ban
targeting individuals and entities supporting illegal armed groups with the
illicit trade of natural resources. Similarly, in the case of Libya, the Security
Council opted for a freezing of the assets of the national oil company rather
than imposing an oil embargo.
One major advantage of targeted sanctions is that individuals and entities
responsible for provoking a threat to the peace are targeted directly. This
prevents a major problem encountered in the commodity-based sanctions
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regimes. In the cases of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the Taylor
government and the Forces Nouvelles respectively, switched from one natural
resource to another in order to escape the sanctions.254 Sanctions targeting
individuals and entities avoid this problem, but also have major disadvantages,
such as the risk of the arbitrary application of sanctions. This can be illustrated
with reference to the reforms in recent years with regard to appeal procedures
regarding the delisting of individuals.255 Another important disadvantage
is the sophisticated level of knowledge required and the administrative burden
placed on the Sanctions Committee responsible for the listing and delisting
of individuals and entities. In order to apply targeted sanctions effectively,
it is necessary to have detailed knowledge of those individuals and entities
directly and indirectly involved in the illegal trade of natural resources. From
this perspective, commodity sanctions exempting from the embargo those
natural resources that are traded with a certificate of origin regime are prefer-
able.256
Perhaps the best option for the Security Council would be to apply a
combination of the two types of sanctions. Recently, in a resolution relating
to the situation in Somalia, the Security Council did resort to imposing both
types of sanctions. In Resolution 2036 (2012), the Security Council imposed
an embargo on the export of charcoal from Somalia in order to prevent this
natural resource from financing armed groups operating in the country.257
This embargo was intended to strengthen the targeted measures imposed by
the Security Council in earlier resolutions, most notably Resolution 1844 (2008).
7.6.4 Sustainability: a missed opportunity
The Security Council has only referred to the protection of natural wealth and
resources in a few resolutions. In its resolutions relating to Cambodia, it simply
endorsed measures imposed by the national authorities to protect the environ-
ment, while in the case of Liberia it referred to the promotion of environ-
mentally sustainable business practices as a reason to lift the timber sanctions.
However, in the case of Liberia the Security Council’s measures should be
254 See P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson & D. Strandow, ‘Sanctions for Conflict Prevention and
Peace Building: Lessons Learned from Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia’, Department of Peace
and Conflict Research, Uppsala University (2006), p. 31.
255 See, e.g., S. Eckert, T. Biersteker, L.J. van den Herik and A. Cuyvers, ‘Due Process and
Targeted Sanctions, Update of the Watson Report’, Brown University: Watson Institute
(2012); and L.J. van den Herik, ‘The Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need
of Better Protection of the Individual’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 20 (4),
pp. 797-807.
256 In the case of the DR Congo, attempts to introduce a regional tracking-and-tracing system
for minerals is currently developed under the auspices of the International Conference for
the Great Lakes Region.
257 UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012), para. 22.
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viewed in relation to the Liberian Forest Initiative. In other words, it was not
the Security Council that took the initiative to impose measures aimed at
environmental protection, but rather the organizations responsible for imple-
menting the LFI.
Thus the Security Council does not actively include environmental pro-
tection in its strategies for conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding.
A study of relevant reports of UN Panels of Experts does reveal some attention
to the issue of environmental protection. For example, some references to this
issue can be found in the reports of the Panels of Experts on Liberia and the
DR Congo. The main focus of these panels is the issue of (over)exploitation
of natural resources and its effect on the environment.
The Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example,
designates the “illicit exploitation of wildlife, forest and other resources” in
national nature reserves and “intensive and unsustainable mining and logging
activities” outside these reserves as the causes of the ecological destruction
resulting from the armed conflict.258 It reports “highly organized and system-
atic exploitation activities at levels never before seen”. According to the Panel,
these activities include “poaching for ivory, game meat and rare species,
logging, and mining for coltan, gold and diamonds”.259 Similarly, the Panel
of Experts on Liberia explicitly refers to the problem of over-exploitation of
forest resources by the parties to the armed conflict in Liberia.260
In addition, both Panels assess the impact of sanctions on the environment.
In this respect the Panel of Experts on Liberia assesses the impact of the timber
sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on the long-term viability of
the forest and advises the UN Security Council to declare a moratorium on
all commercial activities in the extractive industries.261 In contrast, the Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo assesses the desirability
of imposing sanctions on particular commodities and concludes that “an
embargo or a moratorium banning the export of raw materials originating
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo does not seem to be a viable means
of helping to improve the situation of the […] natural environment”.262
258 Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2002/565,
para. 50.
259 Ibid., para. 52.
260 Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to paragraph 25 of Security Council Resolution
1478 (2003) concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/2003/779, para. 14 and paras. 66-69.
261 Ibid., para. 17.
262 Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2002/1146,
para. 155.
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In addition to these general references to the environment and to sustain-
ability, the reports of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
also contain indications that parties to an armed conflict must respect the rules
of international environmental law. In two of its reports, the Panel of Experts
explicitly refers to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in relation to poaching activities. In
its interim report, the panel states that it “has indications that, in most cases,
poaching of elephants in violation of international law (Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)) was
well organized”.263 It goes on to specify that the violations of CITES were
committed by the parties themselves: “[e]ither soldiers hunted directly with
the consent of the commander or they provided equipment and protection
to local villagers to execute the task with the objective of collecting elephant
tusks”.264 In its final report, the panel asks Member States to ensure “that
their National Bureaus, established under the [Lusaka Agreement on Coopera-
tive Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and
Flora], intensify their investigations into the criminal traffic in endangered
species of wild animals and plants as outlined by CITES”.265
In many cases the Security Council expressly relies on information from
reports issued by the Panels of Experts that it established, but it does not show
any particular sensitivity with regard to the environmental findings of the
Panels of Experts. These findings do not seem to play any role in decisions
of the Security Council to either impose or to refrain from imposing sanctions.
This is unfortunate, as environmental protection is essential for creating an
enduring peace in a country. It is therefore of the utmost importance for the
Security Council to start devoting more explicit attention to environmental
protection as part of its strategies regarding the economic reconstruction of
States that have experienced armed conflict.
7.6.5 The role of the Security Council
With regard to the conflicts discussed in this chapter, the Security Council
acts principally in a coordinating capacity. Sanctions serve mainly to prompt
reforms that have to be implemented by means of other forms of cooperation.
The role of the private sector is of paramount importance in this respect. The
263 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2001/357, para. 62.
Author’s emphasis added.
264 Ibid.
265 Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2002/1146,
para. 185.
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trade in natural resources that finance armed conflict can only be curbed by
engaging the private sector in reforms. The diamond sanctions, as well as the
due diligence standards, reveal the Security Council’s awareness of the need
to engage the private sector in reforms.
The role of governments is of course equally important. Reforms in the
natural resources sectors can only be achieved with the full support of the
government of a State. Sanctions serve only as a tool to bring about the neces-
sary changes. The Security Council therefore often leaves the initiative to
implement changes to the States themselves. Examples include the certificate-of-
origin regimes proposed for rough diamonds. The Security Council has left
it to the States themselves to choose the appropriate mechanism for this
purpose.
In most cases, the Security Council keeps its distance while using sanctions
to put pressure on governments to implement the necessary changes. This can
even benefit the respective governments when it gives the national authorities
the necessary support to push for changes. For example, this was the case in
Liberia. The sanctions strengthened the efforts of President Johnson Sirleaf
to implement changes in Liberia’s administrative system.
The principle of national ownership of strategies for post-conflict peace-
building is central to the Security Council’s efforts in this respect. In a 2009
Presidential Statement on post-conflict peacebuilding, the Security Council
explicitly emphasised the importance of this principle for peacebuilding efforts
and priorities, while at the same time emphasising “the vital role of the United
Nations in supporting national authorities to develop an early strategy, in close
consultation with international partners, to address these priorities”.266 The
sanctions regimes discussed in this chapter demonstrate the will of the Security
Council to respect national ownership as much as possible, even in relation
to sanctions regimes.
Finally, it is of paramount importance for the Security Council to continue
its efforts to address the role of natural resources in financing armed conflict.
In fact, its role should even be strengthened in this respect. The current sanc-
tions regimes focus mainly on preventing the trade in natural resources by
armed groups. However, in order to achieve a lasting peace, the underlying
governance structures should be addressed as well. The Security Council
should use sanctions more often to push for structural changes in the govern-
ance of natural resources in countries recovering from armed conflict. These
changes should be aimed at introducing transparency, accountability and
sustainability in the governance of natural resources as a tool to prevent future
conflicts in countries that have suffered from armed conflict. The Security
Council has wide discretionary powers to act under Chapter VII of the UN
266 UN Security Council Presidential Statement of 22 July 2009, S/PRST/2009/23. The import-
ance of the principle was confirmed in subsequent presidential statements regarding post-
conflict peacebuilding. See S/PRST/2010/7 and S/PRST/2010/20.
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Charter, and greater use should be made of these. It is precisely because of
its authority to impose mandatory measures that the Security Council is the
appropriate body to do so. This approach is in line with the broader acceptance
of the Security Council’s role beyond immediate crisis management.
Of course, a word of caution is required in this appraisal. Sanctions are
an effective tool to address the links between natural resources and armed
conflict. In this respect, achieving structural reforms in natural resources sectors
can be a legitimate objective of sanctions regimes. However, the role of the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is limited to addressing
“threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression” and should
therefore not be overestimated. This means that the role that sanctions can
play is limited to this context.

8 Addressing resource-related armed
conflicts with informal normative
processes
8.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The preceding chapter discussed the ways in which sanctions regimes imposed
by the Security Council address the links between natural resources and armed
conflict. It demonstrated that several of the resolutions adopted by the Security
Council encouraged States to participate in voluntary initiatives aimed at
improving resource transparency.
Some of these resolutions established a direct link between the participation
of States in voluntary initiatives and the implementation of the sanctions
regime. Resolution 2045 (2012) related to Côte d’Ivoire is one example. This
resolution explicitly offers the government of Côte d’Ivoire the possibility of
modifying or lifting sanctions, provided that the Ivorian authorities “create
and implement an action plan to enforce the Kimberley Process rules in Côte
d’Ivoire” and that they “closely work with the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme to conduct a review and assessment of Côte d’Ivoire’s internal controls
system for trade in rough diamonds and a comprehensive geologic study of
Côte d’Ivoire’s potential diamond resources and production capacity”.1
Another example concerns the sanctions regime imposed to address the armed
conflict in the DR Congo, where the Security Council expressed its intention
to impose sanctions for the non-compliance by corporate entities to the
voluntary due diligence guidelines developed by the UN Group of Experts.2
The Security Council also expressed its support for these voluntary ini-
tiatives in a more general fashion. In its Presidential Statement of 25 June 2007
on Natural Resources and Conflict, it emphasised the important contribution
of commodity monitoring and certification schemes, such as the Kimberley
Process, in preventing and combating trafficking, illicit trade, and illegal
exploitation of natural resources.3 It also recognised the role of voluntary
initiatives aimed at improving revenue transparency such as EITI in ensuring
that natural resources stimulate sustainable development.4 Furthermore, the
Security Council referred to the role of voluntary initiatives aiming at en-
1 UN Security Council Resolution 2045 (2012), especially paragraph 6 and 21.
2 See UN Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010), especially paragraph 9.
3 UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Natural Resources and Conflict, UN Doc.
S/PRST/2007/22, 25 June 2007, paragraph 8.
4 Ibid., paragraph 9.
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couraging multinational enterprises to adopt responsible business practices,
such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the UN Global
Compact.5 Lastly, in its Presidential Statement of 15 April 2013 on Peace and
Security in Africa, the Security Council recognised “the importance of com-
modity monitoring and certification schemes, such as the Kimberley Process,
and the role of voluntary initiatives aimed at improving revenue transparency,
such as the Extractive Industries Transparancy Initiative” as tools for the
prevention of conflicts.6
The current chapter aims to identify the contribution of these voluntary
initiatives to the development of a regulatory framework for the management
of natural resources in post-conflict environments. More specifically, the
purpose of this chapter is to assess whether and to what extent these voluntary
initiatives respond to the call made in the report of the High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change to the United Nations, national authorities,
international financial institutions, civil society organizations and the private
sector “to develop norms governing the management of natural resources for
countries emerging from or at risk of conflict”.7
This call did not receive express follow-up in subsequent formal documents.
Instead, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document focused exclusively on
the process of peacebuilding and its procedural modalities, most notably the
establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission as the principal institution
to coordinate action in this field. From a substantive perspective, the call
therefore remains very relevant. This is illustrated by the fact that the UN
Peacebuilding Commission itself has recently started to consider issues relating
to the management of natural resources in its work programme, showing the
continued need for a regulatory framework as called for by the High-level
Panel.
For this purpose, the current chapter first examines the substantive contri-
butions made by voluntary initiatives to the governance of natural resources
in countries emerging from armed conflict. To what extent do voluntary
initiatives create standards for the management of natural resources in post-
conflict situations? More in particular, to what extent do such initiatives
effectively incorporate elements of sustainable development in their methods
of operation, and how do these elements contribute to shaping the governance
of natural resources in countries recovering from armed conflict?
Furthermore, given their increasing popularity, this chapter addresses the
question whether these informal instruments provide a credible alternative
to legally binding instruments. Even though these instruments do not impose
5 Ibid., paragraph 10.
6 UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Peace and Security in Africa, UN Doc. S/
PRST/2013/4, 15 April 2013, paragraph 18.
7 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, United Nations: New York (2004), para. 92.
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legally binding obligations on participants, these participants have committed
themselves to strive for the achievement of particular objectives. The question
is therefore whether these voluntary instruments contain effective mechanisms
to monitor and enforce the implementation of the instruments by the parti-
cipants.
The current chapter discusses three initiatives that are representative of
the categories of voluntary initiatives mentioned in the Presidential Statement.
The Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds is an example
of a commodity monitoring and certification initiative. The Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative is an initiative aimed at improving resource trans-
parency. Finally, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas is an example
of an initiative aimed at improving responsible business conduct.
These initiatives share some common characteristics that make them
particularly useful for the purposes of this chapter. First, all three specifically
focus on issues related to natural resource governance. This gives them an
added value compared to the broad range of other initiatives that address
revenue transparency and corporate responsibility in a more general fashion.
They include the UN Anti-Corruption Convention and the UN Global Compact.
In addition, all three are multi-stakeholder initiatives, which have been devel-
oped by representatives of States, civil society and the business community.
Thus these initiatives represent a relatively new category of instruments for
setting standards, in the sense that they have not been developed by traditional
state-centred standard-setting processes. Furthermore, the effective implementa-
tion of the initiatives depends not only on States, but also on companies.
Finally, the ambition of all three initiatives is to become universal in their
application. Therefore they go further than initiatives specific to a particular
country or region, such as the Mineral Certification Scheme of the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region.
The following sections discuss the three above-mentioned initiatives.
Section 2 discusses the Kimberley Process, section 3 examines the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative and section 4 looks at the OECD Due
Diligence Guidance. Section 5 discusses the substantive contribution of the
three initiatives to the development of a regulatory framework for the manage-
ment of natural resources in conflict-affected States, with a particular emphasis
on the role of these initiatives in promoting sustainable resource governance.
Finally, section 6 examines the effectiveness of these instruments.
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8.2 THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF ROUGH DIAMONDS
8.2.1 Context
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was developed in response to
the armed conflicts raging in Angola and Sierra Leone, where diamonds were
used to finance the military campaigns of rebel groups opposing the legitimate
government.8 The Security Council had adopted sanctions targeting the export
of diamonds originating from these States.9 However, neither Angola nor
Sierra Leone had an effective system in place to track the origin of diamonds
mined in these States.10 Therefore, the sanctions could easily be busted by
armed groups smuggling the diamonds into neighbouring countries, from
where they were re-exported and sold on the international market.11
The origin of the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough
Diamonds is therefore linked to UN sanctions. It was set up in order to find
an effective international solution to the problem of diamond smuggling in
contravention of UN sanctions. The aim of the process was quite innovative:
to design a universal certification scheme for rough diamonds that would be
applied by all States producing and purchasing diamonds. The scheme was
to be based on national certification schemes, supplemented with international
minimum standards. Because of its universal membership, the scheme would
stop so-called “blood diamonds” entering the international diamond market
by closing the trade routes for armed groups.
Another innovative feature of the process concerns the diversity of its
membership. The Kimberley Process was initiated not only by governments
but also by the diamond industry and non-governmental organizations. The
involvement of all the interested actors, and especially of the diamond indus-
try, was considered crucial for the success of the scheme. For example, in
relation to Angola the report of the Panel of Experts concluded that lax controls
8 For more details on these conflicts, see Chapter 5 of this study.
9 See UN Security Council Resolutions 1173 (1998) and 1295 (2000) concerning the armed
conflict in Angola; Resolution 1306 (2000) concerning the armed conflict in Sierra Leone;
and Resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia’s involvement in the smuggling of diamonds
from Sierra Leone. For a more detailed discussion of these resolutions, see Chapter 5 of
this study. It should be noted that the first meeting leading to the Kimberley Certification
Scheme took place before the Security Council adopted diamond embargoes for Sierra Leone
and Liberia.
10 See for example the following reports for an account of the difficulties experienced by the
government of Angola in setting up a certification mechanism that would effectively control
the trade in Angolan diamonds. Final Report of the Panel of Experts, UN Doc. S/2000/203,
paras. 94-98; and the 2000 Interim Report of the Monitoring Mechanism, UN Doc. S/2000/
1026, p. 12.
11 For more information, see the report of the Panel of Experts on Angola (the Fowler report),
UN Doc. S/2000/203, paras. 75-114; and the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone,
UN Doc. S/2000/1195, paras. 65-166.
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in diamond- selling centres were one of the factors that made it easy for UNITA
to gain access to the international diamond market.12
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was launched in November
2002, only two and a half years after the first meeting in Kimberley, South
Africa. The Scheme was adopted with a ministerial declaration at a conference
held in Interlaken.13 The process is based on voluntary commitments under-
taken by participants, i.e., countries producing and trading diamonds. These
commitments include the adoption of appropriate national legislation and
reporting requirements concerning the volume of their trade in rough
diamonds. The implementation of the commitments is monitored by the
participating non-governmental organizations.14 The Kimberley Process is
paralleled by a system of self-regulation for the diamond industry under the
auspices of the World Diamond Council.15
8.2.2 Scope and objectives of the scheme
The Kimberley Process is premised on the idea that “urgent international action
is imperative to prevent the problem of conflict diamonds from negatively
affecting the trade in legitimate diamonds, which makes a critical contribution
to the economies of many of the producing, processing, exporting and import-
ing states, especially developing states”.16 The Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme was designed “to exclude conflict diamonds from the legitimate
trade”.17 As its objectives show, it is a very practical initiative with the
primary aim of protecting the legitimate diamond trade.
In order to gain a proper understanding of the scope of the Kimberley
Process, it is essential to take a closer look at its definition of “conflict
diamonds”. This may help to understand what the scheme covers and, more
importantly, what it does not. The Kimberley Process defines conflict diamonds
as:
12 Final Report of the Panel of Experts, UN Doc. S/2000/203, paras. 87-93.
13 Interlaken Declaration of 5 November 2002 on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
for Rough Diamonds.
14 For more details, see J.E. Wetzel, ‘Targeted Economic Measures to Curb Armed Conflict?
The Kimberley Process on the Trade in ‘Conflict Diamonds’’, in N. Quénivet & S. Shah-Davis
(eds.), International Law and Armed Conflict: Challenges in the 21st Century, The Hague: T.M.C.
Asser Press (2010), pp. 170-171.
15 The World Diamond Council has been established in 2000 with the purpose of “repres-
ent[ing] the diamond industry in the development and implementation of regulatory and
voluntary systems to control the trade in diamonds embargoed by the United Nations or
covered by the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme”. See http://www.worlddiamond
council.com/ for more details (consulted on 27 June 2012).
16 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, fourth paragraph of the preamble.
17 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, ninth paragraph of the preamble.
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“rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed
at undermining legitimate governments, as described in relevant United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or in other
similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood
and recognized in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56,
or in other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future”.18
The first element that reveals the scope of the Kimberley Process is the refer-
ence to “rough diamonds”, defined as “diamonds that are unworked or simply
sawn, cleaved or bruted”.19 In other words, as soon as diamonds have under-
gone any form of modification from their natural state, they are no longer
covered by the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Of course, this con-
siderably narrows the scope of the scheme. In addition, it provides loopholes
for bypassing it. In fact, in 2007 the participating NGO Global Witness reported
a significant number of suspicious shipments of polished diamonds from
countries with no diamond industry.20 One possible explanation for this is
that these shipments were deliberately misclassified.
Secondly, the Kimberley Process covers only diamonds that are used by
rebel movements or their allies. Thus the definition covers rebel movements
and all those who provide support to these movements, either by trading with
them or by other means, including foreign governments, such as the Taylor
administration which supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra
Leone, as well as companies.21 Therefore the definition is broader than an
earlier one proposed by the General Assembly in its Resolution 55/56, which
focused exclusively on the role of rebel movements themselves.22
However, diamonds mined by national authorities are excluded from the
definition, even when this is associated with gross human rights violations.
This turns out to be a very problematic limitation, threatening the very survival
of the Kimberley Process. The 2011 Plenary decision to allow Zimbabwe to
resume export of its diamonds,23 after an earlier decision of the Plenary in
2009 to temporarily block the export of diamonds from Zimbabwe, was a cause
18 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section I.
19 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section I.
20 Global Witness, ‘Loopholes in the Kimberley Process’, October 2007.
21 See also J.E. Wetzel, ‘Targeted Economic Measures to Curb Armed Conflict? The Kimberley
Process on the Trade in ‘Conflict Diamonds’’, in N. Quénivet & S. Shah-Davis (ed.), Inter-
national Law and Armed Conflict: Challenges in the 21st Century, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser
Press (2010), pp. 173-174.
22 The General Assembly defined rough diamonds as “diamonds which are used by rebel
movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine or overthrow
legitimate Governments. UN General Assembly Resolution 55/56 (2000), second paragraph
of the preamble.
23 Final Communiqué from the Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting, 3 November 2011,
available through http://www.worlddiamondscouncil.org, resources section (consulted
on 14 June 2012), para. 19.
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of great concern. The reasons for blocking Zimbabwe’s diamond exports in
2009 were reports of human rights abuses committed by the Zimbabwean army
at particular mining sites, as well as reports of smuggling in contravention
of the scheme.24 The 2011 Plenary decision provoked a great deal of anger,
notably among the NGOs involved in the Process. Some of them even walked
out of the process.25
The last element of the definition is very interesting, as it indirectly touches
on the question of the legitimacy of the armed conflict itself. According to the
definition, conflict diamonds are diamonds that are used to finance conflicts
aimed at undermining legitimate governments. The reference to ‘legitimate’
with respect to governments seems to imply that the definition excludes
diamonds that are used by rebel movements to overthrow governments that
are not – or are no longer – recognised by the international community. In
this respect reference can be made to Chapter 2 of this book, which discussed
the position of governments under international law. The reference to legit-
imate governments in the Kimberley definition of conflict diamonds lends
support to the conclusion reached there, in the sense that armed groups that
aim to overthrow an illegitimate government are considered to have a right
to exploit the State’s natural resources.
Furthermore, the definition indicates that it is up to the Security Council
to determine whether rough diamonds used by armed groups constitute
‘conflict diamonds’. The definition explicitly refers to existing and future
Security Council resolutions: “as described in relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions”. This reference could be interpreted to mean that the
Security Council must determine in advance whether diamonds used by armed
groups in particular situations are “conflict diamonds”. This implies that the
Kimberley scheme only covers diamonds that have explicitly been labelled
“conflict diamonds” by the Security Council.
Therefore the definition of conflict diamonds in the context of the Kimber-
ley Process is very specific and very limited. This is understandable, as the
original objective of the Kimberley Process was to stop diamonds from financ-
ing horrific conflicts such as those in Angola and Sierra Leone, where
diamonds were mined by rebel groups like UNITA and the RUF.
However, the Kimberley Process scheme entered into force ten years ago
and it is time to rethink its objectives. Is it an initiative that aims at re-establish-
ing sovereignty over natural resources by helping governments to regain
control over the State’s natural resources? Or is the objective of the process
rather human rights-oriented, i.e., is its objective to exclude from the market
24 See the Final report of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Review Mission to
Zimbabwe from 30 June to 4 July 2009, available through http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/world/ZimFinaldraft020909.pdf (consulted on 9 December 2012).
25 See in this regard e.g. the Press release of Global Witness, one of the founding NGOs, on
http://www.globalwitness.org (consulted on 14 June 2012).
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all diamonds that are associated with violence and human rights abuses in
general? In the latter case, the term ‘conflict diamonds’ urgently needs to be
redefined.
The United States, which chaired the Kimberley Process in 2012,26 was
certainly in favour of increasing the scope of the definition. It proposed a new
definition of conflict diamonds which would include all diamonds associated
with violence and human rights abuses, whether committed by rebel move-
ments or States, in or outside the context of an armed conflict.27 The advocates
of this broader definition not only include civil society groups and State
members to the Kimberley Process, but also companies in the diamond indus-
try. The reason for the diamond industry to engage in the Kimberley Process
in the first place was the damage to the industry’s reputation after reports
involving ‘blood diamonds’ in the late 1990s. Examples like Zimbabwe pose
a similar problem for the industry. However, there are also a number of
opponents to a new definition, especially – and not surprisingly – in States
that produce diamonds. In the light of the controversy surrounding a new
definition, the 2012 Plenary meeting, held in December 2012 in Washington,
delayed the adoption of a new definition until at least 2013. At the time of
publication of this book, no further action has been taken.
8.2.3 Participants and institutional structure
The Kimberley Process has 54 participants, representing 80 States.28 Although
it is not an international organization, State participants are referred to as
“members”. Producing members account for 99.8 % of the worldwide pro-
duction in rough diamonds, and the process includes all the major diamond
trading countries. Other participants in the process include the World Diamond
26 The Chair of the Kimberley Process rotates on an annual basis. The current Chair is South
Africa, while China (the current Vice-Chair) will become the Chair in 2014.
27 In this respect see the Chair Vision Statement of 7 August 2012, available through http://
www.kimberleyprocess.com (consulted on 12 August 2012). See also the commentary to
the Chair Vision Statement, which sets out in more detail a proposition to change the
definition for conflict diamonds so as to apply to “diamond-related conflicts that meet
generally agreed-upon standards of armed conflicts, such as a resort to armed force between
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State. This would also apply to circumstances
of systematic violence, such as protracted and violent internal disturbances and tensions,
grave acts of violence or acts of a similar nature over an extended period. Such a definition
would not apply to individual or isolated cases. Neither would this apply to violence that
is unrelated to diamonds”. See Chair Vision Statement FAQs, p. 4 (consulted on 12 August
2012).
28 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (last consulted on 5 December 2012). The European
Union and its member States count for one single participant. In December 2012, Panama,
Kazakhstan and Cambodia are admitted as new participants following the admission in
August of Cameroon.
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Council, representing the diamond industry, and civil society. Global Witness
and Partnership Africa-Canada are among the founding NGOs.
The institutional structure of the Kimberley Process is very basic. Its opera-
tion largely depends on the contribution of the participants and observers to
the Scheme. The Kimberley Process does not have a permanent secretariat at
its disposal, although there are plans to establish a so-called administrative
support mechanism (ASM).29 Furthermore, the principal organ of the Kimberley
Process is the Plenary, which meets once a year and consists of all the Kimber-
ley Process participants and observers, i.e., the participating States, as well
as the diamond industry and civil society. Decisions regarding the functioning
of the system are adopted by this organ on the basis of consensus.30 It may
also set up ad hoc working groups and subsidiary bodies to refine particular
aspects of the system, i.e., to prepare guidelines on internal controls, or to look
into specific situations.31
The Kimberley Process is supervised by a Chair, a function that rotates
amongst the participants on a yearly basis. In addition to directing the working
groups and administering the Process, the Chair’s functions include the resolu-
tion of disputes between participants regarding the implementation of the
scheme.32 This dispute resolution mechanism could constitute an important
tool to ensure compliance by members, if used effectively. It is triggered by
a form of “whistle blowing”. Participants can inform the Chair of concerns
regarding compliance with the scheme by other participants. The Chair will
then try to find a solution to the problem with a form of mediation. So far,
the dispute settlement mechanism has been used once, leading to the sus-
pension of a participant from the process.33
29 See the 2010 Administrative Decision on the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for
Exploring the Modalities of Enhancing the Efficiency of the Kimberley Process With a View
to Provide Administrative Support for its Activities and the 2011 amendment to this
decision, available through http://www.kimberleyprocess.com, documents section (con-
sulted on 14 June 2012). In December 2012, the Plenary agreed to accept the offer of the
World Diamond Council to supply administrative support to the body for one year, starting
January 1, 2013.
30 2003 Rules of Procedure of Meetings of the Plenary, and its Ad Hoc Working Groups and
Subsidiary Bodies [hereafter: Rules of Procedure], available through http://www.kimberley
process.com (consulted on 14 June 2012), Rule 42.
31 Rules of Procedure, Rule 1 and 19.
32 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section VI.
33 In this respect, see The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: Third Year Review, p. 6,
available through http://www.kimberleyprocess.com, documents section (last consulted
on 27 August 2012).
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8.2.4 Operation of the scheme
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme functions on the basis of export
and import permits for shipments of rough diamonds. Each shipment of rough
diamonds must be accompanied by a duly validated Certificate.34 This Certi-
ficate must meet a number of minimum requirements, including a statement
that the rough diamonds in the shipment have been handled in accordance
with the provisions of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Further-
more, it must be tamper and forgery-proof, it must identify the issuing author-
ity as well as the exporter and importer, state the carat weight, the number
of parcels and the value of the shipment, and it must include a validation of
the Certificate by the Exporting Authority.35 In addition, a confirmation of
receipt must be sent to the relevant Exporting Authority, with reference to
the Certificate number, the number of parcels, the carat weight and the details
of the importer and exporter.36
In order to meet these requirements, participants must establish a system
of internal controls designed to eliminate conflict diamonds from shipments
of rough diamonds imported into or exported from their territory.37 In this
respect, participants must meet a number of minimum requirements. They
must designate Importing and Exporting Authorities, ensure that rough
diamonds are imported and exported in tamper-proof containers, adopt
appropriate legislation to implement and enforce the Certification Scheme,
and collect, maintain and exchange official production, import and export data
with other participants.38 Finally, participants should cooperate with each
other with the exchange of information and best practices.39 Over the course
of time, these requirements have been further refined with administrative
decisions and declarations adopted in the plenary sessions.40
In addition to these minimum requirements, the Kimberley Process Certifi-
cation Scheme provides a number of recommendations for the establishment
of a system of internal controls. These include recommendations relating to
34 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section III (a).
35 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Annex I A.
36 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section III (b).
37 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section IV (a).
38 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section IV (b)-(f).
39 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Section V.
40 See, e.g., the 2005 Moscow Declaration which sets out a number of recommendations
concerning internal controls over alluvial diamond mining. Similarly, the 2007 Brussels
Declaration contains recommendations on internal controls for participants with rough
diamonds trading and manufacturing which directly affect companies. See also the 2009
Administrative Decision on Implementation and Enforcement which builds on Section V
of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme concerning cooperation and transparency,
inter alia, to counter fraudulent certificates and suspect shipments. For all these documents,
see the documents section of http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (consulted on 13 June
2012).
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the transparency of payments for rough diamonds, the licensing of mines and
miners, as well as the registration and licensing of diamond buyers, sellers,
exporters, agents and courier companies.41
The proper functioning of the Kimberley Process is therefore largely de-
pendent on national implementation. Decisions on the operation of the internal
controls are left to the national States participating in the scheme. The prose-
cution of infringements of the scheme is also a domestic issue. The Kimberley
Process Third Year Review Report of November 2006 mentions a number of
seizures of diamond parcels, as well as the instigation of criminal proceedings
by countries, but the report fails to give a real insight into the proper function-
ing of the Process. The significant number of reported seizures by trading
countries such as the European Union, Australia and Canada is a hopeful sign,
but does not provide much information on the overall success of the scheme.
Although the scheme relies on national implementation, the Kimberley
Process has introduced a system of international monitoring. This system is
based primarily on a peer review system and works largely on a voluntary
basis. States have to consent to the use of a review mission.42 Despite the
voluntary nature of the monitoring system, the majority of Kimberley members
have accepted review missions. In some cases, these have had a considerable
impact. In the case of Zimbabwe, for example, a review mission in 2009 pro-
vided essential information, resulting in a temporary blocking of Zimbabwean
diamonds and the adoption of a working plan by the Zimbabwean government
to address the findings of the review team.
Despite the emphasis on national implementation and the voluntary nature
of the commitments, States do have to satisfy a number of requirements in
order to be eligible to participate in the Kimberley Process. Participation in
the process is dependent on the implementation of the minimum requirements
set out above. If States do not meet these minimum requirements, they can
be suspended from the Process.43
In practice there have been some cases of suspension or self-suspension
under the Process. In 2004, the Republic of the Congo was suspended because
it could not provide sufficient details on its diamond production. It was
suspected of being a transit country for smuggling diamonds from the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo and Angola. The suspension was lifted in 2007,
41 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Annex II.
42 See the 2003 Administrative Decision on the Implementation of Peer Review in the KPCS,
available through http://www.kimberleyprocess.com, documents section (consulted on
14 June 2012). The peer review system has been revised several times, the last revision dates
from 2007, through Administrative Decision 16.
43 Guidelines for the Participation Committee in Recommending Interim Measures as regards
Serious Non-compliance with KPCS Minimum Requirements, adopted on 5 November 2008,
available through http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (consulted on 13 May 2012).
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after the Republic of the Congo had demonstrated that it had introduced
reforms in its diamond sector.44
Furthermore, Venezuela and Côte d’Ivoire are examples of participants
that opted for self-suspension. Côte d’Ivoire opted for suspension as soon as
the requirements were introduced in 2003. Today, the country is still not
allowed to trade in rough diamonds, but this is largely due to the UN Security
Council sanctions imposed in 2005 against diamonds originating from the
country. The Kimberley Process and the UN Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire
are closely cooperating to reinstate Côte d’Ivoire as an active member of the
Kimberley Process. Venezuela announced in 2008 that it would suspend its
export of rough diamonds until it had taken the necessary reforms to control
its diamond sector. However, Venezuela has not yet rejoined the Kimberley
Process.
Since the launch of the Kimberley Process, the number of ‘conflict
diamonds’ traded on the international market has dropped significantly. It
is estimated that conflict diamonds represent about one per cent of the inter-
national trade in diamonds today, compared to estimates of up to 15% in the
1990s.45 Nevertheless, it is difficult to measure the precise contribution the
Kimberley Process has made to this success. Some of the conflicts that were
financed with diamonds, in particular the conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone
which triggered the development of the Kimberley Process in the first place,
had already come to an end by the time the Kimberley Process entered into
force in early 2003. As a result, the total number of ‘conflict diamonds’ traded
on the international market obviously declined as well.
Thus it is difficult to measure the impact of the Kimberley Process on the
elimination of the trade in conflict diamonds. One important function of the
Kimberley Process is related to conflict prevention. The improved governance
of diamonds, with the introduction of internal controls, the licensing of mines
and increased transparency in export data and payments, can fulfil an im-
portant role in preventing rebel groups from gaining access to diamond mines.
Furthermore, a functioning system of internal controls can be a disincentive
for rebel groups to consider diamonds as a source of funding or financial gain.
The certificate requirements, as well as the almost universal membership to
the scheme, make it more difficult for rebel groups to find buyers for conflict
diamonds.46
In the case of Sierra Leone, the Kimberley Process has certainly played
an important role in capacity building, making the diamond sector in that
44 See J.A. Grant, ‘The Kimberley Process at Ten: Reflections on a Decade of Efforts to End
the Trade in Conflict Diamonds’, in P. Lujala & S.A. Rustad (eds.), High-Value Natural
Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Oxon/New York: Earthscan (2012), p. 165.
45 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com, ‘About’ section (last consulted on 6 December 2012).
46 See J.A. Grant, ‘The Kimberley Process at Ten: Reflections on a Decade of Efforts to End
the Trade in Conflict Diamonds’, in P. Lujala & S.A. Rustad (eds.), High-Value Natural
Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Oxon/New York: Earthscan (2012), p. 175.
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country more resilient to future attempts by rebel groups to gain control over
the sector. Moreover, the proportion of diamonds exported through govern-
ment channels in that country has increased significantly due to implementa-
tion of the Kimberley Process.47
8.2.5 International recognition of the Kimberley Process
From the beginning, the Kimberley Process received the support of the prin-
cipal UN organs. In its resolution 55/56, adopted in December 2000, the UN
General Assembly enthusiastically welcomed the Kimberley Process initiative
and encouraged the development of an international certification scheme.48
Moreover, the General Assembly issued a number of recommendations on
the design of such a scheme.49 These included recommendations to base it
primarily on national certification schemes to ensure the widest possible
participation. They emphasised the need for appropriate arrangements to help
to ensure compliance and the need for transparency. Since then, the General
Assembly has issued several resolutions endorsing the process and the result-
ing certification scheme.50
From the start of the process, the Security Council also emphasised the
importance of States working together with the diamond industry to devise
effective arrangements to ensure that members of the diamond industry
worldwide abide by the diamond sanctions imposed by it.51 In this respect
the Council welcomed the initiatives that led to the Kimberley Process Certi-
fication Scheme.52 In addition, soon after the official launch of the certification
scheme in 2002, the Security Council expressed its strong support for the
scheme and urged all member States to actively participate in it.53 Moreover,
as discussed in the preceding chapter, the Security Council embraced the
mechanism in several of its subsequent sanctions regimes as the primary way
of implementing the sanctions. This gave significant added authority to the
Kimberley Process.
In addition, the Kimberley Process has received support from organizations
outside the UN. Most notably the recognition by the WTO through its waiver
47 Ibid., pp. 166-173.
48 UN General Assembly Resolution 55/56 of 1 December 2000 (date of publication 29 January
2001) on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit
transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and
settlement of conflicts, paragraph 10 of the preamble and especially paragraph 5.
49 Idem, para. 3.
50 See, inter alia, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/263 of 13 March 2002; Resolution 57/302
of 15 April 2003; Resolution 58/290 of 14 April 2004 and subsequent resolutions. The most
recent resolution is Resolution 66/252 of 25 January 2012.
51 UN Security Council Resolution 1295 (2000), especially paragraph 19.
52 Ibid., especially paragraphs 17-18.
53 UN Security Council Resolution 1459 (2003), especially paragraphs 1-3.
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procedure. This waiver grants WTO members participating in the Kimberley
Process the right to adopt measures to regulate the trade in rough diamonds
that deviates from the trading rules of the WTO.54 In this way, the WTO
expresses its support for the Kimberley Process. It should be noted that it is
exceptional for the WTO to express support for an initiative that addresses
ethical concerns. In most cases where States have invoked ethical concerns
as a reason to deviate from the WTO rules, the WTO has adhered to its non-
discrimination policy.55
8.2.6 Appraisal of the initiative
The Kimberley Process is a voluntary initiative which does not impose legally
binding obligations on participating States. However, as stated before, States
wishing to participate in the initiative must meet the minimum requirements
of the Process. If they do not meet these requirements, they either cannot join
or risk suspension from the Process. This is one of the major strengths of the
Process, as the participants, including almost all the diamond-producing States,
as well as all States hosting major diamond markets, such as Belgium, South
Africa and Israel, are barred from trading with non-participants.56 Therefore
expulsion from the process implies exclusion from the international diamond
market.
54 Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, Decision
of the WTO General Council of 15 May 2003, Doc. WT/L/518 (27 May 2003). The waiver
was extended in 2006 by General Council Decision of 15 Dec. 2006, Doc. WT/L/676
(19 December 2006) and again in 2012 by General Council Decision of 11 December 2012,
Doc. G/C/W/675/Rev.2. The waiver expires on 31 December 2018.
55 See P. van den Bossche, N.J. Schrijver and G. Faber, Unilateral Measures Addressing Non-Trade
Concerns, A Study on WTO Consistency, Relevance of other International Agreements, Economic
Effectiveness and Impact on Developing Countries of Measures concerning Non-Product-Related
Processes and Production Methods, The Hague: OBT / the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands (2007).
56 This is the characteristic of the scheme that has inspired most debates concerning the
compatibility of the scheme with WTO trade law and especially with the principle of non-
discrimination. Although in practice this problem is solved through a waiver by the WTO,
many authors question the necessity of such a waiver. The main argument of these authors
is that the Kimberley Process can be exempted under one of the general exceptions to the
principle of non-discrimination under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
For more details on this discussion, see, e.g., J. Pauwelyn ‘WTO Compassion or Superiority
Complex? What to Make of the WTO Waiver for “Conflict Diamonds”’, Michigan Journal
of International Law, Vol. 24 (2002-2003), pp. 1177-1207; K.N. Schefer, ‘Stopping Trade in
Conflict Diamonds : Exploring the Trade and Human Rights Interface with the WTO Waiver
for the Kimberley Process’, in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn and E. Bürgi, Human Rights and
International Trade, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 391-450; J.E. Wetzel, ‘Targeted
Economic Measures to Curb Armed Conflict? The Kimberley Process on the Trade in “Con-
flict Diamonds”’, in N. Quénivet & S. Shah-Davis (ed.), International Law and Armed Conflict:
Challenges in the 21st Century, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press (2010), pp. 171-173.
Addressing resource-related armed conflicts with informal normative processes 341
The implementation of the Kimberley Process and its standards is achieved
through the adoption of national legislation and procedures. Thus, while the
Kimberley Process itself does not impose legally binding obligations on its
participants, standards set by the Kimberley Process acquire legal force through
implementation in national legislation. Participants expressly commit them-
selves to implementing Kimberley’s minimum requirements regarding internal
controls in their national legislation.
Moreover, the international recognition of the scheme, especially the strong
support from the Security Council, adds considerable weight to the credibility
and effectiveness of the initiative. In its sanctions regimes in relation to Angola,
Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Security Council expressly provided for exemp-
tions from the sanctions for rough diamonds traded with an effective certificate
of origin regime, and expressed a preference for the Kimberley Process Certifi-
cation Scheme. In its sanctions regime in relation to Côte d’Ivoire, the Security
Council even made the lifting of sanctions conditional on Côte d’Ivoire’s
participation in the Kimberley Process.
However, from an institutional point of view, the Kimberley Process also
has some significant weaknesses. The most important concerns the monitoring
mechanism of the scheme. The Kimberley Process relies principally on national
monitoring. There is no independent international body responsible for
monitoring the implementation of the Kimberley Process requirements by the
participants. International monitoring is conducted on the basis of a peer
review system and largely on a voluntary basis. This system diminishes the
credibility of the Kimberley Process and increases the possibilities for rebel
groups to find loopholes to bypass the scheme.
Another weakness of the system is related to the decision-making process.
As indicated above, decisions are taken in the Plenary, which is composed
of the participants in the Process. This means that the participants have to
decide on each other’s performance. Decisions are taken on the basis of con-
sensus, which means that States can effectively block controversial decisions.
This makes enforcing the requirements much more difficult. The Group of
Experts on Côte d’Ivoire mentioned this problem when it concluded that “the
Kimberley Process fails to take action when its participants do not, or cannot,
adhere to its principles. This problem is not restricted to the region, but applies
to Kimberley Process participants more generally”.57
Thus, on the whole, the Kimberley Process could be seen as an example
of a voluntary agreement with compulsory elements, albeit not from a purely
legal perspective. In countries that are committed to implementing the scheme,
the results have been impressive. Sierra Leone serves as an example in this
respect. The country has seen its official diamond exports growing consider-
ably, while a recurrence of the armed conflict has so far been prevented.
57 Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to paragraph 12 of
Security Council Resolution 1893 (2009) of 18 March 2010, UN Doc. S/2010/179, para. 77.
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However, in countries that do not have such a direct interest in implementing
the scheme, the results have not always been so positive. Countries like Vene-
zuela and Côte d’Ivoire, which are notorious for large-scale diamond smuggl-
ing and circumvention of the Kimberley Process requirements, illustrate the
weaknesses of a non-legally binding regulatory regime like the Kimberley
Process.
From a legal point of view, the significance of the Kimberley Process could
be further improved with reforms in its institutional structure. The monitoring
mechanism would benefit from greater impartiality with the introduction of
independent audits. The functioning of the enforcement mechanism could be
improved with the introduction of a more refined set of sanctions. The only
formal sanction that exists at the moment is suspension from the scheme. This
is such a robust measure that it is hardly ever applied.
The introduction of more moderate sanctions would give the participants
more options to deal with issues of non-compliance, and in practice, such
options already exist. The diamond exports of a country can, for example, be
blocked without this resulting in the official suspension of the participant. This
was the case in Zimbabwe in 2009. The system would benefit from formalising
and refining these options.
In spite of its weaknesses, the Kimberley Process has proved to be an
invaluable tool in eliminating conflict diamonds. It has provided a universal
template for the certification of rough diamonds which can be applied in all
countries trading in them. Therefore one important contribution of the Kimber-
ley Process is that it has increased transparency in the diamond industry.
Another important contribution of the Kimberley Process is that it has provided
a platform for dialogue for States, companies and civil society to draw up plans
for the elimination of the trade in conflict diamonds.
It is precisely this latter function that determines the future relevance of
the Kimberley Process. In order to continue to be relevant, the participants
should carefully reconsider the objectives of the Process. Currently, its principal
function is related to conflict resolution, in the sense that it provides a tool
to stop armed groups from financing their armed struggle with the trade in
rough diamonds. Its function as a tool for conflict prevention is limited to
discouraging armed groups from turning to diamonds to finance their armed
struggle. Arguably, the participants should continue to develop the role of
the Kimberley Process in the prevention of conflicts by adopting a broader
definition of conflict diamonds, as proposed by the United States. This defini-
tion should include rough diamonds that are associated with violence and
human rights abuses, whether they are committed by rebel movements or
governments, in or outside the context of an armed conflict. Obviously, this
policy change has major implications, not only for the Kimberley Process itself
but also for its relationship with other institutions, most notably with the
Security Council. The Kimberley Process would become more independent
from the Security Council as a result of this change, since it would allow
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Kimberley to address situations that do not directly pose a threat to inter-
national peace and security. Nonetheless, in order to improve its credibility
as a tool to break the link between diamonds and armed violence, it is impera-
tive for Kimberley to embark upon that route.
8.3 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
8.3.1 Context
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) results from an NGO-
driven campaign, introduced in 1999 with the aim of increasing transparency
in the natural resources sectors of poor States which are rich in resources, by
publishing company payments and government revenues. This “Publish What
You Pay” campaign inspired the British government to initiate EITI, based on
a multi-stakeholder initiative involving governments, the extractive industry
and non-governmental organizations.58 EITI was introduced during the 2002
Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development and a pilot phase was
launched a year later. In the following years, both the institutional structure
and the implementation process were developed in more detail. A Secretariat
and a Board were established, and EITI principles, criteria and a validation
guide were adopted. EITI has been fully operational since 2009.59 Moreover,
the EITI Standard is updated on a regular basis in order to increase the effect-
iveness of the initiative. The most recent version of the Standard was adopted
in May 2013.
8.3.2 Scope and objectives of the initiative
The objective of EITI is to strengthen governance in resource-rich States by
increasing transparency and accountability in the extractive industries. In the
first place this involves the oil, gas and mining sectors, but it may also include
other natural resources industries. Liberia, for example, has included the
forestry and rubber industries in its EITI programme.60
The initiative is based on twelve principles which clearly demonstrate a
broader commitment to sustainable development.61 This is especially clear
from the first principle, which formulates the premises on which the initiative
58 For more information on the ‘Publish What You Pay Campaign’, consult http://www.
publishwhatyoupay.org (consulted on 18 June 2012).
59 For more details, see the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, The EITI Standard,
EITI International Secretariat (May 2013), available through http://eiti.org (consulted on
20 June 2013).
60 See http://eiti.org/Liberia (consulted on 10 August 2012).
61 These principles can be found in the EITI Standard, p. 9.
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is built. This is the belief that “the prudent use of natural resource wealth
should be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contri-
butes to sustainable development and poverty reduction” and that the
improper management of natural resource wealth “can create negative eco-
nomic and social impacts”.
The principles reaffirm the sovereignty of States over their natural
resources, while emphasising the responsibility of governments to manage
natural resources for the benefit of the country’s population and in the interests
of national development. In this respect, the principles reflect the idea of
stewardship for revenue streams and public expenditure.62 In addition, the
principles articulate the relationship between the accountability of governments
for the management of natural resources and for sustainable development.63
EITI’s main tool to increase transparency and accountability for the manage-
ment of natural resources revenues is the regular publication of reports,
including full government disclosure of all extractive industry revenues on
the one hand, and of all material payments to governments by extractive
companies on the other. These publications must be made available to a wide
audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner.
Other tools to increase transparency and accountability include external audits
and the active engagement of civil society.64
Although EITI is not an instrument that is designed specifically to stop
natural resources from fuelling armed conflict, the mechanism can be extremely
useful in restoring effective government control and improving governance
over natural resources in situations of (immediate) post-conflict reconstruction.
In this way, EITI can help to prevent resource revenues from provoking a
relapse into armed conflict. In fact, its broader ambit does not preclude it from
being one of the principal tools to break the link between natural resources
and armed conflict. Many countries where major resource-related conflicts
have taken place in the last twenty years have joined the Initiative.65 In addi-
tion, a concept note prepared by the United Kingdom for the Security Council’s
thematic open debate of 19 June 2013 on natural resources and conflict preven-
tion refers to EITI as one out of four risk mitigating initiatives, together with
the Kimberley Process, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and the Ruggie
62 See Principle 2: “We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit
of a country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the
interests of their national development” and Principle 8: “We believe in the principle and
practice of accountability by government to all citizens for the stewardship of revenue
streams and public expenditure”.
63 See Principle 4, which states that “a public understanding of government revenues and
expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and
realistic options for sustainable development”.
64 See the seven EITI Requirements as set out in the EITI Standard 2013, p. 10.
65 EITI compliant countries include Liberia, while candidate countries include the DR Congo,
Sierra Leone, Iraq and Côte d’Ivoire. See http://eiti.org/countries for up-to-date information.
(consulted on 18 June 2012).
Addressing resource-related armed conflicts with informal normative processes 345
Framework for responsible business practices.66 During the Open Debate,
several delegations confirmed this position.67 Lastly, EITI is among the prin-
cipal tools of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to curb
illegal exploitation of natural resources, as set out in the 2010 Lusaka Declara-
tion.
8.3.3 Participants and institutional structure
EITI has 39 implementing countries, 23 of which are recognised as EITI-com-
pliant countries while 16 have the status of candidate countries.68 Compliant
countries meet all the requirements of the EITI standard, while candidate
countries implement the EITI standard but do not yet meet all the requirements.
Liberia, Nigeria, Iraq and Côte d’Ivoire are examples of compliant countries,
while Afghanistan is a candidate country. In addition to implementing coun-
tries, EITI recognises stakeholders. These are “supporting” countries, including
the Netherlands and the United States, but also non-governmental organiza-
tions, companies and international organizations. Relevant examples of non-
governmental organizations include Global Witness, the Open Society Institute,
Publish What You Pay and Transparency International. Participating companies
include De Beers, BP, Shell and Tata Steel. Finally, international organizations
involved in EITI include the African and European Union, the OECD, the IMF
and the World Bank Group.
EITI’s institutional structure is well developed. EITI is governed by an
association, which is registered as a non-profit organization under Norwegian
law. Its governance structure is codified in Articles of Association.69 The EITI
Association comprises three permanent institutional bodies. First, the EITI’s
Members’ Meeting, consisting of personal representatives of States, companies
and civil society organizations.70 This is EITI’s governing body.71 The second
body is the EITI Board, which is the executive body of the Association. The
66 See Annex to the letter dated 6 June 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General on ‘Conflict prevention and natural resources: how can the effective and
transparent management of natural resources in conflict-affected States contribute to
international peace and security?’, UN Doc. S/2013/334, 6 June 2013, paragraph 6.
67 See e.g. the United States, which emphasised that “[m]ultiple stakeholder partnerships
among Governments, the private sector and civil society, such as the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI), are making significant progress in addressing the link
between extracted resources and conflict”.
68 See http://eiti.org/countries (last consulted: 20 June 2013).
69 See the EITI Standard 2013, pp. 43-52, adopted on 16 February 2009.
70 Articles of Association, Articles 4, 8 and 9. As regards States’ representatives, these are
mostly civil servants or independent experts. There is no formal State representation in
the Members’ Meeting.
71 Ibid., Article 8.
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EITI Board consists of an independent Chair, eight State members, six members
from industry and five members from civil society.72 The members of the
Board are elected by the Members’ Meeting.73 The third institutional body
is the EITI Secretariat, which supports the EITI Board in running the organiza-
tion.74 The Secretariat is funded on a voluntary basis by supporting govern-
ments and participating companies.75
The well-developed institutional structure of the EITI Association, with
organs that can act independently from the Association’s members, is one of
the principal strengths of the initiative, since it effectively allows EITI to per-
form its oversight function. It makes EITI less susceptible to inside pressure
from member countries.
8.3.4 Operation
States wishing to join EITI have to meet four registration requirements. These
include a public announcement of the State’s intention to implement EITI and
the creation of a multi-stakeholder group at the national level consisting of
representatives from the private sector, civil society and relevant government
ministries, to prepare and supervise the implementation of the EITI pro-
gramme.76 When States have satisfied these requirements, they can apply
to the EITI Board for admission as a candidate country. In order to ensure the
participation of all the relevant actors in the implementation process, the
application cannot take place without the full support of the multi-stakeholder
group.
After admission as a candidate country, States have to meet yet another
set of minimum requirements before being accepted as a full member or
“compliant country”.77 Amongst other things, all the relevant actors must
be included in the process of implementation, and all relevant companies and
government entities must submit reports which are based on accounts audited
to international standards.
Furthermore, governments and companies, including state-owned com-
panies, must comprehensively disclose all material payments and revenues.
These are published in an EITI report, drawn up by an independent organiza-
tion. The report must be “comprehensible, actively promoted, publicly access-
ible, and contribute to public debate”.78 One important innovation in the 2013
Standard, compared to the 2011 EITI rules, is that the reports must include
72 Ibid., Articles 4 and 10.
73 Ibid., Articles 9 and 10.
74 Ibid., Articles 4 and 16.
75 Ibid., Article 18.
76 EITI Standard 2013, p. 11.
77 Ibid., p. 10.
78 Ibid., pp. 32-33, Requirement 6.
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contextual information about the extractive industry in the EITI participant’s
State.79 This information must include details about the legal framework and
fiscal regime, production data of the extractive industries, government involve-
ment in extractive companies, and the allocation of licences to extractive
companies. The inclusion of this requirement in the EITI 2013 Standard is an
important step in raising public awareness, as contextual information about
the sector enables citizens to see the individual data from a broader perspect-
ive. The last requirement of interest is that EITI implementation must be on
a “stable, sustainable footing”.80 However, the Standard does not elaborate
on this requirement.
Candidate countries must submit their first EITI report within 18 months
after their admission. After that, countries must report annually. However,
in order to be accepted as an EITI-compliant country, candidate countries must
take one final step. Within two and a half years after admission as a candidate,
countries must submit a validation report to the EITI Board for approval. This
is an external review that assesses a country’s compliance with the EITI Prin-
ciples and Criteria.81 Again, the process comprises a number of checks and
balances: the validator is selected by the EITI Secretariat from a list of accredited
organizations pre-approved by the EITI Board, and the national multi-stake-
holder group must give its consent to the proposed validator.
The validation process has to be repeated every three years once a country
has been accepted as a compliant country. The validation requirements,
together with the annual reporting procedure, ensure that States continue to
comply with the requirements after their recognition as compliant countries.
If the EITI Board considers at any given moment that a country has stopped
complying, it can take several measures, ranging from temporary suspension
from the process to the delisting of a State. At the moment there are several
countries that have been suspended from the process, including the DR Congo,
the Central African Republic and Sierra Leone.82
The effectiveness of EITI was subject to a review in 2011, undertaken by
an independent bureau.83 However, the review report was based on a very
limited case study of three countries, viz. Nigeria, Gabon and Mongolia.
Moreover, the report showed mixed results. In all three countries, reforms
79 Ibid., pp. 21-25, Requirement 3.
80 Ibid., p. 33.
81 For more details on the validation process, see the Validation Guide, included in the EITI
Standard 2013, pp. 35-39.
82 Status as of 20 June 2013. The DR Congo is suspended for not reaching compliance in its
second validation; the CAR for not being able to implement EITI as a result of the coup
d’état in March; and Sierra Leone for not satisfying all the reporting requirements in its
2010 Report.
83 Scanteam, Evaluation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, May 2011,
available through http://eiti.org/files/2011-EITI-evaluation-report.pdf (consulted on
7 December 2012).
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had been undertaken for the purpose of implementing the EITI Standard.
However, there were important differences between the countries, for example,
notably with regard to the inclusiveness of the process and the institutional
structure put in place to ensure the proper implementation of the process.
Moreover, the report showed that the EITI process had hardly had any impact
on society, in the sense of creating more accountability in government admin-
istration or promoting development. Other case studies on the Nigerian and
Liberian EITI programmes have reached similar conclusions.84
Joining EITI is regarded as an important step in creating a platform for
dialogue and for building trust in government institutions, but it does not
directly contribute to creating more accountability in government administra-
tion. The 2013 review of the EITI requirements is specifically intended to
address these deficiencies, notably with the introduction of the requirement
to publish contextual information on the extractive sector and by requiring
more detailed information regarding individual payments by companies to
governments.
In conclusion, EITI’s most important functions so far have been to provide
a framework for changes in the administration of natural resources revenues,
to create a level playing field for companies in the extractive industries, and
to create a platform for dialogue. However, when it comes to bringing about
changes in government administration in general, and especially in fostering
accountability and sustainable development, it has not yet generated any
tangible results. As a tool for conflict prevention and resolution, EITI’s role
is therefore limited to improving the basic structure for resource governance,
while it is not sufficiently equipped to eliminate grievances over resource
distribution and to promote sustainable peace.
8.3.5 International recognition of the initiative
Although the launch of EITI had been announced in 2002, it was not until 2009
that it became fully operational. Since then, it has steadily been gaining sup-
port. Early support for EITI was voiced by the leaders of the G8, who referred
to the importance of the initiative for increasing transparency in the extractive
industries in all their declarations since 2007. In their most recent declaration,
adopted at the 2013 summit held in Northern Ireland, the G8 expressly en-
couraged countries to join EITI.85
84 See P.D. Ocheje, ‘The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): Voluntary Codes
of Conduct, Poverty and Accountability in Africa’, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa,
Vol. 8 (2006), No. 3 on Nigeria; and E. Rich & N. Warner, ‘Addressing the Roots of Liberia’s
Conflict Through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’, in P. Lujala & S.A.
Rustad (eds.), High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Oxon/New York:
Earthscan (2012), pp. 201-209 on Liberia.
85 G8, 2013 Lough Erne G8 Leaders’ Communiqué, 18 June 2013, paras. 34-39.
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Furthermore, several international organizations participate directly in the
initiative, including the African and European Unions, the IMF, the World Bank
and the OECD. It is relevant to note that the World Bank administers EITI’s so-
called Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which provides technical and financial
assistance to implementing States.86 In addition, the OECD has integrated EITI
in its own policy tools, such as its Due Diligence Guidance, examined in the
following section.87 The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
also endorsed EITI in its Lusaka Declaration of 15 December 2010 as one of
the six tools developed to curb the illegal exploitation of natural resources.88
EITI has encouraged the implementation of disclosure requirements for the
extractive industries in the national legislations of several States, including
those where major extractive companies are located. The United States, for
example, has included a section in its Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act which requires oil, gas and mining companies listed
on Wall Street to include in their annual report information relating to any
payment made by the company or any of its subsidiaries to a government
for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or
minerals.89 This legislation affects all companies listed on the American stock
market, including foreign companies such as BP and Shell.
Similarly, the European Union is currently amending the 2004 Transparency
Directive and the 1978 and 1983 Accounting Directives in order to introduce
mandatory disclosure requirements in EU legislation. Under the new Direct-
ives, both extractive and timber companies must publicly disclose their tax
and revenue payments to governments worldwide.90 The EU legislation goes
86 See the Memorandum of Understanding between the MDTF and the EITI International
Secretariat of 20 March 2008, available through http://eiti.org (consulted on 18 June 2012).
87 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected
and High-Risk Areas, OECD Publishing (2011), p. 24.
88 Declaration of the ICGLR Special Summit to Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
in the Great Lakes Region, Lusaka, 15 December 2010, especially paragraph 2.
89 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H. R. 4173, 21 July 2010,
Section 1504.
90 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive
2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and Commis-
sion Directive 2007/14/EC, 25 October 2011, COM (2011) 684 final, Article 6; Proposal for
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Annual Financial State-
ments, Consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports of Certain Types of Under-
takings, 25 October 2011, COM (2011) 684 final, Article 4.9. Recently, the Legal Affairs
Committee of the European Parliament has proposed an amendment to the Directives that
would require oil, gas, mining and forestry companies not only to disclose their payments
to governments country by country, but also on a project-to-project basis. Furthermore,
it has set a relatively low threshold by requiring disclosure of all payments of C= 80,000 and
over. See The Guardian, ‘EU legislators aim for tougher law on oil, gas and mining pay-
ments’, 19 September 2012, available through http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-develop-
ment/2012/sep/19/eu-tougher-transparency-law-extractive (last consulted on 19 December
2012).
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beyond section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act in two respects. First, unlike the
Dodd-Frank Act, the EU legislation applies to timber companies as well. In
addition, unlike the Dodd-Frank Act, which applies only to companies listed
on the stock market, the EU proposals apply both to companies listed on the
European stock markets and to large unlisted companies.91
Furthermore, the UN’s principal organs have expressed their support for
EITI. In a resolution on strengthening transparency in industries, the UN General
Assembly emphasised that permanent sovereignty over natural resources must
be exercised in the interests of national development and the well-being of
the people of the State concerned.92 It is in this context that the General
Assembly encouraged the international community “to strengthen, as appro-
priate, upon request, the capacity of States endowed with natural resources,
especially those emerging from conflict situations” and that it noted “the efforts
of countries that are participating in all relevant voluntary initiatives to
improve transparency and accountability in industries, including in the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in the extractive sector”.93
Similarly, the Security Council has expressed its support for EITI, both in
a general fashion and in the specific case of Liberia.94 In its Presidential State-
ment of 25 June 2007, the Security Council recognised the role of voluntary
initiatives aimed at improving revenue transparency, such as EITI, in ensuring
that natural resources become an engine for sustainable development.95 In
addition, in Resolution 1854 (2008) concerning Liberia the Security Council
expressed its support for Liberia’s decision to take part in EITI and encouraged
“Liberia’s continued progress in implementing their EITI work plan to improve
revenue transparency”.96
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Security Council has never made
use of the initiative to support its sanctions regimes, as it did with the Kimber-
ley Process. This is remarkable, as there have been several cases where the
Security Council had the occasion to do so. The first example concerns the
conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, where revenues from natural resources were used
91 Large companies are those that exceed two of the following three criteria: annual turnover
of C= 40 million; total assets C= 20 million and employees 250. An important consequence
of bringing large unlisted companies under the directive is that state owned companies
also fall under the directives.
92 UN General Assembly Resolution 62/274 of 11 September 2008, paragraph 4 of the pre-
amble.
93 UN General Assembly Resolution 62/274 of 11 September 2008, especially paragraph 3
and 4.
94 See the Statement by the President of the Security Council of 25 June 2007, UN Doc. S/PRST/
2007/22, p. 2; and UN Security Council Resolution 1854 (2008), paragraph 5 of the preamble.
95 UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Natural Resources and Conflict, UN Doc.
S/PRST/2007/22, 25 June 2007, paragraph 9.
96 UN Security Council Resolution 1854 (2008), paragraph 5 of the preamble.
Addressing resource-related armed conflicts with informal normative processes 351
by both sides to the conflict in order to acquire arms in contravention of the
embargo.97
The second example concerns the situation in the DR Congo. In its Resolu-
tion 2053 (2012), the Security Council encouraged the Congolese Government
“to further increase transparency in the administration of contracts for mining
rights and the collection and accounting for taxes”.98 These recommendations
were made in connection with broader efforts to stop the trade in conflict
resources from the DR Congo and to restore governance over the natural
resources sectors. However, the Security Council did not refer to EITI as a tool
to help the Congolese government to increase the transparency of its admin-
istration. Therefore the support for EITI expressed by the Security Council is
not unequivocal.
The hesitancy of the Security Council to embrace an initiative like EITI can
be linked to the diverging views of members of the UN Security Council with
regard to the role of the UN Security Council in preventing armed conflicts.
EITI is primarily an initiative aimed at improving the public management of
natural resources, and in this way helps to eliminate some of the root courses
of armed conflict. An open debate held in the Security Council on the topic
of “Conflict prevention and natural resources” on 19 June 2013 revealed that
many countries support a stronger role for the Security Council in addressing
the root causes of armed conflict. France, for example, emphasised the respons-
ibility of the Security Council “to encourage initiatives that ensure proper,
lasting and responsible management” of natural resources. In France’s view,
the Security Council “must support measures that can establish the basis for
lasting peace”.99 France explicitly referred to EITI as one of those measures,
which, according to it, “has as a goal to ensure that [natural] resources serve
development and not fuel ongoing conflicts”.100
At the same time, Russia opposed strengthening the role of the UN Security
Council. In Russia’s view, the Security Council can adopt sanctions “only in
the case of specific violators whose actions fuel hotspots of instability. Such
measures should be introduced on the basis of the Charter of the United
97 See, e.g., the Midterm report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with para-
graph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008) of 8 April 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/188,
paras. 61-72; Final report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph
11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008) of 9 October 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/521, paras.
171-210; Final report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 12
of Security Council Resolution 1893 (2009) of 27 April 2011, UN Doc. S/2011/271, paras.
118-219. The indications of the Group of Experts were confirmed after the conflict had
ended. See Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, prepared in accordance
with paragraph 14 of Security Council Resolution 1980 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/196, paras.
92-100.
98 UN Security Council Resolution 2053 (2012), especially paragraph 25.
99 United Nations Security Council, Open debate on conflict prevention and natural resources,
UN Doc. S/PV.6982, p. 13.
100 Ibid.
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Nations, be targeted in nature and take account of the negative humanitarian
consequences thereof for the population as a whole”. Russia also emphasised
the danger of “attempts to introduce automaticity in the sanctions mechanisms
or to introduce, through the Security Council and not in line with its mandate,
quasi-sanction instruments by broadening the practice of the certification of
raw materials”.101
It is this difference of opinion of the permanent members of the UN Security
Council with respect to the role of the Security Council in addressing the root
causes of armed conflict which to a large extent explains the Council’s position
with respect to EITI. During the open debate, many delegations emphasised
the significance of EITI in preventing armed conflicts involving natural
resources. However, the debate also reveals that opinions diverge as to the
role of the Security Council in promoting EITI as part of its sanctions mechan-
isms. This is unfortunate, because instruments like EITI can and do make a
valuable contribution to preventing the outbreak of armed conflicts.
8.3.6 Appraisal of the initiative
EITI is an initiative based on voluntary participation and States decide for
themselves whether they are willing to participate. However, as soon as a State
has decided to implement EITI, it has to satisfy a large number of compulsory
requirements, both before joining and after admission. These requirements
may not be legally binding, but compliance is essential for participation in
the initiative. Furthermore, States that do not – or no longer – satisfy the
criteria can lose their membership. One of the major strengths of the initiative
lies in its system for the verification of compliance with the EITI requirements.
Compliance is verified with an independent third party audit and the process
is supervised by the EITI Board.
However, the initiative also has some weaknesses, for example, it relies
exclusively on national reporting. EITI therefore relies completely on the
national multi-stakeholder groups to provide reliable information concerning
both government revenues and company payments. Even the validation process
cannot guarantee that the information that is provided is wholly accurate. This
weakness could be partly remedied by requiring governments and companies
to report directly to EITI.
Furthermore, EITI has so far not been able to improve accountability in
government administration. However, the evaluation reports predate the 2013
adaptation of the EITI requirements. Previous EITI Standards did not include
any requirements regarding the distribution of revenues from the extractive
sectors. The focus of the initiative was one-sided, in the sense that it dealt only
with resources revenues and not with issues relating to the expenditure of
101 Ibid., p. 16.
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revenues from the extractive sector. This meant that EITI could be instrumental
only in showing where the money came from, but not what it was spent on.
The 2013 EITI Standard on the other hand, does include requirements related
to the distribution of revenues from the extractive industries. Requirement
3.7 in particular determines that the EITI Report “should indicate which
extractive industry revenues, whether cash or in-kind, are recorded in the
national budget. Where revenues are not recorded in the national budget, the
allocation of these revenues must be explained…”. Although framed as a
recommendation rather than as a mandatory requirement, the inclusion of
a reporting requirement for revenue expenditure is encouraging. Broadening
the scope of EITI to mandatory public expenditure reporting does not seem
to be a viable option, as this would mean that States would have to accept
a third party audit on their expenditure. This could be a bridge too far for
many countries participating in the initiative.
In conclusion, EITI is the only global initiative that specifically addresses
problems related to public administration in the extractive industry. This makes
it an important tool for the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts which
have grievances over natural resources among their root causes. EITI has
successfully highlighted the importance of transparent and accountable public
administration in a sector that is of great economic importance to many devel-
oping countries, including developing countries emerging from armed conflict.
The subsequent adoption of national and regional legislation to address these
issues attests to EITI’s success in this respect.
At the same time, the adoption of the US Dodd-Frank Act and the revision
of the European Transparency Directives, each with its own standards and
modes of operation, also present a risk of the duplication of efforts. Therefore,
there is a clear need to develop a single global reporting standard for the
extractive industries, which was also recognised by the G8 at its 2013 Summit.
In their final declaration, the leaders of the G8 committed themselves to “raise
global standards for extractives transparency and make progress towards
common global reporting standards, both for countries with significant
domestic extractive industries and the home countries of large multinational
extractives corporations”.102 EITI should play an important role in the imple-
mentation of these commitments. As the initiative brings together all the
relevant actors and has a well-developed institutional structure, it constitutes
a convenient forum for the synchronisation of further international action, both
in relation to improving the governance of natural resources in general and,
specifically, as part of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Its primary role in
improving resource transparency in conflict-affected States has been expressly
acknowledged in specific instruments. Amongst these are the Lusaka Declara-
tion of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, referred to
102 G8, 2013 Lough Erne G8 Leaders’ Communiqué, 18 June 2013, para. 36.
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above, and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains
of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, examined below.
8.4 OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF
MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS
8.4.1 Context
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance is a voluntary code of conduct for com-
panies in the minerals sector that either import from or operate in conflict-
affected or otherwise politically unstable regions. The Guidance refers to “high-
risk areas”, which are characterised by the presence of widespread violence
or other risks of harm to people.103 They include areas of political instability
or repression, institutional weakness, insecurity, collapse of civil infrastructure
and widespread violence.104
In other words, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance applies both to com-
panies operating in States where there is ongoing armed conflict and to com-
panies operating in fragile States. Thus the Guidance is not only a tool to
address the responsibility of companies for fuelling conflicts but also to address
their responsibility in other situations where gross human rights violations
occur.
The Guidance elaborates on earlier OECD initiatives in the context of the
OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multilateral Enterprises.
These initiatives include in particular the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and the OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises
in Weak Governance Zones.105 The 2011 revision of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises includes general due diligence requirements for all
companies adhering to the OECD Guidelines.106 The OECD Due Diligence Guid-
ance develops these requirements specifically for some of the minerals that
have contributed most to contemporary armed conflicts. These are tin,
tantalum, tungsten and gold (3TG).
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance was developed to address the respons-
ibility of corporations in respect of the trade in conflict minerals, in particular
103 See the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas, OECD Publishing (2013), p. 13.
104 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected
and High-Risk Areas, OECD Publishing (2013), p. 13.
105 For a discussion of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, see, e.g., J.L. Černič,
Human Rights Law and Business: Corporate Responsibility for Fundamental Human Rights,
Groningen: Europa Law Publishing (2010), p. 184-207. For a discussion of the 2011 update
of the guidelines, from the same author, ‘The 2011 Update of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises’, ASIL Insight, Vol. 16 (4), February 2012.
106 Ibid for a discussion of these requirements.
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from the DR Congo. In 2009, the Security Council mandated the Group of
Experts on the DR Congo to draw up guidelines for the exercise of due
diligence by the importers, processing industries and consumers of mineral
products from the DR Congo, taking advantage of work carried out in other
forums.107 In order to implement this resolution, the Group of Experts turned
to the OECD, member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region, industry and civil society. This collaboration resulted in two instru-
ments: the OECD Due Diligence Guidance as a general tool for companies in
the minerals sector operating in conflict-affected or high-risk regions, as well
as a more specific set of guidelines to address the problem of conflict minerals
originating from the DR Congo, which was presented to the Security Council
by the Group of Experts.
The OECD Council endorsed the Guidance with a recommendation.108
It recommended that members and non-members adherent to the Declaration
on Investment and Multilateral Enterprises “actively promote the observance
of the Guidance by companies”, that they “take measures to actively support
the integration into corporate management systems” of the framework, and
that they “ensure the widest possible dissemination of the Guidance and its
active use by other stakeholders including professional associations, financial
institutions, and civil society organizations”.109 Furthermore, the OECD Council
instructed the Investment Committee and the Development Assistance Commit-
tee to monitor the implementation of the recommendation.110
8.4.2 Scope and objectives of the initiative
The aim of the Guidance is to ensure that companies procuring minerals from
conflict-affected and high-risk areas “respect human rights, avoid contributing
to conflict and successfully contribute to sustainable, equitable and effective
development”.111 The Guidance provides a framework for these companies
to help them assess the risk of their activities contributing to armed conflict
or human rights abuses. Companies are to observe “due diligence”, defined
as “an on-going, proactive and reactive process through which companies can
107 UN Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009), especially paragraph 7. The UN Security
Council thus implicitly referred to the work undertaken by the OECD, in particular the
2006 Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones; and
by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, in particular to its 2006 Protocol
Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and related initiatives.
108 See the Recommendation of the OECD Council on Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, adopted on 25
May 2011 (amended on 17 July 2012), Doc. C(2012)93.
109 Ibid., especially paragraphs 1-3.
110 Ibid., especially paragraph 5.
111 Ibid., especially paragraph 1.
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ensure that they respect human rights and do not contribute to conflict”.112
The due diligence framework applies to companies throughout the mineral
supply chain, from the phase of the extraction of the minerals to their incor-
poration in the final consumers’ product.113 The Guidance currently covers
tin, tantalum and tungsten, including their ores or mineral derivatives, as well
as gold sources.114
The framework for due diligence aims to provide practical guidance to
companies to help them to assess the risks of their activities contributing to
armed conflict or human rights violations and to find adequate responses to
eliminate these risks. This raises important questions regarding the nature of
the risks the OECD Guidance aims to address. In this regard, the OECD Guidance
incorporates a Model Supply Chain Policy which sets out principles and
standards for responsible mineral sourcing.115 Companies adhering to the
OECD Guidance must ensure that their own supply chain policy is consistent
with the standards set out in this model. A discussion of the principles and
standards set out in the Model Supply Chain Policy helps to gain a proper
understanding of the OECD’s definition of responsible mineral sourcing.
First of all, the Model Supply Chain Policy determines that companies
“sourcing from, or operating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas are not
to tolerate nor by any means profit from, contribute to, assist with or facilitate
the commission by any party” of serious abuses associated with the extraction,
transport or trade in minerals. The first paragraph of the Model Supply Chain
Policy identifies the following serious abuses: any forms of torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, any forms of forced or compulsory labour,
the worst forms of child labour, other gross human rights violations and abuses
such as widespread sexual violence, and war crimes or other serious violations
of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity or genocide.
In other words, the Model Supply Chain Policy requires companies engaged
in the minerals sector in fragile States to ensure that neither they nor their
business partners are in any way involved in the violation of fundamental
human rights or the commission of international crimes. Thus the Model
Supply Chain Policy sets a very high standard. It is also interesting to note
that the Guidance does not require companies to respect relevant conventions,
112 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected
and High-Risk Areas, OECD Publishing (2013), p. 13.
113 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected
and High-Risk Areas, OECD Publishing (2013), p. 14.
114 Recommendation of the OECD Council on Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, adopted on 25 May 2011
(amended on 17 July 2012), Doc. C(2012)93.
115 Model Supply Chain Policy for a Responsible Global Supply Chain of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, OECD Publishing (2013),
Annex II.
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although it specifically refers to particular conventions and also uses legal
terminology. It explicitly refers to the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of
Child Labour and uses the ILO’s definition of forced and compulsory
labour.116 In addition, it uses such legal terms as ‘war crimes’ or ‘other
serious violations of international humanitarian law’, ‘crimes against humanity’
and ‘genocide’.
The second form of irresponsible mineral sourcing that the OECD Guidance
seeks to prevent is the provision of support to non-state armed groups or
public or private security forces that illegally control mining sites. In this
respect, the Model Supply Chain Policy requires companies not to tolerate
any direct or indirect support to non-state armed groups or to public or private
security forces through the extraction, transport, trade, handling or export of
minerals. Direct or indirect support is defined broadly to include not only the
procurement of minerals themselves, but also any indirect payments to such
groups (e.g., by paying them illegal taxes) or providing them with logistical
assistance or equipment.
In other words, the OECD Guidance seeks to prevent the involvement of
companies in the trade in conflict minerals. It is interesting to note that the
Guidance not only targets non-state armed groups, but also other actors such
as mercenaries, private security companies and members of the national army
involved in illegal mining. In this way, the Guidance aims to cover situations
like that in the DR Congo, where criminal bands in the national army are
involved in illegal mining.117
Finally, the Model Supply Chain Policy requires companies to refrain from
engaging in bribery or fraudulent misrepresentation of the origin of minerals.
They must support efforts to eliminate money laundering and they must ensure
that all taxes, fees and royalties related to mineral extraction, trade and export
are paid to the government and disclosed in accordance with the EITI prin-
ciples.
In this way, the OECD Guidance seeks to prevent illegal taxation in all its
forms by non-state armed groups and criminal bands in conflict-affected and
high-risk areas. This was a major issue in several of the conflicts discussed
in this book. The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is a good example. The Group of
Experts on Côte d’Ivoire uncovered the existence of parallel taxation systems
in that country, operated by the opposition forces.118 A second point of inter-
est is the reliance of the OECD Guidance on EITI as a means to ensure that taxes,
116 ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, concluded on 17 June 1999,
2133 UNTS 161; ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, con-
cluded on 28 June 1930, 39 UNTS 55.
117 Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo prepared
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009), UN Doc. S/2010/596
of 29 November 2010, p. 76, pp. 47-76.
118 Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, prepared in accordance with para-
graph 14 of Security Council Resolution 1980 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/196, paras. 92-110.
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fees and royalties paid to the government are accounted for. This can be seen
as a form of direct support for EITI.
It can be concluded from the above that the OECD has opted for a very
broad definition of “responsible supply chains of minerals”. The responsibility
of mineral companies is not limited to their role in fuelling armed conflicts.
The OECD Guidance also seeks to address the broader responsibility of mineral
companies and their policies on society in conflict-affected and high-risk areas,
in particular with the provisions on serious abuses and bribery.
However, at the same time, the OECD Guidance sets a very high standard
with regard to abuses in the minerals sector that are not directly related to
the issue of providing support to armed groups. In order for the Guidance
to become relevant, these abuses must have a serious nature, in the sense of
amounting to complicity in the violation of fundamental human rights and
international crimes. Therefore, the relevance of the Guidance is limited to
addressing only the most serious irregularities in the extractive sector. It is
not an instrument that addresses responsible business conduct in the extractive
sector in a broad sense.
8.4.3 Participants and institutional structure
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance is part of a broader framework of instru-
ments adopted by the OECD in relation to the (revised) OECD Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. All OECD members,
as well as nine non-members (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Latvia,
Lithuania, Morocco, Peru and Romania), have signed this declaration. For the
purposes of the present study, it is relevant to note that these countries do
not include any African States.
The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are annexed to the Declaration
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.119 They contain
recommendations on responsible business conduct for multinational companies.
Since 2011, the Guidelines have included detailed recommendations on supply
chain due diligence. Under the new Guidelines, companies should “carry out
risk-based due diligence […] to identify, prevent and mitigate actual and
potential adverse impacts […] and account for how these impacts are
addressed”.120 The impacts referred to in the Guidelines include both adverse
119 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing, 2011 Edition.
120 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing, 2011 Edition, Chapter II,
para. A 10.
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impacts caused by a company’s own activities and adverse impacts caused
by their business relations.121
In addition to this general due diligence requirement, companies must also
carry out human rights due diligence in relation to their own activities and
those of their business partners.122 These requirements were inserted in
response to the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework for Business and
Human Rights’, developed by John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations
and other business enterprises.123 This framework formulates human rights
standards for companies. Guiding Principle 17, which sets out a human rights
due diligence standard, is particularly relevant in this respect.124
It is also relevant to note that States adhering to the Guidelines for Multi-
national Enterprises must set up so-called National Contact Points (NCPs). The
role of the NCPs is to increase the effectiveness of the Guidelines, for example,
by resolving issues that arise in relation to the implementation of the
Guidelines.125 These issues can be raised by all the interested parties, inclu-
121 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing, 2011 Edition, Chapter II,
paras. A 11-12. The OECD official Commentary to these Guidelines define business relation-
ships as including “relationships with business partners, entities in the supply chain and
any other non-State or State entities directly linked to its business operations, products
or services. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing, 2011 Edition,
p. 23.
122 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing, 2011 Edition, Chapter IV,
paras. 2, 3 and 5.
123 This framework has been developed on the initiative of the UN Human Rights Council
(then: Commission) in order to improve corporate responsibility for the protection of human
rights. It was subsequently endorsed by the Human Rights Council. Also see the Report
on the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework for Business and Human Rights’ by John
Ruggie, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April
2008. See also the Report on the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc.
A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011.
124 Guiding Principle 17 states: “In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how
they address their adverse human rights impacts, business enterprises should carry out
human rights due diligence. The process should include assessing actual and potential
human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and
communicating how impacts are addressed. Human rights due diligence:
(a) Should cover adverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise may cause or
contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its operations,
products or services by its business relationships;
(b) Will vary in complexity with the size of the business enterprise, the risk of severe human
rights impacts, and the nature and context of its operations;
(c) Should be ongoing, recognizing that the human rights risks may change over time as
the business enterprise’s operations and operating context evolve.”
125 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing, 2011 Edition, p. 68, section
I(1).
360 Chapter 8
ding worker organizations and non-governmental organizations.126 Although
the NCPs cannot take binding decisions, the dispute resolution mechanism has
proved to be a valuable resource for non-governmental organizations challeng-
ing the human rights policies of individual companies.
As the Due Diligence Guidance was a specific result of the general due
diligence requirements set out in the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
its implementation is subject to the same institutional structure. This means
that the dispute resolution mechanism set up under the Guidelines is also able
to address alleged violations of the Due Diligence Guidance. This is a promis-
ing possibility for challenging the supply chain policies of mineral companies
operating in conflict regions. In the 2000 version of the Guidelines, several
complaints had already been filed against mineral trading companies operating
in the DR Congo.127 These complaints were triggered by a report of the Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on business enterprises
considered by the Panel to be in violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multi-
national Enterprises.128
Most of these complaints alleged that the company had failed to observe
sufficient due diligence in the supply chain. Despite the rudimentary provision
of the 2000 version of the Guidelines on supply chain due diligence, stating
merely that “[e]nterprises should encourage, where practicable, business
partners, including suppliers and sub-contractors, to apply principles of
corporate conduct compatible with the Guidelines”,129 some of the cases
brought before NCPs have been quite successful.
One of these complaints related to the practices of Afrimex, a British
mineral trading company operating in the DR Congo. The complaint brought
to the British NCP by Global Witness accused Afrimex of paying taxes to rebel
forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and of practising insufficient
due diligence in the supply chain, sourcing minerals from mines that use child
and forced labour. According to the NCP, Afrimex failed to fulfil the due
diligence requirements in two ways. In the first place the NCP concluded that
the reliance of Afrimex on statements by its suppliers on the origin of the
minerals purchased by Afrimex did not reflect sufficient due diligence.130
126 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing, 2011 Edition, p. 72, sec-
tion C.
127 See e.g. Global Witness vs. Afrimex (filed on 20 February 2007); 11.11.11 et al vs. Cogecom (filed
on 24 November 2004); 11.11.11 et al vs. Nami Gems (filed on 24 November 2004); RAID
vs. Das Air (filed on 28 June 2004); and NiZA et al. vs. CPH (filed on 3 July 2003).
128 Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2002/1146,
Annex III.
129 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing, 2000 Edition, Chapter II,
para. II.10.
130 Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises: Afrimex (UK) LTD, Summary of NCP Decision, 28 August 2008, para. 51.
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Secondly, Afrimex practised insufficient due diligence in the supply chain,
because it “did not take steps to influence the supply chain and to explore
options with its suppliers exploring methods to ascertain how minerals could
be sourced from mines that do not use child or forced labour or with better
health and safety”.131
The UK National Contact Point applied the Guidelines in a very forward
looking way in the Afrimex case, taking into account new developments in
corporate responsibility for human rights abuses emanating from the ‘Protect,
Respect and Remedy Framework’ developed by John Ruggie, Special Repres-
entative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and trans-
national corporations and other business enterprises. The implementation of
this framework in the 2011 version of the Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises will hopefully raise the awareness of both companies and implementing
States about the responsibility of companies to carefully assess the risks of
their activities contributing to armed conflict or human rights abuses. Further-
more, it is to be expected that when assessing whether companies in the
extractive sector have satisfied the due diligence requirements of the 2011
Guidelines, National Contact Points will turn to the Due Diligence Guidance
for more specific indications.
8.4.4 Operation
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance was developed to ensure that companies
procuring minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas “respect human
rights, avoid contributing to conflict and successfully contribute to sustainable,
equitable and effective development”.132 The Guidance attempts to realise
these objectives by introducing transparency and accountability in the minerals
supply chain. It does so predominantly by using two main tools. The first
involves putting in place mechanisms to ensure that upstream companies
obtain information from their suppliers about the origin of the minerals pur-
chased by them and that downstream companies provide such information
to their business partners. The second concerns requiring independent audits
from companies in order to ensure the credibility of the information relied
on by upstream companies, as well as the information provided to them by
downstream companies.
The OECD Guidance is based on a five-step approach to due diligence. The
basic components of the five-step approach are the establishment of strong
company management systems, the identification and assessment of supply
131 Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises: Afrimex (UK) LTD, Summary of NCP Decision, 28 August 2008, para. 62.
132 Recommendation of the OECD Council on Due Diligence for Responsible Supply Chains
of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, adopted on 25 May 2011, para. 17.
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chain risks, the design and implementation of strategies to respond to identified
risks, the performance of independent third-party audits, and annual reporting
on supply chain due diligence.
Therefore the approach focuses on the management of risks associated with
business transactions in the mineral and gold sectors. The Guidance provides
individual companies with the tools to reduce the risks of their business
practices contributing to armed conflict and other forms of violence. In order
to ensure the proper implementation of the due diligence policies, the approach
has also built in some safeguards. These consist of the independent third-party
audits and the disclosure requirements, which permit business partners, as
well as the general public, to verify the company’s mineral policies.
The OECD has also developed two separate supplements which provide
specific guidance to companies on how to implement the five steps in their
particular sectors, as referred to above. One supplement focuses on supply
chain due diligence for companies trading in tin, tantalum and tungsten, while
the other focuses on gold. The two supplements make a distinction between
so-called “upstream companies”, referring to the supply chain from the mine
to smelters/refiners, and “downstream companies”, referring to the supply
chain from smelters/refiners to retailers.133 Specific recommendations apply
to these categories of companies. Neither of the supplements applies to small-
scale mining by individuals, informal working groups or communities.
Both supplements require companies to review their sourcing practices
in advance in order to determine whether the Guidance applies to them. The
supplement on tin, tantalum and tungsten contains a set of “red flags” trigger-
ing the due diligence standards and processes contained in the Guidance. Red
flags apply to certain locations of mineral origin or transit (minerals originating
from or transported via a conflict-affected or high-risk area, minerals that are
alleged to originate from a country with very low production levels of the
mineral concerned, and minerals that are alleged to originate from a known
transit country) and to particular suppliers (suppliers with ties to companies
operating in one of the red flag locations, the suppliers or their business
partners who are known to have recently sourced minerals from a red flag
location). If one of these red flags applies or if a company cannot determine
whether this is the case, it should proceed with the implementation of the
Guidance.
The supplement on gold does not contain such a red flag system. In order
to determine whether they actually or potentially source gold from conflict-
affected and high-risk areas, all companies in this sector should immediately
start carrying out the first steps of the process. These involve establishing
strong management systems and identifying and assessing risks in the supply
133 For these definitions, see the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains
of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, OECD Publishing (2013), Supplement
on Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten and Supplement on Gold.
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chain.134 One important first step in this respect is the adoption of a supply
chain policy, consistent with the Model Supply Chain Policy discussed above.
The objective of this policy is to set forth common principles and standards
against which the company can assess its own policies, as well as the activities
and relationships of its suppliers.135
8.4.5 International recognition of the initiative
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance has had extensive back-up from the inter-
national community. As mentioned above, both the International Conference
on the Great Lakes Region and the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic
Republic of Congo were involved in drafting the guidelines. This cooperation
resulted in the development of mutually supporting initiatives.
First, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region endorsed
the OECD Due Diligence Guidance in its Lusaka Declaration and directed its
Secretariat to integrate the processes and standards of the OECD Guidance in
the six tools of the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources.136 Secondly, the Group of Experts on the DR Congo developed
a set of due diligence guidelines specifically for minerals originating from the
DR Congo, which relies on the OECD Guidance. This was acknowledged by
the Group of Experts, which recommended in its final report of 2010 “that
relevant individuals and entities refer to the OECD guidance for further details
on due diligence requirements”.137
The Security Council also expressed support for the OECD Guidance, both
directly and indirectly, on several occasions. Most importantly, it did so by
endorsing the Group of Experts Guidelines for the DR Congo. More specifically,
the Security Council mandated the DR Congo Sanctions Committee to take
the exercise of due diligence by a company into account when deciding
whether to place it on the sanctions list. In this respect, the Security Council
specifically referred to the guidelines developed by the Group of Experts or
“equivalent guidelines” as a means of appraising the exercise of due diligence
by companies.138 The five-step approach to due diligence examined above
134 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected
and High-Risk Areas, OECD Publishing (2013), Supplement on Gold.
135 Supplement on Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, Step 1 (A); Supplement on Gold, Step 1, Section
1 (A).
136 Declaration of the ICGLR Special Summit to Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
in the Great Lakes Region, Lusaka, 15 December 2010, especially paragraphs 12 and 13.
These six tools are a Regional Certification Mechanism; harmonisation of national legislation;
a regional database on mineral flows; formalisation of the artisanal mining sector; promotion
of EITI; and a whistle blowing mechanism.
137 Final Report of the Group of Experts prepared pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council
Resolution 1896 (2009), UN Doc. S/2010/596, para. 319.
138 UN Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010), especially paragraph 8.
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is essential to the Security Council in this respect. Thus, at least in relation
to the DR Congo, the Security Council expressed strong support for the
approach to due diligence set out in the OECD Guidance. In its Resolution 2101
(2013) in relation to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the UN Security Council
confirmed its support for the OECD Guidance. In this resolution it expressly
encouraged the government of Côte d’Ivoire to participate in the OECD-hosted
implementation programme with regard to the due diligence guidelines for
responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk
areas.139 This reference to the OECD Guidance in relation to Côte d’Ivoire
confirms the willingness of the Security Council to promote the implementation
of the OECD Guidance in a more general fashion.
Furthermore, the OECD Guidance was put forward as a tool to implement
national legislation, such as the obligations imposed by section 1502 of the
US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.140 Section
1502 of that Act requires companies listed on Wall Street to determine whether
their products contain conflict minerals originating in the DR Congo or neigh-
bouring countries, and to report this to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC).141 A proposal for a European counterpart to section 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Act is currently under discussion. In October 2010 the European
Parliament requested the European Commission and Council to examine a
legislative initiative similar to section 1502 of the US Dodd-Frank Act.142
However, the European Commission has not yet submitted a proposal to this
end. In its Communication of 27 January 2012 to the European Parliament,
the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on Trade,
Growth and Development, the Commission stated in more general terms its
commitment to “explore ways of improving transparency throughout the
supply chain, including aspects of due diligence”.143 However, the Commis-
139 UN Security Council Resolution 2101 (2013), especially paragraph 25.
140 See Joint Letter of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the OECD and
the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 29 July 2011, available through http://www.oecd.org (consulted
on 9 July 2012). The transparency requirements regarding the provenance of minerals
sourced in the DR Congo, included in section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, must be dis-
tinguished from the transparency requirements regarding the payments of oil, gas and
mining companies to governments under section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, discussed
above. Although these sections complement each other in some ways, they deal with
different issues.
141 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H. R. 4173, adopted on 21
July 2010, Section 1502.
142 European Parliament Resolution of 7 October 2010 on Failures in Protection of Human
Rights and Justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo, P7_TA(2010)0350.
143 Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee on Trade, growth and development: Tailoring
trade and investment policy for those countries most in need, 27 January 2012, COM(2012)
22, p. 15.
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sion did not make any concrete proposals, apart from stating its readiness to
promote the OECD Due Diligence Guidance.
8.4.6 Appraisal of the initiative
The OECD Guidance is a voluntary initiative that aims to increase corporate
responsibility in the minerals sector, operating on the basis of supply chain
due diligence. Assigning responsibility throughout the supply chain is one
of the ways of contributing to the effectiveness of the OECD Guidance as a
framework for industry self-regulation. By requiring companies throughout
the supply chain to conduct due diligence, it gives every company a stake
in the due diligence process. Companies cannot hide behind each other or
deny knowledge of what is happening further down the supply chain. Every
company in the supply chain has a responsibility to check whether its business
partners comply with the due diligence requirements in order to be able to
fulfil its own obligations.
Another major strength of the Guidance is that it does not stand by itself,
but that it can be used to give effect to other initiatives on social corporate
responsibility. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance primarily provides mineral
companies with a sophisticated set of guidelines which can be used to imple-
ment the due diligence requirements formulated in the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Companies can also ask the National Contact Points
established pursuant to the OECD Guidelines for assistance with regard to the
implementation of the Guidance. In addition, the Guidance can be instrumental
in helping companies to implement their due diligence obligations pursuant
to other initiatives, in particular the due diligence requirements that were
imposed in relation to the DR Congo by the UN Security Council sanctions
regime and by the United States Dodd Frank Act. The close coordination
between these initiatives has resulted in mutually supportive regimes.
Another advantage of the complementary nature of the OECD Guidance
is related to its enforcement. Although companies implement the due diligence
requirements on a voluntary basis, there are ways of holding companies to
account for their failure to exercise due diligence. The principal option for
this is to file a complaint with the National Contact Points established pursuant
to the OECD Guidelines. Although the decisions of the NCPs are not legally
binding, their role in mediating disputes should not be underestimated. In
addition, and exclusively in relation to the DR Congo, companies can be placed
on a UN Security Council sanctions list for their failure to exercise due diligence
and can be subjected to fines under the United States Dodd-Frank Act. It is
to be expected that the European Union will adopt similar legislation in the
near future.
The Due Diligence Guidance is a promising tool for increasing the respons-
ibility of companies in the minerals sector and for preventing these companies
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from contributing to human rights violations and/or armed conflict. The
principal contribution of the Guidance is that it provides companies with a
comprehensive due diligence model which they can integrate in their company
policies. Furthermore, the Guidance sets standards for the protection of human
rights and combating corruption. Although these standards are for the most
part based on existing legal instruments, including ILO and OECD Conventions,
the Guidance is one of the few instruments that is directly addressed to com-
panies.
In order to increase corporate responsibility in the minerals sector, some
issues need further consideration. The Guidance currently covers tin, tantalum
and tungsten, including their ores or mineral derivatives, as well as gold
sources.144 Despite the broad reach of the Guidance, there is one striking
omission from the list of minerals. The OECD Guidance does not cover
diamonds, a mineral that has financed several contemporary armed conflicts.
At first sight, it could be argued that this is obvious, as diamonds are already
covered by the Kimberley Process. However, a closer look reveals that there
is no clear explanation for this omission. Although the core objective of both
initiatives is to exclude conflict minerals from the international market, they
use different methods to achieve this objective. The Kimberley Process focuses
on government-controlled certification, while the OECD Guidance focuses on
the role of companies throughout the supply chain. This makes these initiatives
mutually compatible. Moreover, the OECD Guidance could strengthen the
Kimberley Process. After all, the Guidance covers every phase of the process,
from rough minerals to end products, while the Kimberley Process focuses
exclusively on rough diamonds. In addition, the Guidance applies not only
to countries where there is an ongoing armed conflict, but also to countries
where there is widespread violence. In these ways, the OECD Guidance could
fill some of the existing gaps in the Kimberley Process. Therefore it is imperat-
ive to increase the scope of the Guidance by adding a supplement on
diamonds, as suggested by the Kimberley Process Civil Society Coalition.145
This suggestion has not yet been followed up.
Furthermore, it is necessary to coordinate initiatives such as the OECD
Guidance with other corporate responsibility initiatives. In this respect, special
mention can be made to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights, a multi-stakeholder initiative that formulates due diligence require-
ments for companies in the extractive sector in relation to their security ar-
rangements. These principles overlap with the requirements formulated under
the OECD Guidance in relation to security forces.
144 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected
and High-Risk Areas, OECD Publishing (2013).
145 Kimberley Process Civil Society Coalition, Communiqué, Brussels, 19 November 2011,
para. 3, available through http://www.pacweb.org
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It is therefore clear that the OECD Due Diligence Guidance is an important
step in addressing the contribution of companies to resource-related armed
conflicts. The years to come will show whether the Guidance can succeed in
changing corporate behaviour in the extractive sector in conflict regions. A
recent pilot project in the Great Lakes region produced some encouraging
results, although it also revealed that the success of the OECD Guidance is
largely dependent on external factors, two of which are particularly important.
First, the final report revealed that the success of the pilot project was in large
part due to the adoption of relevant national legislation, as well as to the
formulation of requirements by the industry itself.146 In addition, the effective
implementation of due diligence by companies can only be achieved if the
origin of the minerals can be traced. The 2012 Final Report of the Group of
Experts on the DR Congo showed that smuggling had increased considerably
in the past year.147 This shows that the implementation of corporate respons-
ibility tools is highly dependent on the efficient functioning of a certification
mechanism, as well as on law enforcement efforts in the border regions.
8.5 SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INITIATIVES TO IMPROVING RESOURCE
GOVERNANCE
This section aims to assess the substantive contribution of the initiatives to
the governance of natural resources in conflict-affected States. In this respect
it is important to note that the three initiatives have different objectives and
methods, but a common aim, i.e., to increase transparency in the management
of natural resources. For this purpose, the initiatives set standards with regard
to their management, both for States and for companies. The overall objective
of the Kimberley Process is to introduce transparency in the trade in rough
diamonds in order to eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds by rebel groups.
Relevant standards set by the Kimberley Process include the establishment
of internal controls, as well as the collection, maintenance and exchange of
data relevant to diamond production, import and export. Additional standards
relating to the management of rough diamonds include the licensing of mines
and tracking cash purchases of rough diamonds through official banking
channels. It is relevant to note that the Kimberley Process does not address
companies directly.
146 See OECD, ‘Upstream Implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’, Final Report on
one-year pilot implementation of the Supplement on Tin, Tantalum, and Tungsten (2013),
p. 9.
147 Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC submitted in accordance with paragraph
4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/843, 15 November 2012, paras.
159-242.
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EITI’s contribution to increasing transparency in the management of natural
resources consists of setting standards for the public administration of natural
resources, which could be part of broader reforms in post-conflict peace-
building strategies. In order to comply with EITI, States must publish the
revenues obtained from contracts with the oil, gas and mining industries, while
companies in these sectors must publish their payments to the government.
In this way, EITI contributes more directly to improving governance over
natural resources. In addition, the 2013 review of the EITI Standard introduced
requirements aimed at improving transparency, in particular by formulating
requirements relating to the publication of relevant information and to public
administration. In this way, EITI has moved closer to achieving its basic object-
ive, i.e., to promote sustainable development in resource-rich States.
Finally, the contribution of the OECD Guidance in increasing transparency
in the management of natural resources consists of setting standards for
companies that extract, handle or procure minerals from countries that suffer
from armed conflict or internal tensions in order to ensure that these companies
source their minerals in a responsible manner. Responsible mineral sourcing
implies, inter alia, respect for international human rights standards for the
prevention of the most serious violations of human rights, as well as standards
for the procurement of minerals and transparency in payments.
However, there is one aspect that is neglected in all three initiatives. None
of the initiatives includes any direct sustainability requirements in its scheme.
This is strange, as both EITI and the OECD Guidance include a reference to
sustainable development as part of their objectives.148 The absence of require-
ments ensuring that natural resources are sourced in an environmentally
sustainable way is regrettable, as environmental protection is essential for the
proper management of natural resources and for the prevention of a relapse
into armed conflict. In order to contribute more directly to achieving
sustainable development, it is necessary for the initiatives to include some
minimal requirements for environmental protection in future revisions of their
standard-setting documents. The Kimberley Process could include a commit-
ment adopting the ISO standards for environmental protection of diamond
mines. The OECD Guidance could include recommendations on the prevention
of serious environmental pollution related to the extraction of minerals.
148 EITI is based on the principle that “the prudent use of natural resources should be an
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable develop-
ment”. See EITI Standard 2013, p. 9. The OECD Guidance formulates as its objective that
companies procuring minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas “respect human
rights, avoid contributing to conflict and successfully contribute to sustainable, equitable
and effective development”. See the Recommendation of the OECD Council on Due
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and
High-Risk Areas, adopted on 25 May 2011 (amended on 17 July 2012), Doc. C(2012)93,
para. 1.
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8.6 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INITIATIVES
The initiatives discussed in this chapter can be characterised as voluntary
agreements between States and other relevant stakeholders, notably civil society
and the business community, aimed at creating standards for the governance
of particular natural resources, which are to be implemented by States and/or
companies respectively. In other words, the initiatives discussed in this chapter
create commitments for the actors involved, but on a voluntary basis only.
It is relevant to note that all the basic documents relating to the three
initiatives emphasise the voluntary nature of the commitments, either expressly
or in their formulation. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme recommends
that participants adopt the scheme. Furthermore, it consistently provides that
participants should ensure that they meet all the requirements. The EITI Rules
formulate minimum requirements for States to be EITI compliant. Finally, the
OECD Guidance recommends that OECD members ensure the widest possible
dissemination of the Guidance. In addition, the Five Step Framework for Due
Diligence contains a number of measures that companies should take. Therefore
it is clear that none of the initiatives was intended to create legally binding
obligations for participants.
Considerable differences can also be seen in the nature of the commitments.
For the Kimberley Process and EITI, domestic implementation of the commit-
ments is a prerequisite for participation in the initiatives. States that do not
implement the commitments are suspended from the initiatives. However,
even between the Kimberley Process and EITI, there are differences as regards
the monitoring of compliance with the initiatives. While the Kimberley Process
relies principally on a peer review system for the monitoring of compliance
with the Kimberley requirements, EITI uses an independent third-party monitor-
ing system. The OECD Guidance operates in a different way. It formulates
guidelines to assist companies to implement responsible sourcing practices,
while respect for the Guidance must be ensured through the OECD National
Contact Points.
Finally, the effectiveness of the initiatives hinges on five factors: 1) a
dedication by those concerned to implement the commitments; 2) an inclusive
system, in which all the relevant actors participate; 3) an effective monitoring
system to ensure compliance; 4) effective national legislation to implement
the commitments and 5) external recognition of the initiatives. These factors
can be illustrated with reference to the OECD Guidance. Even though it is
principally a code of conduct, the OECD Guidance does provide companies
with a set of guidelines to comply with OECD requirements, as well as with
external requirements, such as the US and Congolese legislation, with respect
to conflict minerals originating from the DR Congo, as well as the due diligence
requirements set by the UN Security Council with respect to minerals sourced
from the DR Congo. As a result, companies operating in the DR Congo have
started to implement the guidance.
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This example reveals that the effectiveness of voluntary initiatives depends
to a large extent on their inclusion in broader initiatives to tackle the problems
related to resource-related armed conflicts. It is relevant to note in this respect
that the OECD Guidance is the only initiative that is embedded in an inter-
national organization, while the Kimberley Process and EITI stand alone.
Obviously, it is a great advantage for the OECD Guidance to benefit from the
institutional structure of the OECD, but that fact alone does not make it neces-
sarily more effective than the Kimberley Process or EITI, since these initiatives
rely on other mechanisms to ensure their effectiveness. Lastly, it must be noted
that broad participation, not only of producing States, but also of transit and
consuming States, is essential to ensure the effectiveness of the initiatives.
When these conditions are satisfied, voluntary initiatives can play an important
role in addressing the problems associated with resource-related armed con-
flicts.
8.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The principal question that must be answered here is how and to what extent
the initiatives discussed in this chapter respond to the recommendation of the
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to the United Nations
“to develop norms governing the management of natural resources for coun-
tries emerging from or at risk of conflict”.149 It should be noted that all three
initiatives address aspects relating to the management of natural resources.
Although the initiatives do not develop legal norms, they do develop standards
for the management of natural resources for countries emerging from or at
risk of conflict. Their main contribution is that they introduce elements of
transparency, accountability and corporate responsibility in the management
of natural resources in States that have experienced armed conflict. In this
respect, the voluntary initiatives do respond to the call made by the High-Level
Panel.
It should also be noted that the three initiatives discussed in this chapter
are representative of particular categories of mechanisms which are essential
components of a regulatory framework for resolving armed conflicts involving
natural resources. These are certification mechanisms, anti-corruption mechan-
isms and corporate responsibility mechanisms. One major contribution of the
initiatives discussed in this chapter is that they have resulted in best practices
for the development of other regulatory initiatives. For example, reference can
be made to the scheme for tracking and tracing minerals that is currently being
developed under the auspices of the International Conference for the Great
Lakes Region. This scheme is modelled on the Kimberley Process, but also
149 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, United Nations: New York (2004), p. 35, para. 92.
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takes into account the failures of the Kimberley Process, including its failure
to properly address the issuing of false certificates. Furthermore, this scheme
recognises the limited use of certification mechanisms such as Kimberley for
the elimination of the root causes of armed conflict relating to the governance
of natural resources.150 Furthermore, the best practices resulting from these
mechanisms can assist the UN Peacebuilding Commission in devising new
strategies for peacebuilding.
However, the existence of all these initiatives does not eliminate the need
to develop general standards for the management of natural resources for
countries emerging from or at risk of conflict, as called for by the High Level
Panel. The focus of such general standards should be on promoting a parti-
cipatory and sustainable management of natural resources for the purpose
of conflict prevention and resolution.
The first part of this book, dealing with the general legal framework for
the management of natural resources, revealed several obligations for States
with respect to the management of their natural resources. Amongst the
principal obligations for States were, first, an obligation to exploit natural
resources for the benefit of the population and, for this purpose, to establish
constitutional and political processes which allow for public participation in
decision making, and, secondly, an obligation to exploit natural resources in
a sustainable way. General standards for the management of natural resources
for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict should be based on these
two obligations, as they constitute the very foundations of contemporary
natural resources law.
It is a fact that these obligations are not adequately reflected in the ini-
tiatives examined in this chapter. Nevertheless, important lessons can be
learned from these initiatives. A general regulatory framework for the manage-
ment of natural resources in countries emerging from armed conflict should
include standards relating to transparency, accountability and corporate
responsibility in the management of natural resources. These standards are
important prerequisites for conflict resolution and prevention, as they can be
instrumental in eliminating the trade in conflict resources and improve the
governance of natural resources.
Lastly, the question arises who should develop such general standards.
The High-level Panel called on national authorities, international financial
institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to do this. The
most likely option would be to set up an ad hoc mechanism for this purpose.
Participants would have to include the World Bank, regional organizations
(including the OECD and the International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region), representatives from the extractives industry and NGO’s such as Part-
150 For more information on the design of this scheme, see Partnership Africa Canada, Taming
the Resource Curse: Implementing the ICGLR Certification Mechanism for Conflict-prone
Minerals, March 2011.
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nership Africa Canada and Global Witness. Such an effort should be
coordinated from within the UN system, preferably by the UN Secretariat,
because of its general oversight function and its ability to bring together the
key players, including the private sector represented in the UN Global Compact.
Concluding remarks to Part III
This part has discussed the two principal approaches adopted to address the
links between natural resources and armed conflict during the phase of conflict
resolution. Specific emphasis was given to the ways in which these approaches
contribute to improving effective governance over natural resources in States
that have experienced armed conflict.
Chapter 7 discussed sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council
in specific conflict situations to resolve armed conflicts involving natural
resources. It demonstrated that these sanctions regimes focus mainly on the
role of natural resources in financing and perpetuating armed conflicts. The
Security Council does not really address the role of natural resources in causing
armed conflicts. It also showed that the aim of most sanctions regimes was
to assist governments in restoring sovereignty over parts of their territory
under the control of armed groups. In general the Security Council is reluctant
to impose sanctions against national authorities when their actions pose a
threat to international peace and security.
A similar bias can be seen in the voluntary initiatives developed by States
and other entities to address the challenges resulting from resource-related
armed conflicts. Both the Kimberley Process and the OECD Guidance exclusively
target the trade in natural resources by armed groups. The Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative (EITI) can be seen as an exception in this respect because
it focuses on enhancing transparency in government revenues from the
extractive industries. However, it should be noted that EITI was not developed
for the specific purpose of addressing resource-related armed conflicts, but
as an instrument for combating corruption in the extractive industries. Its
significance for addressing the root causes of resource-related armed conflict
is nevertheless clear and its role in preventing these armed conflicts was raised
by several participants in the Security Council’s Open Debate on Natural
Resources and Conflict Prevention of 19 June 2013.
Despite their general emphasis on the role of natural resources in financing
armed groups, both approaches – i.e., Security Council sanctions regimes and
voluntary initiatives – develop standards for the governance of natural
resources as a tool for conflict resolution. Effectiveness, transparency and
accountability are common elements of resource governance that can be
identified in both approaches.
The focus of both approaches is therefore on promoting responsible or
‘good’ governance of natural resources as an element of conflict resolution.
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These approaches also contribute to preventing a relapse into armed conflict
in countries that have experienced armed conflicts involving natural resources.
However, in order to achieve lasting peace and promote long-term develop-
ment, it is also necessary to prevent the over-exploitation of natural resources
and ensure that exploitation activities do not place too great a burden on the
environment. This is an element that is largely lacking in existing approaches
which address the links between natural resources and armed conflict. The
existing mechanisms devote little or no attention to issues of sustainability
or environmental protection. The Security Council’s sanctions regimes in
relation to Cambodia and Liberia are exceptions. It is argued here that these
exceptions should become the norm.
Furthermore, the existing mechanisms devote much attention to trans-
parency and accountability as means of preventing a relapse into armed
conflict. In order to reduce the risks of dormant or renewed grievances flaring
up, it is however necessary to involve the population more directly in the
process of conflict resolution and post-conflict recovery. This is not adequately
reflected in the current initiatives.
In a more general vein, it is necessary to develop more structural solutions
to prevent natural resources from financing or fuelling future armed conflicts.
Promoting effectiveness, transparency and accountability in the governance
of natural resources is important in conflict resolution strategies, but these
elements in themselves are not sufficient to promote responsible governance
over natural resources for the purposes of conflict resolution and prevention.
It is essential to integrate sustainability and public participation requirements
more directly in strategies to promote responsible resource governance for
the purpose of conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding. Addressing
these elements from an early stage increases the chances of creating a lasting
peace in countries that are recovering from armed conflicts involving natural
resources.
9 Regulating the governance of natural
resources for the purposes of conflict
prevention, containment and resolution
9.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
This book has demonstrated that resource-related armed conflicts pose con-
siderable challenges to the premises on which the international legal framework
for the governance of natural resources is based. It was argued that the general
legal framework for the governance of natural resources relies on a stable
government that is in full control of the State’s natural resources and exploits
these for the benefit of all. However, resource-related armed conflicts often
show a different reality in which governments are unable to exercise sover-
eignty over portions of the State territory, foreign States and armed groups
plunder the State’s natural wealth, and/or governments use the proceeds from
natural resource exploitation to fund destructive military campaigns.
The objective of this book was to analyse the role of international law in
addressing these challenges. More specifically, it attempted to identify and
assess the role of international law in ensuring that natural resources are used
to promote development and achieve sustainable peace in countries that have
experienced armed conflicts that are either caused, financed or fuelled by
natural resources. For this purpose, this book first analysed the general legal
framework for the governance of natural resources within States (Chapters
2-4), as well as the effects of armed conflict on this legal regime (Chapter 5).
It then examined the additional protection provided to natural resources and
the environment under the law of armed conflict (Chapter 6). Finally, it
analysed the legal and extra-legal approaches to severing the link between
natural resources and armed conflict. More in particular, this book examined
the approach of the UN Security Council with regard to resource-related armed
conflicts (Chapter 7) and the role of voluntary initiatives that have been devel-
oped alongside Security Council action (Chapter 8).
This chapter aims to bring to the fore the most important conclusions that
can be drawn from this book. Furthermore, it endeavours to assess the role
of international law in the prevention, containment and resolution of resource-
related armed conflicts. Sections 2, 3 and 4 briefly discuss the most important
conclusions of this book with reference to the three principal research questions
formulated in the introduction. These are:
1. Does current international law provide rules to ensure that natural resources are
exploited for the purpose of achieving sustainable development?
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2. Do these rules continue to apply in situations of armed conflict and does inter-
national humanitarian law provide relevant rules?
3. Do norms and standards developed by ad hoc mechanisms contribute to improv-
ing governance over natural resources in States that are recovering from armed
conflict?
Subsequently, section 5 places these questions in a broader context by looking
at the role of international law in the prevention, containment and resolution
of resource-related armed conflicts.
9.2 THE GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF NATURAL
RESOURCES WITHIN STATES
The governance of natural resources within States is based primarily on the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. As discussed in
Chapter 2, this principle is rooted both in the principle of State sovereignty
and in the right of peoples to self-determination. Originally asserted as a right
for former colonial countries to freely dispose of their natural resources as
a means to advance their development, permanent sovereignty has evolved
into the organizing principle of international law regulating the governance
of natural resources, both between and within States. As such, it has come
to entail both obligations and rights for States.1 The obligation for a State to
exercise permanent sovereignty for the purposes of national development and
the well-being of the people on the one hand, and the obligation to devote
due care to the environment on the other are the most relevant obligations
for the purposes of this book. They are based on international human rights
and environmental law.
Chapter 3 discussed the legal position of peoples in relation to the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The right of peoples to freely
dispose of their natural resources is part of their right to self-determination,
as enshrined in the identical Articles 1(2) of the ICESCR and the ICCPR. Peoples
are the subjects of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources. However, as argued in Chapter 2, permanent sovereignty is an
attribute of State sovereignty as well. In this sense, peoples are also bene-
ficiaries of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The
1962 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources had
already recognised that natural resources must be exploited for the well-being
of the people. This condition has been revived in modern legal and political
instruments dealing with resource-related armed conflicts.
1 See in particular, N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1997).
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Chapter 3 also analysed the legal implications of peoples’ ownership of
natural resources for the governance of natural resources within States. In the
context of a sovereign State, it argued that there are two categories of peoples
that are eligible to exercise peoples’ rights. First, there is the whole population
of a State as the successor of the people who have exercised a right to external
self-determination. Furthermore, particular groups within a State have been
granted a limited right to exercise peoples’ rights. These include minorities
and indigenous peoples.
The principal argument advanced in this chapter was that for the realisation
of the right to internal self-determination and the – emerging – right to devel-
opment it is essential for governments to put in place procedures that allow
for public participation in decision-making with respect to the use of the State’s
natural resources. Public participation in this sense can be defined broadly
to include a right of access to information and justice with regard to all projects
that involve the exploitation of the State’s natural resources, as well as a right
to be consulted with regard to projects that could affect the living environment
of local communities.
Although the right for peoples living in an independent State to participate
in decision making is not expressly enshrined in current international law,
it is implied in the practice of human rights bodies and in resolutions of the
UN Security Council. Human rights bodies require States to establish general
procedures that allow for the realisation of the right to self-determination in
practice. Furthermore, specific case law relating to the right of indigenous
peoples to enjoy their culture points to an obligation for governments to
consult indigenous peoples when conducting exploitation projects on their
lands. Similarly, resolutions of the UN Security Council in general call for
effective, transparent and accountable management of natural resources,
implying that the government of a State must hold up the management of
the State’s natural resources against public scrutiny. Therefore international
practice shows the emergence of an obligation for States to manage their
natural resources in a transparent and accountable way. This entails an obliga-
tion for States to involve citizens in decision making with respect to projects
relating to the exploitation of the State’s natural resources.
Chapter 4 also discussed the environmental obligations of States. Inter-
national environmental law formulates several standards for States which they
must take into account when exploiting their natural resources. These include
an obligation to conserve and sustainably use natural wealth and resources,
to safeguard natural resources for future generations, to prevent damage to
the environment of other States, and to adopt a precautionary approach to
the protection of the environment and natural resources. Elements of the
environmental principles examined in this chapter can also be found in inter-
national humanitarian law. The precautionary principle, for example, recognises
that States should take into account the risks to the environment, even when
these risks cannot be precisely defined. In this sense, the precautionary prin-
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ciple can play a role in battlefield practice, where military commanders must
assess the potential damage of their actions on the environment. In addition,
the related obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment for
activities that pose a risk to the environment is relevant for States contem-
plating exploitation projects, whether in situations of peace or in situations
of armed conflict.
Chapter 4 also analysed several ‘common regimes’ aimed at protecting
the interests of a larger community of States with regard to a State’s natural
resources. Relevant common regimes include those aimed at protecting natural
resources situated within a State’s territory but which represent a special
interest to the international community, including “world heritage”, “wetlands
of special importance” and certain endangered species of flora and fauna, those
that are aimed at addressing a common concern of the international commun-
ity, such as the loss of biological diversity, and those that are aimed at protect-
ing the interests of States that share a natural resource. Common regimes are
therefore based on an obligation to individually and collectively protect the
natural resources in the interests of all the States concerned. The common
interest that these regimes are aimed at protecting entails a presumption that
they cannot be unilaterally suspended in situations of armed conflict.
Chapter 4 demonstrated the existence of a general obligation for States
to exploit their natural resources in a sustainable way, while preventing
damage to the environment of other States. These obligations apply to States
both as a matter of treaty law and as customary international law. Furthermore,
it is relevant to note that some of the most important treaties that embody
these principles are widely accepted. This applies particularly with regard
to treaties that establish common regimes. The Convention on Biological
Diversity, for example, enjoys universal acceptance with 193 States parties.
This Convention is of the utmost importance, because biological resources are
estimated to support nearly 40 per cent of the world economy.2
Similarly, the World Heritage Convention, with 190 States parties, enjoys
near universal acceptance. This Convention is especially important because
it protects a number of nature reserves that are particularly rich in biological
diversity, including nature reserves in conflict areas. Examples include the
Virunga National Park located in the East of the DR Congo and the Comoé
National Park located in the Northeast of Côte d’Ivoire.3
The last convention of particular relevance to the current book is CITES.
With 178 States parties, the convention has been widely ratified. As a combined
environmental and trade convention, CITES could play an important role in
curbing the trade in particular conflict resources, such as timber and ivory.
The significance of CITES in this respect was explicitly recognised by the Panel
2 See http://www.cbd.int/sustainable/ (last consulted on 21 January 2013).
3 See http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/ for the full list of World Heritage sites. (last consulted
on 21 January 2013).
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of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The potential of CITES
should therefore be explored to the full.
In conclusion it can be argued that Part I of this book showed that the
general legal framework for the governance of natural resources within States
contains a number of principles that directly or indirectly aim to ensure that
governments exploit natural resources for the purpose of promoting sustainable
development. These include in particular the principles of public participation,
sustainable use and precaution. Together these principles constitute the basic
foundations for a legal framework for the governance of natural resources
within States that have experienced armed conflicts.
9.3 THE GOVERNANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED
CONFLICT
The exploitation of natural resources is principally a commercial activity, even
if the proceeds of the natural resources are used to sustain an armed conflict.
This is one of the primary reasons which explains the fragmentation of the
international legal framework for the governance of natural resources in
situations of armed conflict. International humanitarian law is normally con-
sidered to be the lex specialis in situations of armed conflict, but this field of
international law is primarily concerned with acts of warfare and their implica-
tions for the population of a State. Therefore other fields of international law
are equally important for the regulation of natural resources exploitation in
situations of armed conflict, at least for States. These are, in particular, inter-
national economic, environmental and human rights law.
The international legal framework for the governance of natural resources
in situations of armed conflict is therefore composed of rules from different
fields of international law. Relevant factors that determine which rules apply
in a specific situation are notably the nature of the armed conflict (international
or internal) and the actors involved in the exploitation of the natural resources
(domestic governments, foreign States or armed groups). Nevertheless, some
rules apply to all parties to an armed conflict, irrespective of the nature of
the armed conflict or the actors involved.
First, all parties to an armed conflict are bound by the international human-
itarian law prohibition of pillage. This prohibition, which applies to cases of
the appropriation of natural resources for personal gain, can be construed
broadly to cover all instances of natural resources appropriation by parties
to an armed conflict that do not serve a military purpose. This means, for
example, that an occupant is prohibited from exploiting the natural resources
in occupied territory for the benefit of its own economy. It also implies that
public officials of the domestic State who misappropriate the proceeds from
natural resources exploitation for their personal enrichment violate the prohi-
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bition of pillage. Furthermore, the prohibition of pillage is an important tool
for addressing instances where armed groups or members of armed forces
loot natural resources for their personal gain. However, it does not cover
instances of natural resources appropriation for military purposes. These are
covered by more specific provisions which do not equally apply to all parties
to an armed conflict.
Another obligation that applies to all parties to an armed conflict is the
prohibition against removing or destroying objects indispensable to the civilian
population, which is linked to the prohibition against starving the civilian
population as a method of warfare. It is relevant to note that the drafters of
the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, which include this prohibition, en-
visaged a large measure of flexibility in the interpretation of the prohibition.
The determination of the types of objects that were to be considered indispens-
able to the civilian population was considered to depend on local circum-
stances. In many of the countries examined in this book, local communities
are highly dependent on natural resources to earn a basic living for themselves
and their families. From this perspective, it is therefore logical that the prohi-
bition covers such natural resources as well. This means that the prohibition
covers instances where parties to an armed conflict deliberately deprive the
local population of the opportunity to earn their living by denying them access
to mining sites.
In addition to these general obligations, Chapters 5 and 6 examined specific
obligations which apply only to some of the parties to an armed conflict. As
regards the rights and obligations of domestic governments in armed conflicts,
the applicable legal framework is principally derived from international
economic, environmental and human rights law. As the outbreak of an armed
conflict does not automatically suspend the existing obligations of States under
international law, governments must continue to respect their obligations under
international human rights and environmental law.
It should be noted that situations of armed conflict can obviously alter the
extent to which States have to fulfil their obligations under relevant treaties.
The treaties themselves allow for this. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, for example, contains an express provision on derogation.
This provision allows States to derogate from their obligations under the
Convention in situations of public emergency, though only to the extent that
is necessary in view of the situation. In any case, States can never derogate
from the prohibition embodied in Article 1(2) of the Covenant against de-
priving a people of its means of subsistence. This implies that, as a minimum,
States cannot deny the local population access to exploitation sites if these are
necessary for their subsistence. This obligation for States under international
human rights law therefore complements and strengthens the protection
granted to the civilian population under international humanitarian law,
notably by the prohibition against removing or destroying objects indispensable
to the civilian population.
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Furthermore, some international environmental law treaties provide States
with a degree of leniency regarding the implementation of specific obligations.
The degree to which relevant obligations must be implemented depends on
the circumstances. However, even if States are given a measure of flexibility
with regard to the implementation of specific obligations, they must continue
to respect their core obligations under these treaties. The flexibility provided
to States does not annul these obligations, but rather provides States with the
possibility of implementing them according to the circumstances. Therefore
States must continue to respect their core obligations under relevant inter-
national environmental treaties, especially if these treaties protect natural
resources that are of importance to the broader international community.
While the rights and obligations of domestic governments with regard to
the exploitation of the State’s natural resources in situations of armed conflict
are primarily regulated by the general legal framework that applies to the
exploitation of natural resources, the rights and obligations of other States with
regard to these natural resources are primarily determined by international
humanitarian law. A distinction should also be made between States that
militarily intervene in other States without occupying part of that State’s
territory, and States that do occupy portions of the State’s territory. In some
cases, States can assume both roles in the same armed conflict. An example
of this can be found in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory
of the DR Congo, where the International Court of Justice determined that
Uganda was an occupying State in some parts of the DR Congo while it was
not in others.
Different rules apply to each of these situations. International humanitarian
law contains an almost absolute prohibition with respect to the exploitation
of natural resources for foreign States militarily intervening in another State
without taking effective control over that State’s territory. These States are
not allowed to appropriate the natural resources of their adversary, except
in cases of imperative military necessity. Chapter 6 argued that this exception
must be interpreted restrictively. The appropriation of natural resources is
permitted only when the following requirements are fulfilled: 1) the appro-
priation must secure a military advantage; and 2) the situation must be urgent,
in the sense that there is no moment for deliberation and there is no alternative
solution available. Instances of systematic resource exploitation by foreign
States are therefore not covered by the exception of imperative military neces-
sity.
While foreign States are therefore generally not allowed to exploit natural
resources in territory where they are militarily present, the legal framework
changes when these States gain effective control over territory. The rights and
obligations of occupants with respect to the exploitation of natural resources
are primarily regulated on the basis of the concept of usufruct. According to
the right of usufruct, an occupant is allowed to exploit the natural resources
in occupied territory for the purpose of administering the territory. Further-
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more, the administration of the territory must be for the benefit of the popula-
tion of the occupied territory. Finally, according to Article 55 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations, the exercise of the right of usufruct is subject to the condition that
occupants safeguard the capital of the properties they administer. A modern
interpretation of this requirement points to an obligation for occupants to
exploit the natural resources in a sustainable way.
Furthermore, the exploitation activities of armed groups are primarily
regulated by international humanitarian law, though the set of rules that
applies to these groups depends on their legal status. Generally, the legal
position of armed groups is regulated by the legal rules that apply to internal
armed conflicts, which determine that armed groups cannot appropriate the
State’s natural resources, except in cases of imperative military necessity.
However, armed groups that act on behalf of a foreign State, or which have
been recognised by the international community as belligerents, fall under
the rules applicable to international armed conflict. In these circumstances,
armed groups that are in control of a portion of the State’s territory fall under
the rules relating to occupation, which means that the concept of usufruct
applies to them as well.
Despite the numerous different obligations that apply to different actors
in different situations, an important conclusion that can be drawn from this
book is that the international legal framework regulating the exploitation of
natural resources in situations of armed conflict is difficult to oversee, but not
necessarily incomplete. Even where one can observe an asymmetry in inter-
national humanitarian law with regard to obligations that apply to armed
groups on the one hand, and to the domestic government on the other, it is
important to realise that international humanitarian law is only one of several
fields of international law that apply to the exploitation of natural resources
in conflict situations.
At the same time, it cannot really be argued that the system as it exists
today is perfect. The existing legal framework would benefit immensely from
clarification, as well as a reinterpretation of existing obligations. There are two
issues that deserve particular attention in this respect. These are the protection
of the environment on the one hand, and the legal position of armed groups
on the other. In relation to the legal position of armed groups, this book
strongly advocates applying the concept of usufruct from international occupa-
tion law to all situations in which armed groups exercise effective control over
portions of a State’s territory. According a right of usufruct to armed groups
that are in control of portions of a State’s territory would provide these armed
groups with an incentive to respect international humanitarian law. The
qualified nature of the concept of usufruct strikes a careful balance between
the realities of armed conflict and the provisional character of the situation.
Moreover, the concept can be interpreted in the light of relevant human rights
and environmental norms. This balancing of rights and obligations is the best
way to protect the environment and the civilian population in territories that
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are controlled by armed groups. Finally, according a right to armed groups
that are in effective control over portions of a State’s territory provides these
armed groups with the opportunity to show that they are willing to assume
governmental responsibilities, while it leaves open the possibility of enforce-
ment action in individual cases.
9.4 THE GOVERNANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES AS PART OF CONFLICT RESOLU-
TION AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS
Several ad hoc mechanisms have been developed over the past years to address
the challenges resulting from resource-related armed conflicts. Most important-
ly, the UN Security Council has addressed several of these armed conflicts using
its powers under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Chapter 7 of this
book examined the role of sanctions regimes adopted by the Security Council
in addressing these conflicts. It demonstrated that the Security Council has
used a variety of measures to address resource-related armed conflicts, includ-
ing selective commodity sanctions, as well as asset freezes and travel bans
targeting individuals and organizations involved in the illicit exploitation of
natural resources.
The Security Council has also set substantive standards for the governance
of natural resources as part of its sanctions regimes. In relation to the diamond
sanctions, it demanded a certificate-of-origin regime that was effective, trans-
parent, accountable and internationally verifiable. In relation to timber, it called
upon States, international organizations and other bodies to assist the Liberian
government, under the presidency of Johnson-Sirleaf, to promote responsible
and environmentally sustainable business practices in the timber industry.
In addition, in several of its resolutions, it emphasised in a general sense that
natural resources must be exploited in order to promote development. In the
case of Liberia, it went a step further, and in Resolution 1408 (2002), it called
upon the Taylor regime to take urgent steps to ensure that revenue from the
timber industry was used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development
purposes.
Chapter 7 also demonstrated that the Security Council has continuously
tried to improve its methods in order to address specific threats to the peace
more effectively. It embraced innovations such as a certificate-of-origin regime
to distinguish between diamonds traded by armed groups and by govern-
ments, support for specific programs in Liberia to stimulate the necessary post-
conflict reforms, and due diligence requirements for companies sourcing from
the DR Congo.
However, the readiness of the UN Security Council to adopt measures is
often linked to a particular type of threat to peace and security. Most of the
sanctions regimes examined in this book were aimed at assisting the govern-
ment of a State to restore governance over natural resources that had fallen
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into the hands of subversive entities. Only in a few cases has the Security
Council directly targeted the government of a State, but most of these sanctions
regimes did not, strictly speaking, address resource-related armed conflicts.
These were the sanctions regimes imposed against Iraq, Southern Rhodesia
and Libya. It was only in the case of Liberia under the presidency of Charles
Taylor that the Council targeted the government of a State in relation to a
resource-related armed conflict. However, even in this case, the purpose of
the sanctions regime was to cut off the rebel financing. It can therefore be
concluded that the UN Security Council is committed to upholding the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in most circumstances, even
when it is clear that a government is violating its commitments under peace
agreements.
A recent Open Debate held in the Security Council on ‘Natural Resources
and Conflict Prevention’ showed the diverging opinions within the Council
with respect to its role in preventing natural resources from fuelling armed
conflict. This debate revealed the divisions between those countries advocating
an increased role for the Security Council in preventing conflicts involving
natural resources, which would include approaches directly related to improv-
ing a State’s governance of natural resources, and those countries that insisted
on the right of States to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural
resources. This divergence of opinions was an obstacle to adopting a Presiden-
tial Statement on the issue of natural resources and conflict prevention.4
Voluntary initiatives have been developed by partnerships of States, civil
society and companies, parallel to the efforts of the Security Council to address
threats to the peace related to the trade in natural resources. Chapter 8 dis-
cussed three of these voluntary initiatives that were endorsed by the UN
Security Council as a means of addressing problems associated with resource-
related armed conflicts. These are the Kimberley Process for the Certification
of Rough Diamonds as an example of a certification mechanism that aims to
combat the trafficking and trade of natural resources by armed groups, the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as an example of a mechanism
that aims to improve transparent and accountable governance over natural
resources as a tool for conflict resolution and prevention, and the OECD Guid-
ance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and
High-Risk Areas as an example of a mechanism that is aimed at improving
corporate responsibility with respect to mineral sourcing in conflict-affected
States.
The most important contribution of the initiatives to addressing problems
associated with resource-related armed conflicts is related to their function
of setting standards. All three initiatives set standards aimed at increasing
transparency in the management of natural resources. Furthermore, EITI sets
4 United Nations Security Council, Open debate on conflict prevention and natural resources,
19 June 2013, UN Doc. S/PV.6982
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standards related to accountability in the management of natural resources,
while the OECD Guidance sets standards for companies in relation to human
rights and public procurement policies. For the purposes of conflict resolution
and prevention, environmental protection is equally important, though it is
not addressed in any of these initiatives. The initiatives discussed in this book
focus exclusively on standards related to restoring or improving the political
governance of natural resources. However, in order to ensure that natural
resources are used to achieve sustainable development, environmental pro-
tection must constitute an integral component of conflict resolution and preven-
tion strategies.
Furthermore, the question arises why the initiatives discussed in Chapter
8 formulate voluntary commitments rather than legally binding obligations.
The reason for choosing voluntary rather than legally binding mechanisms
cannot be automatically attributed to the participation of entities without
treaty-making powers in the initiatives. Although all three initiatives were
developed on the basis of multi-stakeholder processes, this multi-stakeholder
structure is only marginally reflected in their means of operation. Both the
Kimberley Process and EITI formulate requirements only for States, while the
role of companies is addressed indirectly. The OECD Guidance does formulate
requirements for companies, but its whole institutional focus is on States. The
reason for the voluntary nature of the commitments should therefore primarily
be sought in other characteristics of the initiatives, notably in their flexibility,
which makes it easier to adopt the instruments and to adjust them to achieve
better results.
Despite their voluntary nature, the initiatives have yielded some tangible
results. The Kimberley Process has significantly reduced the smuggling of
diamonds from conflict regions. In addition, a considerable number of States
recovering from resource-related armed conflicts have started to implement
EITI. Finally, the OECD pilot project in the Great Lakes Region demonstrates
a gradual change in attitude in companies with respect to the exercise of due
diligence. However, these results cannot be completely attributed to the ini-
tiatives themselves. Experience has shown that the effectiveness of voluntary
mechanisms depends in particular on five factors: 1) a dedication by those
concerned to implement the commitments; 2) an inclusive system, in which
all relevant actors participate; 3) an effective monitoring system to ensure
compliance; 4) effective national legislation to implement the commitments
and 5) external recognition of the initiatives. These factors are considered
essential for ensuring the success of voluntary mechanisms.
In conclusion, the UN Security sanctions regimes, as well as the voluntary
mechanisms discussed in this book make a significant contribution to address-
ing the most acute problems related to the role of natural resources in armed
conflicts. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to develop more structural solutions
to prevent natural resources from financing or fuelling future armed conflicts.
Promoting effectiveness, transparency and accountability in the governance
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of natural resources are important elements of conflict resolution strategies,
though in themselves they are not sufficient to promote responsible governance
over natural resources for the purpose of conflict prevention. For this purpose,
it is necessary to develop general standards for the management of natural
resources in countries recovering from armed conflict. These standards should
integrate requirements relating to sustainability and public participation in
addition to transparency and accountability in order to increase the opportun-
ities for countries recovering from resource-related armed conflicts to achieve
enduring peace.
9.5 THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE PREVENTION, CON-
TAINMENT AND RESOLUTION OF RESOURCE-RELATED ARMED CONFLICTS
This book has examined the role of international law in addressing the two
main challenges associated with resource-related armed conflicts. The first
is to stop natural resources from financing or fuelling armed conflicts. This
book has shown that the international law that applies to situations of armed
conflict prohibits most forms of resource exploitation by parties to an armed
conflict. The problems associated with resource-related armed conflict therefore
do not stem from an absence of rules. However, there are several factors that
prevent international law from effectively regulating the exploitation of natural
resources in situations of armed conflict.
The first concerns the lack of clarity that results from the numerous differ-
ent obligations that exist. There is a clear need to formulate general guidelines
that stipulate the rights and obligations of parties to an armed conflict and
the most appropriate body to develop these guidelines is the International
Law Commission, because of its broad expertise and its mandate to codify
and progressively develop international law. As specified in the concluding
remarks to Part II of this book, one of the aspects that an ILC study should
also address concerns the effects on the environment of the exploitation of
natural resources by parties to an armed conflict. As resource exploitation is
primarily a commercial activity, the rules of international humanitarian law
do not provide adequate protection. Moreover, the existing rules of inter-
national environmental law do not address armed groups.
However, a more fundamental question that should also be considered
is whether the rules which apply to armed groups are adequate. The equality
of parties to an armed conflict is a fundamental principle of the law of armed
conflict. This book does not argue in favour of giving armed groups the same
rights and obligations with regard to the exploitation of natural resources as
governments, nor does it propose assigning all armed groups the right to
exploit natural resources. However, it does propose granting those armed
groups that are in control of a portion of the State territory a qualified right
to exploit natural resources, based on the right of usufruct that is central to
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international occupation law. The principal reason for granting armed groups
that control portions of a State territory this right is it protects the civilian
population and the environment more adequately than the current rules do.
In the first place, granting armed groups a right of usufruct gives them an
incentive to respect the rules of international humanitarian law. Secondly, the
concept of usufruct does not entail a right to use the proceeds from the exploita-
tion of natural resources to buy weapons. It merely grants armed groups a
right to set up and maintain a civilian administration for the benefit of the
population. Furthermore, granting armed groups such a right does not exclude
the possibility for the Security Council to impose sanctions when it considers
that a specific situation poses a threat to peace and security.
The second challenge associated with resource-related armed conflicts is
to improve the governance over natural resources within States, both in order
to resolve existing armed conflicts and to prevent a relapse into armed conflict.
The governance of natural resources within States is based on the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. This principle is rooted in
the right to self-determination of peoples. Although the principle of permanent
sovereignty is considered to be attached to the sovereignty of the State, its
roots in the right to self-determination are not without significance. This
demonstrates that the State’s natural resources should be exploited for the
benefit of the people of the State. This is further emphasised by the condition
imposed on the principle of permanent sovereignty stipulating that States must
be able to exercise the right to freely dispose of their natural resources for
national development and the well-being of the people.
This condition is reflected in the modern practice as regards resource-
related armed conflicts, in particular in resolutions of the UN Security Council
and in regional treaties. Moreover, the governance of natural resources in States
suffering from armed conflict is increasingly qualified by requirements linked
to the concept of good governance. UN Security Council resolutions require
effective, transparent and accountable management of natural resources by
States. These elements are also reflected in the political initiatives discussed
in Chapter 8. However, current practice does not fully address good govern-
ance. In this respect it should be recalled that the present book defined good
governance as:
“the sustainable, transparent and accountable management of natural resources
for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear and
participatory decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, trans-
parent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and
distribution of natural resources and their revenues as well as capacity building
for elaborating and implementing measures aimed in particular at preventing and
combating corruption in the public administration of revenues from natural
resources”.
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The elements of good governance that are mainly neglected in the current
initiatives include aspects of public participation and sustainability, factors
that are essential for the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts.
In conclusion, it can be argued that international law addresses the
challenges associated with resource-related armed conflict fairly well. Although
the existing legal framework for the governance of natural resources in
situations of armed conflict is fragmented and in some ways inconsistent, there
are rules to address instances of the illicit exploitation of natural resources
in situations of armed conflict. Furthermore, the current approaches to address
the problems associated with resource-related armed conflicts are mostly ad
hoc and sometimes informal. However, international law does provide some
tools to address these problems and the role of the UN Security Council has
proved invaluable in this respect. Its sanctions regimes have helped to push
for the necessary reforms to assist countries emerging from armed conflict
to regain control over their natural resources. The creation of the Kimberley
Process, as well as the formulation of due diligence guidelines for companies
in the extractive sector, can be directly related to Security Council sanctions
regimes. While Security Council measures have so far largely focused on
helping governments restore their governance over natural resources that have
fallen into the hands of subversive entities, the Security Council should increase
its role in the resolution of armed conflicts involving natural resources by
focusing more on some of the root causes of armed conflict. In particular, the
Security Council should use its powers under the UN Charter more actively
than it has done so far, to achieve reforms in the public administration of
natural resources in countries recovering from armed conflict.
Finally, it should be emphasised that it is of the utmost importance that
natural resource wealth is once again associated with development rather than
armed conflict. In order to achieve this, it is essential to assist States that are
recovering from armed conflict to (re)build the institutions that are necessary
for the proper management of their natural resources. It is only in this way
that natural resources can be transformed from engines for conflict into engines
for sustainable development.
Samenvatting
INTERNATIONAAL RECHT EN HET BEHEER VAN NATUURLIJKE HULPBRONNEN IN
CONFLICT EN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIES
Inleiding
Natuurlijke hulpbronnen, zoals goud, diamanten, olie en hout, zouden een
motor moeten zijn voor ontwikkeling van de landen waar zij worden gewon-
nen. Diverse hedendaagse conflicten schetsen echter een ander beeld, waarin
natuurlijke hulpbronnen conflicten in stand houden of zelfs aanwakkeren.
Diamanten financierden de conflicten in Angola en Sierra Leone rond de
eeuwwisseling, terwijl het huidige conflict in de Democratische Republiek
Congo aanhoudt doordat gewapende groeperingen zich in stand houden door
de handel in lucratieve mineralen. In veel gevallen blijkt bovendien dat de
manier waarop een overheid natuurlijke hulpbronnen beheert, van invloed
kan zijn op de uitbraak en beëindiging van een gewapend conflict. Slecht
beheer door de overheid ligt in veel gevallen ten grondslag aan een gewapend
conflict of staat een structurele oplossing voor een conflict in de weg. In het
kader van de preventie en beëindiging van conflicten is het daarom van groot
belang om zowel de handel in conflictgoederen te bestrijden, als ook om
manieren te zoeken om het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen in een land
structureel te verbeteren.
Onderzoeksdoel en probleemstelling
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt gewapende conflicten die gerelateerd zijn aan
natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Het doel van het proefschrift is om na te gaan welke
bijdrage het internationaal recht kan leveren aan het beëindigen en voorkomen
van dit soort conflicten. Daarmee bouwt het onderzoek voort op gezaghebben-
de studies uit andere wetenschappelijke disciplines, gerelateerd aan theorieën
met betrekking tot (wat wordt aangeduid als) de politieke economie van
gewapend conflict en de vloek der natuurlijke rijkdommen. Het proefschrift
heeft met name een antwoord willen geven op de vraag hoe internationaal
recht ertoe kan bijdragen dat rijkdom aan natuurlijke hulpbronnen in een land
ten goede kan komen aan duurzame vrede en de ontwikkeling van dat land
in plaats van aan gewapend conflict. Daarbij heeft dit proefschrift zowel
390 Samenvatting
aandacht besteed aan regels die moeten voorkomen dat natuurlijke hulpbron-
nen conflicten financieren als aan regels die tot doel hebben het beheer van
natuurlijke hulpbronnen door overheden te reguleren.
Het juridische kader voor het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen in staten
Het eerste deel van het proefschrift is ingegaan op de internationaalrechtelijke
regels die betrekking hebben op het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen in
algemene zin. Daarbij stond de volgende vraag centraal: bevat het huidige
internationaal recht regels die verzekeren dat natuurlijke hulpbronnen worden
geëxploiteerd ten behoeve van duurzame ontwikkeling?
Uitgangspunt voor het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen die zich bevin-
den binnen de territoriale grenzen of onder de jurisdictie van een staat is het
recht van die staat om vrijelijk te beschikken over de aanwezige natuurlijke
hulpbronnen. Dit recht vormt de kern van het beginsel van permanente soeve-
reiniteit over natuurlijke hulpbronnen, dat op haar beurt is gegrondvest in
het beginsel van staatssoevereiniteit en in het recht op zelfbeschikking van
volkeren. Het beginsel van permanente soevereiniteit over natuurlijke hulp-
bronnen is ontstaan uit een claim van voormalig gekoloniseerde volkeren en
ontwikkelingslanden, die hun pas hervonden rechten over hun natuurlijke
hulpbronnen veilig wilden stellen. Tegenwoordig is het beginsel van permanen-
te soevereiniteit uitgegroeid tot een volwaardig beginsel dat niet alleen rechten
maar ook plichten omvat voor staten met betrekking tot het beheer van hun
natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Voor het huidige onderzoek zijn met name de volgen-
de twee plichten van belang. Het beginsel van permanente soevereiniteit omvat
een plicht voor staten om de aan hen toegekende rechten over hun natuurlijke
hulpbronnen uit te oefenen in het belang van nationale ontwikkeling en met
het oog op het welzijn van de bevolking. Daarnaast moeten staten zorgvuldig-
heid betrachten met betrekking tot het milieu.
De plicht om natuurlijke hulpbronnen aan te wenden ten behoeve van
ontwikkeling en het welzijn van de bevolking komt op twee manieren tot
uiting. In de eerste plaats zijn de bevolking van een staat, alsmede specifieke
groepen binnen een staat, begunstigden van het beginsel van permanente
soevereiniteit over natuurlijke hulpbronnen. De opbrengsten die worden
verkregen uit de exploitatie van natuurlijke hulpbronnen moeten worden
gebruikt om ontwikkeling te stimuleren. Bovendien heeft dit proefschrift
aangetoond dat het beginsel van permanente soevereiniteit, als onderdeel van
het recht op zelfbeschikking, ook rechtstreeks toekomt aan volkeren. Daarmee
zijn volkeren niet alleen begunstigden maar ook rechthebbenden van het
beginsel van permanente soevereiniteit over natuurlijke hulpbronnen. De
bevolking als geheel, maar ook minderheden en inheemse volkeren, hebben
een recht om te participeren in besluitvorming omtrent het gebruik van natuur-
lijke hulpbronnen. Bovendien hebben deze groepen een recht om te profiteren
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van de opbrengsten van natuurlijke hulpbronnen met het oog op hun ontwik-
keling.
Naast deze sociale verplichtingen, hebben staten ook verplichtingen met
betrekking tot de bescherming van het milieu. Internationaal milieurecht
formuleert diverse verplichtingen voor staten die zij in acht moeten nemen
wanneer zij hun natuurlijke hulpbronnen exploiteren. Staten hebben onder
meer een plicht om het milieu en de natuurlijke hulpbronnen te beschermen
en duurzaam te gebruiken; de rechten van toekomstige generaties veilig te
stellen; schade te voorkomen aan het milieu van andere staten; en om een
voorzorgsbenadering te betrachten met betrekking tot de bescherming van
het milieu en natuurlijke hulpbronnen.
Daarnaast heeft dit proefschrift vormen van gemeenschappelijke regimes
besproken, die tot doel hebben om de belangen van een grotere groep staten
te beschermen. Voorbeelden van dergelijke regimes zijn het UNESCO Wereld-
erfgoedverdrag uit 1972 en het Biodiversiteitsverdrag uit 1992. Diverse gemeen-
schappelijke regimes vragen staten om natuurlijke hulpbronnen binnen hun
territoriale grenzen of jurisdictie te beschermen vanwege het specifieke belang
dat deze natuurlijke hulpbronnen vertegenwoordigen voor de internationale
gemeenschap. Staten die partij zijn bij dergelijke gemeenschappelijke regimes
zijn derhalve een speciale verantwoordelijkheid aangegaan, die niet zomaar
ophoudt wanneer een gewapend conflict uitbreekt binnen hun territorium.
Dit betekent bijvoorbeeld dat overheden tijdens een gewapend conflict gehou-
den blijven om werelderfgoed binnen hun territorium te beschermen.
Uit het eerste deel van dit proefschrift blijkt derhalve dat het algemeen
juridische kader voor het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen binnen staten
een aantal belangrijke beginselen bevat die ervoor moeten zorgen dat staten
hun natuurlijke hulpbronnen exploiteren met het oog op het bereiken van
duurzame ontwikkeling. Met name van belang zijn de beginselen van publieke
participatie en duurzaam gebruik. Deze beginselen leggen bovendien de basis
voor een juridisch raamwerk met betrekking tot het beheer van natuurlijke
hulpbronnen in staten na afloop van een gewapend conflict.
Het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen tijdens gewapend conflict
Het tweede deel van het proefschrift is ingegaan op de regels die van toepas-
sing zijn op de exploitatie van natuurlijke hulpbronnen tijdens een gewapend
conflict. In hoeverre en voor welke partijen is het algemene internationaalrech-
telijke kader voor het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen van toepassing; en
welke regels formuleert het internationaal oorlogsrecht ten aanzien van het
gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen tijdens een gewapend conflict?
De exploitatie van natuurlijke hulpbronnen is in de eerste plaats een
commerciële activiteit, ook als de opbrengsten worden gebruikt om een ge-
wapend conflict te financieren. Dit betekent dat het internationaal oorlogsrecht,
dat situaties van gewapend conflict reguleert, slechts ten dele relevant is. Het
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oorlogsrecht richt zich immers in de eerste plaats op daden van oorlogvoering
en de effecten daarvan op de bevolking. Het houdt zich slechts zijdelings bezig
met commerciële activiteiten. Andere rechtsgebieden, met name internationaal
economisch recht, mensenrechten en internationaal milieurecht, blijven daarom
eveneens van groot belang voor het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen tijdens
gewapend conflict, althans voor staten.
Het internationaalrechtelijke raamwerk voor het beheer van natuurlijke
hulpbronnen tijdens gewapend conflict bestaat derhalve uit regels die afkom-
stig zijn uit verschillende rechtsgebieden. Welke regels gelden in welke situatie
is afhankelijk van meerdere factoren, met name het soort conflict (internationaal
of intern) en de actoren die de natuurlijke hulpbronnen exploiteren (de rege-
ring, andere staten of gewapende groeperingen). Niettemin zijn er enkele regels
die in alle situaties en voor alle actoren gelden. Deze verplichtingen vloeien
voort uit het oorlogsrecht, het enige rechtsgebied dat rechtstreeks verplichtin-
gen formuleert voor gewapende groeperingen.
In de eerste plaats verbiedt het oorlogsrecht partijen bij een gewapend
conflict om te plunderen. Dit verbod is van toepassing op alle gevallen waarin
partijen bij een gewapend conflict zich natuurlijke hulpbronnen toe-eigenen
voor persoonlijk gewin. Persoonlijk gewin kan breed worden opgevat, in de
zin dat het alle vormen van toe-eigening omvat die geen directe militaire
doeleinden dienen. Dit betekent, bijvoorbeeld, dat een bezetter de opbrengsten
van natuurlijke hulpbronnen in bezet gebied niet mag gebruiken voor het
stimuleren van de eigen economie. Daarnaast is het verbod tot plunderen een
belangrijk middel om het roven van natuurlijke hulpbronnen door gewapende
groeperingen of legereenheden aan te pakken, maar alleen voor zover de
opbrengsten niet direct worden aangewend om de gewapende strijd te financie-
ren. Als dat wel het geval is, worden de activiteiten gereguleerd door andere
bepalingen. Deze gelden echter niet op dezelfde manier en in gelijke mate voor
alle partijen bij een gewapend conflict.
Een andere verplichting die geldt voor alle partijen bij een gewapend
conflict is het verbod om de bevolking uit te hongeren door objecten weg te
nemen of te vernietigen die onmisbaar zijn voor de bevolking. In veel van
de landen die in dit proefschrift zijn bestudeerd, is de lokale bevolking in hoge
mate afhankelijk van de exploitatie van natuurlijke hulpbronnen om in de
eerste levensbehoeften te voorzien. Een brede interpretatie van het verbod om
de bevolking uit te hongeren, zoals door dit proefschrift gepropageerd, brengt
met zich mee dat het partijen bij een gewapend conflict niet is toegestaan om
de lokale bevolking opzettelijk de toegang te ontzeggen tot gebieden die door
hen worden gebruikt om natuurlijke hulpbronnen te exploiteren, als zij daar-
door niet langer in hun primaire levensonderhoud kunnen voorzien.
Naast deze algemene verplichtingen, gelden ook andere verplichtingen
voor partijen bij een gewapend conflict. Deze zijn echter niet voor alle partijen
gelijk. In de eerste plaats blijven overheden die verwikkeld zijn in een intern
gewapend conflict, primair gehouden aan het algemene internationaalrechtelij-
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ke raamwerk voor het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Uiteraard kunnen
die verplichtingen wel worden aangetast door het uitbreken van een gewapend
conflict, een realiteit die ook is verdisconteerd in diverse verdragen.
Zowel mensenrechtenverdragen als milieuverdragen kennen mechanismen
die het landen mogelijk maken in dringende omstandigheden af te wijken van
hun verplichtingen. Deze mechanismen gaan echter niet zover dat het landen
zou zijn toegestaan af te wijken van de kernverplichtingen onder de verdragen.
Zo kunnen staten bijvoorbeeld niet afwijken van het verbod om volkeren hun
bestaansmiddelen te ontnemen, zoals neergelegd in Artikel 1 lid 2 van het
Internationaal Verdrag inzake Economische, Sociale en Culturele Rechten en
het Internationaal Verdrag inzake Burgerrechten en Politieke Rechten. Deze
bepaling versterkt daarmee het oorlogsrechtelijke verbod om in conflictsituaties
objecten weg te nemen of te vernietigen die onmisbaar zijn voor de bevolking.
In de tweede plaats heeft dit proefschrift gekeken naar de rechten en
plichten van staten met betrekking tot de natuurlijke hulpbronnen van een
andere staat in situaties van gewapend conflict. Deze rechten en plichten
worden primair beheerst door internationaal oorlogsrecht. Twee verschillende
situaties kunnen zich voordoen. Wanneer een staat effectieve controle uitoefent
over (een deel van) het grondgebied van een andere staat geldt het bezettings-
recht, dat bezetters een beperkt recht geeft om de natuurlijke hulpbronnen
in bezet gebied te exploiteren. Het recht op vruchtgebruik, zoals neergelegd
in Artikel 55 van het Haagse Reglement van 1907, staat bezetters, onder
stringente voorwaarden, toe de natuurlijke hulpbronnen in bezet gebied te
exploiteren om te voorzien in de kosten van de administratie van die gebieden.
Wanneer een staat militair aanwezig is in een andere staat zonder effectieve
controle uit te oefenen over grondgebied, gelden andere regels. In die gevallen
mogen staten zich natuurlijke hulpbronnen niet toe-eigenen, behalve wanneer
– in de woorden van Artikel 23(g) van het Haagse Reglement van 1907 – dit
“door oorlogsnoodzaak gebiedend wordt gevorderd”. Deze uitzondering leent
zich er niet toe om systematische exploitatie van natuurlijke hulpbronnen van
een vijand te rechtvaardigen. Dit betekent dat het internationaal oorlogsrecht
min of meer een totaalverbod bevat voor staten om de natuurlijke hulpbronnen
van hun vijand te exploiteren, wanneer zij geen effectieve controle uitoefenen
over grondgebied.
Een dergelijk totaalverbod bestaat tot slot ook voor gewapende groeperin-
gen die geen effectieve controle uitoefenen over grondgebied. Wanneer zij dit
wel doen, kunnen zij in twee gevallen een beperkt recht hebben om natuurlijke
hulpbronnen te exploiteren. Dit is het geval wanneer gewapende groeperingen
namens een andere staat handelen of wanneer gewapende groeperingen door
andere staten worden erkend als formele partij bij een conflict. In die gevallen
geldt het recht tot vruchtgebruik, zoals dat ook voor bezetters geldt.
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift heeft tot slot vastgesteld dat het inter-
nationaalrechtelijke kader voor de exploitatie van natuurlijke hulpbronnen
tijdens gewapend conflict wellicht lastig is om te overzien, maar dat het zeker
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niet incompleet is. De verplichtingen van partijen bij een gewapend conflict
zijn weliswaar niet gelijk, maar er bestaan regels voor alle partijen. Een natio-
nale overheid die partij is bij een gewapend conflict blijft grotendeels gehouden
aan algemene regels van internationaal economisch recht, mensenrechten en
internationaal milieurecht, terwijl de voornaamste verplichtingen voor ge-
wapende groeperingen en andere staten primair in het oorlogsrecht zijn te
vinden.
Desondanks vertoont het juridische kader ook een aantal imperfecties. Het
bestaande juridische kader zou op een aantal vlakken moeten worden verdui-
delijkt en opnieuw geïnterpreteerd. Dit proefschrift heeft twee onderwerpen
geïdentificeerd die met name aandacht verdienen. Dit zijn enerzijds de bescher-
ming van het milieu en anderzijds de juridische positie van gewapende groepe-
ringen. Er bestaan bijvoorbeeld geen regels die gewapende groeperingen
verplichtingen opleggen met betrekking tot de bescherming van het milieu.
Dit hangt deels samen met het tweede gesignaleerde probleem, namelijk de
juridische positie van gewapende groeperingen. Het huidige recht kent ge-
wapende groeperingen in bijna geen enkel geval een recht toe om natuurlijke
hulpbronnen te exploiteren, met als gevolg het ontbreken van randvoorwaar-
den wanneer zij dit wel doen.
Daarom pleit dit proefschrift ervoor om gewapende groeperingen een recht
op vruchtgebruik toe te kennen in alle gevallen waarin zij effectieve controle
uitoefenen over een deel van het grondgebied van de staat en niet alleen in
die gevallen waarin gewapende groeperingen handelen namens een andere
staat of wanneer zij zijn erkend door andere staten. Hoewel er zeker ook
nadelen kleven aan een dergelijke uitbreiding van de rechten van gewapende
groeperingen, is een belangrijk voordeel dat het gewapende groeperingen een
stimulans geeft om internationaal oorlogsrecht te respecteren, terwijl er ook
duidelijke voorwaarden worden gesteld aan de uitoefening van die rechten.
Bovendien staat een dergelijke uitbreiding van rechten in individuele gevallen
niet in de weg aan een besluit tot het nemen van dwangmaatregelen.
Het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen als onderdeel van conflictoplossing en
wederopbouw
Tot slot heeft het derde deel van dit proefschrift een aantal juridische en
politieke mechanismen onderzocht die zijn ontwikkeld om gewapende conflic-
ten gerelateerd aan natuurlijke hulpbronnen te beëindigen. Dit zijn in de eerste
plaats sanctieregimes die door de VN Veiligheidsraad zijn ingesteld om de
handel in conflictgoederen te bestrijden. De vraag die centraal stond is welke
benadering de Veiligheidsraad kiest om de rol van natuurlijke hulpbronnen
in het voortduren en aanwakkeren van conflicten tegen te gaan. Daarnaast
bespreekt dit deel enkele informele politieke mechanismen die speciaal zijn
ingesteld om de handel in conflictgoederen te bestrijden en/of het beheer van
natuurlijke hulpbronnen in een land te verbeteren. Welke standaarden ontwik-
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kelen deze mechanismen voor het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen in
conflictgebieden en vormen dit soort informele politieke mechanismen een
geloofwaardig alternatief voor formele juridische mechanismen?
Hoofdstuk 7 heeft verschillende sanctieregimes besproken die de VN
Veiligheidsraad heeft ingesteld om gewapende conflicten gerelateerd aan
natuurlijke hulpbronnen tot een einde te brengen en duurzame vrede te
bereiken. Uit dit hoofdstuk blijkt dat de Veiligheidsraad volop heeft geëxperi-
menteerd met verschillende soorten maatregelen, waaronder selectieve grond-
stoffenembargo’s en bevriezing van tegoeden en reisverboden voor personen
en organisaties die betrokken zijn bij de illegale handel in grondstoffen. Hierbij
heeft de Veiligheidsraad voortdurend geprobeerd middelen te vinden om de
sanctieregimes effectiever te maken, waaronder een certificeringssysteem voor
diamanten, een wederopbouwprogramma voor de overheidsadministratie en
de houtindustrie in Liberia en het aannemen van due diligence richtlijnen voor
mineralen afkomstig uit de Democratische Republiek Congo.
Verder heeft de Veiligheidsraad in verschillende resoluties inhoudelijke
standaarden geformuleerd voor het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen in
conflictgebieden. In relatie tot diamanten, bijvoorbeeld, heeft de Veiligheidsraad
geëist dat een certificeringsregime zou worden ontwikkeld dat effectief, trans-
parant en internationaal verifieerbaar zou zijn en waarover de overheid verant-
woording zou moeten afleggen. Met betrekking tot hout, riep de Veiligheids-
raad staten, internationale organisaties en andere entiteiten op om de nieuwe
regering van Liberia te helpen om verantwoordelijke en duurzame praktijken
in de houtindustrie te bewerkstelligen. Daarnaast heeft de Veiligheidsraad
staten in meer algemene zin opgeroepen om natuurlijke hulpbronnen te
exploiteren met het oog op het stimuleren van ontwikkeling. In het geval van
Liberia ten tijde van het regime van President Charles Taylor, ging de Veilig-
heidsraad zelfs een stap verder. In Resolutie 1408 (2002), riep de Veiligheids-
raad het regime van Taylor op om dringende stappen te nemen om ervoor
te zorgen dat opbrengsten uit de houtindustrie zouden worden gebruikt voor
legitieme sociale, humanitaire en ontwikkelingsdoeleinden.
Ondanks de belangrijke bijdrage die sanctieregimes hebben geleverd aan
het oplossen van conflicten, is ook naar voren gekomen dat er beperkingen
zijn verbonden aan dit type maatregelen. Naast inherente beperkingen, blijkt
ook dat de Veiligheidsraad niet in alle omstandigheden bereid is sanctieregimes
in te stellen. De Veiligheidsraad heeft zijn bevoegdheden primair gebruikt om
één specifieke vorm van een bedreiging van de vrede en veiligheid aan te
pakken. De meeste sanctieregimes hebben tot doel de nationale overheid te
helpen om haar autoriteit te herstellen over natuurlijke hulpbronnen die ten
prooi zijn gevallen aan subversieve entiteiten. Slechts in enkele gevallen heeft
de Veiligheidsraad zijn bevoegdheden gebruikt om een overheid te raken, maar
de meeste van die sanctieregimes waren niet direct gerelateerd aan een ge-
wapend conflict waarin natuurlijke hulpbronnen een belangrijke rol speelden.
Hieruit kan worden geconcludeerd dat de Veiligheidsraad er de voorkeur aan
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geeft het beginsel van permanente soevereiniteit over natuurlijke hulpbronnen
te respecteren, zelfs wanneer het duidelijk is dat een overheid zijn verplichtin-
gen onder internationaal recht schendt.
Parallel aan de sanctieregimes ingesteld door de Veiligheidsraad, zijn de
afgelopen jaren diverse informele politieke mechanismen tot stand gekomen
die tot doel hebben de handel in conflictgoederen aan te pakken en/of het
beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen in landen te verbeteren. Deze vrijwillige
initiatieven zijn ontwikkeld door partnerschappen tussen staten, non-gouverne-
mentele organisaties en het bedrijfsleven. Diverse van die initiatieven zijn door
de Veiligheidsraad aangemerkt als belangrijke mechanismen om gewapende
conflicten gerelateerd aan natuurlijke hulpbronnen aan te pakken.
Hoofdstuk 8 van dit proefschrift heeft een drietal van dergelijke initiatieven
onderzocht. Dit zijn het Kimberley Proces voor de handel in conflictdiamanten
als een voorbeeld van een certificeringsmechanisme dat de handel in conflict-
goederen bestrijdt; het Extractive Industries Transparancy Initiative (EITI) als
een voorbeeld van een mechanisme dat transparantie en verantwoording
stimuleert met betrekking tot het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen door
overheden; en de OESO due diligence richtlijnen voor verantwoord ketenbeheer
van grondstoffen uit conflict- en risicogebieden als een voorbeeld van een
mechanisme dat de verantwoordelijkheid van bedrijven bij het winnen van
grondstoffen tracht te verbeteren.
De belangrijkste bijdrage van deze initiatieven aan het oplossen van grond-
stofgerelateerde conflicten is gelegen in hun standaardiseringfunctie. De
initiatieven ontwikkelen standaarden die tot doel hebben transparantie in het
beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen te verbeteren, overheden te stimuleren
verantwoording af te leggen voor het door hen gevoerde beleid ten aanzien
van grondstoffen en de sociale verantwoordelijkheid van bedrijven vorm te
geven.
Een vraag die kan worden gesteld is waarom de initiatieven slechts vrijwil-
lige afspraken formuleren in plaats van juridisch bindende verplichtingen.
De reden voor deze keuze kan niet zonder meer worden gevonden in de
participatie van entiteiten zonder verdragsluitende bevoegdheid in de initiatie-
ven. De initiatieven zijn misschien wel ontwikkeld door partnerschappen
waarbij non-gouvernementele organisaties en bedrijven zijn betrokken, maar
uiteindelijk is daarvan weinig merkbaar in de uitvoering. De reden voor de
vrijwillige afspraken waarop de initiatieven zijn gebaseerd moet derhalve
worden gevonden in andere factoren, zoals tijdswinst bij het opstellen van
de regels en flexibiliteit van de herzieningsprocedures, die ervoor zorgen dat
de initiatieven snel kunnen worden aangepast aan de omstandigheden.
Ondanks hun vrijwillige basis, hebben de initiatieven wel resultaten opge-
leverd. Het Kimberley Proces heeft de smokkel in diamanten uit conflictgebie-
den grotendeels tot een halt weten te roepen. Daarnaast gaan steeds meer
voormalige conflictlanden ertoe over om de EITI-standaarden te implementeren.
Tot slot blijkt uit een project van de OESO in het Afrikaanse Grote Merengebied
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dat bedrijven langzamerhand het belang van due diligence beginnen in te zien.
Deze resultaten kunnen slechts ten dele direct aan de initiatieven worden
toegeschreven. Uit de praktijk blijkt dat het succes van dit soort vrijwillige
initiatieven afhangt van een vijftal factoren: 1) de bereidheid van de betrokken
actoren om de afspraken na te komen; 2) de betrokkenheid van alle relevante
actoren; 3) de aanwezigheid van een effectief systeem om te monitoren of de
afspraken daadwerkelijk worden nagekomen; 4) de aanwezigheid van effectieve
nationale wetgeving om de afspraken te implementeren; 5) steun van buitenaf.
Dit deel van het proefschrift heeft geconcludeerd dat de sanctieregimes
ingesteld door de Veiligheidsraad en de vrijwillige initiatieven een significante
bijdrage hebben geleverd aan het aanpakken van de meest acute problemen
gerelateerd aan de rol van natuurlijke hulpbronnen in gewapende conflicten.
Daarnaast is het echter noodzakelijk om op zoek te gaan naar meer structurele
oplossingen om te voorkomen dat natuurlijke hulpbronnen gewapende conflic-
ten in stand houden of zelfs aanwakkeren. Effectiviteit, transparantie en
verantwoordingsstructuren zijn belangrijke onderdelen van strategieën gericht
op conflictbeëindiging. Er is echter meer voor nodig om ervoor te zorgen dat
natuurlijke hulpbronnen op een verantwoordelijke wijze worden beheerd, zodat
nieuwe conflicten worden voorkomen. Specifiek van belang is om publieke
participatie en duurzaamheid rechtstreeks te integreren in strategieën gericht
op conflictbeëindiging en wederopbouw. Als aan deze aspecten in een vroeg
stadium aandacht wordt gegeven, dan verhoogt dit de kans op een blijvende
vrede aanzienlijk.
Conclusie
Dit proefschrift heeft onderzocht welke bijdrage het internationaal recht kan
leveren aan het beëindigen van bestaande gewapende conflicten en het voor-
komen van nieuwe conflicten die gerelateerd zijn aan natuurlijke hulpbronnen.
Een belangrijke bijdrage van het internationaal recht bestaat uit het stellen
van regels voor het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen voor nationale over-
heden, zowel in vredestijd als ten tijde van gewapend conflict. Daarnaast bevat
het internationaal recht regels voor partijen tijdens een gewapend conflict ten
aanzien van het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Al met al kan worden
gesteld dat het internationaal recht de uitdagingen die voortkomen uit ge-
wapende conflicten gerelateerd aan natuurlijke hulpbronnen redelijk aan kan.
Het internationaal recht stelt niet alleen inhoudelijke regels, maar biedt ook
het kader voor de Veiligheidsraad om actie te ondernemen in concrete gevallen.
Daarbij vormen politieke mechanismen, zoals het Kimberley Proces, EITI en
de OESO-richtlijnen, een waardevolle aanvulling op het internationaalrechtelijke
kader.
Desondanks heeft dit proefschrift ook enkele mankementen gesignaleerd.
Dit geldt met name het gebrek aan regelgeving met betrekking tot de bescher-
ming van het milieu tijdens gewapend conflict en de te restrictieve regels die
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gelden voor gewapende groeperingen met betrekking tot het gebruik van
natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Beide onderwerpen verdienen meer aandacht, met
name met het oog op wederopbouw na een gewapend conflict. Het is lastig
om structurele vrede en duurzame ontwikkeling na een conflict te bewerkstelli-
gen als de natuur ernstig is aangetast door roofbouw, met als doel zoveel
mogelijk natuurlijke hulpbronnen te bemachtigen. In sommige gevallen kan
het daarom beter zijn om een praktijk te reguleren dan om deze compleet te
verbieden. Dit is de reden waarom dit proefschrift ervoor pleit om regels te
stellen voor het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen door gewapende groepe-
ringen, in ieder geval wanneer zij een deel van het grondgebied onder hun
controle hebben.
Tot slot is het van groot belang om staten die een gewapend conflict hebben
doorgemaakt te helpen bij het opbouwen van instituties met betrekking tot
het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. De Veiligheidsraad, met zijn brede
en zware bevoegdheden, zou zijn rol op dit vlak moeten uitbreiden, al is het
maar om het werk van andere verbanden, zoals het Kimberley Proces, EITI,
de OESO, regionale organisaties en de VN Vredesopbouwcommissie, een steuntje
in de rug te geven. Daarbij is het van belang dat voldoende aandacht wordt
besteed aan de basisvoorwaarden van een goed beheer van natuurlijke
hulpbronnen. Naast effectiviteit, transparantie en het afleggen van verantwoor-
ding over gevoerd beleid zijn dit publieke participatie in besluitvormingsproce-
dures en duurzaamheid. Het is alleen op deze manier dat natuurlijke hulpbron-
nen kunnen veranderen van motoren voor conflict in motoren voor ontwikke-
ling.
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1. SURVEY OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE IN RELATION TO NATURAL RESOURCES
RESOLUTIONS
Situations Principal resolutions and overview of relevant decisions
General Resolution 1459 (2003): expresses its support for the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme
Angola Resolution 864 (1993): installs an arms embargo and an embargo on the
export of petroleum to Angola
Resolution 1127 (1997): installs travel and aviation sanctions
Resolution 1173 (1998): installs an import ban on diamonds that are not
controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the Angolan
government
Resolution 1176 (1998): brings into effect the diamond sanctions
Resolution 1237 (1999): establishes the Fowler Commission
Resolution 1295 (2000): welcomes steps in the direction of devising a
more comprehensive system of controls in relation to diamonds
Resolution 1448 (2002): terminates the sanctions regime
Cambodia Resolution 668 (1990): endorses the framework for a comprehensive
political settlement of the conflict
Resolution 792 (1992): expresses support for the national moratorium on
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Côte
d’Ivoire
Resolution 1572 (2004): installs an arms embargo, travel ban and assets
freeze and establishes the Sanctions Committee
Resolution 1584 (2005): establishes the Group of Experts
Resolution 1643 (2005): installs diamond sanctions
Resolution 1727 (2006): requests the Kimberley Process to communicate
information about the production and illicit export of diamonds
Resolution 1782 (2007): renews the sanctions until 31 October 2008 and
decides to review the sanctions in light of progress achieved in the
implementation of the peace process
Resolution 1842 (2008): renews the sanctions until 31 October 2009 and
decides to review the sanctions in light of progress achieved in the
implementation of the peace process
Resolution 1893 (2009): renews the sanctions until 31 October 2010 and
introduces an exemption for diamonds that will be used solely for
scientific research and analysis coordinated by the Kimberley Process
Resolution 1946 (2010): renews the sanctions
Resolution 1980 (2011): renews the diamond sanctions and conditions the
lifting of the diamond sanctions on cooperation with the Kimberley
Process
Resolution 2045 (2012): renews the diamond sanctions and urges the
authorities to adopt an action plan for the implementation of the
Kimberley Process
Resolution 2101 (2013): renews the sanctions until 30 April 2014; reiterates
the conditions set out in Resolution 2045; and encourages the authorities
to participate in an OECD-hosted programme with regard to the
implementation of the Due Diligence Guidance
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DR Congo Resolution 1291 (2000): expresses its serious concern at reports of illegal
exploitation of natural resources in the DR Congo
Resolution 1355 (2001): expresses its concern over the findings of the
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Resolution 1457 (2003): strongly condemns the illegal exploitation of the
natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and demands that all States concerned
take immediate steps to end these illegal activities
Resolution 1493 (2003): installs an arms embargo and expresses its
intention to consider means to end the illegal exploitation of natural
resources
Resolution 1533 (2004): establishes a Sanctions Committee and Group of
Experts
Resolution 1596 (2005): amends and expands the arms embargo; imposes
targeted travel and financial measures on particular leaders of armed
groups; demands neighbouring States to impede the flow of illegal
natural resources through their territories
Resolution 1698 (2006): requests the Group of Experts and the Secretary-
General reports relating to the illegal exploitation of natural resources
and expresses its intention to consider measures with respect to natural
resources
Resolution 1857 (2008): extends the travel ban and asset freeze to
individuals providing support to armed groups through the illicit trade of
natural resources
Resolution 1896 (2009): mandates the Group of Experts to produce
recommendations to the Committee for guidelines for the exercise of due
diligence by the importers, processing industries and consumers of
mineral products regarding the purchase, sourcing, acquisition and
processing of mineral products from the DRC.
Resolution 1925 (2010): includes natural resources related tasks in
MONUSCO's mandate
Resolution 1952 (2010): supports taking forward the Group of Experts'
recommendations on guidelines for due diligence; calls upon all States to
take appropriate steps to raise awareness of the due diligence guidelines
and to urge importers, processing
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Iraq Resolution 661 (1990): installs a comprehensive import and export
embargo and an asset freeze; introduces humanitarian exemptions
Resolution 687 (1991): affirms that Iraq is liable under international law
for the depletion of natural resources in Kuwait; decides to create a
compensation fund to pay for the damage inflicted by Iraq; broadens the
exemptions to the export embargo to cover foodstuffs notified pursuant
to the ‘no-objections procedure’
Resolution 986 (1995): establishes the ‘Oil-for-Food programme’
Resolution 1409 (2002): revises the ‘Oil-for-Food programme’ through the
introduction of a Goods Review List
Resolution 1483 (2003): terminates the ‘Oil-for-Food programme’; notes
the establishment of a Development Fund for Iraq; and underlines that
the Development Fund shall be used in a transparent manner to meet the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction
and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq,
and for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes
benefiting the people of Iraq
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Liberia Resolution 788 (1992): installs an arms embargo
Resolution 1343 (2001): establishes a Sanctions Committee and a Panel of
Experts; renews the arms embargo and installs diamond sanctions;
demands the government of Liberia to cease import of Sierra Leone
rough diamonds which are not controlled through the Sierra Leonean
Certificate of Origin regime; and calls upon the government to establish
an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in rough diamonds that
is transparent and internationally verifiable
Resolution 1408 (2002): calls upon the government to take urgent steps to
ensure that revenue from the timber industry is used for legitimate social,
humanitarian and development purposes
Resolution 1478 (2003): installs a timber embargo; reiterates its call upon
the government to establish a Certificate of Origin regime for Liberian
rough diamonds; rrefers to the Kimberley Process; proposes to exempt
from the embargo rough diamonds controlled by a transparent and
internationally verifiable Certificate of Origin regime
Resolution 1521 (2003): terminates the previous sanctions regime; installs
sanctions on diamonds and timber products from Liberia; encourages the
government to join the Kimberley Process; encourages the government to
establish oversight mechanisms for the timber industry that will promote
responsible business practices, and to establish transparent accounting
and auditing mechanisms
Resolution 1579 (2004): encourages the government to implement the
Liberia Forest Initiative and the necessary reforms in the Forest
Development Authority in order to meet the conditions for the lifting of
the timber sanctions
Resolution 1647 (2004): encourages the Liberian government to implement
the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program as a
means to expedite the lifting of the sanctions
Resolution 1689 (2006): lifts the timber sanctions
Resolution 1753 (2007): lifts the diamond sanctions
Resolution 1854 (2008): supports the decision of Liberia to take part in
EITI
Libya Resolution 1970 (2011): installs an arms embargo, a travel ban and an
asset freeze, targeting Qhadafi’s family members
Resolution 1973 (2011): extends the asset freeze to all entities under the
control of Libyan authorities, including the Libyan National Oil
Corporation
Resolution 2009 (2011): terminates the asset freeze in relation to the
National Oil Corporation
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Leone
Resolution 1132 (1997): installs a travel ban, an arms embargo and a
petroleum embargo; establishes a Sanctions Committee
Resolution 1306 (2000): installs an import ban on diamonds, exempting
from the measures diamonds controlled by an effective Certificate of
Origin regime; calls for an exploratory hearing to assess the role of
diamonds in the Sierra Leonean conflict and the link between diamonds
and the violation of the arms embargo
Resolution 1385 (2001): renews the diamond embargo
Resolution 1446 (2002): renews the diamond embargo
Southern
Rhodesia
Resolution 217 (1965): calls upon all States to break all economic relations
with Southern Rhodesia
Resolution 232 (1966): installs sanctions, including an import embargo on
several commodities
Resolution 253 (1968): extends the sanctions to all products and
commodities originating from or destined to Southern Rhodesia,
exempting humanitarian goods
Resolution 460 (1979): lifts the sanctions
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with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1842 (2008), UN Doc. S/2009/188.
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Libya
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